IGNACIO DE LOS ANGELES, PETITIONER, VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (PHILIP­PINE COCONUT AUTHORITY) AND THE EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari (review of the decision
of the ECC) filed by petitioner Ignacio de los Angeles against respondents
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), the Philippine Coconut
Administration (PCA) and the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), praying, inter
alia, that the decision of the ECC in ECC Case No. 0233 denying his
claim for employee’s compensation benefits be reversed.

Upon being required to comment on the petition, respondent PCA
filed a manifestation (p. 33, rec.) praying that it be relieved of the duty to
submit its comment on the petition for reasons stated therein, which prayer was
granted in a resolution of this Court dated December 2, 1977 (p. 36, rec.).

It appears that petitioner was employed as Quality Control Agent
of the Philippine Coconut Authority since January 17, 1955 up to October 1,
1975. During the period of his
employment, he was assigned at several stations inspecting the quality of copra
for export. In the performance of his
assigned task, he had to travel several kilometers from his place of work to
places where copras are loaded and unloaded. When he was assigned in Leyte and Samar, he had to travel about 500
kilometers from Tacloban City to Borongan, Eastern Samar. In the latter years of his employment, he
became sick first with cerebral ischemia at the age of 52 years in 1965 when he
first felt the symptoms of cerebral thrombosis, until October 1, 1975, at the
age of 62 when he retired optionally (see p. 103, rec.). When he applied for retirement his
ailment was diagnosed as cerebral Ischemic Secondary to Cerebral Thrombosis.

On May 12, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for employee’s
compensation with the Government Service Insurance System. On June 4, 1976, petitioner’s claim was
denied by the GSIS stating that petitioner’s ailment is not an occupational
disease.

On July 20, 1976, petitioner wrote the GSIS praying for a
reconsideration of the denial of the claim.

On August 2, 1976, respondent GSIS denied peti­tioner’s request
for a reconsideration, the dispositive portion of which letter-denial reads:

“In your case, your ailment is Cerebral Ischemia secondary to
Cerebral Thrombosis. This ailment, not
being listed as an occupational disease, therefore, requires such degree of
proof as mentioned above. On the basis,
however, of the papers and evidence on record which you have submitted, it
appears that you have not established that your employment had any causal
relation­ship with the contraction of the ailment. While it is admitted that the aforesaid ailment supervened in the course of your employment as
Quality Control Agent in the Philippine Coconut Authority, Cebu City, there has
not been any showing that the same directly arose therefrom or resulted from
the nature thereof” (Underscoring supplied, pp. 67-68, rec.).

A second request for reconsideration was sought by the petitioner
in his letter of September 27, 1976. This time, however, the GSIS treated the same as an appeal to the
Employees’ Compensation Commission.

On June 27, 1977, the respondent Commission rendered a decision
affirming the GSIS denial of petitioner’s claim.

There is no dispute that the ailment of the petitioner diagnosed
as cerebral ischemia secondary to cerebral thrombosis supervened in 1965 in the
course of his employment (GSIS denial of petitioner’s request for
reconsideration, pp. 67-68, rec.). It
appears that petitioner was employed as quality control agent by the respondent
Corporation, the Philippine Coconut Adminis­tration, and that during his
employment he contracted ailment diagnosed first as cerebral ischemia or a mild
form of hypertension. In the course of
his employment, he was, by the nature of his work, forced to travel as far as
500 kilometers to inspect the copras loaded and unloaded for export and
“moistering” and “grading” purposes. He had undergone sleepless nights, tensions
and physical exhaustions due to exposure to the ravages of the natural elements
as rain, dust, cold and heat of
the sun. Sometimes, he had to forego
his meals and periods of relaxation or rest. Because of these the cerebral ischemic ailment worsened and at the time
of his retire­ment at the age of 62 in 1975
(optional) his ailment was certainly aggravated which was diagnosed as cerebral
thrombosis.

