AMANDO ALGABRE, ENRICO ATAÑGAN, JOSE CAONTOY, APOLONIO GONZALES, BONIFACIO JALEA, BENITO LAMELA, HILARION LAMELA, PATRICIO LOBREDO, RODRIGO MONTEVERDE, PEDRO SALCEDO, MANUEL SAL…

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in seven cases, entitled as above
but separately numbered as CA-G.R. Nos. 34492-R, 24604-R, 34605-R, 34606-R,
34607-R, 34608-R, and 34609-R, promulgated on January 18, 1965, as well as from
the resolution, dated February 24, 1965, denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof.

The essential facts in
these cases found by the Court of Appeals and which are binding upon Us are:

“Rebecca Andres of Bago, Negros Occidental, as landholder, and three groups of
tenants whose names appear in the present petition as respondents, numbering 33
in all, have entered into separate Compromise Agreements bearing identical
terms and conditions under which the tenants agreed, ‘to surrender, as they do
hereby surrender, effective upon the signing of this instrument, their
respective palay landholdings described
in paragraph two hereof, in favor of Rebecca Andres, who accepts the same.  That Rebecca Andres, in fairness to the
herein tenants because of the improvements made thereon, does hereby condone,
quit-claim and waive, all the previous and present loans of money or kind,
seeds and fertilizers, taken by the said tenants from her in connection with
their tenancy relations in said hacienda, and still further gives them money in
amounts appearing opposite their respective names, to wit:  (names and amounts indicated).’ (Record, pp. 18, 20, 22.) The three compromise agreements
bear the following identical acknowledgments:

‘Personally appeared before me the above-named parties in the
above-entitled case, who subscribed and acknowledged to me that the above are
their signatures and that they understood the contents thereof, after the same
are translated in the local dialect (Hiligaynon) by
the undersigned, and that they entered into said agreement voluntarily without
mental reservation.

‘In witness whereof, I hereunto set my hand on this 4th day of December,
1962 in the Municipality of Bago, Negros
Occidental, Philippines.

(Sgd.) Gerardo G. Pandan

Deputy
Clerk of Court, C.A.R.”

(Page 16, Record.)

Submitted for the consideration of the
Court of Agrarian Relations at Bacolod
City, presided over by His Honor,
Judge Valeriano A. del
Valle, without the assistance of counsel, the aforesaid Compromise Agreements
were duly approved and judgments respectively rendered thereon, the trial court
stating that:

‘After a careful examination of the terms and conditions aforequoted in the foregoing amicable settlements shows
that there is nothing contrary to law, morals, and/or public policy.

‘Wherefore, judgment is rendered approving the amicable settlement
and the same shall, as between the parties, have the force and effect of, and
be deemed to be, a decision in this case.’ (Record, pp. 18,
20, 22.)

“The Compromise Agreement with respect to the First Group of
14 tenants (respondents), which is CAR Case 2217, bears date 4 December 1962.  Decision on this case was rendered December 7, 1962 (Record, 18), copy of which was served upon
the tenants on January 9, 1963 (Record, 64).  The Compromise Agreement with regard to the
Second Group of 12 tenants (respondents) is dated May 20, 1963 (CAR Case 2455) and decision was rendered
almost a month thereafter, to wit:  June
18, 1963
(Record, 22).  The Compromise Agreement
with reference to the Third Group of 7 tenants (respondents) is also dated May 20,
1963 but the
decision thereon in CAR Case 2856 was promulgated on June 17, 1963 (Record, 20).  Aside from the condonation
of past and present loans, Rebecca Andres, the landholder, claims to have
delivered to herein respondent-tenants the sums of P5,069.00, P3,250.00 and
P1,690.00, respectively, in pursuance of the terms of the compromise agreements
as approved and adjudged by the Court of Agrarian Relations on the dates
afore-stated.  On July 9, 1963 (7
months and 2 days from the decision in CAR Case 2217; 21 days from decision in
CAR Case No. 2455; and 22 days from decision in CAR Case 2456), the herein
respondent-tenants, represented by Atty.
Bernardo B. Pablo, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration in the aforesaid CAR Cases Nos. 2217, 2455 and 2456 alleging coercion, intimidation
and trickery in securing the signatures of the tenants on the compromise
agreements aforementioned as well as nonpayment of the amounts agreed upon
therein and thereby prayed that the judgments rendered therein be set aside
(Record, 23, 116, 125).  An opposition
was registered by Rebecca Andres alleging that the tenants’ motion for reconsi­deration
is the “product of concoction with the purpose of misleading this
Honorable Court because of the petitioner’s (tenants’) desire to again enrich
themselves at the additional expense of the herein respondent (Rebecca
Andres)” and maintaining at the same time that the afore­said judgments
have already become final and definite in character pursuant to Section 12 of
Republic Act 1267, as amended by Republic Act 1409 (the law creating the Court
of Agrarian Relations), which section provides that “at the expiration of
fifteen (15) days from notice of the order or decision, judgment shall be
entered in accordance therewith, unless during said 15 days an aggrieved party
shall move for a reconsideration of the order or decision or
appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court as provided for
in the next succeeding section.” (See Opposition, pp.
25-26, Record.) On April
27, 1964 (9 months and 13 days from the filing of the
Motion for Reconsideration by the tenants), the Court of Agrarian Relations,
Judge Jose R. Cabatuando presiding, denied the
tenants’ Motion for Reconsideration filed in CAR Case 2217 in this wise:

“Considering that the decision in this case (CAR 2217), dated
December 7, 1962 was admittedly served upon movants
(tenants) on January 9, 1962; considering, further, that their petition for
reconsideration of the said decision was filed only on July 11, 1963, or six
(6) months from service of said decision, said motion for reconsideration, was,
therefore, filed out of time (Section 12, RA 1267, as amended).

“Wherefore, said petition for reconsideration is denied.”
(Record, p. 64.)

“During the interregnum,
meaning between the filing of the tenants’ Motion for reconsideration (July 9,
1963) and the denial Resolution (April 27, 1964), Federico Lamela
(member of the 2nd Group) filed with the CAR on December 12, 1963, Case 2815
(now CA-G.R. 34604); tenant Pedro Salcedo (member of
the 1st Group) filed CAR Case 2816 (now CA-G.R. 34605-R) on the same date;
tenant Amando Algabre
(member of the 1st Group) filed CAR Case 2817 (now CA-G.R. 34606-R) on the same
date; tenant Juan Bañes (member of the 3rd Group)
filed CAR Case 2818 (now CA-G.R. 34607-R) on the same date (Dec. 12, 1963);
tenant Genofreo Lamela
(member of the 2nd Group) filed CAR Case 2819 (now CA-G.R. 34608-R) on the date
already mentioned); and tenant Enrico Atañgan (member of the 1st Group) filed CAR Case 2826 (now
CA-G.R. No. 34609-R), all represented by Atty. Bernardo B. Pablo, praying in
each of these cases for reinstatement to the portions already vacated under the
compromise agreements and for damages (Record, pp. 27, 29, 32, 35, 38,
41).  The landholder, Rebecca Andres,
filed a motion to dismiss the above six (6) cases on January 6, 1964, predicated on res
judicata or prior judgment, meaning the
judgments rendered by Judge Valeriano del Valle approving the Compromise Agreement in CAR Cases
2217, 2455 and 2456 (now covered by CA-G.R. No. 34492-R).  (See Motion to Dismiss, p.
48, Record.) On February 24,
1964, Rebecca Andres’ Motion to Dismiss was overruled in a curt
order for lack of merits (Record, 51). 
Thereupon, on March 9, 1964,
Rebecca Andres was constrained to file her answer to the reinstatement cases
Nos. 2815, 2816, 2817, 2818, 2819, and 2826 wherein, once again, she rei­terated
the defenses of finality of judgment and res judicata (Record, 52).  On August
7, 1964, the reinstatement cases (CAR 2815, 2816, 2817, 2818, 2819
and 2826) were called for hearing before Commissioner Carmelino
L. Ipac for the proper presentation of evidence but
counsel for landholder Rebecca Andres (who was notified of this hearing on July 15, 1964) moved for postponement
and thereupon left the courtroom. 
Commissioner Ipac denied it in a written order
bearing the same date 7 August 1964
(Record, 110) and proceeded with the hearing thereof.  A petition by Rebecca Andres to set aside the
ex-parte hearing was denied by Judge Jose R. Cabatuando on August
27, 1964 (Record, 111).  This
is the present sta­tus of the aforesaid six reinstatement cases.

