G.R. No. L-7920. May 10, 1955
SERVANDO R. LARA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FROILAN BAYONA IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, THE SHERIFF OF MANILA, CONCEPCION YALDUA AND PRUDENCIO D…
CONCEPCION, J.:
decision in Civil Case No. 18393 thereof, entitled “Concepcion Yaldua vs.
Prudencio de Guzman,” reading:
“Las partes han presentado un convenio de transaccion del tenor
siguiente:‘COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
‘COME NOW the parties in the above-entitled case, assisted by their
respective attorneys, and to this Hon. Court most respectfully submit the
following compromise agreement:‘1. That the defendant acknowledges to be indebted to the plaintiff in the
sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00), Philippine Currency, with interest at the
rate of 12% per annum effective December 6, 1949;‘2. That the plaintiff admits that before the filing of the present complaint
defendant has paid to her a total sum of ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE
PESOS (P1,475);‘3. That the parties hereto admit that the defendant, as of December 31,
1952, after deducting payments already made, is still indebted to the plaintiff
in the sum of SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE PESOS (P6,685.00);‘4.. That the defendant confesses judgment in the sum of SIX THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE PESOS (P6,635 .00) , with 12% interest thereon to be
reckoned with from January 1, 1953, until fully paid.‘WHEREFORE, the parties hereto pray that judgment be rendered in accordance
with the foregoing compromise agreement, without, pronouncement as to costs, and
likewise without prejudice to submitting a subsequent compromise agreement
before the judgment to be rendered in pursuant hereof becomes final and
executory.Manila, March 17, 1953.
Manila
Avenue, Manila’“El Juzgado, POR TANTO, aprueba el mencionado convenio, y dicta sentencia
condenando al demandado para que pagare a la demandante la suma de P6,685.00 con
los intereses de 12% al año, empezando el l.o de enero de 1953, sin costas.“ASI SE ORDENA.
“Manila, Filipinas. 20 de marzo de 1953.MAGNO S. GATMAITAN
J u e z.”
(Annex A, p. 9, Roll).
This decision having become final, the corresponding wttt of execution was
issued on July 11, 1953. Owing, seemingly, to request of defendant be Guzman,
who had, meanwhile, made partial payments on account of the sum due under the
decision, plaintiff Yaldua allowed said writ to lapse. On February 4, 1954, the
court issued an alias writ of execution, which was delivered to the sheriff on
February 24 of the same year. Pursuant thereto, on April 13, 1954, the Sheriff
of Manila levied upon the following personal properties of De Guzman, located in
his residence, at No. 693 Makiling St., Sampaloc, Manila:
“1-Sofa de madera ‘Dao’ con celujia de bejuco;
“l-Mesita de madera ‘Dao’
con cristal;
“4-Butacas de madera ‘Dao’ con celujia de bejuco;
“1-Piano
marca ‘P.S. Wick’ con su banquito redondo;
“1-Refrigirator marca
‘SHELVADOR’;
“1-Estante de madera con cristal;
“1-Aparador platera de
‘Dao’ con espejo y cajonitos;
“1-Radio de combinacion
(Cabinet);
“2-Espejos de pared, desiguales;
“1-Mesa para coniffidor de
madera con cristal; y
“8-Sillas para comedor de madera con asiento de
bejuco.” Petition, p.2.)
The next day, said officer issued a notice to the effect that these
properties would be sold at public auction on April 22, 1954,at 10:00 a.m. about
thirty (30) minutes before the time scheduled for the auction sale, petitioner
herein, Servando R. Lara, filed, with the Sheriff of Manila, a verified third
party claim alleging that said properties were subject to a chattel mortgage
constituted, in his favor, by De Guzman, by virtue of a deed, copy of which was
attached to said third party claim, dated December 12, 1952, and registered with
the office of the register of deeds for the City of Manila. Said deed of chattel
mortgage states that the same was executed to guarantee the .payment of a debt
of P5,000. on or before June 12, 1953, with interest thereon at the rate of 12%
per annum, to be computed and paid, upon maturity, simultaneously with the
capital. On or about April 26, 1954 Yaldua filed an “urgent motion to quash
third party claim and/or to determine the valnie of the levied propertyos for
purposes of filing a bond.” Despite the opposition of Lara thereto, the court
issued, on May 13, 1954,’ the following:
“O R D E R
“After a rareful consideration of the urgent motion filed on April 27, 1954,
and for the reasons stated therein, this court believes and so holds that the
same is well taken;“AS PRAYED FOR, the third party claim filed by one, Servando R. Lara is
hereby quashed, and the Sheriff of the City of Manila is hereby ordered to
proceed with the sale of the personal properties of the defendant for the
satisfaction of the deficiency of the judgment datee March 20, 1954, rendered
against the defendant in the above-entitled case.“SO ORDERED.” (Annex F, p.21, Roll).
