ANDRES BORROMEO, PLAINTIFF, VS. FERMIN MARIANO, DEFENDANT.

Quo warranto proceedings have been
instituted in this court to determine the right of the plaintiff and of
the defendant to the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance of
the Twenty-fourth Judicial District.

The only facts, and these are undisputed ones, which need be
noticed, are the following: Andres Borromeo was appointed and
commissioned as Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District, effective
July 1, 1914. He duly qualified and took possession of the office on
that date. On February, 25, 1920, he was appointed Judge of the
Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge
of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has since the
latter date consistently refused to accept appointment to the
Twenty-first Judicial District.

Judges of First Instance are appointed by the Governor-General with
the consent of the Philippine Senate to serve until they reach the age
of 65 years. (Adm. Code, sees. 65, 66, 148.) One Judge of First
Instance is commissioned for each judicial district, except the ninth.
(Sec. 154.) The oath of office of the judge is “filed with the clerk of
the court to which the affiant pertains and shall be entered upon its
records.” (Sec. 128.) Judges of First Instance may only be detailed by
the Secretary of Justice to temporary duly in a district other than
their own for the purpose of trying land registration cases and for
vacation duty. (Sec. 155.) The concluding portion of section 155 of the
Administrative Code, to which particular attention is addressed by the
Attorney-General, is, “but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent
a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to be
judge of another district.” A Judge of First Instance can be removed
from office by the Governor-General only if in the judgment of the
Supreme Court sufficient cause shall exist involving serious misconduct
or inefficiency in office. (Sec. 173.)

The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires the court to
give effect to the general legislative intent if that can be discovered
within the four corners of the Act. When the object intended to be
accomplished by the statute is once clearly ascertained, general words
may be restrained to it and those of narrower import may be expanded to
embrace it, to effectuate the intent. Along with this fundamental
principle is another, equally well-established, that such a
construction is, if possible, to be adopted, as will give effect to all
provisions of the statute. (2 Lewis’ Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, pp. 662, et seq.; In re Allen [1903], 2 Phil., 630; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 287.)

Leaving out of consideration for the moment the last part of
section 155 of the Administrative Code, the provisions of the Judiciary
Law are plain and unambiguous. Judges of First Instance are appointed
judges of the courts of first instance of the respective judicial
districts of the Philippine Islands. They are not appointed judges of
first instance of the Philippine Islands. They hold these positions of
judges of first instance of definite districts until they resign,
retire, or are removed through impeachment proceedings. The intention
of the law is to recognize separate and distinct judicial offices.

The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code,
although not beginning with the usual introductory word, “provided,” is
nevertheless, in the nature of a proviso, and should be construed as
such. The office of a proviso is to limit the application of the law.
It is contrary to the nature of a proviso to enlarge the operation of
the law. It should not be construed so as to repeal or destroy the main
provisions of the statute. A proviso which re directly repugnant to the
purview or body of an Act is inoperative and void. (See generally, 25 R. C. L., pp. 984, et seq.; and specifically, the leading cases of McKnight vs. Hodge [1909], 55 Wash., 289, 104 Pac, 504, 40 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1207; McCormick vs. West Duluth [1891], 47 Minn., 272, 50 N. W., 128; Idaho Power & Light Co. vs.
Blomquist [1916], 26 Idaho, 222; 141 Pac., 1083, Ann. Cas. [1916 E], p.
282, where these principles concerning provisos are applied.)

To arrive at a correct decision with reference to the proviso
before us, let it first be recalled that the law is emphatic in its
specification that, save when judges of first instance are detailed to
try land registration cases or when assigned to vacation duty, “no
judge of first instance shall be required to do duty in any other
district than that for which he is commissioned.” The keyword to the
proviso which follows is “appointed.” This word should here be given
its usual signification. Many of the decisions follow the definition of
“appoint” found in the Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia. “Appoint”
is there defined as “to allot, set apart, or designate; nominate or
authoritatively assign, as for a use, or to a position or office.” All
the authorities unite in saying that the term “appoint” is well-known
in law and whether regarded in its legal or in its ordinary
acceptation, is applied to the nomination or designation of an
individual. Appointment signifies no more than selection for public
office. (4 C. J., 1402, 1404, citing numerous decisions.)

