G.R. No. L-57392. January 30, 1982
ELISEO A. MATURAN, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE GIBSON A. ARAULA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SOUTHERN LEYTE, BRANCH II, SAN JUAN, SOUTHERN LEYTE; AND MATILDE MONTE…
MAKASIAR, J.:
dated May 26, 1981 of respondent Judge dismissing petitioner’s appeal.
In 1974, herein petitioner as plaintiff filed Civil Case No. R-142
before the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte presided by
respondent Judge against only one defendant, herein private respondent
Matilde Montederamos Vda. de Chung for the recovery of two parcels of
coconut land challenging as fictitious and a forgery the alleged deed of
sale covering said parcels in favor of said private respondent. The
other private respondents herein are the stepchildren of the original
defendant Matilde in said civil case, who were admitted as intervenors.
It appears that Civil Case No. R-142 of the Court of First Instance of
Southern Leyte, was deemed submitted for decision on June 30, 1980.
On November 3, 1980, counsel for herein petitioner, as plaintiff in the
aforesaid case, received a copy of the decision dated September 29, 1980
which was actually sent only on October 24, 1980 by registered mail to
herein petitioner.
On November 11, 1980, herein petitioner as the losing party, filed a duly verified motion for reconsideration (Annex “B”).
At the bottom of said motion for reconsideration was the notice
addressed only to the clerk of court, requesting the latter to “cause
the foregoing motion to be heard by the Court on December 8, 1980
without further oral arguments and the presence of plaintiff and
counsel.” A copy of the said motion for reconsideration was sent by
registered mail to Atty. Joaquin G. Chung Jr., as counsel for the
defendant and intervenors as indicated below the aforesaid notice to the
clerk of court (Annex “B”).
The defendant and intervenors thru counsel filed an opposition dated
January 14, 1981 to the said motion for reconsideration on the ground
that said motion is fatally defective as it was not a notice to the
defendant, private respondent herein, and that a motion was merely pro
forma and therefore did not interrupt the running of the period for
appeal.
In an order dated January 15, 1981, respondent Judge denied the motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit as the grounds raised in the said
motion are “the same grounds raised in the memorandum for the plaintiff x
x x” (Annex “D”).
On January 28, 1981, herein petitioner received a copy of the said order
dated January 15, 1981 denying his motion for reconsideration. On
February 2, 1981, herein petitioner filed his notice of appeal and the
appeal bond.
On February 9, 1981, herein petitioner filed a motion for extension of
forty-five (45) days within which to file his record on appeal, notice
of which was furnished Atty. Joaquin G. Chung Jr., as counsel for the
defendant and intervenors, advising him that the said motion for
extension will be presented for reconsideration by the Court on February
27, 1981 at 9 o’clock in the morning without further oral argument and
without the presence of plaintiff and counsel, as shown at the bottom of
said motion (Annex “E”).
Herein private respondents, as defendant and intervenors in Civil Case
No. R-142, filed a motion to dismiss appeal dated March 2, 1981, setting
the said motion for hearing for March 16, 1981 with due notice to
counsel for herein petitioner (Annex “F”).
Herein petitioner filed his opposition dated March 16, 1981 to said
motion to dismiss appeal, contending that his motion for reconsideration
substantially complied with the requirement of notice thereof to the
herein respondents and that the said motion for reconsideration was not
pro forma (Annex “G”).
In an order dated May 26, 1981, respondent Judge dismissed the appeal,
sustaining the grounds invoked by herein respondent and intervenors.
Hence, this petition.
As enjoined by the Rules of Court and the controlling jurisprudence, a
liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling
principle to effect substantial justice.
The rule requiring notice to herein private respondents as defendant and
intervenors in the lower court with respect to the hearing of the
motion filed by herein petitioner for the reconsideration of the
decision of respondent Judge, has been substantially complied with.
While the notice was addressed only to the clerk of court, a copy of the
said motion for reconsideration was furnished counsel of herein private
respondents, which fact is not denied by private respondent. As a
matter of fact, private respondents filed their opposition to the said
motion for reconsideration dated January 14, 1981 after the hearing of
the said motion was deferred and re-set twice from December 8, 1980,
which was the first date set for its hearing as specified in the notice.
Hence, private respondents were not denied their day in court with
respect to the said motion for reconsideration. The fact that the
respondent Judge issued his order on January 15, 1981 denying the motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit as it merely repeated the same
grounds raised in the memorandum of herein petitioner as plaintiff in
the court below, one day after the opposition to the motion for
reconsideration was filed on January 14, 1981 by herein private
respondents, demonstrates that the said opposition of herein respondents
was considered by the respondent Judge.
Moreover, the respondent Judge, in an order dated February 27, 1981,
granted herein petitioner as plaintiff “an additional forty-five (45)
days from the reglementary period of 30 days within which to file his
Record on Appeal,” stating expressly therein that the motion of the
plaintiff for such extension of 45 days was without objection on the
part of herein private respondents (p. 7, rec.).
The motion for reconsideration of herein petitioner, while substantially
based on the same grounds he invoked in his memorandum after the case
was submitted for decision, is not pro forma as it points out
specifically the findings or conclusions in the judgment which he claims
are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law (City of
Cebu vs. Mendoza, L-26321, Feb. 25, 1975, 62 SCRA 440, 446), aside from
stating additional specific reasons for the said grounds.
Then again, the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioner
challenged the correctness of the decision which considers the findings
and conclusion of the handwriting expert presented by him as unworthy of
belief, especially because his findings as such expert have not been
refuted by another handwriting expert. This circumstance also
characterizes the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioner as not
pro forma, following the doctrine in the case of Ylanan vs. Mercado (50
O.G. 1982; 94 Phil. 769, 771) that where the motion for reconsideration
was based on a claim that the finding of the trial court as to the
authenticity of the disputed signature was not justified by the evidence
submitted, which is the testimony of the expert witness denying such
authenticity, it was held that the motion points out sufficiently why
the finding of the court is not justified by the evidence, and is not a
pro forma motion, hence it suspends the period for perfecting an appeal.
Furthermore, the motion for reconsideration is not pro forma when it
points out why the decision is contrary to law or the evidence (Phil.
Advertising Counselors, Inc. vs. Revilla, L-31869, Aug. 8, 1973, 52 SCRA
246, 254; Villarica vs. Court of Appeals, L-28363, May 15, 1974, 24
SCRA 28).
The rule was all the more liberalized in Elnar vs. Santos, et al.
(L-13113, Aug. 13, 1959, 106 Phil. 28, 33), where a motion for
reconsideration pointed out specifically the findings of the trial court
that were not supported by evidence without making express reference to
such evidence, but also pointed out the conclusions which were contrary
to law, reserving the right to submit written or oral argument, We held
that the motion was a substantial compliance with the rule.
And such a motion is not pro forma if it explains in detail the relevant
facts for seeking the revocation of the judgment, as in the instant
case (Carbonell vs. Padilla, 75 Phil. 95, 101; see Vol. 2, Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 ed., pp. 216-218).
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED AND THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE
DATED MAY 26, 1981 IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. NO COSTS.
THIS DECISION IS IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, and Plana, JJ., concur.