BISIG NG MANGGAGAWA SA CONCRETE AGGREGATES, INC., FLARE, AND, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF ALL OF ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS INVOLVED IN THE 4/6/92 STRIKE, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR …
INTING, S.B., J.:
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CC No.
000039-92 and NLRC NCR CASE No. 00-05-02652-92, which adopted as its own
decision the April 14, 1997 Report of Labor Arbiter Daisy Barcelona.
Petitioner assails and seeks to annul the July 30, 1997 Decision[1] and the May 11, 2010 Resolution[2]
THE FACTS
Petitioner (BIMCAI) is the labor union operating in respondent company, Congregate Aggregates Corporation (CAC).
The labor conflict between the two parties found its inception on
September 4, 1991 when BIMCAI filed a notice of strike for unfair labor
practice allegedly on account of CAC’s violation of the CBA, acts of
discrimination, hiring of per trip drivers in lieu of regular drivers
and forcibly placing regular employees to go on leave and in their
stead, casual employees took their place.
The tension between
the parties heightened when on December 17, 1991, BIMCAI President Ramon
Banas, Jr. prevented five (5) transit mixer drivers from delivering
ready-mixed concrete to Pampanga. He was thereafter required to explain
his act of allegedly utilizing his moral ascendancy and influence as
union president in directing the transit mixer drivers to disobey the
orders of CAC’s authorized personnel, Mr. Claro Bagalso, for them to
proceed to San Fernando, Pampanga for trial pouring upon the request of
Foundation Specialist for its project at the Resettlement area for
Pinatubo Victims at Floridablanca, Pampanga. On December 18, 1991, Mr.
Banas explained and admitted that he indeed advised the transit mixer
drivers not to proceed to San Fernando, Pampanga unless the company
issues written instruction. For this reason, he was placed on preventive
suspension effective December 19, 1991 and was eventually terminated on
January 15, 1992.
Meanwhile, prior to the Banas’ termination,
BIMCAI filed another notice of strike on January 13, 1992 reiterating
the issues stated in its September 4, 1991 notice of strike but this
time it included as well union busting and dismissal of union officers,
docketed under NCMB-NCR-NS-01-028-92.
Subsequently, a strike vote
was taken on February 9, 1992, under the supervision of National
Conciliation and Mediation Board representatives. 212 employees of the
357 votes cast voted in favor of the strike while the remaining 143
voted against. Noting that the grounds raised in the notice of strike
are not strikeable issues and are suited for preventive mediation, the
NCMB directed the parties to submit their issues to conciliation
proceedings. As such, conciliation proceedings began on February 26,
1992.
However, despite the ongoing conciliation proceedings, BIMCAI again filed a notice of strike on March 8, 1992.
Finally, BIMCAI staged the controversial April 6, 1992 strike. BIMCAI
struck and picketed at the premises of the CAC’s four (4) plants located
in Bagumbayan and Longos in Quezon City, Angono and Antipolo in Rizal,
San Fernando, Pampanga, and San Pedro, Laguna. On the same date, CAC
wrote the DOLE Secretary to assume jurisdiction over the strike.
On April 14, 1992, on the ground of failure to comply with the
requirements of a valid strike and committing prohibited activities and
illegal acts during the strike, CAC filed its petition to declare the
strike of April 6, 1992 illegal before the NLRC.
BIMCAI again
filed a notice of strike on April 21, 1992. On April 24, 1992, it filed
its petition for injunction to enjoin CAC from enlisting the aid of the
police and military officers to escort the scabs in entering the “struck
establishment”.
While conferences were held before the NCMB, the
strike continued. Again, CAC wrote the DOLE Secretary regarding the
status of the labor dispute. In its letter, CAC reported that although
500 workers returned to work, some of the striking workers have not
returned as they were restrained by BIMCAI officers.
Acting on
CAC’s letter, the DOLE Secretary assumed the dispute and certified the
same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. In an Order dated June 18,
1992, the DOLE Secretary ordered all those who participated in the
strike to return to work under the same terms and conditions existing
prior to the work stoppage, except the union officers and those with
pending cases.
