G.R. No. L-42626. December 08, 1982
ANITA G. TORRES AND LAZARO TORRES, PETITIONERS, VS. NORA S. YU, JOSE B. YU AND COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the much discussed and vexed question as to
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under section 45 of the Judiciary Law,
as amended by Republic Act No. 6031, to review the decision of the Court of
First Instance in cases exclusively cognizable by an inferior court.
The municipal court of Lingayen, Pangasinan in its decision dated September 1, 1975 in an ejectment suit, Civil Case No. 3509, ordered the Yu spouses
to vacate the one-third portion on the southern side of Stall No. 1 of the Lingayen Central Market
and to pay the spouses Anita G. Torres and Lazaro
Torres the sum of ninety pesos a month from February 19, 1975 until the
possession of the stall is restored to the Torres spouses (p. 27, Rollo).
The Yu spouses appealed to the Court of First Instance which in a
decision dated October 27, 1975
in Civil Case No. 15178 affirmed the municipal court’s judgment (p. 40, Rollo). A copy of
that decision was received by the Yu spouses on October 28, 1975.
Fifteen days later, they filed a motion for reconsideration. They received the order denying it on December 9, 1975 (p. 75, Rollo). Fourteen
days later, or on December 23, they mailed their petition for review to the
Court of Appeals (p. 5, Rollo).
The Court of Appeals in its resolution of January 13, 1976 gave
due course to that petition, required the Torres spouses to answer it, set the
case for hearing on February 11 and directed the issuance of a preliminary
injunction upon private respondents’ filing of a bond in the sum of one
thousand pesos (Yu vs. Torres, CA-G. R. No. SP-04952).
That resolution was assailed by the Torres spouses in the instant
special civil action of certiorari which they filed in this Court on February 2, 1976. Their petition was given due course. (In the meantime, the decision of the Court
of First Instance was executed).
The Torres spouses
contend that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 6031
to review the said decision of the Court of First Instance because the issue of
whether its factual findings are supported by substantial evidence is
allegedly a purely legal question which this Court has the exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve (pp. 7 and 11, Rollo).
Diametrically opposed to
that contention is the position taken by the respondents Yu. They contend that whether the factual
findings in the decision of the Court of First Instance are supported by
substantial evidence is an issue that is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals (pp. 95, 100-103, Rollo).
In resolving these conflicting views, it is necessary to examine
the lawmaker’s efforts to diminish the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
over cases decided by the Court of First Instance which are exclusively
cognizable by inferior courts and thus relieve in some measure the congestion
of cases in the appellate courts.
In the beginning, all cases decided by the Court of First
Instance involving factual issues were appealable to
the Court of Appeals as a matter of right.
Note that no distinction was made as to cases coming from inferior
courts and cases originally filed in the Court of First Instance. Before the Judiciary Law was amended, it
provided:
“SEC. 29. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.- The Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases, actions, and
proceedings not enumerated in section seventeen of this Act, properly brought
to it from Courts of First Instance. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in such cases shall be final:
“Provided, however, That the Supreme Court in its
discretion may, in any case involving a question of law, upon petition of the
party aggrieved by the decision and under rules and conditions that it may
prescribe, require by certiorari that the said case be certified to it
for review and determination, as if the case had been brought before it on
appeal.”
To avoid protracted litigations over cases coming from inferior
courts, like ejectment cases, which could pass
through four courts, including this Court, the lawmaking body found it
expedient to abolish appeals to the Court of Appeals from judgments of the
Court of First Instance in cases decided by inferior courts and to allow the
Court of Appeals to review the said judgments by means of a petition for review
under certain conditions.