“Coming back to the compromise agreement
cases (CAR 2217, 2455 and 2456, subject of CA-G. R. 34492-R), we have
already stated that the finality of the judgment in CAR Case 2217 was sustained
by Judge Jose R. Cabatuando in his order of April 27, 1964 herein already copied
in full.  With respect, however, to this
same CAR Case 2217, in relation to Compromise Agreement sister-cases 2455 and
2456 wherein a Motion for Reconsideration has also been filed by Rebecca Andres
which were still unresolved, the Lower Court, Judge Jose R. Cabatuando
presiding, issued on July 15, 1964 a lengthy order vacating and setting
aside the judgments rendered therein dated December 7, 1962 (Case 2217), June
18, 1963 (Case 2455), and June 17, 1963 (Case 2456).  (Record, pp. 65-69.)
At least insofar as CAR Case 2217 is concerned, it will be noted at once that
the order of July 15, 1964
(vacating decision) is inconsistent with the order of April 27, 1964 (upholding the finality of the
judgment in said case 2217).  Be that as
it may, the reasons adduced by the Lower Court in setting aside the judgments
in these three compromise agreement cases are: 
(1) ‘no summons or other process was issued, no other pleading was
filed, no notice of hearing was issued, and no hearing was ever held’ (Record,
66); (2) ‘Before the filing of these three cases, there does not appear to be
any pending case in this Court between the same landholder on the one hand and
the tenants herein, on the other’ (Record, 66); and (3) ‘neither were they
(tenants) served with summons to appear in these three(3) cases.  We hold that the mere filing of the so-called
compromise agreements did not in itself vest the Court with jurisdiction over
the persons of said tenants’ (Record, 67). 
The motion of Rebecca Andres to reconsider this vacating order was denied
on August 11, 1964 (Record,
70, 74).  This is the situation of the
three compromise agreement cases.”

Just to make the
resolution of these cases clearer, it bears straightening out that there are
actually nine cases elevated to this Court. 
The first three are the cases wherein the three compromise agreements in
question were respectively filed, approved and subsequently set aside,
respectively numbered as CAR Cases Nos. 2217, 2455 and 2456 in the trial
court.  The other, six are those in which
individual tenants, already parties in the previous three cases aforementioned,
filed their respective motions asking for their reinstatement to the portions
of respondent Andres’ land already vacated by them pursuant to the
court-approved compromise agreements, which respondent Andres failed to have
dismissed by the CAR, on the ground of res adjudicata, and which Commissioner Carmelino L. Ipac of the CAR was
hearing at the time respondent Andres went to the Court of Appeals.  In any event, the dispositive
portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining, in part, herein
respondent Andres, is as follows:

“In view of the foregoing considerations, we declare null and
void the order of respondent Court of July 13, 1964 vacating the judgments of
CAR Cases Nos. 2217, 2455 and 2456 as well as the ex-parte
hearing conducted on August 7, 1964 by Commissioner Carmelino
L. Ipac in Reinstatement Cases Nos. 2815, 2816, 2817,
2818, 2819 and 2826.  The respondent
court is directed to set for hearing and reception of evidence CAR Cases Nos.
2217, 2455 and 2456 for the purpose of determining the following issues:  (a) whether the aforesaid judgments have
already become final as claimed; (b) in the negative, whether the evidence to
be presented by the parties are of sufficient quantum and quality to justify a
declaration of nullity of said judgments on the ground of fraud, violence
and/or intimidation, or for nonpayment of the compensation therein agreed
upon.  In the meantime, the respondent
Court is enjoined from proceeding with the reinstatement cases until after
final judgment shall have been rendered on the validity of the judgments
rendered in the Compromise Agreement cases and to maintain the status quo of
the parties in the condition in which they may be found at present.  No pronouncement is made as to costs.”

Petitioners are now
before this Court with the following assignment of errors:

“I

“THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE
DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN CAR CASES NOS. 2217, 2455 AND
2456 FOR SAID DECISIONS ARE NULL AND VOID BECAUSE YOUR PETITIONERS WERE
DEPRIVED OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

“II

“THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE HEARING
HELD BY THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN CAR CASES NOS. 2815, 2816, 2817,
2818, 2819 AND 2826, AND IN ENJOINING THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS FROM
PROCEEDING WITH SAID CASES”.

