THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PAULO SANTOS ET AL., DEFENDANTS. JOSE DIZON RAMOS (ALIAS MORVEN), DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Jose Dizon Ramos alias Morven, together with several
other persons who had not yet been apprehended at the time of trial, was accused
of the murder of Marina de Leon, Manuel Lansang, and Florencio A. Manalo in
three separate informations before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. By
agreement of the parties the three cases were tried and decided jointly. The
said accused was acquitted of the murder of Marina de Leon in criminal case No.
267, and convicted in criminal cases Nos. 269 and 270 (G.R. Nos. L-1820 and
L-1821) of the murder of Manuel Lansang and Florencio A. Manalo, respectively,
and sentenced in each ease to suffer life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs
of each of the deceased in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the costs. From that
sentence he has appealed to this court.

The evidence for the prosecution, consisting of the direct
testimony of eleven witnesses and two extrajudicial sworn declarations of the
accused, establishes the following facts:

The appellant Jose Dizon Ramos alias Morven, and his
co-accused Paulo Santos alias Pampanga, Celestino Santos alias
Jesse, Nicolas Payumo alias Espiritu, Pedro Sicat alias Edison,
Eugenio Salenga alias Balagtas, Fortunate Medina alias Fred,
Apolinario Manalo, alias Ritano, and Monico Salalila alias Belly,
were all members of the Hukbalahap organization and belonged to the unit or
group of which Paulo Santos alias Pampanga was the chief, and which had
its headquarters in the municipality of Santa Rita, Pampanga. On October 26,
1943, Paulo Santos convened the members of his unit to a meeting in the house of
Felisa Cruz in the barrio of Diladila, Santa Rita, at which the appellant was
among those present. In that meeting Eugenio Salenga proposed the kidnaping and
killing of Florencio A. Manalo on the ground that he was a bad character,
alleging that he was responsible for the killing of some seventeen persons in
Santa Rita. That proposition was carried and Paulo Santos then and there issued,
the order to realise it. Accordingly, on the night of October 29, 1943 the
appellant, accompanied by Celestino Santos, Eugenio Salenga, and Pedro Sicat,
went to the house of Florencio A. Manalo in the barrio of San Juan of the
municipality of Santa Rita and, not finding him there, proceeded to the house of
his brother-in-law Eleuterio Calilong in the same barrio. According to Eleuterio
Calilong and Emerita Manalo, Florencio’s daughter, it was the appellant and
Pedro Sicat who called at his house and demanded that the door be opened,
otherwise they would shoot, and who thereafter dragged Florencio A. Manalo to
the street, where they were joined by Celestino Santos and Eugenio Salenga. That
same night the appellant and his companions brought Manalo to their chief, Paulo
Santos, in the barrio of Diladila. After making Manalo write a letter to his
family telling them not to worry about him because he had joined Huk Squadron
No. 101, Paulo Santos ordered the appellant, Celestino Santos, and Pedro Sicat
to take Manalo to a field about four hundred meters away and kill him there. The
appellant and his companions took along with them Ceferino Cunanan after
ordering the latter to procure a hoe and a shovel with which to dig the grave.
On the way to the place of execution they saw Victor Dizon and brought him along
also to help dig the grave. According to Ceferino Cunanan, as soon as the pit
was deep enough, the appellant and Pedro Sicat held Florencio Manalo and brought
him close to the pit and then the appellant told Manalo to pray because he was
going to die. While Manalo was kneeling, the appellant picked tip the hoe which
was lying on the ground and hit Manalo at the back of his head, Manalo fell face
downward. The appellant “hit him again causing him to turn to his side,” and
then “hit him for the third time causing his death.” When Manalo was thus hit by
the appellant, his hands were tied behind him and his eyes were covered
(blindfolded). After thus murdering Manalo, the appellant and Pedro Sicat
dragged him by the feet and dropped him into the grave and then ordered the
grave-diggers to cover it. Victor Dizon corroborated the testimony of Ceferino
Cunanan that it was the appellant who told Manalo to kneel down and pray. When
asked, however, who hit Manalo on the head, Victor Dizon answered, “I do not
know his name.” He said it was the appellant who ordered him and Cunanan to
cover the pit.