Hence, it enacted Republic Act No. 5433, which took effect on
September 9, 1968 and which amended section 29 by providing that decisions of
Courts of First Instance rendered after trial on the merits in the exercise of
their appellate jurisdiction, which affirm in full the judgment of an
inferior court, may be elevated to the Court of Appeals by the aggrieved
party only on petition for review and that the Court of Appeals may
entertain that petition when it shows prima facie that the Court of
First Instance “has committed errors of fact or of fact and law that would
warrant reversal or modification of the judgment or decision sought to be
reviewed”. For reference, section
29, as amended by Republic Act No. 5433, is quoted below:
“SEC. 29. Jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases, actions,
and proceedings, not enumerated in section seventeen of this Act, properly
brought to it, except final judgments or decisions of Courts of First Instance
rendered after trial on the merits in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction,
which affirm in full the judgment or decision of a municipal or city court, in
which cases the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals
only on petition for review, to which the Court of Appeals shall give
due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the court has
committed errors of fact or of fact and law that would warrant reversal or
modification of the judgment or decision sought to be reviewed. The decision of the Court of Appeals shall be
final:
“Provided, however, That the Supreme Court in its
discretion may, in any case involving a question of law, upon petition of the
party aggrieved by the decision and under rules and conditions that it may
prescribe, require by certiorari that the said case be certified
to it for review and determination, as if the case had been brought before it
on appeal.”
On the other hand,
section 45 of the Judiciary Law originally provided that “Courts of First
Instance shall have appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in municipal
and justice of the peace courts, in their respective provinces”. Note that no distinction was made between
cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts and cases falling within the
concurrent jurisdiction of inferior courts and the Court of First Instance.
Republic Act No. 2613,
which took effect on August 1, 1959 and which enlarged the jurisdiction of
inferior courts in criminal cases, amended sections 45 and 87 by providing that
the decisions of justices of the peace of provincial capitals and city judges
in criminal cases where the penalty does not exceed six years’ imprisonment or
a fine of three thousand pesos, or both, shall be appealable
directly to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court as the case may be. The proceedings in such cases shall be
recorded.
In the meantime, Republic
Acts Nos. 3345, 3820 and 3828 changed the designation of justice of the
peace and municipal judge into municipal judge and city judge,
respectively. The term “inferior
court” is now used to refer to municipal and city courts (SC Resolution of
December 23, 1963).
Republic Act No. 6031,
which took effect on August 4, 1969, amended section 77 of the Judiciary
Law by providing that “all municipal and city courts shall keep records of
their proceedings in the same manner as courts of first instance” and
“all judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in writing
personally and directly prepared by the municipal or city judge, stating
clearly the facts and the law on which they are based, signed by him, and filed
with the clerk of court”. Thus,
inferior courts became courts of record.
Republic Act No. 6031
also amended section 45 of the Judiciary Law by abolishing the trial de novo
provided for in section 9, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court (when inferior courts
were not court of records) and by requiring the Court of First Instance in
deciding cases appealed from the inferior court to decide them on the
basis of the record transmitted from the inferior court to the Court of First
Instance.
Republic Act No. 6031
further amended section 45 by adopting the innovation introduced by Republic
Act No. 5433 in section 29 of the Judiciary Law. That amendment or innovation is that the
decision of the Court of First Instance in cases exclusively cognizable by the
inferior court shall be final.
But in contrast with Republic Act No. 5433, Republic Act No.
6031 (enacted less than a year from the enactment of Republic Act No. 5433)
provides that the decision of the Court of First Instance in cases exclusively
cognizable by the inferior court shall be final only when the factual findings
in the said decision are supported by substantial evidence and the conclusions
therein are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence.
Another amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 6031 into
section 45 is that the decision of the inferior court in cases falling within
the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and an inferior
court shall be appealable directly to the Court of
Appeals whose decision shall be final, subject to review by this Court on
legal questions as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As amended, section 45 reads:
“SEC. 45. Appellate jurisdiction.- Courts of First Instance shall have appellate
jurisdiction over all cases arising in city and municipal courts, in their
respective provinces, except over appeals from cases tried by municipal judges
of provincial capitals or city judges pursuant to the authority granted under
the last paragraph of Section 87 of this Act.
“Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on
the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal
courts: Provided, That the
parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so
requested: Provided, however,
That if the case was tried in a city or municipal court before the latter
became a court of record, then on appeal the case shall proceed by trial de
novo.
“In cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts which are appealed to the courts of first instance,
the decision of the latter shall be final:
Provided, That the findings of facts contained in said decision
are supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof, and the conclusions
are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence; in cases falling under the
concurrent jurisdictions of the
municipal and city courts with the courts of first instance, the appeal
shall be made directly to the court of appeals whose decision shall be
final: Provided, however, that
the Supreme Court in its discretion
may, in any case involving a question of law, upon petition of the party
aggrieved by the decision and under rules and conditions that it may prescribe,
require by certiorari that the case be certified to it for review
and determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.”
