PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU) AND BAGUIO AMALGAMATED RADIO ANNOUNCERS AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PAFLU), PETITIONERS, VS. HON. PIO R. MARCOS, AS DIS­TRICT …

Petitioner Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions is a legitimate labor organization operating
as a federa­tion of trade unions. 
Affiliated to it is co-petitioner Baguio
Amalgamated Radio Announcers and Employees Associa­tion, a labor organization
composed of the rank and file employees of Radio Stations DZBS and DZAH in Baguio City owned and operated by private respondent
Radio Philippines Network, Inc.

On June 17, 1966, respondent filed Civil Case 1697 in the Court of First Instance of Baguio, for injunction with damages, alleging principally
that co-petitioner and its members staged an illegal strike that very morning
and “x x
x have
picketed the working premises of the DZBS and DZAH, padlocked the doors, cut
telephone lines, re­moved switches, damaged equipment of the plaintiff and
threaten/ed7 to do fur her damage to the property of the plaintiff.” The
verified complaint also contained the requisite allegations for to issuance of
preliminary in­junction in labor disputes.^[1]

The following day, June 18,
1966, the lower court issued an order
requiring co-petitioner union to answer and appear before it on June 20,
1966 to show cause
why preliminary injunction should not issue.

On June 20, 1966, co-petitioner union filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleg­ing that the present labor dispute
was connected with an unfair labor practice charge previously filed by
petitioner on May 22, 1966 against respondent in the Court of Industrial
Relations for alleged violation of Sec. 4(a)(1) and
(2) of Republic Act 875.

By an order of even date,
the lower court resolved the motion as follows:^[2]

“Finding the Motion to Dismiss to be with­out merit, the Court
hereby denies it.

“Both parties agree, after counsel for de­fendants had
announced his intention to appeal this order to the Supreme Court, and the
Court hereby orders, that defendants or any of the members of the PAFLU shall
not molest nor pro­hibit the officials of plaintiff or any of its non-striking
employees when entering or getting out of the premises of plaintiff; that defen­dants
shall not destroy or cause any damage to the properties of plaintiff in the
premises in question; that defendants shall not coerce or threaten any person
in the premises; and that the alleged two stabs shall not perform any an­nouncing
work in the radio station nor do the duties of technicians except to guard and
keep maintenance work on the equipment of plaintiff, in the meantime that this
case is pending de­termination.”

Without asking for a
reconsideration of the above-quoted order, petitioners instituted the present
special civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction.  The petition was given due course and this
Court issued preliminary injunction.

Petitioners admit that the order of June 20, 1966 did not even
amount to a restraining order issued by the lower court.  They raise no question regarding the
same.  The only issue tendered is whether
the Court of First Ins­tance had jurisdiction over Civil Case 1697.

A labor dispute involving an unfair labor practice is exclusively
cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations.^[3]
The Court of First Instance has no jurisdic­tion.  To establish this, however, there must be a
show­ing – not mere allegation – that the labor dispute either arose out of, or
is connected or interwoven with the un­fair labor practice.  The mere filing of an unfair labor practice
charge in the Court of Industrial Relations does not, per se, establish the connection.  So We ruled in
United Pepsi-Cola Sales Organization v. Hon. Cañizares,
102 Phil. 887, 891, thru the pen of Justice J.B.L. Reyes –

“We see nothing in the Company’s com­plaint and petition for
preliminary injunc­tion that could apprise or warn the court below that an
unfair labor practice case was involved. 
Nor can the lack of
jurisdiction of the lower court be simply assumed from the bare fact that an unfair labor practice case had been filed with the Court of Indus­trial
Relations.  The criterion, to bring the case
under the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court,
is whether the acts complained of in
the petition for injunction arose out of, or are connected or interwoven with, the unfair
labor practice case. (PAFLU vs. Caluag,
G.R. L-9104 Sept. 10, 1956), a question of fact that should be brought to the attention of
the court a quo to enable it to pass upon the issue whether it has jurisdiction
or not over the case. x x x” (Stressed for
emphasis)

The rule above-stated, based on the foregoing pro­nouncement, was
followed and reaffirmed in four subsequent cases wherein the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance was upheld because of the showing
that the labor dispute subject of the civil case was connected with the unfair
labor practices charged.  In ERLANGER
& GALIN­GER v. ERLANGER & GALINGER EMPLOYEES ASS’N., 104 Phil. 17, the
petitioner company admitted to the lower court that the labor dispute involved
an unfair labor practice.  The records
also disclosed that the strike and picketing arose from the unfair labor
practice charges levelled against petitioner
company.  In NATIONAL MINES &
ALLIED WORKERS’ UNION v. HON. ILAO, G.R. No. L-16884, Jan. 31, 1963, the unfair la­bor
practice charge for discrimination was based particu­larly on the alleged
unjust dismissal of one Jorge Patinio, which dismissal caused the petitioning union to
stage a picket, thereby creating a labor dispute which respondent company
sought to enjoin in a civil case. 
In B.C.I. EM­PLOYEES & WORKERS UNION v. HON. MARCOS, G.R. No.
L-21016, July 30, 1965, the
unfair labor practice charges were based on the alleged unlawful dismissal of
union members because of union activities and the records showed that one of
the reasons for the strike which was sought to be enjoined was
“discrimination against union members in enforcement of disciplinary
actions.” Finally, in CITIZENS’ LEAGUE OF FREE WORKERS v. HON. ABBAS, G.R.
No. L-21212, Sept. 23, 1966, the complaint itself in the civil case contained
the allega­tion that plaintiff’s refusal to recognize their auto­-calesa drivers as employees and bargain with them as such
was the cause of the strike staged by the latter.

In the case at bar, except for the bare allegation in
co-petitioner’s motion to dismiss filed before the lower court and the controverted allegations in par. IV of the petition, there
is no competent and satisfactory showing that the labor dispute object of Civil
Case 1697 was connected or
interwoven with the acts constituting unfair labor practice covered in Case
1159-ULP filed in the Court of Industrial Relations.  The connection could not even be inferred
from the charge which was couched in general language.  Petitioners could very well have established
this connection in a motion for reconsidera­tion which they should have filed
first before resorting to this Court. 
Withal, there is nothing to prevent peti­tioners from showing said
connection before the lower court in the proceedings to follow.  But the petition here must be dismissed for
now.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed and the
preliminary injunction heretofore issued is revoked and set aside.  Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, Acting Chief Justice, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 8-9.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 14.

^[3]
Sec. 5(a),
Republic Act 875.