In his sworn declaration before Special Prosecutor Filemon
Cajator, the appellant gave his version of the killing as follows:

“Q. When the pit was fully dug, what happened?—A. Florencio
Manalo, Edison, and I conversed, Florencio Manalo saying that he knew me
and that Edison was his nephew. But Edison told him that nothing
could be done, because that was ordered by Pampanga. We, however,
told Florencio Manalo that Edison and I would not lay a hand on him. But
while we were thus talking Jessy, who was behind Florencio Manalo, hit
him with the hoe he was holding, the head of the hoe falling on the back of the
head of Florencio Manalo, while the two hands of the latter were tied behind
him. Florencio Manalo did not fall with that first blow dealt by Jessy.
Jessy hit him again with the same hoe, its head hitting the top of the
head of Florencio Manalo. This time the latter fell face down on the ground in
which position Jessy hit him again with the head of the hoe on the head.
Then Florencio Manalo died completely.

“Q. When Florencio Manalo died, what happened?—A. Jessy
told me to take off Florencio Manalo’s undershirt and to give it to the persons
who had dug.

“Q. Did you obey this order?—A. I did. I untied the hands of
Florencio Manalo’s cadaver and took off his undershirt and gave it to those who
had dug.

“Q. Who lifted and dropped the cadaver into the pit?—A.
Edison and I helped Jessy lift and drop the cadaver into the pit,
Jessy holding it by the shoulders, Edison and I each by each
foot.” (Exhibit A-1, a translation of Exhibit A.)

In his affidavit Exhibit D subscribed and sworn to before the
municipal mayor, the appellant made substantially the same declaration as that
made by him in Exhibit A as to the killing of Manalo.

The foregoing refers to case No. 270 of the trial court (G.R.
No. L-1821 of this court). We shall now proceed to state the facts proven by the
prosecution with regard to case No. 269 of the lower court (G.R. No. L-1820 of
this court), referring to the murder of Manuel Lansang.

About noon on October 30, 1943, Paulo Santos alias
Pampanga again called a meeting in the house of Felisa Cruz in the barrio of
Diladila, Santa Rita, at which were present the appellant, Celestino Santos
alias Jesse, Nicolas Payumo alias Espiritu, Pedro Sicat
alias Edison, Eugenio Salenga alias Balagtas, Fortunato Medina
alias Fred, Apolinario Manalo alias Ritano, and German Galang. At
that meeting Eugenio Salenga proposed the apprehension and execution of Manuel
Lansang, mayor of Santa Rita, on the ground that he was a bad character,
alleging that together with Manalo (who had just been killed iearly in the
morning he of that day) was responsible for the killing of seventeen residents
of Santa Rita. No one expressed any objection to that proposition; and Paulo
Santos; giving his assent thereto, designated the appellant, Apolinario Manalo,
Fortunato Medina, Gelestino Santos, Nicolas Payumo, and Pedro Sicat to apprehend
and kill Manuel Lansang, giving them full discretion as to the manner and place
of execution. Accordingly, about nine o’clock in the evening of that day,
October 30, 1943, the designated group went to the house of Manuel Lansang in
the barrio of San Jose, Santa Rita, and apprehended him. At the same time they
ransacked the house and took therefrom cbthes, money, and jewelry. The appellant
and his companions brought their captive and their loot to the hut of Serafin
Ocampo situated in the middle of a field in the barrio of Santa Barbara,
Bacolor, a town adjacent to Santa Rita. There they met Eugenio Salenga
(Balagtas) with another captive, Marina de Leon. From that place Eugenio
Salenga, Pedro Sicat and Crisanto Sason brought Manuel Lansang and Marina de
Leon to a place about half a kilometer north of Ocampo’s hut, where Eugenio
Salenga shot Manuel Lansang to death and Pedro Sicat boxed Marina de Leon about
ten times until she fell unconscious. Then Balagtas and Edison dropped the
lifeless body of Manuel Lansang and the still breathing body of Marina de Leon
into the pit that had been dug by Crisanto Sason upon their orders and buried
them. The appellant and his other companions remained in Ocampo’s hut during the
killing.

In his declaration before Special Prosecutor Filemon Cajator
which he made on July 27, 1946, the appellant gave his version of the
apprehension and execution of Manuel Lansang as follows:

“Q. What did you do in order to be able to get Manuel Lansang
from his house?—A. Pampanga left us after assigning us to the task of
taking Manuel Lansang. We went directly to the house of Manuel Lansang in barrio
San Jose, Sta. Rita, witih Quitano leading us there, because he knew the
house well.

“Q. When Pampanga separated from you, after your having
eaten your supper in the three houses, where did he go?—A. He returned to barrio
San Basilio, Sta. Rita, where his brother, Perlin, lived.

