J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., HON. HERMOGENES CALUAG, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (QUEZON CITY BRANCH IV) AND HON. NICASIO YATCO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTAN…

The
record shows that the judgments rendered in 1955 by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, in its ejectment cases Q-1401 and Q-1402, were, upon
regular appeal, subsequently affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals in its cases CA-G.R. Nos. 16265-66-R, “Tuason & Company,
Inc. vs. Bruna Rosete and Buenaventura Dizon”. The Court of First
Instance, after the appellate court’s decision became final and upon
return of the records in due course, Issued writs of execution of the
judgment against Rosete and Dizon, as prayed for by the landowner
Tuason & Company. Subsequently, on November 19, 1960, the Court of
First Instance issued orders of demolition of the houses of the
evictees or judgment debtors.

A few days previously, on
November 16, 1960, the landowner J. M. Tuason & Company had also
applied for a writ of prohibition in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City (Case No. Q-5527) against the Land Tenure Administration,
the Auditor General, and the Solicitor General, to restrain them from
instituting expropriation proceedings of the petitioner Company’s land
in Quezon City, generally known as the “Tatalon Estate”, as expressly
and specifically authorized by Republic Act No. 2616, that became law,
without executive approval, on August 3, 1959; the Company claiming
mainly that: the Republic Act was unconstitutional, null and void, as
legislation aimed at depriving it of its property for the benefit of
squatters and occupants, even If the property had been actually
subdivided, and its lots were being sold to the public; and that
respondent officers threatened to enforce said law by initiating
expropriation proceedings. At petitioner’s request, Judge Hermogenes
Caluag of the Quezon City Court of First Instance (to whom the
prohibition case was assigned) issued an ex parte writ of preliminary
injunction on November 18, I960, upon the filing of a bond of P20,000.

After
injunction was issued, the evictees in Quezon City cases Q-1401 and
1402, Bruna Rosete and Tranquilino Dizon, petitioned the Court of First
Instance to suspend the order of demolition of their houses, on the
ground that they were tenants of the Tatalon Estate; that Republic Act
No. 2616, after specifically authorizing the expropriation of the
Tatalon Estate, in its section 4, prescribes as follows:

“Section
4. After the expropriation proceedings mentioned in section two of this
Act shall have been initiated and during the pendency of the same, no
ejectment proceedings shall be instituted or prosecuted against the
present occupant of any lot in said Tatalon Estate, and no ejectment
proceedings already commenced shall be continued and such lot or any
portion thereof shall not be sold by the owners of said estate to any
person other than the present occupant without the consent of the
latter given in a public document.”

However, Judge Nicasio Yatco of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City denied the suspension, because no expropriation proceedings had
been actually filed.

Thereupon, the evictees Rosete and
Dizon recoursed to the Court of Appeals, and there instituted, on
February 4, 1961, certiorari proceedings (C.A.-G.R. No. 28842-R)
against Judges Yatco and Caluag, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and the
Land Tenure Administration. They averred, after recital of the facts,
that Judge Caluag gravely abused his discretion in issuing the
preliminary injunction in the prohibition case No. Q-5527 to restrain
the initiation of condemnation proceedings over the Tatalon Estate;
that as beneficiaries under section 4 of Republic Act No, 2616, they
were entitled to a stay of the demolition proceedings against them; and
that Judge Yatco abused his discretion in refusing to suspend the same
until the expropriation case was terminated. The petitioners prayed
that—

(1) Judge Yatco be enjoined from issuing orders of demolition in Cases Nos. Q-1401and 1402;

(2) Judge Galuag be enjoined from enforcing the preliminary injunction he had issued in Case No. Q-5527; and

(3)
That the Land Tenure Administrator be commanded to institute the
expropriation proceedings authorized by Republic Act No. 2616.

The Court of Appeals gave due course to the certiorari petition, and on February 9, 1961 ordered the issuance ex parte
of the preliminary injunction prayed for, upon the filing of a P1,000
bond, which was done. Respondent Tuason & Company, Inc., moved to
dissolve the preliminary injunction of the Court of Appeals, pointing
out that said Court’s jurisdiction to take cognizance of certiorari
proceedings and to issue injunctions was only in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction; that the orders of execution issued by the Quezon City
Court are not appealable; that the prohibition proceedings in case No.
Q-5527, involving (as they did) a question of constitutionality of a
statute, were likewise not appealable to the Court of Appeals; and that
said Court, therefore, was without jurisdiction to pass over the
questioned orders and that its injunction was improperly issued, not
being in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
These points were reiterated in the Company’s answer to the petition
for certiorari. The Court of Appeals (Second Division) refused to lift
the preliminary injunction; on the contrary, on February 26, upon
motion of one of the respondents, the Land Tenure Administration, it
clarified the previous writ of preliminary injunction,—

“In
the sense that said Writ lifts, quashes, or dissolves the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the Hon. Judge Hermogenes Caluag, in
Civil Case No. 5527, CFI, Rizal, so that respondent Land Tenure
Administration may thus properly file the complaint for expropriation
as authorized by Republic Act No. 2616.”