It is at once evident that Republic Acts Nos. 5433 and 6031
overlap or are in pari materia
with respect to the finality of the decision of the Court of First Instance in
cases exclusively cognizable by an inferior court such as ejectment cases.
Both laws abolished appeal by record on appeal to the Court of Appeals
from the decision of the Court of First Instance in cases exclusively
cognizable by an inferior court. Such
cases are not, repeat, are not appealable to
the Court of Appeals.
Both Republic Acts Nos. 5433 and 6031, the former in section 29,
dealing with the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and the latter
in section 45, dealing with the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance, intend that litigation should, if possible, be terminated in the
Court of First Instance.
However, both amendatory
laws assume that the Court of First Instance is not infallible. Therefore, in exceptional cases the
rule on finality should not be enforced and the decision of the Court of First
Instance in the cases exclusively cognizable by an inferior court should be
reviewed by an appellate court.
Republic Act No. 5433 provides that the decision of the Court of
First Instance in that kind of cases may
be reviewed by the Court of Appeals
by means of a petition for review when it is apparent that the Court of
First Instance committed errors of fact or of fact and law and that there is
some basis for possible reversal or modification of its decision
notwithstanding the fact that the Court of First Instance affirmed in toto the inferior court’s decision.
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6031, while allowing also the
review of the decision of the Court of First Instance in those same cases, does
not unmistakably and explicitly indicate the appellate court that should
undertake the review and by what means the review should be made. That deficiency or silence has generated
controversy.
Republic Act No. 6031
changed the grounds for review spelled out in Republic Act No. 5433. Republic Act No. 6031 provides that the
grounds for review are that the factual findings in the decision of the Court
of First Instance in the said class of cases are not supported by substantial
evidence and that its conclusions are contrary to law and jurisprudence.
It is obvious that, as to the grounds for review, there is
repugnancy between the two amendatory laws.
Republic Act No. 6031, as the later law, should prevail and should be
deemed to have superseded Republic Act No. 5433 on the matter of the review by
the Court of Appeals of decisions of the Court of First Instance in cases
exclusively cognizable by inferior courts.
But Republic Act No. 5433 should not be considered totally
abrogated by the later law because Republic Act No. 5433, in indicating that
the mode of review is by petition for review and that the Court of Appeals is
the tribunal to undertake the review, supplies the deficiencies of Republic Act
No. 6031 on these matters.
The question of whether it is this Court or the Court of Appeals
that should review the decision of the Court of First Instance in cases
exclusively cognizable by inferior courts has been debated for a long time in
this Court. The pros and cons have been
thoroughly threshed out. One school of
thought believes that the petition should always be filed in this Court.
Of course, that solution would aggravate the congestion of cases in this
Court.
It is said that hard cases make bad law. The converse is true. A bad law (meaning a law that is ambiguous
and deficient) makes cases hard.
Republic Act No. 6031 is such a law.
The lawmaking body did not indubitably clarify whether it was intended
to repeal Republic Act No. 5433 and where the petition for review should be
filed.
We hold that if the only issue is whether the conclusions of the
Court of First Instance are in consonance with law and jurisprudence, then
that issue is a purely legal
question. It should be ventilated in
this Court by means of a petition for review on certiorari, as expressly
provided in the last proviso of section 45, as amended by Republic Act. No. 6031.
The petition for review in that case should be in the form
prescribed in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court for an appeal from the Court of
Appeals, a form adopted by Republic Act No. 5440 which took effect on September 9, 1968.
But if the issue is whether “the findings of fact
contained” in the decision of the Court of First Instance “are
supported by substantial evidence“, which is not purely a legal issue,
or if that issue is raised together with the legal issue of whether the
conclusions of the Court of First Instance are in conformity with pertinent law
and jurisprudence, then the petition for review should be filed in the Court of
Appeals.
Those issues require an examination and evaluation of the
evidence. As that function is the
prerogative of the Court of Appeals, the review in that case should be by means of a petition for review.