The effect to be given to the word “appoint” is corroborated by the
principles of the law of public officers. Appointment and qualification
to office are separate and distinct things. Appointment is the sole act
of those vested with the power to make it. Acceptance is the sole act
of the appointee. Persons may be chosen for office at pleasure; there
is no power in these Islands which can compel a man to accept the
office. (22 R. C. L., 423.) If, therefore, anyone could refuse
appointment as a judge of first instance to a particular district, when
once appointment to this district is accepted, he has exactly the same
right to refuse an appointment to another district. No other person
could be placed in the position of this Judge of First Instance since
another rule of public officers is, that an appointment may not be made
to an office which is not vacant. (29 Cyc, 1873.) In our judgment, the
language of the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code,
interpreted with reference to the law of public officers, does not
empower the Governor-General to force upon the judge of one district an
appointment to another district against his will, thereby removing him
from his district.

Returning again to the principle of
statutory construction that a proviso should not be given a meaning
which would tend to render abortive the main portions of the law, it
should further be recalled that judges of first instance are removable
only through a fixed procedure. Moreover, impeachment proceedings, as
conducted by the Supreme Court, may be in the nature of jurisdiction,
conferred upon the Supreme Court by ratification of the Congress of the
United States, which, it has uniformly been held, cannot be diminished.
(We make no ruling on this point because unnecessary for the resolution
of the case.) But, certainly, if a judge could be transferred from one
district of the Philippine Islands to another, without his consent, it
would require no great amount of imagination to conceive how this power
could be used to discipline the judge or as an indirect means of
removal. A judge who had, by a decision, incurred the ill-will of an
attorney or official, could, by the insistence of the disgruntled
party, be removed from one district, demoted, and transferred to
another district, at possibly a loss of salary, all without the consent
of the judicial officer. The only recourse of the judicial officer who
should desire to maintain his self-respect, would be to vacate the
office and leave the service. Unless we wish to nullify the impeachment
section of the Administrative Code, and thus possibly to encroach upon
the jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Organic Law,
section 155 must be interpreted so as to make it consistent therewith.

What we have said is reenforced by the authorities most directly in point. In the early decision of Marbury vs.
Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch, 137), the Supreme Court of the United
States, in unmistakable terms, explained the powers of the Judiciary in
enforcing the Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Land and held that
the President of the United States had no power to remove a justice of
the peace of the District of Columbia from office. Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall said that “When the officer is not removable at the will of
the executive, the appointment is not revocable, and cannot be
annulled: it has conferred legal rights which cannot be resumed. The
discretion of the executive is to be exercised, until the appointment
has been made. But having once made the appointment, his power over the
office is terminated, in all cases where, by law, the officer is not
removable by him. The right to the office is then in the person
appointed, and he has the absolute unconditional power of accepting or
rejecting it.” The great jurist further on observed that “It is,
emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say
what the law is.”

In State of Louisiana vs. Dowries ([1869], 21 La. Ann.,
490), the Supreme Court of Louisiana said that a judge of a court
could, under the Constitution of that State, only be removed from
office by impeachment, by address of the Legislature, or by proceedings
under the intrusion act. It was held that the appointment and
commissioning by the Governor of the State of a party to an office
which has legally been filled, without the vacancy being first declared
according to law, was an absolute nullity.