Two motions for reconsideration of this order having been denied, the last by
Hon. Froilan Bayona, Judge, the third party claimant., Servando R. Lara,
instituted the present case, against said Judge, and the Sheriff of Manila,
Concepcion Yaldua ana Prudencio de Guzman. In the petition, it is prayed:
“x x x that a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued against the
sheriff of Manila to suspend the sale on July 7, 1954 upon filing the necessary
bond, and that, after due hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the
aforesaid orders and actuations of Judge Julio Villanor and the respondent Judge
Froilan Bayona, null and void; that the preliminary injunction be made permament
and perpetual; and that a writ of prohibition be issued against said respondent
judge, prohibiting him from issuing another similar order of execution against
the same properties previously levied upon and finally to order the Sheriff to
discharge said properties from levy and to deliver the possession thereof to the
petitioner.” (Petition, p. 7, loll.)
Soon after the filing of the aforementioned petition, we issued the writ of
preliminary injunction therein prayed for, upon ,the filing of the corresponding
bond.
Petitioner contends that the lower court has no jurisdiction to quash his
third party claim, for: the same was filed, not in court, but with the Sheriff
of Manila; petitioner is not a party in the case; and the validity of the third
party claim and the rights of the third party claimant should be determined in a
separate and independent action.
Upon the other hand, aside from maintaining that respondent Judge had full
authority to issue the order complained of, respondents point out a number of
circumstances tending to suggest that the chattel mortgage and the debt it
purports to guarantee are fictitious in nature. It is not necessary, however,
that the point last adverted to be determined or evesrconsidered. For the
purpose of this decision, we will assume that said debt and chattel mortgage are
legitimate, at least, as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee.
It appears that, although dated December 12, 1952, the deed of chattel
mortgage in favoe of petitioner Lara was not filed with the office of the
register of deeds until April 22, 1954, at 9:00 a.m., or one (1) hour before the
time set for the sale at public auction of the properties: in question, and over
nine (9) days after the levy made by the sheriff, in compliance with the
alias writ of execution aforementioned. Section 4 of Act No. 1508,
provides:
“A chattel mortgage shall not be valid against any person except the
mortgagor, his executors or administrators, unless the possession of the
property is delivered to and retained by the mortgagee or unless the mortgage is
recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the province in which the
mortgagor resides at the time of making the same, or if he resides without the
Philippine Islands, in the province in which the property is situated: x x x.”
(Underscoring supplied.)
Inasmush as, at the time of the levy, on April 13, 1954, the mortgagee was
not in possession of the property in dispute and the deed of mortgage was not
registered in the manner provided by law, it is obvious that petitioner’s
chattel mortgage is not valid as against either the judgment creditor or the
court. Anyhow, even if said deed had been registered prior to tho levy by the
sheriff, a sale of said properties in pursuance of the aforementioned writ of
execution could not affect the rights -if any- of the alleged mortgagee, for
“such sale conveys to the purchaser all the rights which the debtor had in such
property on the day the execution or attachment was levied.” (Rule 39, section
22, Rules of Court). In other words, the buyer acquires the propperty subject to
such liens or encumbrances as existed thereon at the time of the execution or
attachment.
Moreover, the sheriff is an officer of the court. He acted as such when he
received petitioner’s third. party claim. To put it differently, insofar as
necessary for the exercise of the “inherent” power of the court “to control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers” (Rule 124,
section 5[d] . Rules of Court) and “to do all things reasonably necessary for
the administration of justice,” (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Revised
Edition [1952] Vol. III, p. 642) said third party claim may be considered as
filed with the court itself.
Again, in the case of Planas vs. Madrigal (L-6570, decided April 12,
1954), we said:
“The question to be determined is whether the respondent Judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the quashing and discarding of the
first and second third party claims interposed by petitioners on January 28,
1953, and February 9, 1953, and in ordering petitioner Juan Planas to vacate the
land of the plaintiff not being a party to the case of forcible entry and
detainer instituted by Madrigal and Co. Inc., against Concepcion L. Planas and
Illuminado L. Planas.“The duty of the sheriff in connection with the execution and satisfaction of
a judgment of the court is governed by Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, With
regard to the proceedings to be followed where the property levied in execution
is claimed by a third person, section 15 provides that if such person makes an
affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the
grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the offacer making the
levy, the officer shall not be, bound to keep the property unless the judgment
creditor, on demand, indemnify the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum
not greater than the value of the property levied on. If the third party claim
is sufficient, the sheriff, upon receiving it, is not bound to proceed with the
lexry of the property, unless he is given by the judgment creditor an indemnity
bond against the claim (Manga-ang v. The Provincial Sheriff, L-4869,
May 26, 1952). Of course, the sheriff may proceed with the levy even without
the indemnity bond, but in such case he will answer for any damages with his
own personal funds. (Waite v. Peterson, et al., 8 Phil. 449; Alzua, et al. V.
