JAMES A. KEISTER, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, AND BATJAK, INC., RESPONDENTS.

Special civil action of prohibition to prevent respondent Judge
Pedro C. Navarro of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
from enforcing his Order dated March 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 10392 requiring
the petitioner to answer the complaint and from proceeding with the trial of
the case, on the ground that the Court has not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner.

Respondent Batjak, is a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
with offices at the NIDC Building,
259-263 Buendia Avenue,
Makati, Rizal; while petitioner James A. Keister
is an American citizen and a resident of 11 Narra
Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal.  Said respondent Batjak,
Inc. is the registered owner of an automobile, Dodge 440, 4-door Sedan,
with Motor No. 4248128752, Serial No. VE-132825C which it bought on November 12, 1965 for P19,000.00
from the Filipinas Auto Motor Corporation, and covered by Registration Certificate
No. 1160094, dated November 23, 1965 issued by the Land Transportation
Commission.

On December 27, 1966,
petitioner James A. Keister, as President-General
Manager of respondent Batjak, Inc., sold the
automobile to Juan T. Chuidian for P5,000.00.  Two (2) days later, or on December 29, 1966, J. T. Chuidian also sold and reconveyed
the same automobile for P5,000.00 to James A. Keister,
who registered the same in his name with the Land Transportation
Commission.  It is claimed by respondent Batjak, Inc. that these transactions were without its
authority, knowledge and consent.

On March 30, 1967,
respondent Batjak, Inc. took possession of the
automobile, but sometime in May, 1967 the said automobile disappeared from the
NIDC Compound at 259-263 Buendia
Avenue, Makati,
Rizal, where it was parked.  However, on October 16, 1967, the automobile was recovered by the
Land Transportation Commission, which, in turn, delivered it to the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary for investigation.

When the Philippine Constabulary (CIS) refused to deliver said
automobile to respondent Batjak, Inc. despite its
repeated demands for its return, the latter filed, on November 22, 1967, a complaint for Annulment of
Sale with Attachment against the Philippine Constabulary (CIS) and petitioner
James A. Keister in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II (Civil Case No. 10392).  Batjak, Inc. then
prayed, among others, that an Order be issued: 
(1) annulling the sale of the automobile by James A. Keister
in the name of Batjak, Inc. to J. T. Chuidian and the resale of said automobile by J. T. Chuidian to James A. Keister; (2)
ordering the attachment of the automobile by directing the Provincial Sheriff
of Rizal to take possession of it from the custody of
the Philippine Constabulary (CIS), Camp Crame, Quezon City, and to deliver it to respondent Batjak, Inc.; (3) ordering the Land Transportation Commission
to cancel the Registration Certificate No. 326456 dated January 5, 1967 issued
in favor of James A. Keister, and to issue, in lieu
thereof, a new registration certificate in favor of Batjak,
Inc.; and (4) ordering James A. Keister and any and
all persons acting on his behalf, jointly and severally, to pay Batjak, Inc. the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees,
expenses of litigation, and costs of the suit.^[1]
It was alleged in the complaint that defendant James A. Keister,
American citizen, and deposed President and General Manager of plaintiff may
“be served with summons at c/o Chuidian Law
Office, Suite 801, J M T
Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal“.
 It also alleged that on or about March
27, 1967, said defendant “without notice to plaintiff and/or any of its
officers and employees secretly and surreptitiously left the Philippines for
the United States and up to the present time, he has not returned * * *.”

On December 1, 1967,
the summons,^[2]
with the complaint attached thereto, was served purportedly upon petitioner at
“c/o Chuidian Law Office, Suite
801, JMT Bldg., Ayala Avenue,
Makati, Rizal“.^[3]
The receipt of service was signed by one Vicente Basallote,
Clerk of said Chuidian Law Office.^[4]

On December 15, 1967,
the petitioner, thru his counsel, filed a special appearance questioning the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of petitioner and moved to dismiss
the complaint.^[5]
It was asserted that the Court had acquired no jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant because the summons was improperly served at the Chuidian Law Office, Suite 801, JMT Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal and not at the
residence or place of business of the petitioner, contrary to the requirements
of Section 8 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.^[6]

On December 23, 1967,
the Motion to Dismiss was heard and argued. 
Thereafter, or on January 12, 1968, respondent Judge issued an Order
denying the afore-mentioned Motion to Dismiss for the reasons:  (1) that the address of the defendant James A.
Keister given in the complaint is c/o Chuidian Law Office, Suite 801, JMT Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal; (2) that the
service of summons and copy of the complaint was made at the said place and
received by one Vicente Basallote, Office Clerk; and
(3) that, as far as the service of summons and complaint was concerned, the
allegation in the complaint must prevail. 
In the same Order, the defendants in said Civil Case No. 10392 were
given ten (10) days from receipt of said Order within which to file their
answer.^[7]

On February 9, 1968,
petitioner, thru his counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated February 7, 1968 of the Order of January 12, 1968 of the respondent
Judge, reiterating the grounds relied upon in his Motion to Dismiss.^[8]
On February 17, 1968,
respondent Batjak, Inc. filed its opposition thereto.^[9]
On March 28, 1968,
respondent Judge issued an Order denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.^[10]

Hence, the present petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction praying that respondent Judge be prohibited from enforcing the Order
requiring petitioner to answer the complaint and to enter trial in Civil Case
No. 10392 of said Court, and from further proceeding in said action, which is
clearly beyond its jurisdiction; and that, pending the resolution of this
petition, a preliminary writ of injunction be issued against the respondent
Judge upon the filing of a bond.