The Attorney-General brings to our notice an obsolete law which had
escaped us, and which, if any lingering doubts exist, would serve to
remove them. This law is Act No. 396, enacted by the Philippine
Commission in 1902. Section 4 thereof, separate and distinct from the
other provisions of the Act, and not tacked on as a proviso, provided
that “any judge of a Court of First Instance * * * may be transferred
from one judicial district to another by order of the Civil Governor,
with the advice and consent of the Commission. Any judge so transferred
shall, upon such transfer, cease the performance of judicial duties in
the district to which he was originally appointed, and shall be the
regular judge thereafter in the judicial district to which he has been
so assigned.” But.Act No. 396 was thrice repealed by the Philippine
Legislature; the first time, impliedly by the enactment of Act No.
2347, the Judiciary Reorganization Act, and subsequently, expressly by
the Administrative Code of 1916 and the Administrative Code of 1917.
Instead, also, of continuing the phraseology of section 4 of Act No.
396, the Legislature merely included the proviso to which we have
alluded. It cannot, therefore, admit of doubt that the members of the
Philippine Legislature had before them the Act of the Philippine
Commission and preferred, not to perpetuate the old law, but to insert
language of their own. The purpose of the Philippine Legislature was
clearly to safeguard the interests of the judiciary, and this laudable
purpose, it is for us now to effectuate.

Far more convincing than precedent or argument are great and basic
principles long inherent in popular government intended to create an
independent judiciary. A history of the struggle for a fearless and an
incorruptible judiciary prepared to follow the law and to administer it
regardless of consequences, can be perused with ever-recurring benefit.
Since the early days of the Republic, the judicial system in the United
States, with certain exceptions which only served to demonstrate more
fully the excellence of the whole, has been viewed with pride, and
confidently relied upon for justice by the American people. The
American people considered it necessary “that there should be a
judiciary endowed with substantial and independent powers and secure
against all corrupting or perverting influences; secure, also, against
the arbitrary authority of the administrative heads of the government.”
(Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States, pp.
17, 142.) It was such a conception of an independent judiciary which
was instituted in the Philippines by the American administration and
which has since served as one of the chief glories of the government
and one of the most priceless heritages of the Filipino people.

The Attorney-General in the argument in support of his motion for
reconsideration, quotes the last preceding sentence and says that he
dissents therefrom. The number of authoritative replies to the
proposition advanced by the law officer of the government relative to
the intention to establish an independent judiciary in these Islands,
is limited only by space in which to quote them. Possibly we can do no
better than to make our own the language of Mr. Justice Trent, speaking
for a unanimous court, in Severino vs. Governor-General and
Provincial Board of Occidental Negros ([1910], 16 Phil., 366, 384),
when he said: “This government, being modelled after the Federal and
State governments in the United States, now possesses a complete
governmental organization, with executive, legislative, and judicial
departments, which are exercising functions as independent of each
other as the Federal or State governments.” (For the legislative
version of the same idea, see Administrative Code, sec. 17.)

On occasion, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has
applied the accepted theory of the division of powers, termed by the
United States Supreme Court as “one of the chief merits of the American
system of written constitutional law” (Kilbourn vs. Thompson
[1881], 13 Otto, 168), and has unhesitatingly refused to interfere with
the official acts of the Governor-General or to intrude on the rights
and privileges of the Philippine Legislature. (In re Patterson [1902], 1 Phil., 93; Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, supra} In re McCulloch Dick [1918], 38 Phil., 41; U. S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7; U. S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1; Veloso vs.
Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886.) As an
instance of this class of decisions, in Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers
of Leyte and Samar, supra, this court, in considering the
right of the Philippine Senate to be the judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of its elective members, said:

“The grant of power to the Philippine Senate and
the Philippine House of Representatives, respectively is full, clear,
and complete. * * * The judiciary, with its traditional and careful
regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege
of the legislature to remain where the sovereign authority has placed
it. Since, therefore, the Philippine Senate is made the sole judge of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of its elective members,
this tribunal neither can, nor ought, to take jurisdiction of the case.”

