JUAN PARANPAN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. PERFECTO B. QUERUBIN, HON. JESUS S. RODRIGUEZ, HON. WENCESLAO L. FERNAN, ALL IN THEIR CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILO…

Paranpan versus Querubin

The Case

This is Paranpan versus Querubin, a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction brought directly before the Supreme Court. The petitioner, Juan Paranpan, had been designated Acting Mayor of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo by the President of the Philippines. He asked the Court to annul a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, which restrained him from assuming the office of municipal mayor at the instance of the respondent, Teresa Buendia, a municipal councilor who claimed the same office. The case matters to a reviewee because it is a study in the disposition of a petition that events have overtaken — the Court's handling of a case that has become moot and academic.

Procedural History

On September 14, 1963, Teresa Buendia filed a complaint for injunction with a writ of preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against Juan Paranpan. On the same day, respondent Judge Perfecto B. Querubin issued the writ of preliminary injunction ex parte, that is, without notice to the other side, and the writ was served on Paranpan. Paranpan then filed an urgent motion to dissolve the writ, which was denied by respondent Judge Jesus S. Rodriguez. His motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge Wenceslao L. Fernan. Paranpan then filed the present petition for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction before the Supreme Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion to all three judges. The Court gave the petition due course but did not issue the preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for. The case was set for hearing, but nobody appeared for the parties, and no memorandum was submitted in lieu of oral argument.

Facts

In the general elections of November 1959 in Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, Augusto Araneta was elected municipal mayor, Juan Bretania was elected municipal vice-mayor, and Mariano Araneta, Jugo Belmonte, and Teresa Buendia were elected municipal councilors, in that order of votes. On September 13, 1963, four of these incumbent officials filed certificates of candidacy for other offices in the coming November 1963 elections: the mayor for the provincial board, the vice-mayor for municipal mayor, and two councilors for municipal mayor and municipal vice-mayor. Having filed certificates of candidacy for offices other than those they held, they were considered as having permanently resigned from office.

Teresa Buendia, as the councilor who obtained the next largest number of votes after the two resigned councilors, claimed the office of municipal mayor under Section 7 of Republic Act 2264, and took her oath of office at midnight of September 13, 1963. Also on that day, President Diosdado Macapagal designated Juan Paranpan as Acting Mayor of Barotac Nuevo, vice Mayor Augusto Araneta who had filed his certificate of candidacy for the provincial board.

Buendia then sued Paranpan for injunction, alleging that he was threatening to occupy the office of municipal mayor without right. The trial court issued the writ ex parte. Paranpan's motions to dissolve the writ and for reconsideration were denied. By the time the Supreme Court took up the petition, the November 1963 elections had been held, a new set of municipal officials had been elected, and the person elected municipal mayor had assumed office on January 1, 1964.

Issues

• Whether or not respondent Judge Perfecto B. Querubin acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction ex parte.
• Whether or not respondent Judge Jesus S. Rodriguez acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for the dissolution of the writ.
• Whether or not respondent Judge Wenceslao L. Fernan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion for dissolution.
• Whether or not the petition had been rendered moot and academic by the assumption of office of the newly elected municipal mayor.

Applicable Provisions

Section 7 of Republic Act 2264, the statute under which Buendia claimed the office, is the provision discussed in the decision. The Court's narration describes its operation as follows:

Herein respondent Teresa Buendia, being the municipal councilor that obtained the next largest number of votes after the two incumbent municipal councilors who were considered permanently resigned, claimed the office of municipal mayor of Barotac Nuevo pursuant to the provisions of Section 7 of Republic Act 2264.

This provision is the source of the right Buendia asserted, and it is the right that the injunction sought to protect.

Ruling

The Court did not reach the merits of the three issues on grave abuse of discretion. Instead, it took judicial notice that in the general elections of November 11, 1963, a new set of municipal officials had been elected for Barotac Nuevo, that Buendia had ceased to occupy the office of municipal mayor because the person elected mayor had assumed office on January 1, 1964, and that no vacancy in that office could any longer be claimed by Paranpan by virtue of his appointment by the President. On that basis, the Court held:

This case has become moot and academic.

Because the office at the center of the controversy had been filled by the newly elected mayor, there was no longer any live controversy for the Court to resolve, and the petition was dismissed.

Doctrine

A case becomes moot and academic when events have so transpired that the resolution of the issues has ceased to have any practical legal effect. Courts will not resolve a question that no longer presents a live controversy. When the term or office in dispute has been filled by a newly elected official and the claimant can no longer assert any right to it, the petition is dismissed. A reviewee should state the rule plainly: the courts decide actual controversies, and where supervening events have rendered the relief sought impossible or useless, dismissal follows.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction was dismissed, without costs, because the case had become moot and academic.

Remember This

The single line to memorize is that a case has become moot and academic when a new set of officials has assumed office and no vacancy can any longer be claimed. Examiners use this case to test the mootness doctrine and the Court's refusal to rule on questions that no longer present a live controversy.