MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. ROSALINA DE LA PEÑA VDA. DE OLIVEROS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This is an appeal by certiorari under the provisions of sections 46 and 49,
Act No. 3428, as amended by Act No. 3812, Commonwealth Act No. 210 and Republic
Act Nos. 772 and 889, in connection with Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, to
review a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission dated 9 December 1957
ordering the petitioner to pay to the respondent Rosalina de la Peña Vda. de
Oliveros the sum of P4,000 as compensation for the death of her husband Napoleon
Oliveros and to the Commission the sum of P46 as fees (Annex H) and the
resolution of the Commission en banc dated 28 July 1958 denying the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration (W.C.C. case No. 35306, Annex J).

On or about 20 January 1955 the respondent Rosalina Vda. de Oliveros filed a
claim for compensation for the death of her husband Napoleon Oliveros in the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission against Tuazon, Hizon and Ocampo Construction
Company. On or about 20 September 1956 the respondent widow filed an amended
claim to include the petitioner Manila Railroad Company (Annex A). On 30 October
1956 the acting chief referee of the respondent Commission ordered the
petitioner to answer the amended claim within 15 days from receipt of notice
(Annex B). On 7 December 1956 the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
amended claim on the ground that “There is no employer-employee relationship
between the deceased and the respondent (petitioner) MRR;” and that “the claim
is barred by sec. 24” (Annex D). The respondent widow filed an answer to the
motion to dismiss and grayed for its denial and setting of the case for hearing
on the merits. On 5 January 1957 the acting chief referee denied the motion to
dismiss and set the case for hearing on 11 January 1957 at 8:00 o’clock a.m.
(Annex E). At the hearing, the petitioner and the respondent widow appeared by
counsel but the respondent contractor did not. On 12 January 1957. the acting
chief referee rendered a decision holding that the petitioner is the statutory
employer of the deceased engineer; that section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, as amended, providing among others that in case of death, notice of claim
for compensation must be given by the person claiming such benefit to the
employer within a period of not later than three months after death of the
employee, is not a prescriptive period; and that although such notice had been
given after that period, the fact that the petitioner had knowledge of the death
of the employee, such notice is no longer necessary, and ordering the petitioner
and the respondent contractor, jointly and severally, to pay to the respondent
widow the sum of P4,000 as compensation for the death of her husband and to the
commission the sum of P41 as fees (Annex F). On 14 February 1957 the petitioner
filed with the respondent Commission a petition for review of the decision of
the acting chief referee. In support of its petition, it claimed that “the
deceased employee was not a laborer within the meaning of section 39 (b) of Act
No. 3428, as amended;” that “the employment of the deceased is purely casual and
is not for the purpose of occupation or business of the respondent MRR Co.
(petitioner);” and that “the claim is barred by section 24.” (Annex G). On 9
December 1957 the Chairman of the respondent Commission rendered a decision
affirming that of the acting chief referee (Annex H). On 23 December 1957 the
petitioner filed a “motion for reconsideration of the decision dated December 9,
1957.” (Annex I). On 28 July 1958 the Commission en banc denied the
motion for reconsideration (Annex J). Hence this appeal interposed by the
petitioner.

The petitioner has raised the following questions for resolution of this
Court:

1. Whether the deceased was an employee of petitioner MRR or of respondent
   Tuazon, Hizon and Ocampo Construction.

2. Whether or not the deceased was a laborer within the meaning of Section 39
   (b) of Act 3428 as amended.

3. Whether the employment of the deceased is purely casual, and not for the
   purpose of the occupation or business of MRR Co.

4. Whether or not the claim is barred by Section 24 of Act 3428, as amended.
5. Whether or not Section 24 is a Statute of Limitation.
6. Whether or not Section 27 of the Act could be applied in the instant case to
   justify the claimant’s delay in filing her claim when said Section has express
   reference to notice of injury and not claim for compensation,

which may be reduced to a single issue, to wit: whether or not the petitioner
is liable to the respondent widow for compensation for the death of her husband
while employed by the respondent contractor who undertook to build a bridge for
the petitioner.