“Q. Tell what happened when you reached the house of Manuel
Lansang.—A. Quitano called and said good evening. It was only after about
five minutes that Manuel Lansang opened the door. As he did so, Manuel Lansang
said: “Come in.” We went in, with Quitano leading us. As soon as we were
in Quitano grabbed Manuel Lansang and brought him down from the house.
Since we had orders from Pampanga to take everything we could when we
would take the Japanese Spy, we did so, my two companions opening the two
cabinets (aparadores). We took all the clothes we could take. Fred
found jewelry and money which he also took. We also carried away three (3)
umbrellas. We wrapped the clothes into four bundles with white blankets. While
my companions were gathering the things we took, I stood guard in the house,
holding my Revolver with my right hand, in view of the possibility that those in
the house might be armed, because I saw a pistol holster on top of one of the
cabinets (aparadores). When they had finished and had bundled everything,
Fred said:”Let us go, Captain,” (in English) and I answered: “O. K.” (in
English). Then we left, taking Manuel Lansang with us, Quitano carrying
him on his right shoulder because Manuel Lansang altho tall was thin, while
Quitano was a big man. Fred made me carry one of the bundles.
Quitano, however, did not tie the hands of Manuel Lansang. We went
directly to the house of Serafin Ocampo near the Baluyot Creek, and at the foot
of the stairs of said house we reached Balagtas, Belly with Marina de
Leon. Jessy and I went up the house, because Jessy was sick and I watched
over him. My companions, Balagtas, Belly, Quitano, Fred, Espiritu and
Edison were the ones who left and brought with them our captives, Marina
de Leon and Manuel Lansang. We depended upon them to kill the Said two persons.”
(Exhibit A-1, a translation of Exhibit A.)

The appellant had given substantially the same version in his
affidavit dated July 10, 1946, which he subscribed and swore to before Mayor
Hernando E. Dizon of Santa Rita.

The appellant was the only witness who
testified in his behalf. He gave his personal circumstances as being “15 years
of age, single, operator of a gambling house, and a resident of Maria Clara,
Manila.” He declared in substance that in the month of January or February,
1943, Pampanga (Paulo Santos) and Jesse (Celestino Santos) kidnaped him on
suspicion that he was in connivance with his cousin, Lamberto Dizon, a
provincial guard’ during the Japanese occupation; that after his capture he was
forced to go with his captors on threat that, should he escape, his relatives
would pay with their lives; that when Pampanga and Jesse went to Santa Rita to
organize and recruit members of the Hukbalahap organization they took him along
for fear that he would escape; that from the time of his capture until he was
taken to Santa Rita he was never given any firearm; that during that time he was
gssigned as a courier. Although he admitted that he was present in the meetings
called by Pampanga in the house of Felisa Cruz wherein the kidnaping and killing
of Florencio Manalo and Manuel Lansang was proposed and decided, he denied
having participated in the deliberations, alleging that being a mere captive he
had no personality to take part therein. He also denied any participation in the
kidnaping and killing of Manalo and Lansang.

In his brief for the appellant counsel de oficio does
not rely on the latter’s testimony given in open court “which naturally and
undoubtedly was made to suit the interests of the defense,” according to counsel
himself, but relies solely on the appellant’s affidavit Exhibit D-1.

Thus, counsel for the appellant, the Solicitor General, and the
trial court agree that the uncorroborated testimony given by the appellant
during the trial is unworthy of credence, and we find no justification
whatsoever to overrule that conclusion. The testimony of the various witnesses
for the prosecution establishing the conspiracy among the members of the
Hukbalahap unit headed by Paulo Santos and the appellant’s participation therein
as well as in the killing and kidnaping of Florencio Manalo and Manuel Lansang
has not been re butted by any credible evidence. On the contrary, it is
corroborated and fortified by appellant’s extrajudicial sworn declarations
Exhibits A and D.

We can not sustain the contention of counsel for the appellant
that the latter should be acquitted of the murder of Manuel Lansang and
convicted only as an accomplice in the murder of Florencio Manalo on the ground
that the appellant did not participate in the murder of the first victim and was
only used as a tool in the murder of the second. Conspiracy having been alleged
and proven, the appellant as a conspirator is equally responsible for the acts
of his co-conspirators. It has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellant was present in each of the meetings wherein the kidnaping and killing
of Manalo and Lansang was proposed and decided. The appellant was one of those
designated to carry out the agreement reached in each case, and he performed his
bloody mission without any scruple. He took part in the kidnaping and actual
killing of Manalo. He was one of those who apprehended Lansang and turned him
over to his co-conspirators for execution. The fact that he was not present on
the spot where Lansang was killed does not minimize or mitigate his criminal
liability because the killing was done by his co-conspirators in pursuance of
the conspiracy.