Thereupon,
Tuason & Company instituted in this Supreme Court certiorari
proceedings (G.R. No. L-18128). We gave it due course and enjoined
enforcement of the orders of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-.G.R. No.
28842, and ordered the Land Tenure Administration to defer the filing
of the expropriation proceedings until further orders.

The
sequel to the events narrated can be gleaned from the record of case
G.R. No. L-18672, a certiorari proceeding filed by the Land Tenure
Administration against Judge Hermogenes Caluag and Tuason &
Company, Inc. The motion of this Land Tenure Administration and its
co-respondents to dismiss the prohibition case in the Quezon City Court
(Case No. Q-5527), as well as their motion to dissolve the preliminary
injunction issued by Judge Caluag, was denied by him; and when the
Second Division of the Court of Appeals issued its resolution of
February 26, 1961, quashing Judge Caluag’s preliminary injunction, the
Land Tenure Administration attorneys attempted to file the complaint
for the expropriation of 93 hectares of the Tatalon Estate in the
Quezon City court, but said complaint could not be docketed because the
Judge had forbidden the Court Clerk to do so. Despite entreaties, Judge
Caluag refused to allow the expropriation complaint to be docketed,
claiming that he had no official knowledge of the resolution of the
Court of Appeals, even after he was served with a certified copy
thereof.

The Land Tenure Administration avers that the
issuance of the injunction in the prohibition case (Q-5527), the denial
of the motion to dismiss the case, the refusal to dissolve the
injunction, and the refusal to have the complaint for expropriation
docketed were all in abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction;
that furthermore, venue was improperly laid, because an action for
prohibition is personal in character, and neither petitioner nor any of
the respondents in said prohibition case were domiciled in Quezon City,
Petitioner Land Tenure Administration, therefore, prayed that Judge
Caluag be ordered by this Court to refrain from proceeding with the
prohibition case, from enforcing the writ of preliminary injunction
issued therein, from issuing orders of demolition of the tenants
houses, and to allow the expropriation case to be docketed and
regularly proceeded with.

As we view it, two main questions are involved in these cases:

(1)
In G. R. L-18128: Did the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to lift,
quash, and dissolve the preliminary writ of injunction issued by Judge
Caluag in the prohibition case No. Q-5527 pending in his court?

(2)
In G. R. L-18672: Did Judge Caluag act without or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the preliminary injunction in the prohibition
case?

As to the first issue, we are satisfied that the writ
of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 28842-R is
null and void for want of jurisdiction. The authority of said Court to
issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari and habeas
corpus is expressly limited by statute to their issuance in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
(Judiciary Act, sec. 30), and it has been repeatedly ruled by us that
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to issue such writs must be
based on the existence of a right to appeal to it from the judgment on
the merits in the main case. Without such right of appeal the Court of
Appeals is without jurisdiction to interfere, for that Court is purely
a creature of statute. ^[1]
Since the issuance of orders for execution after the judgment of
ejectment had become final are not appealable, as the Court of Appeals
itself has ruled ^[2], otherwise
litigations would never end; and since the prohibition case No. Q-5527
involved the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2616, an issue of
which the Court of Appeals could not take cognizance, said Court
clearly had no authority to interfere by prerogative writ in either
litigation, for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Judge Caluag of Quezon
City was, therefore, not bound by the writs so issued by the Court of
Appeals.

On the second question, the preliminary injunction
issued by Judge Caluag was merely an incident to the main (prohibition)
case, and evidently had for its object to prevent that the principal
case and any remedy to be granted therein should be rendered moot and
nugatory by the filing of the condemnation proceedings sought to be
prohibited Issuance of the injunction was authorised by section 7 of
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, dealing with writs, certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus.—

“SEC. 7 Expediting proceedings. Preliminary injunction.
The court in which the petition is filed, or a judge thereof, may make
orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant a preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending
such proceedings.”

Authority is likewise derived from section 6 of Rule 124, concerning the powers and duties of courts:

“When
by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry into
effect may be employed by such court or officer.”

That
the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 2616 could be
invoked as a defense in the expropriation proceedings does not alter
the right of respondent Tuason & Company to invoke it in the
prohibition case, without awaiting the initiation of the condemnation
case. In any event, the issue of constitutionality would be like a
prejudicial question to the expropriation, as it would be a waste of
time and effort to appoint evaluation commissioners and debate the
market value of the property sought to be condemned if it turned out
that the condemnation was illegal.

It is urged by amicus
curiae that Courts of First Instance have no jurisdiction to entertain
actions assailing the constitutionality of statutes or treaties,
because section 10 of Article VIII of the Constitution prescribes that—

“No
treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence
of two-thirds of all the members of the (Supreme) Court.”

