PHILIPPINE PLYWOOD CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR UNION, RESPONDENT.

Petitioner, Philippine Plywood Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the
Corporation, states in its petition herein that the same is one “for certiorari
as a special civil action“, because “the questions of law and facts”
therein raised “would not be permissible in a petition for certiorari” as a
means to secure a review on appeal, although it, likewise, avers that said
petition “may also be treated by this Court as an appeal by certiorari”.

It is alleged in the petition that, in August 1950, thirty-seven (37)
employees of the Corporation were dismissed for just causes; that, on January 4,
1951, said employees moved for their inclusion as petitioners in Case No. 462-V
of the Court of Industrial Relations, entitled “Plywood Labor Union-CLO
vs. Philippine Plywood Corporation”, which was begun on July 7, 1950;
that, for reasons of expediency, the title of the case of said employees was
changed to “National Labor Union vs. Philippine Plywood Corporation”, and
docketed as Case No. 553-V; that after due hearing and consideration of the
evidence submitted, judgment was rendered on October 22, 1958, declaring that
most of the aforementioned employees had been dismissed without just cause and
directing their reinstatement, some with three (3) years backpay, others with
back wages, from their respective dates of dismissal, minus the earnings they
may have had elsewhere, one without backpay, and declaring that the other
employees had been dismissed for just cause; that, upon motion for
reconsideration, said decision was affirmed by the Court sitting en banc;
that the Court had gravely abused its discretion in holding that the first set
of employees were dismissed without just cause, in allowing their reinstatement
and awarding them backpay, and in concluding that some of them were not given
separation pay; and that there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Based upon these allegations, the Corporation prayed
that “a writ be issued nullifying and setting aside” said decision, and that,
“instead, another one be issued: (1) holding that the dismissals” of the
employees in question “were justified; (2) denying their reinstatement and
backpay; (3) holding that the one-month separation pay given” to specified
employees “were in lieu of one month’s notice; and (4) awarding the other
dismissed employees the corresponding one-month pay or mesada, in lieu of
notice”.

At the outset, we note that the resolution of respondent Court sitting en
banc, denying the motion for reconsideration of the decision appealed from,
was promulgated on January 30, 1959, and that, on March 11, 1959, the
Corporation filed a notice stating that “it will appeal said decision to the
Honorable Supreme Court, in accordance with the provisions of section 14 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103”, which gives the aggrieved party “ten (10) days
from the date of the award, order or decision” within which to “appeal
therefrom to the Supreme Court of the Philippines by writ of certiorari”.
Considering that said notice was given forty (40) days after said date, and that
the present petition for certiorari was filed on April 16, 1959, or over two (2)
months after the expiration of said period of ten (10) days, it is clear that
the case at bar cannot be considered as an appeal by certiorari, and must be
dealt with only as a special civil action of certiorari.

As such special civil action, it is, however, devoid of merit. Indeed, there
is no question that respondent Court had jurisdiction over the aforementioned
Case No. 553-V, as well as over the parties therein. The task of said Court was
to ascertain the true cause of the dismissal of the employees involved in the
case and to deter mine whether such cause was just or not. Both parties
introduced their respective proof thereon, with the result that the issue
narrowed down to which one of the two (2) sets of evidence thus appearing on
record reflected the truth. After carefully analizing said evidence in a 58-page
decision, Judge Tabigne of respondent Court reached the conclusion, which was
shared by the Court sitting en banc, that the evidence for the
petitioners therein was more reliable than that of the Corporation, that most of
said employees had been dismissed by the general manager of the Corporation
merely because they were involved in certain charges preferred against him and,
accordingly, without just cause, and that the one-month pay given to some of
them was an advance salary, not separation pay. Whether the lower court should
have given more credence to the evidence for the Corporation or not is a matter
that does not connote an abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, to warrant
the relief for which the special civil action of certiorari is intended,
particularly considering that the Corporation could have availed itself of the
remedy of appeal by certiorari, and that the same would have been a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

What is more, we are satisfied that respondent Court was justified by the
evidence of record in reaching the conclusions aforementioned. Thus, to mention
only some of the most salient facts of the case, the Corporation has not even
tried to explain why its General Manager dismissed all the aforementioned
thirty-seven (37) employees—who belonged to different departments—in August
1950, or shortly after the filing, on July 18, 1950, of an administrative
complaint charging him with several irregularities ranging from theft of
property of the Corporation to immorality with female employees thereof,
involving abuse of authority—although the acts or omissions imputed to said
employees as justification for their dismissal had taken place long before. For
instance, it is claimed that Lorenzo Aldana had committed a series of errors in
the performance of his duties as chief mechanic. These alleged errors were
committed, however, while he was working for the Corporation from March to June,
1949. Yet, he was re-employed in February 1950 and was not dismissed until
August 31, 1950, a few weeks after the filing of the aforementioned complaint
against him. Then, again, the Corporation alleges that some of the main
employees dismissed had connived among themselves to bring clown its production
with a view to paving the way for the removal of its general manager. As stated
in the decision appealed from:

“* * * It should be noted that in August, 1950, while the number of logs
delivered was only 37,288 bd. ft., it processed 54,441 bd. ft. with a total
output of 5,375 sheets of plywood finished (Exhibit ‘Q’). In July, 1950, while
the number of logs delivered was 114,819 bd. ft., it processed l45,847 bd. ft.
with a total output of 11,777 sheets of plywood finished (Exhibit ‘p’). In
September, 1950, while the number of logs delivered was 138,139 bd. ft., it
processed 137,617 bd. ft. with a total output of 8,217 sheets of plywood
finished (Exhibit ‘R’). From the foregoing comparative statements, it is clear
that there was lack of logs delivered as well as processed in August, 1950,
causing naturally to the low production of finished plywood for the same period,
compared with those produced in July, 1950 in relation with the number of logs
delivered and processed. It should also be observed that in September, 1950, as
computed with that of July and August, 1950, the number of logs delivered
exceeded the number of logs processed, which goes to show that there was
sufficient supply of logs for said month. In July and August, 1950, the number
of logs delivered, aside from being low, was less than the number of logs
processed (See Exhibit ‘R’). Likewise, the lack of sun dried veneers due to the
rainy season contributed also to the low production of plywood in August, 1950.
Manager Espinosa admitted that the low production of plywood in October, 1950
might have been due to the rainy season, considering that some veneers were
dried under the sun (t.s.n. p. 24, November 9, 1951)”.

It may not be amiss to add that the aforementioned charges against the
general manager were apparently preferred upon the behest of a ranking officer
of the Corporation—who was seemingly at logger heads with its General
Manager—and under promise of immunity from disciplinary action. In other words,
we are inclined to agree with counsel for respondent union that the employees
adverted to above were merely caught in by the cross-fire produced by an
intramural conflict between members of the management, which eventually ended in
the withdrawal of the ranking officer aforementioned, thus leaving said
employees at the mercy of the general manager, who from accused turned to be the
accuser and judge at the same time.

Wherefore, the petition herein is dismissed and the writ prayed for denied,
with costs against the Philippine Plywood Corporation. It is so
ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, De Leon, and Natividad, JJ., concur.