Although much more reluctantly, and also much more infrequently we
are happy to add, the court has had to defend the judiciary against
legislative and executive encroachment. (Ocampo vs. Cabangis [1910], 15 Phil., 626; In re Guarina [1914], 24 Phil., 37; Barrameda vs. Moir [1913], 25 Phil., 44; and Province of Tarlac vs. Gale [1913], 26 Phil., 338.) As an instance of the latter class of decisions, in Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, supra, Mr. Justice Moreland, speaking for the court, said:

“The judiciary is one of the coordinate branches of the Government. (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil., 534; United States vs.
Bull, 15 Phil., 7.) Its preservation in its integrity and effectiveness
is necessary to the present form of Government * * * It is clear * * *
that each department is bound to preserve its own existence if it live
up to the duty imposed upon it as one of the coordinate branches of the
government. Whatever a person or entity ought to do or must do in law,
it has the power to do. This being true, the judiciary has the power to
maintain its existence; and whatever is reasonably necessary to that
end, courts may do or order done. But the right to live, if that is all
there is of it, is a very small matter. The mere right to breathe does
not satisfy ambition or produce results. Thefefore, courts have not
only the power to maintain their life, but they have also the power to
make that existence effective for the purpose for which the judiciary
was created. They can, by .appropriate means, do all things necessary
to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an
effective institution of Government. Courts have, therefore, inherent
power to preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity and to insure
effectiveness in the administration of justice. This is clear; for, if
the judiciary may be deprived of any one of its essential attributes,
or if any one of them may be seriously weakened by the act of any
person or official, then independence disappears and subordination
begins. The power to interfere is the power to control, and the power
to control is the power to abrogate. The sovereign power has given life
to the judiciary and nothing less than the sovereign power can take it
away or render it useless. The power to withhold from the courts
anything really essential for the administration of justice is the
power to control and ultimately to destroy the efficiency of the
judiciary. Courts cannot, under their duty to their creator, the
sovereign power, permit themselves to be subordinated to any person or
official to which their creator did not itself subordinate them.”

A stirring plea has been made by the learned representative of the
Government for a decision which will work for the public welfare. We
agree that, under the peculiar conditions existing in the Philippines,
it is sometimes well for a judge not to remain indefinitely in a
particular district. But it is a far cry from this premise to the use
of a method not sanctioned by existing law and savoring of military
discipline. Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who
have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in
accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the
office undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and
self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate
to the other two departments of governments We are pleased to think of
judges as of the type of the erudite Coke who, three centuries ago, was
removed from office because when asked “if in the future he would delay
a case at the King’s order,” replied: “I will do what becomes me as a
judge.”

For the reasons given, we are of opinion that the reasonable force
of the language used in the proviso to section 155 of the
Administrative Code taken in connection with the whole of the Judiciary
Law, and the accepted canons of interpretation, and the principles of
the law of public officers, leave room for no other construction than
that a Judge of First Instance may be made a judge of another district
only with his consent.

It is our holding that the plaintiff Andres Borromeo is lawfully
entitled to the possession of the office of Judge of the Court of First
Instance of the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District. It is our judgment
that the defendant Fermin Mariano shall be ousted from the office of
Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District, and the plaintiff placed
in possession of the same. The motion for reconsideration filed by the
Attorney-General is denied. No costs shall be allowed. Let this be
entered as the order of the court. So ordered.

Araullo, Street, and Avancena, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., signed the original decision, but was not present when
the motion for reconsideration was filed and when this decision was
promulgated.

---

VILLAMOR, J.,

I dissent. The interpretation, which the majority give to the last
clause of section 155 of the Administrative Code, in the sense that it
requires the consent of a judge of the Court of First Instance in order
that he may be transferred from one judicial district to another, is an
amendment of the law, an act which should be done only by the
legislative branch of the government. I am not unaware of the
possibility that the power of the Governor-General to effect such
transfers of Judges of First Instance with the consent of the Senate
may produce as a result the resignation of the judge thus transferred
if he does not accept the transfer. However, this fact should be
referred to the legislature in order that it may amend the law if it
sees fit to do so. The provisions of the law being clear, the court
should apply it in the manner and form in which it has been passed by
the legislature, without attempting to attach thereto a condition, as
that of the consent of the judge transferred, which the legislature did
not see fit to require.

