PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MICHELLE BERINGA AND JOSEPHINE CORITANA, ACCUSED,
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People versus Beringa
The Case
This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Michelle Beringa and Josephine Coritana for the killing of an eighty-eight-year-old lawyer, Attorney Emilio Venegas, who was found dead in his own home office with a wire around his neck. Beringa alone stood trial, was convicted of homicide rather than murder, and appealed. The case matters to the reviewee because it is a clean teaching vehicle on two points that examiners love: the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt, and the correct range of the penalty for homicide when no modifying circumstance is proven.
Procedural History
An Information for murder was filed against Beringa and Coritana. On arraignment, Beringa, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty; as to Coritana, who remained at large, the case was sent to the archives. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, rendered its Decision dated 18 April 2012, finding Beringa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, not murder, because the qualifying circumstances had not been proven, and sentencing her to imprisonment of fourteen years, eight months and one day to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, and ordering her to pay the heirs moral damages of 50,000 pesos, civil liability ex delicto of 50,000 pesos, and actual damages of 300,000 pesos. Beringa appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which decided the case through its Third Division, with Justice de Guia-Salvador writing the opinion.
Facts
Beringa worked as a housemaid of Attorney Venegas beginning May 2008, her specific task being to cook. Two days before the killing, the old man got mad at the maids, and the maids were heard to say that if he got mad again, they would retaliate. On the evening of 12 September 2008, the victim's son Manuel arrived home with his family and found the gate unopened; after entering, the household found the victim lifeless in his basement office, blood at the back of his head and a wire around his neck. There was no sign of forced entry. Both maids were gone, together with their personal belongings.
Beringa testified that at about seven in the evening she heard the victim shout, "Josephine, Josephine, help me!" She went to the office but the door was locked; Josephine then left with her bag. Beringa said her boyfriend Rommel Pabuaya, who was visiting her that day for the first time and was unknown to the victim, dragged her out of the house and took her to Bagong Silangan, where she stayed four months, then to Cadiz, Negros, where she was kept for about a week until her arrest. She learned of her employer's death only in April 2009, when the victim's secretary, Nina Garcia, reached her by text message; Garcia played along to obtain her address, which led to the arrest.
The trial court convicted her of homicide on circumstantial evidence: that she and Josephine were left alone with the victim that morning while he was still alive; that the victim had scolded them and they resented it; and that in the evening he was found dead and both maids had left and could no longer be found.
Issues
- Whether or not the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that Beringa strangled the victim to death.
- Whether or not the trial court imposed the correct penalty for homicide.
Applicable Provisions
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes homicide:
Article 249. Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
This is the provision under which Beringa was convicted, and it fixes reclusion temporal as the penalty.
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code governs the imposition of penalties with modifying circumstances:
Article 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances: 1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.
This is the rule the Court applied in correcting the penalty, there being no modifying circumstance proven.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the appeal was bereft of merit and upheld the conviction. Direct evidence is not the only matrix from which guilt may be drawn; circumstantial evidence alone suffices when there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The circumstances must point to the accused's guilt and be inconsistent with innocence. The Court added its own observations: Rommel had no motive and no reason to kill, being a first-time visitor unknown to the victim, and no valuables were shown to be missing, excluding robbery as a motive. Against Beringa, the Court found it incredible that she would leave her employer while he shouted for help without checking on him even after the door was opened, that she would not protest being dragged out, and that she would not protest four months of detention in Bagong Silangan and another week in Cadiz. Her presence at the scene during the violence, her flight, and her silence pointed to her participation, whether in conspiracy with Rommel or on her own. Her claim that mere presence proves nothing failed, because what implicated her was not mere presence but presence during the crime and flight thereafter. Her hearsay objection to the scolding likewise failed, since the son testified to what he personally witnessed in the same household.
On the second issue, the Court found merit in her contention and corrected the penalty. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal, and with neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance proven, it must be imposed in its medium period, which is fourteen years, eight months and one day to seventeen years and four months.
Doctrine
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt; the circumstances must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with every other rational hypothesis except guilt. Flight, silence, and unexplained failure to report a crime, taken with admitted presence at the scene, may complete the chain. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punished by reclusion temporal, and under Article 64, absent any modifying circumstance, the penalty is imposed in its medium period.
Disposition
The appeal was denied and the conviction for homicide affirmed, but the penalty was corrected to the medium period of reclusion temporal, from fourteen years, eight months and one day to seventeen years and four months.
Remember This
Memorize the three requisites of circumstantial evidence and the rule that no modifying circumstance means the medium period. Examiners use this case to test sufficiency of circumstantial evidence and the correct penalty for homicide under Article 249 with Article 64.