REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (PHILIPPINE NAVY), PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND JOSE EROLIN, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Chairman
of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, as affirmed by the Commission en
banc.

Jose Erolin – hereinafter referred to
as respondent – was employed as a dockman-rigger of
the Philippine Navy, in its ship repair yard at the Cavite
Naval Base, from January 16, 1952
to May 18, 1962.  Working five days a week at P5.95 a day –
sometimes on night shift, from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. – he used to carry dam­aged
parts of vessels, chain blocks and equipment from the ships to trucks, over
distances ranging from 30 to 150 meters, as well as to unload effects of
similar nature from trucks to the shop, deliver cables from the latter to
ships, remove therefrom damaged life boats to be
repaired and thereafter returned thereto, and take re­placements from the
shop.  While at work, sometime in March,
1962, he began coughing and had a hemoptysis (vomited
blood).  An X-ray examination, made on May 18, 1962, revealed that he was
afflicted with tuberculosis, minimal, bi-lateral, in view of which, Dr. Isaac,
the Philippine Navy physician, advised Erolin to stop
working.  He did so and had himself
treated thereafter by Dr. Jose L. Bucoy.

His claim for compensation, filed on July 18, 1962, was not controverted,
although written notice of his illness had been given to the ship repair
officer on May 18, 1962.  Months later, the Navy – hereinafter referred
to as petitioner – tried to controvert said claim through a communication dated
October 30, 1962.  After ap­propriate proceedings, a hearing
officer of Regional Office No. 4 – hereinafter referred to as the referee –
rendered a decision, dated April 3,
1963, dismissing the claim upon the ground that respondent’s
illness is not compensable, because of his alleged failure to establish its
causal connection with his employment. 
On April 17, 1963,
re­spondent filed a petition praying, for the reasons therein given, that the
referee “render a report to the Workmen’s Compensation Com­mission.”
This petition was denied by the referee, in an order dated April 18, 1963, for the reason that respondent
had not filed, either a petition for review, or a motion for reconsideration of
said decision.  A petition for
reconsideration of this order, filed on April
30, 1963, was denied by the referee on the same date.  On July
15, 1963, respondent filed a request for elevation of the
case” to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, which was forthwith
denied, upon the theory that the aforementioned decision was al­ready final and
executory. 
Respondent having, on January 25, 1965, filed a similar petition,
directly with the Commission, on February 4, 1965, the latter ordered said
Regional Office to forward thereto the entire record of the case.  Thereafter, or on April 21, 1965, the Chairman of the Commission
directed both parties, with their respective physicians, to appear before the
Evaluation Division of the Commission, for a joint physical examination of
respondent.  Subsequently, or on June 8, 1965, said Chairman of the
Commis­sion rendered a decision reversing that of the referee and ordering the petitioner:

“1. To pay
claimant, thru the Commission, the sum of TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY
FIVE PESOS and 40/100 (60% of P29.75 from May 18, 1962 to June 2, 1965 or
P2,825.40) as compensation and a weekly compensation of P17.85 from June 3,
1965 until his illness is pronounced arrested or cured by competent authority,
but the total compensation should not exceed the amount of P4,000 maximum
allowable by law under Section 14 of the Act;

“2. To
reimburse the claimant the sum of P168.00 for medical expenses he incurred and
to provide him with whatever medical assistance he needs until his illness is
pronounced arrested or cured by competent authority under Section 3 of the Act;
and

“3. To pay to
the Workmen’s Compensation Fund the sum of P34.00 (plus P5.00 cost of the
review) as fees under Section 55 of the Act. “

A motion, filed by petitioner, for the reconsideration of this
decision, was denied in a resolution of the Commission en banc,
dated June 29, 1965.

It appears that, for the period from May 18, 1962 to June 2,
1965, respondent was later paid the sum of P2,825.40, and that, thereafter, up
to September 5, 1966, he was paid the weekly compensation provided in said
decision of June 8, 1965, which, added to the said sum of P2,825.40, made a
grand total of P4,000.00.  The re­cords
do not show that the P168.00 originally awarded to respondent for medical
expenses had been reimbursed to him.

On February 25, 1966, respondent filed a motion alleging that he
was still suffering from his aforementioned illness, as shown by an X-ray
plate, taken on November 2, 1965, and attached to the motion, and “that after
the filing of his claim for compensation in 1962 up to October 15, 1965, he had
incurred professional and me­dical expenses for the treatment” of said illness
in the total sum of P1,248.90, itemized as follows:  (a) “for professional fees of Dr. Jose
L. Bucoy,” P225.00; (b) “for medication by
Dr. Bucoy,” P512.00; and (c) “for drugs and
medicines bought in drug stores,” P511.90. 
Respondent submitted, in support of the motion, his affidavit and that
of Dr. Bucoy, as well as itemized receipts of the
pharmacist who allegedly sold the aforementioned drugs and me­dicines, and
prayed that petitioner be ordered to reimburse to him said sum of
P1,248.90.  Despite the opposition
thereto, filed by petitioner on March
10, 1966, the Chairman of the Commission granted said motion, in an
order of May 26, 1966,
which was upheld in a resolution of the Commission en banc, dated
October 6, 1966.  Thereupon, or on October 28, 1966, petitioner gave notice of its
intention to appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court.  Hence, the petition herein, in which it is
urged that said order and resolution, dated, respectively, May 26 and October
6, 1966, have been issued with grave abuse of discretion because:  (1) the Com­mission had no original
jurisdiction to entertain respondent’s motion of February 25, 1966; (2) such
motion was granted without a formal hearing, despite petitioner’s opposition
thereto; and (3) respondent had failed to give the notice required in Section
13 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended.