Hence, pursuant to the June 18, 1992 Order, on
March 13, 1995, the NLRC ordered the reinstatement of all workers of CAC
(except the union officers whose culpability depends on the illegality
or legality of the strike) and payment of backwages and other benefits
from the time they presented themselves for work until they are actually
reinstated.
On June 17, 1996, a Writ of Execution was issued
directing the Sheriff to effect the reinstatement of thirty-seven (37)
employees. CAC moved for the quashal of said writ which was granted by
the NLRC in its per curiam Order dated October 3, 1996. This Order set
aside the NLRC’s earlier Order dated March 13, 1995 which directed the
reinstatement of one hundred fifty-four (154) employees contained in the
Report of Labor Arbiter Cristeta D. Tamayo, dated September 30, 1996.
These 154 employees are respondents in CAC’s petition to declare the
strike illegal docketed as NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-05-02652-92. The writ of
execution, dated June 17, 1996, was likewise ordered suspended pending
consideration of the question of whether or not subject employees are
covered by the return-to-work order of the DOLE Secretary considering
that the thirty-seven (37) workers sought to be reinstated were among
the one hundred fifty four (154) listed respondents in the illegal
strike case and, by express mandate of the DOLE Secretary, are therefore
excluded from the return-to-work order.
While the union bats
for the reinstatement of 37 workers, the Tamayo Report of September 30,
1996 clarified that only twenty-eight (28) were included in the list of
respondents in the illegal strike case.
In the same per curiam
Order of October 3, 1996, BIMCAI was required to comment on the Tamayo
Report and to appear for oral arguments set on October 21, 1996. It
likewise directed Labor Arbiter Daisy Barcelona to handle the cases and
to take over from Labor Arbiter Cristeta D. Tamayo.
On February
5, 1997, a hearing was held. However, BIMCAI refused to participate and
walked out of the court room together with its counsel. BIMCAI was
questioning the authority of the NCMB to hear the case.
Despite
the walk out, the Labor Arbiter pushed through with the proceedings. CAC
presented four (4) witnesses, namely, Jovencio Layug, Rudy Balasadas,
Paquito Santos and Eduardo Raymundo, together with their respective
affidavits. Generally, the affidavits state how the April 6, 1992 strike
took place and contained the names of those who participated in said
strike. BIMCAI did not submit any evidence, comment or pleading to
address the issues raised. Hence, the case was submitted for resolution.
RULING OF THE LABOR ARBITER
Labor Arbiter Barcelona was faced with resolving the twin
issues of: 1) whether or not the thirty-seven (37) unreinstated workers
pursuant to the June 18, 1992 Order of the Acting DOLE Secretary should
be reinstated; 2) whether or not the April 6, 1992 strike was illegal
and if so, who among the respondent workers are to be declared to have
lost their employment status.
In her April 14, 1997 Report, Labor
Arbiter Barcelona found the April 6, 1992 strike illegal and declared
the 15 BIMCAI officers and striking union members to have lost their
employment, and directed CAC to reinstate only 9 of the 37 workers who
were earlier ordered to be reinstated by the June 17, 1996 writ of
execution.
RULING OF THE NLRC
The NLRC adopted Labor Arbiter Barcelona’s Report in its now assailed Decision dated July 30, 1997.
Both parties moved for the reconsideration of the NLRC’s decision.
BIMCAI prayed for the voiding of the order dismissing the 15 union
officers and the remaining 28 union members and to reinstate the latter.
CAC, for its part, maintained that the 9 employees ordered to be
reinstated were involved in the illegal strike and committed prohibited
acts, hence, lost their employment status.
In its Resolution dated May 11, 2010, the NLRC denied both parties’ motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, BIMCAI has come to Us praying for a reversal of the assailed
NLRC Decision and Resolution by declaring the April 6, 1992 strike
legal, the dismissal of the union officers and members illegal and by
ordering their reinstatement, and for award of moral damages and
attorney’s fees.