The particular portion of
the decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners assail reads thus:

“The first problem to be resolved is in reference to the Compromise
Agreement Cases (2217, 2455 and 2456). 
What is the effect of the approval by the Court of Agrarian Relations of
the compromise agreements between the landholder and the tenant concerning
their agricultural tenancy relationship in the absence of a pending case
between them?  In this regard, the Court
of Agrarian Relations in a number of cases (CAR Cases Nos. 31, 32 and 33-Rizal
158, March 6, 1958) held that “it may hear, decide and settle not only justiciable cases brought before it but also consider,
investigate and settle any question or matter involving agricultural tenancy
relations” (the Law on Agricultural Tenancy in the Philippines by Judge
Guillermo S. Santos, Supplement
1959, page 128).  In other words, the
Court of Agrarian Relations decisions on the matter are to the effect that by
virtue of power granted to it by Section 7 of Republic Act 1267, as amended by
Republic Act 1409 (creating the CAR), as well as by the Agricultural Tenancy
Act of 1954 itself (Section 21 of Republic Act 1199 as amended by Rep. Act 2263), it had authority to
approve Compromise Agreements although made out of court and without its
intervention, the principal reason for this stand being that “the Court
merely would be achieving the purposes for which it was created – to maintain
harmonious relations between the parties and/or prevent future disputes between
them, more effectively.” Thus, it has declared its authority in the
premises “to be independent of any formal petition and therefore capable
of being exercised motu proprio.”
To fortify this conclusion, the Court of Agrarian Relations cited the case of
Marquez vs. Marquez, 73 Phil. 74 (1941), which rules that stipulations in a
compromise approved by the Court becomes orders of the Court contained in the
judgment rendered in accordance with the compromise.  Under Article 2038 NCC, ‘a compromise is a contract whereby the
parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a li­tigation
or put an end to one already commenced.’ Upon the other hand, Article 2037, NCC,
states that ‘a compromise has
upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata, but there shall be no execution
except in compliance with a judicial compromise.’ From these provisions of the
New Civil Code herein quoted, it is clear that a compromise may either be
judicial or extrajudicial, depending upon whether its object be
to terminate a suit already instituted or to avoid a future litigation.  Whether it be
judicial or extrajudicial, a compromise has, with respect to the parties, the
same authority as res judicata
with the sole difference that only a compromise made in court may be enforced
by execution in accordance with the latter clause of Article 2037, NCC.  We find no reason to disagree with the
aforementioned interpretation made by the Court of Agrarian Relations in the
sense that the effect of C.A.R. approved agreements, even in the absence of a
pending action between the parties, can be equated with that of judicial
compromises under Article 2037 of the New Civil Code.  And that the C.A.R. was right in extending
its authority to approve compromise agreements made out of court and without
its intervention.”

The main gripe of
petitioners centers on the manner in which the questioned compromise agreements
were submitted to and approved by the trial court.  It is their view that inasmuch as there was
then no case pending in said court between them and respondent Andres and
neither is there any showing that such a case was even brewing and, more
specifically, there was no complaint filed by either of the parties and,
consequently, no summons served to any of them, the orders of the trial court
approving the said compromise agreements are more or less legally officious and
constitute a deprivation of the due process of law to them, apart from the fact
that the court had no jurisdiction over the matter by reason, precisely of such
absence of a duly filed action therewith. 
It is enough answer to this posture of petitioners that the service of
summons is not always indis­pensable to the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of the parties. 
Such jurisdiction was acquired in the cases in question by virtue of the
voluntary appearance of both parties when they jointly submitted for approval
of the court the mentioned compromises. 
More than that, as well observed by the Court of Appeals, the procedure
followed by the trial court in respect to said compromise agreements was in
line with the then existing practice in the CAR, pursuant to the powers granted
to it by law, of approving compromise agreements, although made out of court
and without its intervention, “the principal reason for this stand being
that the Court merely would be achieving the purposes for which it was created
– to maintain harmonious relations between the parties and/or prevent future
disputes between them, more effectively.”