Johnson 21 Phil. 308; Consulta No. 441 de los abogados do Smith, Bell & Co.,
46 Phil. 565.) And the rule also provides that nothing therein contained, shall
prevent a third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper
action (Section 15, Rule 39).“In the present case, the provincial sheriff departed from ths regular
procedure prescribed by the rules. He chose to proceed with the levy even
without the indemnity bond in view of the urgent motion to quash filed by the
judgment creditor in the main case. It should be remembered that the court,
after proper hearings, wherein the parties were allowed to submit documentary
evidence,found the third party claims to be without merit and ordered that they
be discarded and quashed. Indeed, the court found that Juan Planas, the
third party claimant, is the son of defendants Concepcion L. Planas and
Illuminado L. Planas, and a stockholder of a firm of which Concepcion L. Planas
was the pricipal stockholder. It also found : that since the filing of the
ejectment case against the spouses Planas up to December 29, 1952, the four
houses claimed by Juan Planas were registered in the name of his mother,
Concepcion L. Planas, in the assessment rolls of Pasay City, and that it was
only on said date that said assessments were transferred to Juan Planas. On the
other hc.nd, the answer submitted by spouses Planas in the ejectment case
eontains a clear averment that the four houses now in dispute were constructed
and were the property of said spouses. Likewise, the latter of Atty. Arcadio
Ejercito, counsel of Concepcion L. Planas, sent to the provincial sheriff in
connection with the demolition of the four buildings in question, contains an
avemment which indicates that said buildings belonged to said defendants. This
circumstantial evidence must have engendered in the mind of the court the
conviction that the claim of ownership put up by Juan Planas at so late an hour
is hit an eleventh hour attempt to thwart and frustrate the execution of the
judgment rendered in the ejectment case.“We hold that the action taken by the respondent Judge on this matter is
justified. At any rate, the right of Juan Planas to the property is not
completely lost, for the rule reserves to him the right to vindicate his claim
in a proper action (Section 15, Rule 39). (Underscoring
supplied.)
At any rate, Rule 39, section 15 of the Rules of Court reads:
“If property levied on be claimed by any other person than the defendant or
his agent, and such person make an affidavit of his title thereto or right to
the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serve
the same upon the officer making the levy, and a copy thereof upon the judgment
creditor, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such
judgment creditor of his agent, on demand, indemnify the officer against such
claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of the property levied on,
and, in case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by
the court issuing the writ of execution, The officer is not liable for damages,
for the taking or keeping of such property, to any such third person unless such
claim is made and unless the action for damages be brought within one hundred
twenty days from the date of the filing of the bond. But nothing herein
contained shall prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the
property by any proper action. When, however, the plaintiff, or the person in
whose favor the writ of execution runs, is the Republic of the Philippines, or
any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required,
and in case the sheriff or attaching officer is sued for damages as a result of
the attachment, he shall be Represented by the Solicitor-General and if held
liable therefore, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the
Insular Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for the
purpose.”
Pursuant to this provision, nothing contained therein shall prevent
petitioner “from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action,”
Neither does the order complained of deprive petitioner herein of the
opportunity to enforce his alleged rights by appropriate proceedings. In short,
he has another “Plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law,” and, hence is not entitled either to a writ of certiorari or to a writ of
prohibition, (Rule 67, sections 1 and 2, Rules of Court).
Petitioner alleges that having taken place on April 13, 1954, or more than 60
days from the issuance of the alias writ of execution, on February 4,
1954, the levy in question is null and void. Although the lifetime of a writ of
execution is 60 days, this period should be computed, pursuant to Rule 39,
section 11, of the Rules of Court, not from the issuance of said writ,
but from its receipt by the sheriff. Said receipt, in the case at bar,
took place on February. 24, 1954. It is obvious, therefore, that said period of
60 days had not expired when the levy was made on April 13, 1954.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby denied, and the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued dissolved, with costs against the petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, and
Labrador, JJ., concur.