During the pendency of this appeal the appellant filed a
petition for dismissal under Amnesty Proclamation No. 76, which we are now
called upon to resolve. The Solicitor General opposes the petition on two
grounds: (1) that the two murders of which the petitioner was convicted in the
trial court, having been perpetrated in October, 1943, that is to say, during
the enemy occupation, by members of the Hukbalahap as a guerrilla organization
who were motivated by the belief that the victims were undesirable elements,
fell more properly within the purview of Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 and should
have been submitted to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission created thereby; and (2)
that the petitioner did not comply with the provisions of Circular No. 27-A of
the Secretary of Justice.

Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946, granted amnesty to
“all persons who committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war
efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to
the date when each particular area of the Philippines was actually liberated
from enemy control and occupation.”

On the other hand, Proclamation No. 76, dated June 21, 1985 was
premised on the consideration or understanding that the leaders and members of
the Hukbalahap and the PKM who had theretofore lived beyond the pale of the law
recognized the authority of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and its duly constituted officers and agents and pledged loyalty and obedience
to them so that they might enjoy the rights and the protection under the
Constitution, and upon that premise, among others, said proclamation declared
amnesty “in favor of the leaders and members of the associations known as
Hukbalahap and Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid (PKM) who have committed
the crimes of rebellion, sedition, illegal association, assault upon,
resistance, and disobedience to persons in authority, and/or illegal possession
of firearms; Provided, however, That this amnesty shall apply only to
those of said groups of persons who have presented themselves with all their
arms and ammunition and to those who shall have presented themselves with all
their firearms and ammunition to the duly constituted authorities of the
Republic of the Philippines within twenty days from the date this proclamation
is concurred in by the Congress.”

We agree with the Solicitor General that the murders in
question fell, if at all, within the purview of Proclamation No. 8 and not
within that of Proclamation No. 76. The crimes were committed in October, 1943,
by members of the Hukbalahap (Hukbong Laban sa Hapon) which was then a
guerrilla organization engaged in a fight not against the Government of the
Philippines but against the Japanese invaders. As a matter of fact, these cases
were originally submitted to the Fourth Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, but for
reasons which do not appear in the record, the attorney for the herein
appellant, with the conformity of the provincial fiscal, petitioned that body to
order the return of these cases to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for
trial therein, which petition was granted by the Commission on March 26,
1947.

Amnesty Proclamation No. 76 was not intended for crimes
committed during the enemy occupation, which were already covered by Amnesty
Proclamation No. 8, but for crimes committed after the liberation by members of
the Hukbalahap and the PKM who were no longer engaged in the resistance against
the Japanese enemy but against the constituted authorities of the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, the purpose of said amnesty being to bring
about “the return of these dissident and recalcitrant elements of our population
to their homes and the resumption by them of their lawful pursuits or
occupations as loyal and law-abiding citizens” in order to “accelerate the
rehabilitation of this war-devastated country, restore peace and order, and
secure the welfare and happiness of their communities.”

In any event, in the certificate of the Assistant Director of
Prisons accompanying the petition for dismissal, that official stated that when
Jose Dizon Ramos presented himself to him as a member of the Huk organization,
he did not present any arm or ammunition; and although an affidavit of Felipe
Salas, Chief of Police of Mexico, Pampanga, to the effect that in April, 1946,
he “received, from one Jose Ramos, of Santo Domingo, this municipality, one
pistol, cal. 45, the number and make of which I no longer remember,” has been
attached to the record without explanation as to the identity of Jose Ramos with
the herein appellant Jose Dizon Ramos, nor as to the circumstances under which
he received said firearm from Jose Ramos, we cannot consider said affidavit as a
compliance by the appellant with the requisites of Proclamation No. 76.

Hence, the petition for dismissal must be denied.

A majority of the Court agree with the Solicitor General that
the commission of each of the two murders in question was attended by two
aggravating circumstances, namely, evident premeditation and nighttime, without
any mitigating circumstance, and that, therefore, the maximum penalty, death,
should be imposed. The majority vote, however, is short of the required number
to impose the death penalty.

Wherefore, the sentence of the trial court in each of these two
cases is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor,
and Reyes, JJ., concur.

OZAETA, J.:

I certify that Mr. Justice Pablo voted to affirm the decision
of the trial court.