L.G. FOODS CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ROEL D. IWAY AND BERNABE M. SENANGOTE, RESPONDENTS.
INTING, J.:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents’ appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. ”
The facts of the case are as follows: On June 30, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint filed by Roel D. Iway and Bernabe M. Senangote against LG Foods Corporation (LG Foods for brevity) for illegal dismissal. Nevertheless, LG Foods was directed to pay the complainants their separation pay and other monetary benefits, damages and attorney’s fees. The decision attained finality per Resolution dated May 17, 2004,[2] after the Supreme Court affirmed it when it was raised to it following the Court of Appeals’ and the NLRC’s adverse decision on LG Foods’ appeal and petition, respectively. This paved the way for the issuance of a writ of execution[3] dated December 3, 2004.
However, on March 2, 2005, LG Foods filed a motion to quash the writ of execution[4] on the ground that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction to hear the case and much more issue the writ of execution. LG Foods purportedly found new evidence consisting of BIR, SSS and PAG-IBIG records showing that the complainants are not their employees but that of Harvest Distributor Phil., Inc., a different and distinct company. Since there was no employer-employee relationship between the complainants and LG Foods, it follows that the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction to hear the case and the decision it rendered in the case is void.
The complainants filed their opposition to the motion to quash contending that the case had passed several legal proceedings up to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court but never did LG Foods raise nor question the labor arbiter’s jurisdiction.[5] The complainants reiterated that Harvest Distributor, Inc. is the marketing arm of LG Foods; that this was stated in their position paper which LG Foods did not deny or refute; and that the complainants have submitted documents which show that they were LG Foods’ employees, though the documents were not primarily offered to prove employer-employee relationship as it was never an issue then. Further, the complainants averred that the issue on the employment relationship is basic in labor cases and should have been raised immediately and not only when the decision had attained finality.[6]
In the reply,[7] LG Foods maintains that it would be extremely unjust and detrimental for them to pay the complainants and insists that the latter were not their employees and thus, the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over the action.
The labor arbiter denied LG Foods’ motion to quash the writ of execution in an Order dated September 8, 2006.[8] The arbiter found the motion as whimsical, capricious and intended only to delay the execution of judgment; that LG Foods could no longer raise the issue of jurisdiction on the ground of estoppel as their learned counsel actively participated in the proceedings from the arbitration to the appeal without raising the issue of jurisdiction; that once the judgment becomes final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed, altered or modified; and that the instant case does not belong to the exceptions provided by law.
LG Foods appealed[9] the labor arbiter’s Order. The NLRC, in its August 31, 2007 Resolution,[10] affirmed the labor arbiter and held that the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and thus, not appealable. Moreover, the NLRC found no palpable mistake on the part of the arbiter in rendering the order considering that the decision upon which the writ of execution was based was already final and executory.
Unyielding, LG Foods filed their motion for reconsideration[11] but it was also denied per Resolution dated December 12, 2007.[12]
Hence, this petition by L.G. Foods Corporation raising the following issues to wit:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING THE ISSUANCE OF THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE NEWLY FOUND EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT EMPLOYEES OF HEREIN PETITIONER LG FOODS CORPORATION, BUT BY HARVEST DISTRIBUTOR PHILS., INC., THUS THERE IS LACK OF JURISDICTION;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT A VOID DECISION CAN GAIN FINALITY AND BE ENFORCED THRU A WRIT OF EXECUTION.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Herein petitioner maintains that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed their appeal from the labor arbiter’s order denying their motion to quash the writ of execution. The petitioner alleges that the decision upon which the writ was based is void for being issued without jurisdiction, thus, it follows that the writ is likewise void.
We beg to disagree.