Realizing the deficiencies
in Republic Act No. 6031, the Court of Appeals adopted on August 12, 1971 the
following resolution (67 O. G. 6715) which prescribes the filing of a petition
for review when the decision of the Court of First Instance in cases exclusively
cognizable by an inferior court is assailed for not being supported by
substantial evidence and because its conclusions are claimed to be contrary to
law and jurisprudence:
“WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 6031 does not prescribe the
procedure to be followed by the Court of Appeals in the review of judgments of
the Courts of First Instance, in cases falling under the original exclusive
jurisdiction of the municipal and city courts, where the findings of facts of
the Courts of First Instance are assailed for not being supported by
substantial evidence as basis thereof
and the conclusions are claimed to be clearly against the law and
jurisprudence;
“WHEREAS, it is the
sense of this Court that a uniform practice be followed by all its divisions
and members thereof in reviewing the abovementioned decisions of Courts of
First Instance;
“NOW THEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED, that
the following practice be observed in elevating to this Court for review
decisions of Courts of First Instance in cases falling under the original exclusive
jurisdiction of municipal and city courts:
“SECTION 1. That the aggrieved party shall file within
the period for appealing six (6) copies of a verified petition for the review
of the decision of the Court of First Instance.
The petition shall contain a concise statement of the matters involved
and the grounds and arguments relied upon, specifically pointing out why the
decision in question is not supported by substantial evidence and/or is clearly
against the law and jurisprudence. The
petition shall be accompanied with a certified true copy of the decision or
judgment sought to be reviewed, together with copies of such material portions
of the record as would support the allegations of the petition. As much as possible, the petition shall be a
sort of a brief of the aggrieved party.
“SEC. 2. Upon the filing of the petition, the
petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals the docketing
fee. If the Court finds that, from the
allegations of the petition, the same is not prima facie meritorious or
is intended manifestly for delay, the Court may outright dismiss the petition,
otherwise, the same shall be given due course, in which case, the petitioner
shall deposit the amount of eighty pesos (P80.00) for costs within three days
from notice of the resolution giving due course to the petition. Upon the failure of the petitioner to deposit
the amount for costs within the said
period of three (3) days, the petition shall be dismissed.
“SEC. 3. Immediately after the deposit for costs is
made, the Court shall order the respondents to answer the petition for review
within ten (10) days, unless the Court shall grant the respondents a longer
period, and shall likewise order the corresponding Clerk of the Court of First
Instance to elevate the whole record, including the oral (transcript of
stenographic notes) and documentary evidence, of the case to this Court within
ten (10) days. The answer of the
respondents, which shall also be in six copies, shall be accompanied with true
copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein
together with other supporting papers.
Likewise the answer shall take the place of the respondents’ brief.
“SEC. 4. After the filing of the answer, the petitioner
may reply thereto within five (5) days from receipt of copy thereof, after
which, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless either party
shall, within five (5) days from the filing of petitioner’s reply, ask that the
petition be heard on oral argument, which may or may not be granted at the
discretion of the Court.”
In the instant case, the Yu spouses in filing their petition for
review in the Court of Appeals simply followed the said resolution. It is a correct implementation of Republic
Act No. 6031 which has been in force for more than eleven years now (See Buenbrazo vs. Marave, L-41144,
December 29, 1980, 101 SCRA 849 and Estrella vs. CA,
56284, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 581).
The Yu spouses assailed the adverse judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan on the ground that the
factual findings therein are not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals (per Gatmaitan, J.) acted within its jurisdiction and did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the petition for review
of the Yu spouses.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed with costs against
the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Concepcion,
Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Escolin, Relova, and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, Acting C.J., De Castro and Vasquez, JJ., file
their separate opinion.
Fernando, C.J., on leave.
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SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
DE CASTRO, J.:
With how exhaustive and analytical are the main opinion and the
separate concurring opinion of Justice Vasquez on the “vexing”
question treated by them, it is hoped the following observations will not be mere
superfluities, much less devoid of any merit.
The provision of Section 29 of the Judiciary Act, before and
after its amendment by Republic Act No. 5433, clearly showed a legislative
intent to place the greater burden in appeals from the decisions of the Court
of First Instance on the Court of Appeals.