THE ISSUES
BIMCAI raises the following issues:[3]
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DENIED PETITIONER OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW WITH RESPECT TO THE AFFIDAVITS
OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S O5 FEBRUARY 1997 WITNESSES;
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT RELIED EXTENSIVELY TO (SIC) THE AFFIDAVITS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S
FEBRUARY 1997 WITNESSES FILED FIVE (5) YEARS LATER AND DISREGARDING ITS
OTHER WITNESSES’ AFFIDAVITS, PLEADINGS, EVIDENCES, AND OPEN COURT
TESTIMONIES;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PETITIONER’S STRIKE WAS ILLEGAL;
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT RULED THAT PETITIONER’S OFFICERS AND MEMBERS COMMITTED ILLEGAL ACTS;
V. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DECLARING THE LOSS OF EMPLOYMENT OF PETITIONER’S OFFICERS AND MEMBERS;
VI. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DENIED PETITIONER’S CLAIM TO DECLARE THE DISMISSAL (SIC) RICARDO
MANALANG, RODRIGO LAQUIHON AND OSCAR BARCELLANO AND THE UNION OFFICERS
AND MEMBERS IN PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA (SIC), AND
ALL ITS OFFICERS TO BE ILLEGAL;
VII. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DID NOT RULE ON PETITIONER’S
COMPULSORY COUNTER-CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.
In sum, the issues to be resolved are the following:
1) Observance of due process of law;
2) Legality of the April 6, 1992 strike;
3) Legality of the dismissal of the union officers and members;
4) Award of Moral Damages
THIS COURT’S RULING
First, the observance of due process of law.
Basically, BIMCAI is questioning the judgment of the Labor
Arbiter. It alleged that the Labor Arbiter solely based her report on
the affidavits of CAC’s four (4) witnesses without regard to other
pleadings earlier submitted and events that transpired between BIMCAI
and CAC from 1991 up to the time of the controversial strike held on
April 6, 1992. It further alleged that the said witnesses were not even
presented for direct examination thereby giving no chance for BIMCAI’s
counsel to cross-examine them. These acts, according to BIMCAI,are
consistent to a denial of due process which they suffered under the
hands of the Labor Arbiter.
These arguments do not sway.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. Any seeming defect in its observance
is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.[4]
In fact, [a] formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in
all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute
lack of notice and hearing.[5]
In the case at bar, there is no denial that the essence of due
process was sufficiently complied with. It is undisputed that members
of BIMCAI who were present during the hearing held on February 5, 1997
indeed staged a walk out. Fairly enough, their walk out did not and will
never give them an acceptable justification to complain of a denial of
due process, for had they not walked out, they could have openly aired
their grievances and actively addressed the issues involved in their
case. Verily, by their act of walking out, they blew away their
opportunity to ventilate their cause. Consequently therefore, BIMCAI
could no longer complain because it was given the opportunity to defend
its interest in due course, for it was such opportunity to be heard that
was the essence of due process, but unfortunately, it chose not to be
heard.
Second, the legality of the April 6, 1992 strike.
There is no question that the April 6, 1992 strike was illegal, first,
because when BIMCAI filed the notice of strike, it still had an
existing CBA with CAC which provides for a grievance machinery procedure
as well as a no-strike clause. Second, when it conducted the strike-vote on at least two (2) occasions, the required strike vote prescribed under Article 263 (f)[6]
of the Labor Code was not obtained. It was only during the third
occasion that BIMCAI obtained the required strike vote, but even if it
did, it however did not render the strike legal, the same having been
found conducted without the supervision of NCMB officials.
But then again, even without the above-mentioned factors,
still, the strike is illegal. This is so because the striking workers
committed a violation of Art. 264 of the Labor Code.
ART. 264. Prohibited Activities. —
xxx xxx xxx
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence
of any unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full
backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participates
in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status: Provided,
That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not
constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.xxx xxx xxx
(e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any
act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress
to or egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or
obstruct public thoroughfares.[7] (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Here, the striking workers committed an act of interference by
obstructing the free ingress to or egress from CAC’s compound. This
prohibited act was duly proved by substantial evidence on record, such
as the photographs which graphically depict and show the identities of
the union members who committed said act as well as the affidavits of
CAC’s witnesses specifically identifying the strikers who participated
in the same.