The evidence, as summarized by the respondent Commission, are:

The records show that on January 9, 1955, while the late Napoleon Oliveros, a
civil enginer employed by respondent Tuason, Hizon & Ocampo Construction
Co., was directing the construction of a bridge, a project of the MRR Company at
Bacnotan, La Union, be was killed by one of the laborers. The construction of
said bridge was in accordance with the contract entered into by and between the
respondents under which the MRR Company would furnish the materials while the
contractor, labor. The records also disclose that the MRR Co. exercised close
supervision over the construction of the project in order to assure compliance
by the contractor with the specifications provided in the contract.

* * * The very project engineer of the company supervising the construction
of the bridge knew of the accident which resulted in the death of the workman.
He made inquiry and notified the Chief Train Dispatcher of the tragedy, but
notwithstanding this fact, the company did not submit its employer’s reports as
required by Section 37 of the Act. * * *. (Annex H.)

The recent cases of Shellborne Hotel vs. de Leon, G. R. No. L-9149,
31 May 1957 and Caro vs. Rilloraza, 102 Phil., 61, offer a solution to
the question in the case at bar.

In Shellborne Hotel vs. de Leon, the facts are: Shell-borne Hotel is
engaged in the hostelry business which consists in the entertainment of guests
by offering them food and accommodations. It engaged the services of Crispin
Sigua, a contractor, to construct its mezzanine floor, the hotel furnishing the
necessary materials. The contractor in turn engaged the services of one Romulo,
a laborer, to work on the job with a daily wage of P5.50. The hotel supervised
the construction and saw to it that the work was done in accordance with the
plan. The contractor did not file any bond for the faithful performance or
execution of the work and had to get money by “vales” from the hotel to pay his
laborers every Saturday. While working in the construction the said laborer met
with an accident injuring his right hand and disabling him from work for more
than two months. The question that arose was whether or not the hotel was liable
to the injured laborer for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
This Court held that under the facts of the case, Sigua was not an independent
contractor and that the hotel was liable to the injured laborer for
compensation. Said this Court:

The contention that the construction of the mezzanine floor is far removed
from the business of hostelry is erroneous. Said business consists in the
entertainment of guests—offering food and providing accommodations. The
accommodations include comfortable and luxurious living quarters extended to
guests. The construction of the mezzanine floor was for the purpose of giving
comfort and luxury to petitioner’s guests, more spacious and attractive rooms to
satisfy its customers, thus ultimately keeping their patronage and that of
others who would know of such inviting conditions. The construction can be said
to be for the promotion of, and to have a direct bearing on petitioner’s
hostelry business.

The facts in Caro vs. Rilloraza are: Carmen Prieto de Caro is the
owner of a building “intended or used for rental (business) purposes,” managed
by her husband Ramon Caro, as administrator of their conjugal partnership and
president and general manager of Ramcar, Inc. The administrator engaged the
services of Daniel de la Cruz, a job contractor, to change the joists and repair
other parts of the building, under the direction and control of the former or
his representative and in the manner or by the method designated by either. The
contractor, in turn, engaged the services to Lucas Rilloraza, a carpenter, to
work on the job. While working on the window railing of the building, the wooden
platform on which Rilloraza and another carpenter were working collapsed and
Rilloraza fell to the ground and broke his leg. The injury resulted in his
temporary total disability for a period of six months and permanent partial
disablity of 5% of the broken leg. The question raised was whether or not the
owner of the building was liable to the injured carpenter for compensation under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act. After reviewing the cases of Santos vs.
Javier, 58 Phil., 82, Andoyo vs. Manila Railroad Co., G. R. No. 34722,
28 March 1932 . Philippine Manufacturing Company vs. de Geronimo, 96
Phil., 276 and Marsal vs. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Company, 96 Phil., 941,
this Court held that—

* * * the repair of said building is part of the usual business of the
administration of the aforesaid properties, so that the same may be suitable for
the gainful purpose above referred to. Consequently, even if Rilloraza, who did
the repair work thereof, were a casual laborer, engaged directly by De la Cruz,
acting as an independent contractor, which he is not, the former would still be
an employee of petitioner herein, within the purview of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, and, hence, would be entitled to demand compensation from
him.