It is pretended that the appointment to a specific position in the
Government requires, among other elements, the acceptance thereof,
without which it would not produce any effect. However, with reference
to the transfer of judges a new appointment is made only to distinguish
a permanent transfer from a temporary assignment to sit in another
district, which is forbidden by law, except for the purposes of land
registration cases; and a new oath is taken only to attest the fact
that the transfer has been effected and that the transferred judge has
taken possession of the office in the new district for the purposes of
jurisdiction. But, in reality, in this case there is no new employee,
there is not a different office. The transferred judge continues being
a judge as much as before his transfer, holds the same office with all
the attributes and powers thereto annexed, and enjoys the same
privileges, with the sole difference as to the place in which
jurisdiction is exercised. In this case, according to the law, the
prior consent of the judge is not necessary in order that he may be
transferred to another district, for the good of the public service,
which is the basis of the power to make such transfers, is over and
above the personal interests of every citizen.

It is also
contended that the last clause of section 155 is a danger to the
independence of the judiciary. But if this legal provision is
considered in relation to section 5 of the Administrative Code, which
presumes that administrative discretion is exercised for the good of
the service and the benefit of the public; and if it is furthermore
considered that the executive power to effect transfers of judges is
subject to the approval of a restraining body, that is, the Senate, it
seems, in my opinion, that this legal provision is a prudent measure
tending to protect the interest of good public service.

According to law, the Governor-General has the discretion to make
transfers of judges from one district to another, with the consent of
the Senate. Therefore, to the Governor-General and to the Senate, and
not to the judges, is the power granted to determine how such
discretion should be exercised. In the case at bar there is not even a
single allegation that such discretion has been abused in disregard of
the law, and therefore, there is no way by which this court may
disapprove the transfer of the petitioner decided to be effected by the
Governor-General in the exercise of the discretionary powers conferred
upon him by law.

If the consent of a judge is an essential requisite to his transfer
to another district, it must also be an essential requisite to his
assignment to sit in another district to try land registration cases or
as vacation judge, for in both cases, the same reason exists, that is,
the danger to the independence of the judiciary, which is the
foundation of the majority opinion. The result would be the complete
repeal of section 155 of the Administrative Code through the
interpretation given by this court. And an interpretation leading to
such result should be discarded for it is contrary to the doctrines of
statutory construction cited in the majority opinion, to wit: That the
court should give effect to the general intention of the legislator, if
it may be gathered from all the viewpoints from which the law is
examined; and that, if possible, that construction should be adopted
which gives effect to all the provisions of the law (2 Lewis’
Sutherland, Statutpry Construction, page 662 et seq.; In re Allen [1903], 2 Phil., 630; sec. 207 of the Administrative Code).

But what is the intention of the legislator in the legal provision
now under consideration? The provisions of the law are clear and it is
not necessary either to stretch the imagination or resort to other
jurisdictions/to discover the intention of the legislator. Section 155
^of the Administrative Code provides:

“For the purpose of trying land registration cases
only, a judge of first instance may, if the public interests so
require, be detailed by the Department Head to temporary duty in a
district other than his own. Save when so detailed or when assigned to
vacation duty, no judge of first instance shall be required to do duty
in any other, district than that for which he is commissioned; but
nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a judge of first instance
of one district from being appointed to be judge of another district.”

It is admitted by the authorities on the subject that the object of
a saving clause or proviso is (1) to except something from the legal
provision in question, or (2) to restrict the provisions thereof, or
(3) to exclude all possible reason for erroneously construing such
provision so as to make it applicable to cases which the legislature
did not intend to include therein.

In whatever sense the proviso in question is interpreted, there is
no reason for requiring the consent of the judge for a temporary or
permanent transfer to another district. The intention of the
legislature, as gathered from the provisions of the law, is that no
judge shall be required to render services in another district, except
to try land registration cases or to act as vacation judge, but without
prejudice to his being appointed by the Governor-General as judge of
another district.

That discharge is a different thing from transfer is a self-evident
proposition requiring no proof. That a Judge appointed to another
district may refuse to accept his transfer is not disputed by anyone.
But if he leaves the office by abandonment or resignation, such result
is not a necessary effect of the transfer but of his free will.