This
contention is, however, destroyed by the terms of section 2 of Article
VIII, wherein the Constitution itself inhibits Congress from depriving
the Supreme Court—

“Of its jurisdiction to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari or
writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final
judgments ahd decrees of inferior courts in—

(1) All cases
in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance or executive orders or regulations is in question.” (Italics
Supplied)

Plainly, the Constitution
contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases
involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in
cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue. Construing
both provisions together, it is readily discerned that the two-thirds
vote of the Supreme Court, required by section 10 of Article VIII,
conditions only the decisions of the Supreme Court in the exercise of
Its appellate jurisdiction.

It is true that, as argued by the
petitioner Land Tenure Administration, the mere fact that a statute is
alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to
have its enforcement enjoined. But the rule is not without exceptions.
In Cochiong vs. Dinglasan, 79 Phil. 125, this Court quoted with
approval from 28 Am. Jur. 369-371 the rule that—

“It
is recognized, however, that an injunction will lie to restrain the
threatened enforcement of an invalid law where the lawful use and
enjoyment of private property will be injuriously affected by its
enforcement * * * “,

and the petition for a
writ of prohibition in Q-5527 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City pleads precisely this threatened injury to the proprietary rights
of Tuason & Company, Inc., as owners of the Tatalon Estate. Whether
this injury is real or not must be decided on the evidence submitted in
that case, and we are in no position to resolve it in the certiorari
proceedings now before us. Our task here is merely to determine absence
or excess of jurisdiction: and on the facts and applicable law, we can
not say that in the issuance of the preliminary injunction by the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City there was such grave abuse of
discretion as would constitute excess of jurisdiction.

It may
be added that the maintenance of the injunction issued by Judge Caluag
works no real prejudice at present, not only because we can not
anticipate the final decision of Judge Caluag on the issue of
constitutionality, but also because the Land Tenure Administration
confesses that it has available only two million pesos to pay for
property that, according to the proposed complaint for expropriation,
has an area of 1,096,849.50 square meters with a reasonable assessed
value of P6,034,865.95. Plainly, the government is not now in a
position to take over the possession of the land, since it does not
have the money that it must deposit as a prerequisite to its entry
(section 3 of Rule 69 on Eminent Domain).

In moving for the
lifting of the preliminary injunction and for a stay of, the ejectment
proceedings, the Land Tenure, Administration and the other movants
assume that, upon filing of the condemnation petition, the land owner
will be barred from enforcing its final judgments of ejectment against
the possessors of the land, even if the Government should not take over
the possession of the property involved. This view, in our opinion, is
not warranted. We see nothing in the terms of Republic Act No. 2616 to
justify the belief that the Legislature intended a departure from the
normal course prescribed for eminent domain cases, where the rights of
the owner of the land may not be disturbed without previous deposit of
the provisional, value of the property sought to be condemned. The
effectivity of section 4 of Republic Act 2616, discontinuing ejectment
proceedings against the present occupants, and restraining any act of
disposition of the property, is justifiable only, if the Government
takes possession of the land in question by depositing its value. It
needs no argument to show that by restraining the land owner from
enforcing even final judgments in his favor to recover possession of
his property, as well as from disposing of it to persons of his choice,
he is deprived of the substance of ownership, and; his title is left as
an empty shell. The land owner would the nibe deprived of those
attributes of ownership that give it value, and his property is
virtually taken from him without compensation and in violation of the
Constitution, particularly in view of the fact that R.A. 2616 (unlike
previous Acts of similar character) does not even provide for a deposit
of the current rentals by the tenants during the pendency of the
proceedings (cf. R.A. No, 1162, section 5). The Bill of Rights, in
requiring that “private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation”, and Article XIII, section 4, in prescribing
that “Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at
cost to individuals”, prohibit any disturbance of proprietary rights
without coetaneous payment of just indemnity. Hence, the mere filing of
the condemnation proceedings for the benefit of tenants can not, by
itself alone, lawfully suspend the condemnee’s dominical rights,
whether of possession, enjoyment, or disposition. And this is
especially the case where final and executory judgments of ejectment
have been obtained against the occupants of the property.

Whether or not venue was correctly laid in the prohibition case now
pending in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City is a question of
law that does not affect jurisdiction, and any resolution of the trial
Court thereon is reviewable by appeal and not by certiorari.

In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) In Case G.R. No. L-18128, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., setting aside the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the Court of Appeals in its case CA-G.R. No.
28842-R, the same being null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the Court to take cognizance of said case;

(b) In Case G. R. No. L-18672, Republic of the Philippines vs.
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., et al., dismissing the petition for
certiorari, and denying the writs of certiorari and injunction applied
for.

The Court of First Instance of Quezon City is directed
to hear and resolve the prohibition case No. Q-5527 with all
practicable dispatch.Without costs.

So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Roldan vs. Villaroman, 69 Phil. 12; Breslin vs. Luzon Stevedoring, 84 Phil., 618; 48 Of. Gaz., 1170; Borja vs. Saminiano, 71 Phil., 227.

^[2] Aquino vs. Judge Forilan Bayona, (CA) 56 Off. Gaz., (No. 25), pp. 4232, 4233.