ANTONIO S. ASCAÑO, JR., CONSOLACION D. DANTES, BASILISA A. OBALO, JULIETA D. TOLEDO, JOSEPH Z. MAAC, EMILIANO E. LUMBOY, TITA F. BERNARDO, IGMEDIO L. NOGUERA, FIDEL S. SARMIENTO…

Ascaño versus Jacinto

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed directly with the Supreme Court by a group of market stall lessees against a sitting Regional Trial Court judge. The complainants charged the judge with gross and serious violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Judicial Ethics, and with a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, arising from the way he conducted injunction hearings in their suit against the municipal mayor. The case matters because it is a clean illustration of the ethical canons on judicial decorum, integrity, propriety, and impartiality, and of how the Court calibrates the penalty for a second offense of unbecoming conduct.

Procedural History

The complainants filed an administrative complaint before the Supreme Court. The Court referred the complaint to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals of Manila for raffle among the justices, for investigation, report, and recommendation. The case was raffled to an investigating justice of the Court of Appeals, who conducted the investigation and submitted his report and recommendation. The Supreme Court received that report and, in this decision, adopted the findings and recommendation of the investigating justice.

Facts

The complainants were allegedly section leaders of the lessees of market stalls in the public market of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. The municipal mayor wanted to demolish the public market so that the municipality could erect a new commercial complex on the space. On 26 June 2012, the complainants filed a petition for prohibition with an urgent application for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction against the municipality and the mayor. The case was raffled to the sala of the respondent judge.

The respondent issued a temporary restraining order with a 72-hour validity on 27 June 2012, and set hearings for 2 and 3 July 2012. During the 2 July 2012 hearing, the entire entourage of the mayor, none of whom were parties, was allowed inside the courtroom, while only twelve out of more than five hundred persons accompanying the complainants were allowed to enter. Upon the mayor's motion, all the complainants were escorted out except one witness who was scheduled to testify that day. The complainants claimed that the judge's questions to their witnesses were all geared toward establishing that they had no right to oppose the mayor's plan. After the hearing, the judge announced in open court that the court was not inclined to extend the temporary restraining order.

At the 3 July 2012 hearing, the mayor stepped out of the courtroom through the door used by the judge and court employees, without speaking to anyone, not even his lawyer. The respondent then explained that the mayor had to excuse himself for an important appointment. The respondent eventually issued an order lifting the temporary restraining order. The complainants alleged that the judge berated, scolded, confused, and admonished them without basis, and that he was beholden to the mayor. The respondent denied the accusations and cited cases in which he had ruled against the mayor and his supporters.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of bias and partiality, and of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in issuing the order lifting the temporary restraining order.
• Whether or not the respondent judge violated the canons of judicial conduct on decorum, integrity, propriety, and impartiality in his handling of the hearings and in his remarks from the bench.
• Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of unbecoming conduct, and what penalty is proper given that this is his second infraction.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.

This is the standard against which the respondent's abrasive remarks and raised voice toward a witness are measured.

Section 1 of Canon 2 of the same Code provides:

SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.

This governs the requirement that a judge's conduct be above reproach not only in fact but in appearance.

Section 1 of Canon 4 of the same Code provides:

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

This is the provision breached when the judge appeared to speak for the mayor rather than to preside over the case.

Section 2 of Canon 3 of the same Code provides:

SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.

This is the provision engaged by the judge's unexplained knowledge of the mayor's reason for leaving the courtroom.

Section 15 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. — On any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude from the court any witness not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other witnesses. The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from conversing with one another until all shall have been examined.

This provision sanctions the exclusion of the other witnesses while one of them testified, and defeats that ground of the complaint.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the complainants failed to substantiate bias and partiality. Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough; clear and convincing evidence is necessary. The circumstances detailed did not prove manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in the discharge of judicial functions. The Court also rejected the claim that bias could be gleaned from the refusal to admit more than five hundred persons into the courtroom, since the standard sizes of courtrooms make that improbable, and the exclusion of other witnesses during a testimony is sanctioned by Section 15 of Rule 132.

On the second issue, the Court found the respondent liable for his conduct toward the complainants and their witness. The investigating justice found that the respondent raised his voice, made abrasive and unnecessary statements, and uttered insulting and needlessly lengthy remarks in open court, including telling the complainants that they did not know what they were doing and that they simply signed documents prepared by their lawyer. These statements imperiled the respect and deference due to his position. The Court held that it is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant, or witness, and that a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. The Court further found that the respondent violated the canons on integrity and propriety, because instead of reprimanding the mayor for leaving without permission, he appeared to serve as the mayor's advocate by explaining the mayor's abrupt exit, a matter that was the duty of the mayor's lawyer to explain. The respondent gave the complainants reason to doubt his integrity and impartiality, since not even the mayor's own lawyers knew why he had left. A judge, like Caesar's wife, must not only be pure and faithful but must also be above suspicion.

On the third issue, the Court held that the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge, classified as a light charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, punishable by a fine of not less than one thousand pesos but not exceeding ten thousand pesos, and censure, reprimand, or admonition with warning. Noting that this was the respondent's second infraction, the Court adopted the recommended penalty of a fine of ten thousand pesos and admonition with warning.

Doctrine

A charge of bias and partiality against a judge must be supported by clear and convincing evidence; mere suspicion is not enough. A judge must be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, witnesses, and lawyers, and must be temperate in his language, for humiliating a witness betrays a lack of patience, prudence, and restraint. A judge must not only be above reproach but must be perceived to be so by a reasonable observer, and must avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. A judge must not act as an advocate for any party, and conduct that creates even the appearance of partiality erodes public faith in the Judiciary. Unbecoming conduct is a light charge under Rule 140, and a second infraction warrants a heavier penalty.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent judge guilty of unbecoming conduct, fined him ten thousand pesos, and reprimanded him with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act would be dealt with more severely.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a judge, like Caesar's wife, must not only be pure and faithful but must also be above suspicion. Examiners use this case to test the canons on judicial decorum, integrity, propriety, and impartiality, and the rule that a charge of bias requires clear and convincing evidence.