Third, the legality of the dismissal of the union officers and members.
Having settled that the subject strike was illegal, We shall
now determine the proper sanctions for the conduct of union officers in
an illegal strike and for union members who committed illegal acts
during a strike.
Article 264 (f) of the Labor Code presents a substantial
distinction of the consequences of an illegal strike between union
officers and mere members of the union. For union officers, knowingly
participating in an illegal strike is a valid ground for termination of
their employment. But for union members who participated in a strike,
their employment may be terminated only if they committed prohibited and
illegal acts during the strike and there is substantial evidence or
proof of their participation, i.e., that they are clearly identified to
have committed such prohibited and illegal acts.[8]
The rationale for such a substantial distinction was explained by the Supreme Court in Pilipino Telephone Corp. v. Pilipino Telephone Employees Association, et. al.,[9] to wit:
“It cannot be overemphasized that strike, as the most preeminent
economic weapon of the workers to force management to agree to an
equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital, exert some
disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and
management, but also on the general peace and progress of society and
economic well-being of the State. This weapon is so critical that the
law imposes the supreme penalty of dismissal on union officers who
irresponsibly participate in an illegal strike and union members who
commit unlawful acts during a strike. The responsibility of the union
officers, as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than that of
the members as the union officers have the duty to guide their members
to respect the law.The policy of the state is not to tolerate actions directed at the
destabilization of the social order, where the relationship between
labor and management has been endangered by abuse of one party’s
bargaining prerogative, to the extent of disregarding not only the
direct order of the government to maintain the status quo, but the
welfare of the entire workforce though they may not be involved in the
dispute. The grave penalty of dismissal imposed on the guilty parties is
a natural consequence, considering the interest of public welfare.”
Guided by the above, the dismissal of BIMCAI officers is
justified, so with the BIMCAI members who participated in the illegal
strike and joined in the act of interference by obstructing the free
ingress to or egress from CAC’s compound which is prohibited and illegal
as provided for by Article 264 (e) of the Labor Code. As mentioned
earlier, the union members’ participation was proved by substantial
evidence.
With respect to the dismissal of Laquihon, Manalang
and Barcellano, the same is likewise valid. Their complained acts
constituted serious misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal.
Fourth, the award of moral damages.
Anent the issue of the award of moral damages on BIMCAI’s
counter-claims, BIMCAI failed to substantiate the same, hence, no award
could be granted them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed July 30, 1997 Decision and May 11, 2010 Resolution are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, Jr., (Chairperson) and Galapate-Laguilles[**], JJ., concur.
[*] Vice Associate Justice
Mario V. Lopez who is in Baguio for the yearly summer session from May 5
to 9, 2014, as per Office Order No. 177-14-RDC dated May 2, 2013
[**] Vice Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting who is the Acting Senior Member as per Office Order No. 177-14-RDC dated May 2, 2013
[1] Rollo, pp. 193-211
[2] Rollo, pp. 266-273
[3] Rollo, Petition for Certiorari, pp. 3-80, filed September 6, 2010
[4] Zacarias v. NPC, et. al., G.R. No. 119847. October 24, 2003
[5] Sunrise Manning Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, et. al., G.R. No. 146703, November 18, 2004
[6] (f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned,
obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that
purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority
of the board of directors of the corporation or association or of the
partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called
for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the
dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the
strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may, at its own
initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the
conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the
employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least
seven days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the
cooling-off period herein provided. (Emphasis supplied)
[7] As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 227, June 1, 1982.
[8] Magdala Multipurpose & Livelihood Coop. and Sanlor Motors Corp. v. Kilusang Manggagawa ng LGS and Union Members/Strikers, G.R. Nos. 191138-39. October 19, 201.
[9] G.R. No. 160058.