PURITA S. AGUILON, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, IGNACIO S. AGUILON, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. MONTANO BOHOL, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

CONCURRING
OPINION

ANTONIO, J.:

There is no question that the determination of the rights of
claimants to public lands is lodged primarily with the Director of Lands.^[1]
As stated in Ortua,^[2] “* * * the
Director of Lands has been made by law a quasi-judicial officer.  As such of­ficer he makes findings of facts,
even passes upon questions of mixed fact and law, and considers and decides the
qualifications of applicants for purchase of public lands.” The determination
of the respective rights of rival claimants to public land is, however,
different or distinct from the deter­mination of who has the actual physical
possession or who has a better right of possession with a view to protecting
the same and preventing disorder and breaches of the peace.  This involves a judicial controversy which
properly appertains to the courts.  As
fully explained by the Court in Pitargue:^[3]

“The question that is before
this Court is:  Are courts without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of possessory actions involving these public
lands before final award is made by the
Lands Department, and before title is given any of the conflicting claimants?  It is
one of utmost importance, as
there are public lands everywhere and there are thousands of settlers, especially in newly opened
regions.  It also involves a matter of
policy, as it requires the determination of the respective authorities and
functions of two coordinate
branches of the Government in connection with public land conflicts.

“Our problem is made simple by the fact that under the Civil
Code, either in the old, which was in force in this country before the American
occupation, or in the new, we have a possessory action, the aim and purpose of
which is the reco­very of the physical possession of real property,
irrespective of the question as to who has the title thereto.  Under the Spanish Civil Code we had the acción
interdictal, a summary
proceeding which could be brought within one year from dispossession (Roman
Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291); and as early as
Oct­ober 1, 1901, upon the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No.
190 of the Philippine Com­mission) we implanted the common law action of
forcible entry (section 80 of Act No. 190), the object of which has been stated
by this Court to be to ‘prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder
which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope
such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons
who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to
force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts
to assert their claims.’ (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59
Phil. 312, 314.) So before the enactment of the first Public Land Act (Act No.
926) the action of forcible entry was already available in the courts of the
country.  So the question to be resolved
is, Did the Legislature intend,
when it vested the power and authority to alienate and dispose of the public
lands in the Lands Department, to exclude the courts from entertaining the
possessory action of forcible entry between rival claim­ants or occupants of
any land before award thereof to any of the parties?  Did Congress intend that the lands applied
for, or all public lands for that matter, be removed from the jurisdiction of
the Judicial Branch of the Government, so that any troubles arising therefrom,
or any breaches of the peace or disorders caused by rival claimants, could be
inquired into only by the Lands Depart­ment to the exclusion of the
courts?  The answer to this question
seems to us evident.  The Lands
Department does not have the means to police pub­lic lands; neither does it
have the means to pre­vent disorders arising therefrom, or contain breach­es of
the peace among settlers; or to pass promptly upon conflicts of
possession.  Then its power is clearly
limited to disposition and alienation, and while it may decide conflicts of possession in or­der to
make proper award, the settlement of con­flicts of possession which is
recognized in the courts herein has another ultimate purpose, i.e., the
protection of actual possessors and occupants with a view to the prevention of
breaches of the peace.  The power to
dispose and alienate could not have intended to include the power to prevent or
settle disorders or breaches of the peace among rival settlers or claimants
prior to the final award.  As to this,
therefore, the corresponding branches of the Government must continue to exer­cise
power and jurisdiction within the limits of their respective functions.  The vesting of the Lands Department with
authority to administer, dispose, and alienate public lands, therefore, must
not be understood as depriving the other branches of the Government of the
exercise of their respective functions or powers thereon, such as the authority
to stop disorders and quell breaches of the peace by the police, and the
authority on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory actions
arising therefrom not involv­ing, directly or indirectly, alienation and dis­position.

“Our attention has been called to a principle enunciated in
American courts to the effect that courts have no jurisdiction to determine the
rights of claimants to public lands, and that un­til the disposition of the
land has passed from the control of the Federal Government, the courts will not
interfere with the administration of matters concerning the same.  (50 C.J. 1093-1094.) We have no quarrel with
this principle.  The det­ermination of
the respective rights of rival claim­ants to public lands is different from the
deter­mination of who has the actual physical possession or occupation with a
view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and breaches of the peace.  A judgment of the court ordering restitution
of the possession of a parcel of land to the actual occupant, who has been
deprived thereof by another through the use of force or in any other illegal
manner, can never be ‘prejudicial interference’ with the disposition or
alienation of public lands.  On the other
hand, if courts were deprived of jurisdiction of cases involving conflicts of
pos­session, that threat of judicial action against breaches of the peace
committed on public lands would be eliminated, and a state of lawlessness would
probably be produced between applicants, occupants or squatters, where force or
might, not right or justice, would rule.