Generally, an appeal does not lie as a remedy from the order denying a motion to set aside a writ of execution.[13] In the case of Reburiano v. CA,[14] the Supreme Court held that as a general rule, no appeal lies from such an order, otherwise litigation will become interminable. However, the High Court added that there are exceptional instances when an error may be committed in the course of execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party where considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari) or by a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus. These instances include where-
From the above enumeration, a writ may be questioned when it is allegedly issued by one without authority to do so. In the case at bench, the petitioner’s contention in assailing the NLRC’s resolution is founded on its claim that the labor arbiter was without jurisdiction to render the decision upon which the writ of execution was based. Consequently, petitioner avers that the labor arbiter also has no authority to issue the writ. Considering this controversy, an appeal may, therefore, be made on the denial of the motion to quash the writ of execution. This is one of the instances where the aggrieved party is given the opportunity to elevate questions regarding the execution of an adverse decision since the authority to issue the writ of execution is in query. Thus, We find that the petitioner aptly appealed the labor arbiter’s order before the public respondent.
Nevertheless, it has been held that while parties are given the remedy from the denial of the motion to quash or recall the writ of execution, it is equally settled that the writ will not be recalled by reason of any defense which could have been made at the time of the trial of the case.[15] In the aforementioned case of Reburiano,[16] the Supreme Court declared:
“We agree with this ruling. Rules of fair play, justice, and due process dictate that parties cannot raise for the first time on appeal from a denial of a Motion to Quash a Writ of Execution issues which they could have raised but never did during the trial and even on appeal from the decision of the trial court.”
In the case before Us, it is indisputable that the issue as to the employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the private respondents was not raised during the entire proceedings of the labor case except only when the petitioner filed its motion to quash the writ of execution after the labor arbiter’s decision had already become final. It behooves this Court why such defense was belatedly raised after several years of proceedings made not only before the public respondent or the appellate courts but also before the highest court of the land. The private respondents’ employment is not a supervening event that existed after the judgment was rendered. During the entire proceedings, the petitioner had ample time and opportunity to refute and deny being the private respondents’ employer but they were remiss in doing so. They raised the issue only after the labor arbiter’s decision had already attained finality from the affirmations made not only by the NLRC or the appellate court but also by the Supreme Court. The employer-employee relationship in cases before the labor arbiter is elementary and it would be absurd for a party, thoroughly represented by a counsel, to go through the rigorous proceedings without raising it as an issue if there really was no such relationship in the first place. It is unfathomable for a party to overlook such indispensable fact. The public respondent cannot be faulted when they gave no credit to the documents purporting to show that there was no employer-employee relationship between herein private parties and when they treated the petitioner’s motion to quash the writ as a mere delaying tactic to stay the execution of a final judgment. Thus, there is no sufficient basis to quash the writ.
Generally, the jurisdiction of a court may be assailed at any stage of the proceedings. In the case of Fernando v. de Belen,[17] the Supreme Court reiterates that:
“Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. So that, whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.”
However, it bears noting that such defense may hold no water when laches has set in. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.[18] Although in a plethora of cases the defense of lack of jurisdiction belatedly filed was entertained, it is to be stressed that the actions brought therein were to annul and attack the judgment itself and not merely to quash a writ. The motion filed by herein petitioner before the NLRC was in reference to the writ of execution but not the annulment of the Labor Arbiter’s decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In fact, the relief prayed for in the petitioner’s motion was only to quash the writ of execution. The instant petition before Us seeks only to annul and set aside the NLRC resolutions in relation to their affirmation of the labor arbiter’s denial of the motion to quash the writ of execution.
The remedies against a judgment or order which has become executory are (a) a petition for relief under Rule 38, (b) a direct attack against the judgment, or (c) a collateral attack against the judgment.[19] In the present case, the petitioner attacked the purported judgment by the labor arbiter for being void not through an action to annul the judgment but through a motion to quash the writ of execution. This may be considered a collateral attack but such action is proper only when it is patent that the court rendering the judgment had no jurisdiction,[20] hence, not available to herein case. Therefore, the petitioner’s claim that the labor arbiter’s judgment is void is unfounded absent the proper proceedings to declare it as such. Consequently, there was no convincing reason for the NLRC to stay the execution of the judgment.