Petitioner maintains that the WCC has no more than ap­pellate
jurisdiction to decide claims under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the
original jurisdiction over such claims being vested in Regional Offices, and
that respondent’s motion for reimbursement of medical expenses, dated February
25, 1966, is within the original jurisdiction of a Regional Office, and could
not be validly entertained and decided by the Commission itself, except on
appeal from a decision of that office, which does not exist, the motion having
been filed directly with the Commission.

This pretense is untenable. 
The power to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act^[1]
is, pursuant to Section 46 thereof, under the “exclusive jurisdic­tion”
of the WCC, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.  The hearing officers in Regional Offices of
the Commission are mere “referees” thereof.  Although section 48 of said Act, as amended
by R.A. No. 4119, approved on June 20, 1964, provides that re­ferees
“shall assume original jurisdiction over all workmen’s com­pensation cases
in the regional offices where they are assigned,” such original
jurisdiction does not exclude that of the Commission, for Section 49 of the
same Act explicitly states that hearings under the provisions thereof “may
be held before the Commissioner or any of the referees.” Indeed,
the same section expressly authorizes the Commissioner to “receive”
evidence, a power inconsistent with the exclusively “appellate”
character of the jurisdiction of the Com­mission and that of its members, as
postulated by petitioner herein.  What is
more, said section provides that, in the exercise of the power to review
decisions or orders of a referee, the Commissioner may, in his
discretion, “take or order the taking of additional testi­mony.”
At any rate, respondent’s motion of February
25, 1966, par­took merely of the nature of a petition for the implementation
of the decision, of June 8, 1965,
of the Chairman of the Commission, as affirmed by the Commission en banc,
which both have the power to entertain and grant.

As regards the absence of a formal hearing on said motion, it
should be noted that respondent had a hemoptysis
while at work in March, 1962, and that upon X-ray examination, conducted in petitioner’s
hospital, on May 18, 1962,
he was found to have tuberculosis.  Thus,
on the date last mentioned, petitioner had notice of said illness.  Yet, it did not file, within fourteen (14)
days from said date, or not later than June
1, 1962, the requisite notice of its intention to contro­vert
respondent’s claim for compensation therefor.^[2]
Neither had petitioner sought a reinstatement of its right to controvert said
claim.  Hence, the same was, in legal
contemplation, uncontroverted, and, neither a formal
hearing thereon, nor “a formal award,” was neces­sary for
respondent’s right to collect the amounts due to him.^[3]
In­asmuch as the subject-matter of respondent’s motion of February 25, 1966,
was but an incident of said claim and merely sought an imple­mentation of the
decision thereon rendered on June 8, 1965, as af­firmed by the Commission en
banc, on June 29, 1965, such defenses as petitioner might have had,
predicated upon respondent’s failure to give the notice required in section 13
of the Workmen’s Compen­sation Act, as amended by R.A. No. 4119,4
are likewise deemed waived.  In other
words, petitioner is barred from questioning the validity and reasonableness of
the reimbursement sought by respon­dent in his motion of February 25, 1966,5 and a formal hearing thereon, with
notice to petitioner herein, was unnecessary. 
More­over, the Commission found that the amount claimed in said motion
is reasonable, and, considering the period of time involved, as well as other
factors relevant thereto, We fully agree with such finding.

We note, however, that the expenses for medical services, as well
as drugs and medicines, referred to in the motion, cover the period from July
18, 1962, to October 15, 1965, most of which is within the period of time
embraced by the decision, dated June 8, 1965, which ordered petitioner herein, inter
alia to reimburse respondent “the sum of
P168.00 for medical expenses he incurred and to provide him with whatever medical
assistance he needs until his illness is pronounced arrested or cured by
competent authority.” This award, which is already final, has settled de­finitely
such right of reimbursement as respondent had with re­spect to medical services
rendered and drugs or medicines sup­plied to him up to June 8, 1965. 
In other words, respondent is entitled to recover nothing from
petitioner herein, in addition to the P168.00 awarded, in the decision of June 8, 1965, for medical expenses,
except such expenses as may have been incurred for medical services rendered
and medicines consumed subsequently thereto.

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission for a determination of the amount due to respondent
herein for said medical services ren­dered and drugs or medicines used in the
treatment of his illness after June 8,
1965, and the issuance of the corresponding order directing the
payment of said amount.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Act No. 3428.

^[2]
See Section 45 of Act No. 3428, as amended.

^[3]
National Development Co. v. WCC, G.R .No. L-19863, April 29, 1964; SMB v. Joves,
G.R. No. L-24258, June 26, 1968;
Surigao Consolidated Mining Co. v. WCC, G.R.
No. L-26077, May 27, 1968;
Rebar Buildings Inc. v. WCC, G.R. No. L-27486, Apr. 30, 1968; NDC v. WCC, G.R. No. L-20504,
Mar. 31, 1965; MRR v.
Chavez, G.R. No. L-20103, Sept. 30,
1964; A.D. Santos v. Vas­quez, G.R. No. L-23586, Mar. 20, 1968; MRR v. WCC, G.R.
No. L-21504, Sept. 15, 1967;
MRR v. Rivera, G.R. No. L-23021, May
29, 1968; Rio Y Co. v. WCC, G.R. No. L-21467, Aug. 30, 1967.

4
Requiring notice to the employer and the Commission within twenty (20) days
following the first treatment and, there­after, within the same period,
following every treatment.

5
MRR v. WCC, G.R. No. L-18264, May
26, 1964; NDC v. WCC, G.R. No. L-21724, April 27, 1967; Republic v. WCC, G.R. No. L-22650,
April 28, 1967; Magalona v. WCC, G.R. No. L-21849, Dec. 11, 1967; Luzon
Steve­doring Corp. v. WCC, G.R. No. L-27588, April 28, 1969.