TRANQUILINO O. CALO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. ESTEBAN DEGAMO, RESPONDENT.

Disbarment proceedings against the respondent Esteban Degamo^[1] upon
a verified letter-complaint of the petitioner, Tranquilino
O. Calo, Jr., filed with this Court on 2 March 1962,
and charging the former with “having committed false statement under oath
or perjury” in con­nection with his appointment as Chief of Police of Carmen, Agusan.

On 12 March 1962,
this Court required the respondent to file “an answer (not a motion to
dismiss.)”  After interposing an
unsuccessful motion for a bill of particulars, he filed his answer on 29 May 1962 and this Court
accordingly referred the case to the Solicitor-General for investigation,
report and recommendation.  In return,
the Solicitor General referred the case to the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan.  The fiscal
conducted an investigation.  The petitioner adduced evidence, but not the
respondent, because on the date set for hearing, on 25 July 1964, following
several postponements, the respondent failed to attend, despite due notice, for
which reason the investigating fiscal considered the respondent as having
waived his right to pre­sent evidence. 
Thereafter, the fiscal forwarded the record of the in­vestigation to the
Solicitor General.  On the basis thereof,
the Solicitor General filed his report and a complaint with this Court, re­commending
the disbarment of the respondent, for gross misconduct.

No evidence having been submitted by the respondent, the fol­lowing
facts are either unrebutted or admitted:

On 17 January 1959, respondent Esteban Degamo,
as an applicant to the position of Chief of Police of Carmen, Agusan, subscribed and swore to a filled-out
“Information Sheet” before Mayor Jose Malimit
of the same municipality.  The sheet
called for answers about name, personal circumstances, educational attainment,
civil service elig­ibility and so forth. 
One item required to be filled out reads:

“Criminal or police record, if any
including those which did not reach the Court. 
(State the details of case and the final outcome.)” -?

to which respondent answered,
“None.”

Having accomplished the form, the respondent was appointed by the
mayor to the position applied for. 
However, on the day the respondent swore to the information sheet, there
was pending against him, and two (2) other co-accused,
a criminal case in the Court of First Instance of Bohol
(No. 2646) for illegal possession of explosive powder.^[2]

Prior to the commencement of this administrative case, the re­spondent
was also charged in an information, dated 23 September 1960, for perjury, in
the Court of First Instance of Agusan, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2194, on the same facts upon which he is now proceeded
against as a member of the Philippine bar.

In his defense, the respondent claims that his answer
“None” to the aforequoted questionnaire was
made in good faith, it being his honest interpretation of the particular
question (heretofore quoted) that it referred to a final judgment or conviction
and that Criminal Case No. 2646 was not a criminal or police record.

The defense is
plainly untenable.  The questionnaire was
sim­ple, couched in ordinary terms and devoid of legalism; hence, it needed no
interpretation.  It only called for a simple information. 
That it asked for records “which did not reach the Court”
entirely disproves respondent’s
technical twist to the question as referring to final judgments or
convictions.

Petitioner’s letter-complaint was filed on 2 March 1962 while the act of the respondent
complained of was committed on 17
January 1959.  Without
explaining how and upon what authority, respondent invokes the defense of
prescription.  This defense does not lie;
the rule is that -?

“The ordinary statutes of limitation have no applica­tion to
disbarment proceedings, nor does the circumstance that the facts set up as a
ground for disbarment constitute a crime, prosecution for which in a criminal
proceeding is barred by limitation, affect the disbarment proceeding, x x x.” (5 Am. Jur. 434).

Nor is the pendency of Criminal Case
No. 2194 (for perjury) a prejudicial question, since the ground for disbarment
in the present proceeding is not for conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude but for gross misconduct.  A
violation of a criminal law is not a bar to disbarment (6 Moran 242, 1963 Ed.,
citing the case of In re Montagne and Dominguez,
3 Phil. 577), and an acquittal is no obstacle to cancellation of the lawyer’s license.  (In re Del Rosario, 52
Phil. 399).

Respondent Degamo stresses that there
is no cause of action against him because the information sheet is not required
by law but only by the Civil Service Commission.  This argument is beside the point.  The issue is whether or not he acted honestly
when he denied under oath the existence against him of any criminal or police
record, including those that did not reach the court.  In this, he did not tell the truth.  He deliberately concealed it in order to
secure an appoint­ment in his own favor. 
He, therefore, failed to maintain that high degree of morality expected
and required of a member of the bar (To­ledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, 27
April 1963; Mortel vs. As­piras,
Adm. Case No. 145, 28 Dec. 1956; Bolivar vs. Simbol,
Adm. Case No. 377, 29 April 1966), and he has violated his oath as a law­yer to
“do no falsehood”.  It needs no
reiteration that the ethical standards applicable to a member of the bar, who
thereby automatic­ally becomes a court officer, must necessarily be one higher
than that of the market place.

The facts being clear and undisputed, respondent’s insistence
upon patent technical excuses disentitle him to leniency from this Court.

For the foregoing reasons, respondent Esteban Degamo is hereby disbarred, and his name ordered stricken
from the roll of attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, and
Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.

^[1] Admitted to the Bar on 7 February 1955.

^[2]
The information bears date of 3 July 1958 (Exh. “B-1”).