In the case of Air Services Cooperative v. CA,[21] the labor arbiter’s decision already attained finality when it was assailed by the petitioners for being rendered beyond the former’s jurisdiction contending that the action should have been filed before the Cooperative Development Authority and not before the labor arbiter. The Supreme Court explained:
“One final note. This Court recognizes the significance of the jurisdictional issue posed by petitioners and they obviously invite the Court to give a definite pronouncement thereon. We do not feel, however, that the instant petition presents an opportune time for such kind of pronouncement as it does not actually go into the required resolution of the case. As it is, whether petitioners are correct in arguing that it is the CDA and not the Labor Arbiter which should have taken cognizance of the case at the very beginning, the fact remains that for their failure to correctly appeal to the NLRC instead of the Regional Trial Court, the Labor Arbiter’s judgment has already become final and executory. Thus, it is said: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum. Public interest requires that by the very nature of things there must be an end to a legal controversy. In Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., we declared emphatically:
‘We take this occasion to reiterate the ruling of this Court in an early case that litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, it being essential to the effective and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict… Furthermore, public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law…’” (Italics provided)
In the present case, despite the allegations that the labor arbiter was without jurisdiction to hear the action filed by the private respondents, it cannot be denied that the former’s decision is already final and executory and there is no compelling reason to halt the execution thereof. It is thus, high time to put an end to this litigation. The petitioner cannot claim injustice considering that it was their neglect to raise the defense of lack of jurisdiction, after actively participating in the proceedings, which led the public respondent to conclude that their indeed was an employer-employee relationship between the private parties in the first place.
In the case of Marquez v. Secretary of Labor,[22] the Supreme Court resolved:
“The active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.
When the complaint was pending before the Regional Director, petitioner did not raise the issue of jurisdiction but instead actively participated in the hearings. After the adverse decision of the Regional Director and upon the elevation of the case on appeal to the Secretary of Labor, still no jurisdictional challenge was made. Even in the two motions for reconsideration of the DOLE decision of affirmance, petitioner did not assail the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor or the Regional Director. The Court will not now allow petitioner to raise this issue, estoppel having already set in to bar the challenge.
To be sure, the Court is not unaware of the ruling in Calimlim v. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-34362, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 399, reiterated in Dy v. NLRC, G.R. No. 68544, October 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 211, to the effect that the ruling in Sibonghanoy being an exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal should not be applied in the absence of the pivotal element of laches. The Court, however, will not hesitate to apply the doctrine laid down in the Sibonghanoy case even absent the extraordinary circumstances therein [See Akay Printing Press v. Minister of Labor and Employment, supra; Cebu Institute of Technology v. Ople, supra] where the entertainment of the jurisdictional issue at a belated stage of the proceedings will result in a failure of justice and render nugatory the constitutional imperative of protection to labor [See Article II, Section 18 and Article MXIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.)”
All told, We find no grave abuse of discretion by the public respondent. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.[23] We do not see such grave capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment at hand.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The August 31, 2007 and December 10, 2007 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission, 5th Division in NLRC Case No. RAB 11-12-01353-99 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
Camello ( Chairperson) and Lopez, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp.18-21.
[2] Rollo, p. 147.
[3] Rollo, p. 135.
[4] Rollo, pp. 70-73.
[5] Rollo, pp. 68-69.
[6] Rollo, pp. 53-61.
[7] Rollo, pp. 63-66.
[8] Rollo, pp. 30-35.
[9] Rollo, pp. 30-35.
[10] Rollo, pp. 18-20.
[11] Rollo, pp. 23-27.
[12] Rollo, p. 21.
[13] Reliance Surety & Insurance Co. v. Hon. Andres Amante, Jr., et.al., G.R. No. 150994, June 30, 2005.
[14] G.R. No. 102965, January 21, 1999.
[15] Supra.
[16] Supra.
[17] G.R. No. 186366, July 3, 2013.
[18] Republic v. Bantigue Point Development Corp., GR. No. 162322, March 14, 2012.
[19] Remedial Law Compendium, 9th Revised Edition, Vol. 1, Florenz D. Regalado, p. 443.
[20] Ibid, p. 444.
[21] G.R. No. 118693, July 23, 1998.
[22] G.R. No. 80685, March 16, 1989.
[23] Garrido v. Tortogo, et.al., G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011.