What is reserved to the Supreme Court is the power to review decisions
in any case when they involve only questions of law. It is, therefore, hard to ascribe to the
legislative body that in enacting Republic Act No. 6031, it intended to
eliminate altogether the Court of Appeals from the judicial process involving a
review of the aforementioned decisions and place the entire burden on the
Supreme Court, as would be the effect of the view that appeals from the
decisions of the Court of First Instance referred to in Republic Act No. 6031
should all go directly to the Supreme Court bypassing the Court of Appeals.
The rule has always been that if the questions raised are one of
fact or both fact and law, the appeal goes to the Court of Appeals. The first ground mentioned in Republic Act
No. 6031 on the substantiality of the evidence is, in my humble opinion, if not
one involving solely a question of fact, one involving both question of fact
and law.
The mere fact that this ground is set apart from the other
ground, to wit: that “the
conclusions are clearly against the law and jurisprudence” evinces an
intention to distinguish one from the other, insofar as the nature of the
question as may be raised from either of the two grounds, is concerned. The first ground has reference to the evidence
which has to be assessed and evaluated, which necessarily involves the
determination of what the fact proven or not proven is. The separate mention of this ground from the
second, which explicitly involves question of law or jurisprudence, implies a
nature of the question arising from the first, different from that expressly
stated in the second ground which doubtlessly raises question of law.
The first ground of “substantiality of evidence” could
perhaps be a question of law when the evidence has been evaluated by the Court
in such arbitrary or erroneous manner that the act would constitute a grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. But before making this conclusion, the
factual basis has first to be laid. This
means coming to grip with a question of fact, and of necessity, making first a
conclusion of fact after assessing the evidence before making the legal
conclusion as to the commission of grave abuse of discretion by the lower
court.
There is thus no evading the conclusion that when the appeal from
the decision of the Court of First Instance under Republic Act No. 6031 is
based on the first ground–substantiality of the evidence–what is raised is a
question of fact, or at least a mixed question of law and of fact, which makes
the appeal cognizable by the Court of Appeals, not directly or exclusively, by
the Supreme Court.
Justice Vasquez cited Section 22 of B.P. No. 129, which, to me, lends
support to the view that the Court of Appeals was never intended, under
Republic Act No. 6031, to be stripped of appellate jurisdiction over appeals
taken from decisions of the Courts of First Instance on cases appealed to them
from the inferior courts as therefore exercised by it. Had that been the intention, which would be a sudden and sharp departure from
the appeal procedure then existing and
being observed, Republic Act No. 6031 should have, in all likelihood, not
failed to indicate such intent with clear and unequivocal terms.
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SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE, Acting C.J.:
I concur in the result which upholds the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals to review the adverse judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan under the provisions of section 45 of
the Judiciary Act, as amended by Republic Act 6031 which took effect on August 4, 1969.
In essence, the conflict of views that arose in the Court after
the enactment of Republic Act 6031 is as to where the petition for
review on certiorari of the final decision of the Court of First
Instance acting as an appellate court in appealed cases exclusively originating
from the municipal and city courts should be filed.* One view
is that all such petitions for review should be filed with the Court of
Appeals, subject to the reserved jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of reviewing
on certiorari cases involving pure questions of law. The other adheres to the main opinion’s
orthodox view that if questions of fact are involved, the petition for review
should be filed with the Court of Appeals; and that if the petition for review
involves pure questions of law, then the petition should be filed with the
Supreme Court. (Still a third view would
have all such petitions filed only with the Supreme Court, which would add to the congestion of cases filed with
this Court.)