There is no dispute, likewise, that petitioner’s application for
optional retirement was approved because he was already disabled — no longer
in a position to discharge the duties of his position precisely because of that
disabling ailment of cerebral thrombosis (Memo­randum Circular No. 133 of 1967,
Office of the President). The foregoing
facts are indubitable presumptions that the ailment was contracted and
aggravated in the course of petitioner’s employment in the respondent
Corporation.

It is true that the petitioner filed the instant claim on May 12,
1976 after the new compensation law embodied in the New Labor Code took effect
on March 31, 1975. However, well known
is the rule that the govern­ing law in the prosecution of a cause of action
which has accrued prior to the effectivity of a new law shall be the law
enforced at the time of the accrual of said cause of action. In the instant case, the cause of action
accrued at the time when the old Workmen’s Com­pensation Law was then in full
force and effect. Apply­ing the rule
aforecited, then the old Workmen’s Compen­sation Law shall govern (Corales vs.
ECC, et al., L-44063, Feb. 27, 1979).

Under the old Workmen’s Compensation Law, when there is a showing
that the ailment was contracted and/or aggravated in the course of one’s
employment, presumption of compensability arises and the burden of destroying
this presumption is upon the employer.

“x x On the basis of established and controlling jurisprudence
anchored on Section 44 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act upholding the
presumption of compensability of disabling ailments that supervened during the course of employment.

“In the oft-cited case of Talip vs. WCC, the Court reaffirmed
the principle of presumption of compensability, stating that assuming that the
causal link between nature of (claimant’s) employment and his ailment has been
insufficiently shown, nevertheless it is to be presumed as mandated by Section
44 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act that the employee’s illness which
supervened during his employ­ment either arose out of, or at least was
aggravated by, said employment; and with this legal presumption, the burden of
proof shifts to the employer and the employee is relieved of the burden to show
causation. x x” (Josefina Animos vs.
WCC and the City of Manila, L-43021, x x, June 30, 1978, Teehankee, J.).

The Employees’ Compensation Commission, in affirming the decision
of the GSIS denying the claim of the petitioner, reasoned out that cerebral
ischemia secondary to cerebral thrombosis is caused by the aging process
responsible for the hardening, thickening and loss of the elasticity of blood
vessel walls especially the coronary and cerebral arteries; and that claimant’s
illness can be traced most likely to degenerative processes rather than to the
nature and conditions of his employment.

“Such an argument loses its valid­ity in the face of what this
Court stressed in the oft-quoted case of Abana vs. Quisumbing, 1968, and which
we quote: ‘while there is that possi­bility
that factors other than the employment of the claimant may also have
contributed to the aggravation of his illness, this is not a drawback to its
compensability. For, under the law, it
is not required that the employ­ment be the sole factor in the growth,
development or acceleration of claimant’s illness to entitle him to the
benefits provided for. It is enough
that his employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development
of the disease. It has been repeatedly
held that under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, it is not necessary for a
claimant to carry the burden of proof to establish his case to the point of
demonstration. It is sufficient to show
that the hypo­thesis on which he bases his
claim is probable” (Federico Sevilla vs. Republic of the Philippines
[Bureau of Public Schools], L-44221, Aug. 31, 1978).

Resolution No. 223 dated March 16, 1977 of the Employees’
Compensation Commission adopted as a policy the institution of a more
compassionate interpretation of the restrictive provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended by its administering agencies, the Social Security
System and the Government Service Insur­ance System, with respect to, among
others, myocardial infarction, and other borderline cases. Furthermore, under Resolution No. 432 dated
July 20, 1977, the re­spondent Commission, pursuant to its policy of expanding
the list of compensable diseases, has approved related diseases under PD No.
626, as amended, which included among others, cardio-vascular disease which may
cover myocardial infarction, pneumonia and bronchial asthma (Sepulveda vs. ECC,
et al., L-46290, Aug. 25, 1978).