From the foregoing cases, the following rule on the liability of an owner of
an industrial or business establishment, ordering the performance or execution
of a particular work or job by another, for injury or death of an employee or
laborer of the contractor, arising out of or in the course of employment, may be
drawn: Where the owner of an industrial or business establishment lets another
do a certain piece of work or execute a particular job directly or necessarily
connected with the conduct or pursuit of its usual or habitual business, and the
owner of the said establishment has direct supervision and control of the
employees or workers of the person executing the job or work, the owner of the
establishment ordering the execution of the job or work becomes the statutory
employer of the employees of the said contractor.

Tested by the foregoing standard, the petitioner cannot escape liability
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act to the respondent widow for the death of
her husband. The petitioner is engaged in the transportation business. Its
purpose are stated in Executive Order No. 399, 5 January 1951 , 47 Off. Gaz. 7,
prescribing a uniform charter for all government owned or controlled
corporations, as follows:

(a) To own or operate railroads, tramways, and other kinds of land
transportation, vessels and pipe lines, for the purpose of transporting for
consideration, passengers, mail and property between any points in the
Philippines; and

(b) As an auxiliary to its main purpose, to own and/or operate
powerhouse, hotels, restaurants, terminals, warehouses, timber concessions, coal
mines, iron mines and other mineral properties and to manufacture rolling stock,
equipment, tools and other appliances; to construct and operate in
connection with its railroad lines tool viaducts, tool bridges and
tool tunnels.

To carry out the purposes above-mentioned, it shall have the special power to
acquire by condemnation proceedings rights of way, real property or interest or
easements therein as it may require for its purposes. (Italics
supplied.)

The construction of the bridge, therefore, was directly or necessarily
connected with the conduct or pursuit of its usual or habitual business.
Furthermore, the petitioner furnished the contractor all the necessary materials
for the construction of the bridge and “exercised close supervision over the
construction of the project in order to assure compliance by the contractor with
the specifications provided in the contract.”

The petitioner tries to exploit to its advantage the fact that while the
accident happened on 9 January 1955, yet the amended claim against it for
compensation dated 20 September 1956, was filed by the respondent widow in the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission on 29 September 1956 and served upon the
petitioner on 2 October 1956. It contends that, pursuant to the provisions of
section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, the claimant should
have given it notice of claim not later than three months after the death of her
husband; that the respondent widow’s claim having been filed beyond the period
provided for by law, it became incumbent upon her to prove that the petitioner
“did not suffer by said delay in giving notice inasmuch as petitioner has not
waived the defense provided by Sec. 24 aforecited;” and that the respondent
widow failed to prove such fact. Furthermore, the petitioner tried to prove
“that it suffered from claimant’s (the respondent widow) delay in giving the
required notice for said claim is now too old to be successfully investigated
and defended * * *;” that it “could no longer obtain witnesses regarding the
accident and since this action was brought against it after it had already paid
the Contractor Martin V. Tuason, it could no longer deduct from the proceeds of
the contract whatever compensation may be due the claimant * * *;” and that “by
reason of the termination of the contract and the consequent release of the
surety,” it could no longer recover from the bond filed by respondent contractor
for whatever damage or compensation it might be ordered to pay to the respondent
widow.

The petitioner’s contention cannot be sustained. The respondent Commission
found that the petitioner “exercised close supervision over the construction of
the project in order to assure compliance by the contractor with the
specifications provided in the contract;” and that—

* * * The very project engineer of the company supervising the construction
of the bridge knew of the accident which resulted in the death of the workman.
He made inquiry and notified the Chief Train Dispatcher of the tragedy, but
notwithstanding this fact, the company did not submit its employer’s report, as
required by Section 37 of the Act.

Section 27 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, provides that
“Failure to or delay in giving notice shall not be a bar to the proceeding
herein provided for, if it is shown that the employer, his agent or
representative had knowledge of the accident * * *.”

The decision under review is affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner.

Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon, De Leon, and Natividad, JJ., concur.