On June 22, 1968,
this Court issued, as prayed for, the writ of preliminary injunction.^[11]

The sole issue for determination in this case is whether or not
jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by the court a quo over person of
petitioner.

We find the petition meritorious.

Service of summons upon the defendant is the means by which the
court may acquire jurisdiction over his person. 
In the absence of a valid waiver, trial and judgment without such
service are null and void.^[12]
This process is solely for the benefit of the defendant.^[13]
Its purpose is not only to give the court jurisdiction of the person of the
defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the
claim made against him.^[14]

The summons must be served to the defendant in person.^[15]
It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable
time that a substituted service may be made.^[16]
Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to
find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed.  This statement should be made in the proof of
service.^[17]
This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service.  It has been held that
this method of service is “in derogation of the common law; it is a method
extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute.”^[18]
Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of
substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any
substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered
ineffective.^[19]

Indeed, the constitutional requirement of due process requires
that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give the desired
notice to the party of the claim against him.^[20]

Under the Rules, substituted service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies
at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.^[21]
The terms “dwelling house” or “residence” are generally
held to refer to the time of service, hence it is not sufficient “to leave
the copy at defendant’s former dwelling house, residence, or place of abode, as
the case may be, after his removal therefrom.”^[22]
They refer to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the
time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the
country at the time.  Similarly, the
terms “office” or “regular place of business” refer to the
office or place of business of defendant at the time of service.  Note that the rule designates the persons to
whom copies of the process may be left. 
The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between
the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes
that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him
notice thereof.^[23]

It is not disputed that the dwelling house or residence of the
defendant, herein petitioner James A. Keister, is at
11 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati
Rizal, and that his office or regular place of
business, prior to his temporary departure to the United States on March 27,
1967, is at the Batjak Corporation office in Sarmiento Building, Ayala Avenue, Makati
Rizal.  It is,
however, conceded that in neither of these places was service of summons
effected in the manner prescribed by the procedural law.

The circumstance that “defendant James A.  Keister, without
notice to plaintiff and/or any of its officers and employees, secretly
and surreptitiously left the Philippines for the United States and up to
the present time he has not returned” does not warrant much less justify
the service of summons upon petitioner at a place which is neither his
residence nor regular place of business.

In Montalban v. Maximo,^[24]
this Court explained that summons in a suit in personam
against a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom
may be validly effected by substituted service under Section 8, Rule 14 of the
Revised Rules of Court, and that Section 18 of Rule 14 is not the sole provision
that governs summons upon a defendant temporarily absent from the Philippines
in personal actions.

As above indicated, the service of summons, in the case at bar, was
fatally defective and, therefore, insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
court a quo over the person of petitioner James A. Keister. 
Consequently, the Orders of January
12, 1968 and March 28,
1968 are null and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED,
and the writ of preliminary injunction issued on June 22, 1968 is made permanent.  Costs against respondent Batjak,
Inc..

Fernando, (Chairman), Aquino, and Martin, JJ.,
concur.

Barredo, J., in the result.

Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.

^[1]
Annex “A”, Petition, SC Rollo, pp.
5-10.

^[2]
Annex “B”, Ibid., SC
Rollo, p. 11.

^[3]
Paragraph 1 of the complaint alleges, among others, that: “defendant,
James A. Keister, of legal age, American citizen, and
the deposed President-General Manager of Plaintiff, which for purposes of this
action he may be served with summons at ‘c/o Chuidian
Law Office, Suite 801, JMT
Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal.'”

^[4]
Annex “B-1”, Petition, SC Rollo, p.
11.

^[5]
Annex “C”, Ibid., SC
Rollo, pp. 12-15.

^[6]
The pertinent provisions reads:

“SEC. 8.  Substituted service.  – If the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s dwelling house
or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.”

^[7]
Annex “D”, Petition, SC Rollo, p.
16.

^[8]
Annex “E”, Ibid., SC
Rollo, pp. 17-22.

^[9]
Annex “F”, Ibid., SC
Rollo, pp. 23-24.

^[10]
Annex “G”, Ibid., SC
Rollo, pp. 25-26.

^[11]
SC Rollo, p. 30.

^[12]
Salmon, et al. v. Tan Cueco, 36 Phil. 556;
Echevarria v. Parsons Hardware Co., 51
Phil. 980; Reyes v. Paz, et al., 60 Phil. 440; Pantaleon
v. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 761; Government v. Botor,
69 Phil. 130; Caneda v. Court of Appeals, 116 Phil.
283; Trimica, Inc. v. Polaris Marketing
Corporation, 60 SCRA 321, 325.

^[13] Mosaic
Templars of America
v. Saines, Civ. App.
265, SW 721.

^[14]
72 C.J.S. 989; Mohr v. Manvierre, 101 U.S.
417, 25 L. ed. 1052.

^[15]
Section 7, Rule 14, Revised Rules of Court.

^[16]
Section 8, Ibid.

^[17]
I Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 444.

^[18]
72 C.J.S. 1053.

^[19] Ibid.,
pp. 1053-1054.

^[20] Perkins
v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186; Dy
Reyes v. Ortega, 16 SCRA 903.

^[21]
Section 8, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.

^[22]
72 C.J.S. 1059.

^[23] Ibid.,
p. 1060.

^[24]
22 SCRA 1070.