I believe that the historical record sustains the first view and
shows that Republic Act 6031 was enacted to lessen the number of appeals that a
litigant could take in a case and to relieve the Supreme Court of having to
pass over appeals or petitions for review of cases originating from the
exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal and city courts. Hence, the Act provided for only one appeal
from cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal and
city courts – to the Courts of First Instance, further expressly providing that
the decision of the Courts of First Instance shall be final, thus cutting off any further appeal to a higher court. The Act made a proviso, however, that for
such finality of the decision of the Court of First Instance, acting as an
appellate court, to stand, the “findings of fact contained in the said
decision (must be) supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof and the
conclusions are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence.” The
proviso involves mixed questions of fact and law, to wit: there must be substantial evidence to support
the findings of fact and the conclusions drawn therefrom
“are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence;” and the
appellate court with proper jurisdiction over such mixed questions of fact and
law and with whom all petitions for review should be uniformly filed is the
Court of Appeals which is supposed to have under the Judiciary Act fifteen (15)
divisions composed of three (3) members each and is, therefore, fully equipped
to handle and dispose of all such petitions for review. It should also be noted that the criterion
provided by the Act is the substantial evidence rule which does not involve a
painstaking review of evidence submitted during the trial in the municipal or
city court but merely the determination of the existence in the record of such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the
findings and conclusion. Prescinding from the mixed questions of fact and law
involved by the Act’s proviso, and assuming that the petition raises a pure
question of law, there is nothing objectionable in having the Court of Appeals
pass upon and determine the same, subject to the reserved jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court over such questions. The
last proviso of the third paragraph of the Act expressly recognizes such
reserved and ultimate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases involving pure
questions of law as vested in it by the Constitution [Art. X, section 5 (2)
(e)] and therefore provides that the Supreme Court, in its discretion, may in
such cases require by certiorari that the case be certified to it for
review and determination.
In brief, although the statute’s wording may have lacked the
requisite precision (specially if it is considered that section 29 of the
Judiciary Act was left standing when it should be deemed superseded by the
provisions of the Act), the law as it stands now under Republic Act 6031
provides for finality of the decision of the Court of First Instance in
appealed cases originating from the exclusive original jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts. The
correctness of such decisions may be, however, questioned under petitions for
review filed within the reglementary period with the
Court of Appeals. Such petitions for
review are not appeals which are automatically given due course. The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of
the petition for review and a determination that the findings of fact in the
Courts of First Instance’s decision are supported by substantial evidence and
that the conclusions are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence, may deny the petition outright for lack of
merit. This generally puts an end to the
case. Parties who persist in still
filing a petition with the Supreme Court to review on certiorari the
Court of Appeals’ determination get short shrift with an outright dismissal of
their petition and the consequent waste of time, effort and money and only in
rare cases where a substantial question of law is involved are such petitions entertained by the Supreme
Court.
* No problem is encountered
regarding cases falling under the concurrent jurisdictions of the municipal and
city courts with the courts of first instance.
The Act provides for one appeal directly to the Court of Appeals whose
decision shall be final, regardless of whether the question raised is
one of fact or of law, subject, of course, to the reserved jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to review the Court of Appeals’ decision on certiorari.
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concurring oPINION
VASQUEZ, J.:
It may appear presumptuous for me to add to the exhaustive and
scholarly dissertation made by the ponente of
the main opinion which truly deserves the gratitude of those who have
heretofore been vexed by question involved herein. I only desire to throw in my observations on
some of the points discussed in the hope of adding clarity to the same.
1. It is not very accurate to state that both R.A. 5433 and R.A.
6031 “abolished appeal by record on appeal to the Court of Appeals in
cases exclusively cognizable by an inferior court”; or that “such
cases are not appealable to the Court of
Appeals.” (Decision, p. 7.) The appeal by record
on appeal abolished by R.A. 5433 is only from the decision of a court of first
instance in a case appealed to it from an inferior court which affirms in
full the judgment of the latter.
Where the judgment of the court of first instance modified or reversed
that of the inferior court, the appeal to the Court of Appeals is by ordinary
appeal which needed a record on appeal.
Neither R.A. 5433 nor R.A. 6031 abolished appeals from the
decisions of the courts of first instance in such cases to the Court of
Appeals. The effect of said laws is not
to do away with such appeals, but merely to change the mode of taking the
appeal. After R.A. 5433 was enacted on
September 9, 1968, the appeal from the decision of a court of first instance in
a case appealed to it from an inferior court may be taken in one of two ways,
depending on the nature of said decision in relation to that of the inferior
court; namely, (1) by petition for review if the decision affirms in full that
of the inferior court; and (2) by record on appeal if it does not.
After R.A. 6031 was enacted to amend Section 45 of the Judiciary
Law, R.A. 5433 was virtually repealed.
Insofar as appeals from the decisions of the court of first instance in
cases appealed to them from inferior courts are concerned, the two laws are
irreconcilable and may not be applied together.