To be sure, according to
petitioners, in their brief, the CAR subsequently yielded to observations
brought to its attention regarding the possibility that such practice of
approving extrajudicial compromises could be violative
of the due process clause of the Constitution and, what is more pertinent, it
could also give occasion to the approval of agreements vitiated by the absence
of real consent, freely given, of the parties, and for this reason, the then
Presiding Judge, Hon. Guillermo Santos of the CAR initiated the amendment of its
rules of procedure, and, on July 1, 1959, the CAR approved a rule entitled
“Rule 4, Mediation and Arbitration”, by which it established what it
calls “Pre-Litigation Proceedings”, the main pertinent features of
which are:  (1) the requirement that in
instances wherein there exists “a matter or question involving the
relation of landholder and tenant for the purpose of settling the same
through mediation or arbitration, the proceedings is to be commenced by the
filing of a letter-complaint with the Court; (2) that “if the parties to a
pre-litigation proceeding, settle their dispute and file a joint petition for
the approval of their compromise agreement or if, for failure of the Court’s
mediation efforts one of the parties files a formal petition, the joint
petition or formal petition shall be assigned a new docket number as a ‘CAR
Case’ with necessary reference or notation made in the pre-litigation
docket” and that “if the
matter is settled amicably, a memorandum of the terms and conditions of the agreement shall be reduced to writing,
signed and/or acknowledged by
the parties and two
witnesses, selected by each party and submitted to the Court for its approval through a joint petition.  The written agreement of the
parties, if not contrary to law, morals or public policy, may be approved and
shall be the basis for the decision or judgment of the court.” And it is
now contended that:

“(1)    Rule 4 requires that the proceedings be commenced by a
letter-complaint.  There was no letter
complaint filed in connection with said cases.

“(2)    Rule 4 requires that
the court actively participate in the conciliation proceedings in these cases.

“(3)    Rule 4 requires that
the amicable agreement of the parties be sworn to or acknowledge by the parties
in the presence of witnesses.  In these
cases, it is true that the agreements were acknowledged by the parties, but the
acknowledgments were performed before an officer who had no authority to
administer oath, and, hence, the effect is the same as if the agreements were
not acknowledged.  (Ang
Bayan ng Pilipinas, laban kay Tomas Lopez, CA-GR 04148-R, Agosto
21, 1964)

“In resume, therefore, it may be stated that the Court in CAR
Cases 2217, 2455 and 2456 not only disregarded the requirements of Rule 4,
Rules of the CAR, but approved the agreements of the parties under the very
circumstances which said Rule 4 sought
to guard against.  Considering now that
the Court of Agrarian Relations itself, subsequent to the decision in CAR Cases
Nos. 31, 32 and 33, adopted a method of procedure virtually abandoning said
decision by insuring that the Court will “hear” the parties before
rendering judgment, we submit that this Honorable Court erred in relying on
said decision.” (pp. 18-19 of petitioners’ brief)

We do not find merit in petitioners’ argument
invoking violation of due process.  If,
indeed, there was any deviation in the cases in question from the rules of the
CAR approved on July 1, 1959, the same can not amount to a deprivation of due
process, if only for the simple reason that the essence of due process is the
requirement of notice and hearing, and, surely, when both parties who
could be po­tential adversaries come together to the court and seek the
imprimatur thereof of a written agreement signed by them, the need for notice
and hearing loses completely its significance.

It was but proper for the CAR to have adopted procedures to
insure that compromises submitted to it for approval do not suffer from any
defect in the consent of the parties, but, putting aside the fact that,
incidentally, We do not see in the above-quoted pertinent rules, how such
laudable purpose could be achieved when what is required, in this connection,
is but the filing of a joint petition acknowledged by the parties and two
witnesses, and not a mandatory hearing of said petition wherein the court would
directly intervene, We do not believe a case of denial of due process may be
made out should one of the parties to a compromise approved by the court
complain that said compromise suffers from serious flaws in the consent of the
parties.  At the most, there could be an
annulment of the compromise by reason only of lack of consent.  Truly, We can make Our decision in this case
rest upon the foregoing premises, but considering, however, that since the approval
of the Agricultural Land Reform Code on August 8, 1963, not very long after the compromises herein involved
were approved, the agrarian courts have been transformed virtually into purely
judicial courts stripped of most of the administrative functions it had before,
and governed no longer by rules of procedure of its own making but by the Rules
of Court, We prefer to decide these cases on a basis which appears to be less
controversial and of clearer prospective application than the invoked practice
in the CAR.