The majority decision tries to solve the proposition that if the
remedy prayed for is not granted judges would lose their judicial
independence. But we should remember, in this connection what Judge
Cooley, one of the most eminent American jurists, in resolving the
proposition that if it should be held that the Governor cannot be
compelled to fulfill purely ministerial duties, those in possession of
legal rights would, in many cases, be without remedy, said in the case
of Sutherland vs. Governor (29 Mich., 320), to wit:

“Practically, there are a great many such cases,
but theoretically, there are none at all. All wrongs, certainly, are
not redressed by the judicial department. A party may be deprived of a
right by a wrong verdict, or an erroneous ruling of a judge, and though
the error may be manifest to all others than those who are to decide
upon his rights, he will be without redress. A person lawfully chosen
to the Legislature may have his seat given by the house to another, and
be thus wronged without remedy. A just claim against the State may be
rejected by the board of auditors, and neither the governor nor the
courts can give relief. A convicted person may conclusively demonstrate
his innocence to the governor, and still be denied a pardon. In which
one of these cases could the denial of redress by the proper tribunal
constitute any ground for interference by any other authority? The law
must leave the final decision upon every claim and every controversy
somewhere, and when that decision has been made, it must be accepted as
correct. The presumption is just as conclusive in favor of executive
action as in favor of judicial.”

A case in which the court discussed the proposition that there can be no wrong whatever without any remedy is that of People vs. Bissell (19 111., 229). In that case the court said:

“It is urged upon us, that in a government of laws
there must be an adequate remedy for every wrong, and that where a
clear right exists, there must be some mode of enforcing that right.
While human society is governed by so imperfect a being as man, this
can be true only in theory. If we are to compel the Governor or the
legislature to right every wrong which may arise from their omissions
of duty, then surely they must, in order to make this Utopian system
perfect, have the power to compel us to do right in every case. May it
not be as well supposed that we will act perversely, and refuse to
perform a duty imposed upon us, to the injury of the citizen, as that
the Governor will do so? In the formation of the government, equal
confidence was rightfully reposed in each department, to which
appropriate and Independent duties were assigned.”

The proceeding instituted in this case is entitled Quo Warranto, a
proceeding for determining the right of a Judge of First Instance to
sit in a determined judicial district. But there can be no doubt that
in this question is involved the power of the Governor-General to
appoint Judges of First Instance. While the petition in this case does
not include the Governor-General as party respondent, nevertheless, the
judgment of this court must in the same manner necessarily affect him
who authorized the appointment now in dispute and the appointee, now
respondent Judge Fermin Mariano. This conclusion is inevitable for the
case deals with the appointment of a judge made by the Governor-General
in the exercise of his discretional powers. Indeed this court cannot
decide this case by granting the prayer of the petitioner without
disapproving the manner in which this power of the Governor-General has
been exercised. Has the court jurisdiction to do this?

Section 26 of the Jones Act provides, among “other things:

“The Judges of the Courts of First Instance shall
be appointed by the Governor-General, by and with the advice and
consent of the Philippine Senate.”

In view of this legal provision and of section 155 of the
Administrative Code, to maintain that a Judge of First Instance may not
be transferred to another district without his consent amounts to
judicially determining that the Governor-General cannot exercise the
power conferred upon him by law to transfer a judge from one district
to another without the consent of the judge concerned.

The question whether courts possess or do not possess jurisdiction
to control the official acts of the Governor has been raised before
many courts of the United States. And this Supreme Court, in the case
of Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of
Occidental Negros (16 Phil., 366, 387, 400, 402), after examining the
various cases in which this question was raised in the United States,
said:

“We think that the weight of authority, based upon
legal principles and sound reasoning, supports the proposition that in
the United States the supreme courts of the States do not have
jurisdiction to control the official acts of the governor. For better
reasons we conclude that this court has no jurisdiction, either by
mandamus or injunction, to control the official acts of the
Governor-General, inasmuch as we have seen that his duties, powers, and
responsibilities are more comprehensive than those conferred upon any
State Governor. When the Philippine legislative body confers upon the
Governor-General powers and duties, it does so for the reason that he
is in a better position to know the needs of the country than any other
member of the executive department, and with the full confidence that
he will perform such duties, under his official oath, as his best
judgment dictates. If this had not been the intention of the
legislature, they could have placed the duty upon some other official
of the executive department. It no doubt is sometimes very necessary
for the Governor-General to perform certain important executive duties
without delay, and should this court attempt to distinguish between
purely ministerial and discretionary duties, conferred upon him by law,
and attempt to determine in each case which are purely ministerial,
which are political, or which are discretionary, the Governor-General,
to that extent would become subservient to the judiciary. To avoid this
is why the three great coordinate departments of the Government were
created and made independent of each other. President McKinley in
creating civil government in this country took into consideration these
fundamental principles of separate and independent departments, which
have been demonstrated to be essential to a republican form of
government, and conferred upon the Governor-General, as the Executive
of the Philippine Islands, the power to execute the laws according to
his best judgment, holding him responsible to the President of the
United States, without interference on the part of the judiciary. In so
doing he reposed in the Executive of this country great confidence,
realizing that he, the Executive, acting independently of the
judiciary, would be in a better position to carry out the great
underlying principles of American institutions for the peace and
happiness of the inhabitants of this country. The President realized
that the final decision of every question in controversy must be left
somewhere, and when such decision has been made it must be accepted as
correct. The presumption is just as conclusive in favor of executive
action, as to its correctness and justness, as it is in favor of
judicial action.”

In another part of this decision this court added:

“Inasmuch as the three coordinated departments of
the Government, the executive, legislative, and judicial, have been
established and are operating, as we have said, as independently of
each other as the same three coordinated branches created under the
constitution of the Federal and State governments are operating in the
American Union, and in view of the fact that there have been conferred
upon the Chief Executive of these Islands more extensive powers,
duties, and responsibilities than have been conferred upon the
governors of the various States of the Union, we think the reason for
the holdings of the courts of the United States, which have passed upon
this question are worthy of consideration. We might here add that we
have no doubt that the present incumbent of the office of
Governor-General, a man who is ready and willing at all times to render
obedience to the law, would follow the mandate of this court, but such
willingness to be governed by the order of this court would not of
itself give us jurisdiction. Nor should he manifest (which he has not
done) his intention to not obey the mandate of this court, this would
not be sufficient reason for us to abstain from requiring him to comply
with such mandate in case we have jurisdiction.”

And in the dispositive part of the decision the court among other things said: “That
we can not and should not entertain a complaint which seeks to control
or interfere with the official duties of the Governor-General.”

In the case of Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield (16 Phil., 534), this court, adhering to the same principle announced in the case of Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, supra, established the following doctrine:

“In a government of separate and independent
departments, executive, legislative, and judicial, with separate and
distinct functions, one department will not attempt to interfere with
the performance of the exclusive duties of another. To permit such an
interference would destroy the independence of the separate departments
and would make one subject to the control of the others. For the
judiciary to interfere, for the purpose of questioning the manner of
exercising the legal and political duties of the chief executive head
of the Government or to control the action of the legislative
department, would, in effect/ destroy the independence of the
departments of the Government and would make all departments subject to
the ultimate control of the judicial. Such a conclusion or condition
was never contemplated by the organizers of the Government.”

In deciding the present petition, ordering that the respondent
judge Fermin Mariano should be ousted from the office of Judge of the
Twenty-fourth District and that possession thereof should be
surrendered to the petitioner Andres Borromeo, has not this court
judicially determined that the appointment of the former to said
district and that of the latter to the twenty-first, both made by the
Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate,
are not well made and are contrary to the immovability of judges and
should therefore be annulled by this court? What does the decision of
the majority mean but that it is a real intrusion in the exercise of
the powers conferred upon the executive and legislative departments of
the Government? And is this not openly contrary to the doctrines
established in the decisions cited of this Supreme Court itself, where
the much-vaunted independence of the executive, legislative, and
judicial departments is proclaimed?

The petition is denied.

The motion for reconsideration should be granted.