G.R. No. L-2856. March 27, 1950
GO CAM, ANG TIONG, LO BOK, LIM PENG, TE CHAYE, SY BIO AND MARCOS ENAGE, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN AND FILEMON SAAVEDRA, RESPONDENTS.
PADILLA, J.:
August 1946, an information for murder was filed in the Court of First Instance
of Davao by the Provincial Fiscal against Dy Too alias Donato Pomarala,
Chu Chi Beng, John Doe, Richard Doe and three others for the death of Ang
Liongto (Criminal Case No. 131). On 18 December 1947, another information for
murder was filed by the Provincial Fiscal, ex-officio City Attorney,
against James Young for the death of Ang Liongto (Criminal Case No. 343). On 5
August 1948, a third information for murder was filed against Go Cam, Ang Tiong,
Lo Bok, Lim Peng, Te Chaye, Sy Bio, Marcos Enage, six other named defendants,
and twenty-five (25) other unnamed Chinese Davao residents for the death of Ang
Liongto (Criminal Case No. 458). The last information was signed by Filemon
Saavedra, a special attorney in the office of the Solicitor General. On 31
January 1949, counsel for the defendants moved to quash the information, on the
ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form, and that
the Court of First Instance of Davao “has no jurisdiction over the case and over
the persons of the defendants.” On 17 February, the court denied the motion to
quash. A motion for reconsideration was denied.
Thereupon seven defendants named in the last information instituted these
proceedings seeking to annul the orders of the court denying the motion to quash
and the motion for reconsideration; to enjoin the Court of First Instance of
Davao and Special Prosecutor Filemon Saavedra from trying or in anyway disposing
of the case; and to have the bail filed by the petitioners for their temporary
release cancelled.
In his answer the respondent Special Prosecutor states that, under and
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 94 issued by the Secretary of Justice on 13
May 1948 detailing him “to temporary duty to the province of Davao there to
investigate and prosecute the murder of Alfonso Ang Liongto,” he was empowered
to sign and file the information against the petitioners and their co-defendants
in criminal case No. 458 of the Court of First Instance of Davao.
Petitioners claim that a special prosecutor who is a special attorney in the
office of the Solicitor General created by Republic Act No. 311 is not
authorized to sign the information filed against the petitioners and their
co-defendants in the criminal case referred to, and for that reason the
information signed and filed by him is illegal and the court acquired no
jurisdiction over the case. Hence the orders denying the motion to quash and the
motion for reconsideration are null and void.
The Special Prosecutor, on the other hand, contends that his detail by the
Secretary of Justice, by virtue and pursuant to Administrative Order No. 94
referred to, confers upon him authority to sign the information filed against
the petitioners and their co-defendants.
It would serve no useful purpose to restate the grounds upon which the
decision in the case of Lo Cham vs. Ocampo et al.; Canape et al.
vs. Jugo et al.; and People vs. Dinglasan (44 Off.Gaz.,
458[1]) is made to rest. There the original
law and the subsequent changes made until it reached the present form (section
1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by section 4 of Com. Act No.
144), are set forth. Under either of the interpretations made of the statute, to
wit: whether the appointment of a lawyer, “being either a subordinate from his
office or a competent person not in the public service, temporarily to assist a
fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his duties,n confers upon the
appointee the authority or carries with it the power to sign and file
informations, or whether such authority is conferred by the express language of
the statute which clothes the appointee “with the same authority therein as
might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General,” the respondent
Special Prosecutor detailed by the Secretary of Justice possesses the authority
and power to sign and file the information in question. Hence the respondent
court did not err neither did it exceed its jurisdiction, nor did it commit a
grave abuse of discretion, when it denied the motion to quash the information
filed against the petitioners and their co-defendants.
Petition denied, with costs against the petitioners.
Moran, C. J.,
Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] 77 Phil., 635.
PADILLA, J.:
I certify that Mr. Justice Torres voted for the denial of the petition, and
that.Mr. Justice Montemayor also voted for denial.