In truth, the decision of the Court of Appeals is not based
exclusively on the juridical import or consequence attributable to the approval
by the trial court of the compromises in question.  Plain to everyone who would make a detained
perusal of the assailed portion of the said decision must be the dictum
contained in these words:  “Under
Article 2038, N.C.C., ‘a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced.  Upon the other hand, Article
2037, N.C.C., states that ‘a compromise has upon the parties the effect and
authority of res adjudicata,
but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise’.  From these provisions of
the New Civil Code herein quoted, it is clear that a compromise may either be
judicial or extrajudicial, depending upon whether its object be
to terminate a suit already instituted or to avoid a future litigation.  Whether it be
judicial or extrajudicial, a compromise has, with respect to the parties, the
same authority as res adjudicata
with the sole difference that only a compromise made in court may be enforced
by execution in accordance with the latter clause of Article 2037,
N.C.C.”.  In these words, the Court
of Appeals is saying that the approval given by the court to a compromise is
not necessary to make a compromise agreement have the effect of res adjudicata upon
the parties, the agreement per se, and without more, being res adjudicata upon
its perfection and execution, and perhaps more, upon the partial compliance
therewith by any of the parties thereto. 
This is tantamount to saying that even if it were legally tenable to
hold that the trial court’s approval of the compromise agreements in question
was irregular and void, as an act of the said court in excess of its
jurisdiction or even without jurisdiction at all, the res
adjudicata character of the said agreements is
still the agreements themselves by mandate of the aforequoted
provisions of the N.C.C., albeit they may not be enforced by execution.  In other words, the fact that the trial
court, by its order of July 15, 1964, had vacated and set aside its approval of
the questioned agreements, on the grounds of denial of due process and want of
jurisdiction is inconsequential; the said agreements, by themselves alone,
since they are signed by the parties and they had already complied with their
terms, constitute res adjudicata
just the same.  And We
have no hesitancy in agreeing that this view is fully in accordance with the
law.  (Meneses
v. De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 34, 38) Accordingly, We hold
that the Court of Appeals is correct in refusing to give its stamp of approval
to the trial court’s just mentioned nullifying order of July 15, 1964.

The foregoing, however, settles only one aspect of these
cases.  Actually, the motions for
reconsideration in CAR Cases Nos. 2217, 2455 and 2456 alleged as grounds
thereof neither denial of due process nor want of jurisdiction, their present
pose in these regards being merely an adoption of the grounds of the motu proprio order
of the trial court of July 15, 1964. 
What petitioners alleged in their motion were “coercion,
intimidation and trickery in secur­ing the signature of the tenants on the
compromise agreement aforementioned as well as non-payment of the amounts
agreed upon therein.” (Decision of CA, supra.) These grounds were not passed upon by the trial court nor was
any evidence presented to substantiate the same.  While it is true that “a compromise in
which there is a mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or
falsity of documents is subject to the provisions of Article 1330 of the New
Civil Code” (Art. 2038, N.C.C.), and said Article 1330 says that “a
contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence, or fraud is voidable“, so much so
that, as this Court has already held in the case of Sajona
v. Sheriff, 95 Phil. 955 (Unreported), (G.R. No. L-5603, Aug. 24, 1954) that a
compromise has the effect of res adjudicata only if there has been no vitiated
consent, the jurisprudence in this Court as to Article 1330 holds that there
must be clear and convincing evidence of the pre­sence of vitiated consent (Centenera v. Palicio, 29 Phil.
470) and that in the Court of Appeals, as to Article 2038, is to the same
effect.  (Rojas et al. v.
Rumbava, CA, 52 O.G. 2605) We hold, therefore, that the Court of
Appeals acted aptly in ruling that these cases be returned to the trial court
for the determination of the truth of the allegation of vitiated consent made
by petitioners on the basis of the evidence the parties may present in
connection therewith, albeit not in relation to the decisions in question but
to the compromise agreements themselves. 
In this connection, to avoid further delay, the trial court should treat
these cases, not merely as motions to set aside the questioned decisions, but
as actions to set aside the compromise agreements themselves.  To this end, it is not necessary to determine whether or not the said decisions
have become final and executory, which is required in
the decision of the Court of Appeals.

With the above resolution of the issues in so far as CAR Cases
Nos. 2217, 2455 and 2456 are concerned, the appeal in regard to the other six
cases, called Reinstatement Cases, bearing CAR Cases Nos. 2815, 2816, 2817,
2818, 2819 and 2826, is automatically resolved along the same lines.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed, with the sole modification that the requirement upon the trial
court to determine if the decisions in question have already become final is
eliminated.  No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro, Fernando, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar and Capistrano, JJ., did not take part.