LE HUA SIA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. LUIS B. REYES, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XXI AND CHUA AN, RESPONDENTS.

Upon complaint by Le Hua Sia, an information was filed with the municipal court of
Manila (criminal case F-043204), charging Chua An with “physical injuries
which required me­dical attendance for a period of more than one day but not
more than nine days which prevented her from performing her customary labor for
the same period of time.” After due trial, the accused was found guilty as
charged and sentenced “to pay a fine of P100.00, or suffer subsidiary
imprison­ment in case of insolvency, with costs,” Chua An appealed to the
Court of First Instance of Manila (criminal case 70480).  The counsel for Le Hua
Sia, as private prosecutor, with the conformity of
the City Fiscal, there filed a petition asking that the record of the criminal
case, including the transcript of the stenographic notes taken during the
trial, which had been forwarded to the CFI, be returned to the municipal court
“in order that the said inferior court would elevate the record to the
Court of Appeals which has appellate jurisdiction over
the case.” This petition was denied by the respondent Judge Luis B. Reyes
in his order of June 29, 1963, on the ground that the appeal falls within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Not satisfied with this order, Le Hua Sia filed the pre­sent petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, praying, inter alia, that the respondent judge be declared without
jurisdiction over the ap­peal, that the order of June 29, 1963 be set aside,
and that the said respondent be ordered to return the record of the case to the
inferior court to enable it to elevate the same to the Court of Appeals for
review.

It is the contention of the petitioner that the Court of Appeals,
and not the Court of First Instance of Manila has appellate jurisdiction over
criminal case F-043204, citing the last two paragraphs of section 87 of
Republic Act 296, otherwise known as the “Judiciary Act of 1948,” as
amended by R.A. 2613, and further amended by R.A. 3828, which read:

“Municipal judges in the capitals of provin­ces and subprovinces and judges of city courts shall have like
jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an
offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty
provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six
years or fine not exceeding six thou­sand pesos or both, and in the absence of
the dis­trict judge, shall have like jurisdiction within the province as the
Court of First Instance to hear applications for bail.

“All cases filed under the next preceding paragraph with
municipal judges of capitals and city court judges shall be tried and decided
on the merits by the respective municipal judges or city judges.  Proceedings had shall be recorded and
decisions therein shall be appealable direct to the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be.”

The petitioner argues that because the
above-cited provi­sions confer on city courts “like jurisdiction as the
Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within
their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not
exceed prision correccional
or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand
pesos, or both,” and since the proceedings had in criminal case F-043204
were recorded, the appeal in the said case should go direct to the Court of
Appeals and not to the Court of First Instance of Manila.  This argument is unavailing.

An illuminating analysis of the jurisdiction of city courts vis–a–vis the jurisdiction of courts
of first instance was made by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Esperat
v. Avila, et al, L-25922, June 30, 1967.  Said Mr. Justice Reyes:

“Petitioner contends that although under the original provision
of section 87(b) of Republic Act 296, as well as in Republic Act 2613, the
original jurisdiction of the justices of the peace and municipal courts was
confined to cases punishable by imprisonment for not more than six months, or a
fine of not more than P200.00 or both, this jurisdiction was enlarged by
Republic Act 3828 when it was extend­ed to cases here the penalty provided by
law is imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or fine of not more than P3,000.00,
or both imprison­ment and fine.  Since
under the Revised Penal Code, the crime of grave coercion, of which he was
charged before and found guilty by the City Court of Cotabato,
is punishable by arresto ma­yor and a
fine not exceeding P500.00, petitioner claims that the original jurisdiction of
the said court is exclusive, and the decision is, conse­quently, appealable to the Court of First Instance.

“The fallacy in petitioner’s argument lies in his failure to
consider section 44(f) of the same Judiciary Act of 1948, in conjunction with
its section 87(c).  Note
that notwithstanding the va­rious amendments received by section 87, section
44(f) remained unaltered, thereby indicating the intention of the legislators
to retain the ori­ginal jurisdiction of the court of first instance in certain
cases.  The fact that the
jurisdiction of the municipal or city courts was enlarged in virtue of the
amendments of section 87(c), can­not be taken as a repeal or withdrawal of the
jurisdiction conferred on the court of first in­stance.  Not only is implied repeal disfavored by the
law, but also, it is a cardinal principle that a statute must be so construed
as to harmo­nize all apparent conflicts, and give effect to all its provisions
whenever possible.

“Actually, there is nothing irreconcilable between sections
44(f) and 87(c) of the Judiciary Act.

“As therein provided, the court of first instance was given
original jurisdiction over cases where the penalty prescribed by law is
imprisonment for more than 6 months or fine of more
than P200.00; the justices of the peace and municipal or city
courts of chartered cities, over cases where the penalty is imprisonment for not
more than 3 years, and fine of not more
than P3.000.00.  In other words,
where the prescribed penalty is imprisonment for more than 6 months, but not exceeding
3 years, or fine of more than P200.00 but not exceeding P3,000.00 the justice
of the peace or municipal court only has concurrent (and not exclusive)
original ju­risdiction with the court of first instance.  And, it may be stated that this concurrent
jurisdic­tion between the inferior courts and the court of first instance was
not provided for the first time in Republic Act No. 3828.  Under Republic Act 2613, crimes the penalties
for which do not exceed 3 years, or fine for not more than P3,000.00,
were specifically placed within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
and municipal courts, concurrent with the court of first instance.

“It follows, therefore, that the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the justice of the peace and municipal courts is confined only to cases
where the prescribed penalty is imprisonment for 6 months or
less, or fine of P200.00 or less, whereas the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the court of first instance covers cases where the
penalty is incarceration for more than 3 years (or 6 years in the case of city
courts and municipal courts in provincial capitals), or fine for more than
P3,000.00 (or P6,000.00 in proper cases), or both such imprisonment and fine.  Between these exclusive jurisdic­tions lies a
zone where the jurisdiction is concurrent. 
This is the proper construction to be placed on the provisions involved
herein, regardless of what may have been the prior rul­ings on the matter.  Needless to state, in an appropriate case
where the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, municipal or city court is
concurrent with that of the court of first instance, appeal from the decision
of the for­mer tribunal lies directly to the Court of Ap­peals, or the Supreme
Court.

**         **        
**         **

“The foregoing pronouncement is made on the assumption that the
proceedings in the Cotabato City Court in which
petitioner was convicted have been regularly conducted and recorded and the
stenographic notes have been taken of the testimony submitted to the trial
Court, * * *.”

Paraphrasing, an appeal from a judgment of a munici­pal court or
city court in a criminal case that falls within its original exclusive
jurisdiction is appealable only to the court of first
instance; the judgment of a municipal or city court in a criminal case over
which it has concurrent jurisdiction with the court of first in­stance, is appealable direct to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court, as the nature of the issues involved in the appeal may warrant, provided
of course that the proceedings had in such case were recorded.

In the case at bar, the indictment charges Chua An with slight physical injuries defined and penalized un­der
article 266, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.  The penalty for the offense is arresto menor, or
imprisonment of from 1 day to 30 days. 
It is obvious that the crime charged falls within the original exclusive
juris­diction of the city court of Manila. 
The judgment in such case is therefore appealable
directly to the Court of First Instance of Manila, and not to the Court of
Appeals, as rightly held by the respondent judge.

ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, and the writ
of preliminary injunction issued on August
14, 1963 is dissolved.  Costs against the petitioner.

Reyes, J.B.L., (Acting C.J.), Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles,
and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.