Appeal by record on appeal (authorized by R.A. 5433 in cases where the
court of first instance modified or reversed the decision of the inferior
court) was totally eliminated. Although
R.A. 6031 did not provide expressly as to whether the decision of the court of
first instance in such cases may still be appealed, or if so, by what mode of
appeal, the implication is clear that despite the declaration that the decision
of the court of first instance shall be “final”, an appeal may still
be taken to determine whether the statutory condition for such finality has
been complied with it, to wit, that “the findings of facts contained in
said decision are supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof, and the
conclusions are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence.” It was in
the face of the fact that while an appeal is presumably allowed from such
decisions of the court of first instance, there is a void in the law as to how
such appeal may be taken, the Court of Appeals issued
its Resolution dated August 12, 1971 (quoted in pp. 9-10 of the Decision). Said Resolution, obviously due to the absence
of any mode of appeal provided for in R.A. 6031, adopted the mode prescribed in
R.A. 5433, which is by petition for review if the appeal is to be taken to the
Court of Appeals. Quite understandably,
the said Resolution could not have provided for the mode or procedure if the
appeal shall be taken to the Supreme Court.
2. My understanding of the problem as to whether the petition to
review the decision of the court of first instance in such cases should be
filed in the Supreme Court or in the Court of Appeals is that some Members of
this Court are of the opinion that the determination of whether the findings of
facts contained in the decision of the court of first instance “are
supported by substantial evidence” is a pure question of law, and hence,
the appeal in all such cases should be lodged with the Supreme Court.
The main opinion does not share this view. I join the same conclusion but not exactly on
the same grounds stated in the main opinion.
To my mind, the question of where to appeal a decision of the
court of first instance in a case appealed to it from an inferior court should
not be determined by finding out if the issue is whether the findings of facts
are supported by substantial evidence, or whether the conclusions are not
clearly against the law or jurisprudence, as the case may be. The main opinion holds that in the first
case, the appeal should be to the Court of Appeals, and in the latter, to the Supreme
Court.
My own view is that the appeal should be to the Supreme Court in
all cases wherein the exclusive jurisdiction over such appeals is vested in the
Supreme Court pursuant to the Constitution and Section 17 of the Judiciary
Law. The appeal to the Court of Appeals
is only proper in the cases not included in said category. This is the only way to distinguish between
and delineate the respective appellate jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court with respect to appeals from decisions of the courts of
first instance. It is fallacious, if not
erroneous, to adopt any other test.
3. The condition provided for in R.A. 6031 as to when a further
appeal from the decision of the court of first instance in appealed cases may
be entertained will be a thing of the past the moment the Judiciary
Reorganization Law (B.P. 129) shall become operative. Section 22 of this law provides:
“SEC. 22. Appellate jurisdiction — Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may
be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in
such cases shall be appealable by petition for review
to the Intermediate Appellate Court which may give it due course only when the
petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an error
of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or
judgment sought to be reviewed.”
It will be noted that the above-quoted provision no longer predicates
the finality of the decision of the court of first instance (now Regional Trial
Court) on the ground that the findings of fact contained therein are supported
by substantial evidence and the conclusions are not clearly against the law and
jurisprudence. Instead, it applies the
qualification prescribed in R.A. 5433 in determining whether the decision of
the court of first instance may be appealed by petition for review in cases
where it affirmed in full the judgment of the inferior court, to wit, that the
court of first instance committed errors of fact or of law that would warrant a
modification of reversal of the judgment sought to be reviewed. This change is not only a matter of
terminology. B.P. 129 in effect abandons
the substantial evidence rule in determining whether to give due course to the
petition for review.
Under both tests, however, the question of where the petition to
review the decision should be filed is to be answered in the same manner. Neither provision was intended to deviate
from the rule that the Supreme Court may not be deprived of its appellate
jurisdiction over cases provided for in the Constitution and other applicable
laws.
4. Coming to the case at bar, the issue posed for resolution is
whether the Court of Appeals has the jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
review filed in said court by the herein petitioners to review the decision of
the court of first instance in a case appealed to it from an inferior
court. In the main opinion, it has been
stated that the issues raised in the said petition for review “require an
examination and evaluation of the evidence.” On this assumption, there can
be no doubt that the appeal of petitioners by petition for review was properly
lodged in the Court of Appeals.
On this basis, I concur in the conclusion reached in the main
opinion.