The above-cited principles and doctrinal juris­prudence on the
presumption of compensability were made fully applicable mutatis mutandis
to support pay­ment of disability benefits to the claimants suffering from
rheumatoid arthritis, hypertension, diabetes mellitus with hypertension, and
premature senility followed by an attack of cerebral thrombosis, gall bladder
inflammation, and the loss of vision of the right eye with other complications. Since the employees’ illnesses clearly supervened
during their employment the burden of overthrowing the presumption of
compen­sability shifted to the employers (Alonto vs. WCC, L-42776; De Gascon
vs. WCC, L-42280; Satparam vs. WCC, L-42330; De Mesa vs. WCC, L-43843;
Gabrieles vs. WCC, L-43484; Ong Gako vs. WCC, L-43422; Asuba vs. R.P. &
WCC, L-43036; Cadores vs. WCC, L-42387; Oclarit vs. WCC, L-43334; Panoncillo
vs. WCC, L-43551; Rey vs. WCC, L-43545; and Benitez vs. WCC, L-43722, August 31, 1978).

In the case of Bautista vs. WCC, et al., the Court reiterated
that “while We do not discount the possibility that such ailment may be
’caused by the aging process’ x x x, nonetheless that fact alone will not be
sufficient to remove the ailment from the peri­phery of compensable disabling
diseases under the Work­men’s Compensation Act. The law applies to the young as well as to the aged, and while
advancing age may be a contributing factor to the occurrence of an injury, the
constant physical and mental exertions, strain, and tension x x x are equally
contributing and aggravating causes which render the resulting disabling injury
or ailment compensable under the law” (L-42885, 80 SCRA 313, 319). This case is particularly relevant to the
case at bar, considering that the Employees’ Compensation Commission in
affirming the decision of the GSIS based its findings that the disease of the
claimant is caused by the aging degenerative process which is responsible for
the hardening, thickening and loss of elasticity of blood vessels, especially
in coronary and cerebral arteries.

Pursuant to this legal presumption in the foregoing numerous
cases, in a spirit of utmost liberality called for by the social and humane
character of the law, the Court held that the exact cause of the ailment
suffered by a claimant is not significant and the possibility that
factors other than the employment, such as advancing age, may have
caused or contributed in the development of the ailment is not a drawback,
for what is material and decisive is that the employment contributed
even in a small degree in aggravating the ailment (Abana vs. Quisumbing, 22
SCRA 1278).

This is in consonance with the social justice guarantee of both
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and in obedience to the directive of Article 4
of the New Labor Code that “all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions
of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be
resolved in favor of labor,” which is a re-statement of existing
jurisprudence as well as Article 1702 of the New Civil Code (Separate Opinion,
L-42471, Espiritu vs. WCC, et al., Aug. 22, 1978).

It appears in this case that the records did not disclose the
actual amount being claimed; but in some of Our recent decisions, all
promulgated on June 30, 1978, all the claimant-petitioners therein were granted
the sum of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) respectively and other legitimate
fees and/or costs, to wit:

L-43021, Aninias vs.
WCC & the City of Manila;

L-42840, Villafranca
vs. WCC & Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Schools);

L-44958, Puntera vs.
WCC & Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Schools);

L-43074, Rejuso vs.
Republic of the Philip­pines (Bureau of Public Schools and WCC); and

L-43354, D.P. vda.
de Jabasa, et al. vs. WCC & Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corporation.

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE APPEALED DECISION
IS HEREBY REVERSED AND THE RESPONDENT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

(a)  TO PAY CLAIMANT IGNACIO DE LOS ANGELES SIX
THOUSAND [P6,000.00] PESOS AS COMPENSATION BENEFITS;

(b)  TO REIMBURSE CLAIMANT HIS MEDICAL, HOSPITAL
AND SURGICAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS;

(c)  TO PAY CLAIMANT SIX HUNDRED [P600.00] PESOS AS
ATTORNEY’S FEES; AND

(d)  TO PAY SIXTY-ONE [P61.00] PESOS AS
ADMINISTRATIVE FEES.

SO ORDERED.

Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., (Chairman), took
no part.