“It must be borne in mind that the
action that would be used to solve conflicts of possess­ion between rivals or
conflicting applicants or claimants would be no other than that of forcible
entry.  This action, both in England
and the Uni­ted States
and in our jurisdiction, is a summary and expeditious remedy whereby one in
peaceful and quiet possession may recover the possession of which he has been
deprived by a stronger hand, by violence or terror; its ultimate object being
to prevent breach of the peace and criminal dis­order.  (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero
and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) The basis of the remedy is mere possession as a
fact, of physical
possession, not a legal possession. 
(Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil., 752.) The title or right to
possession is never in issue in an action of forcible entry; as a matter of
fact, evidence thereof is express­ly banned, except to prove the nature of the
pos­session.  (Section 4, Rule 72, Rules
of Court.).  With this nature of the
action in mind, by no stretch of the imagination can the conclusion be arrived
at that the use of the remedy in the courts of justice would constitute an
interference with the alienation, disposition, and control of public
lands.  To limit ourselves to the case at
bar can it be pretended at all that its result would in any way interfere with
the manner of the alien­ation or disposition of the land contested?  On the
contrary, it would facilitate adjudication, for the question of priority
of possession having been decided in a final manner by the courts, said
question need no longer waste the time of the land officers making the adjudication or award.

“The original Public Land Law (Act 926) was drafted and passed
by a Commission composed mostly of Americans and as the United States has had
its vast public lands and has had the same problems as we now have, involving
their settlement and occupation, it is reasonable to assume that it was their
intention to introduce into the country these laws in relation to our problems
of land settlement and disposition.  The
problem now brought before us was presented in an analogous case in the year
1894 before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the case of Sproat vs.
Durland, 2 Okl. 24, 35 Pac. 682, and said court made
practically the same solution as we have, thus:

* * *.  This question is one
of vital importance in Oklahoma.  All our lands are entered, and title procured
therefor, under the homestead laws of the United
States. 
The question ari­sing out of adverse possession, as between homestead
claimants, daily confront our courts.  To
say that no relief can be granted, or that our courts are powerless to do
justice between litigants in this class of cases, pending the settlement of
title in the land department, would be the announcement of a doctrine abhorrent
to a sense of common justice.  It would
encourage the strong to over­ride the weak, would place a premium upon greed
and the use of force, and, in many instances, lead to bloodshed and crime.  Such a state of affairs is to be avoided, and
the courts should not hesitate to invoke the powers in­herent in them, and lend
their aid, in every way possible, to prevent injus­tice, by preventing
encroachments upon the possessory rights of settlers, or by equitably adjusting
their differrences.  In the case under
consideration, no adequate remedy at law is provided for relief.  Ejectment will not lie.  Adams vs. Couch, 1 Okl. 17 26 Pac.
1009.  And, at the time this proceeding
was instituted, the forci­ble entry and detainer act was insuf­ficient in its
provisions to afford a remedy.  The
appellee was entitled to speedy relief, and ought not to be compelled to await
the final and ted­ious result of the litigation in the interior department,
before obtaining that which he clearly shows himself entitled to have.

The action of forcible entry was then
deemed in­sufficient in that state to prevent acts of tres­pass interfering
with an applicant’s possession, so that the court ordered the issuance of an in­junction.  The main issue involved, however, was whether
pending final investigation and award the occupant should be protected in his
possession, and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma said it should issuing an
injunction to protect said possession.

“The same conclusion was arrived at by the Supreme Court of
Washington in the case of Colwell vs. Smith, 1 Wash. T. 92, 94, when it
held:

We will not decide between two conflicting claimants, both of whom
are actually in possession of certain portions of the claim in dispute, who is
in the right, so far as to dispos­sess one or the other from the entire claim,
which would render it impossible for him to prove that residence the law
requires, and thus contest his claim before the register and receiv­er; we can
and must protect either party from trespass by the other, upon such portion of
the claim as may be in the actual exclusive possession of such party.

“Resuming the considerations we have set forth above, we hold
that the grant of power and duty to the Lands Department to alienate and dis­pose
of public lands does not divest the courts of their duty or power to take
cognizance of act­ions instituted by settlers or occupants or appli­cants,
against others to protect their respective possessions and occupations, more
especially the actions of trespass, forcible entry and unlawful detainer, and
that the exercise of such jurisdic­tion is no interference with the alienation,
dis­position, and control of public lands. 
The ques­tion we have proposed to consider must be answer­ed in the
affirmative.

“Our resolution above set forth answers defendant-appellant’s
contention.  We have, how­ever, to go
further and explore another fundamen­tal question, i.e., whether a public land
appli­cant, such as the plaintiff-appellee herein, may be considered as having
any right to the land occupied, which may entitle him to sue in the courts of
justice for a remedy for the return of the possession thereof, such as an
action of for­cible entry or unlawful detainer, or any other sutiable remedy
provided by law.  In the United States a
claim ‘is initiated by an entry of the land, which is effectual by making an
application at the proper land office, filing the affidavit and paying the
amounts required by * * * the Rev­ised Statutes.  (Sturr vs. Beck, 133 U.S.
541, 10 S. Ct. 350, 33 L. Ed. 761.) ‘Entry’ as applied
to appropriation of land, ‘means that act by which an individual acquires an
inceptive right to a portion of the unappropriated soil of the country, by
filing his claim.’ (Ibid., citing Chotard vs. Pope, 25 U.
S. 12 Wheat, 586. 588.) It has been held
that entry based upon priority in the ini­tiatory steps, even if not
accompanied by occupa­tion, may be recognized as against another appli­cant.

In Hastings & Dakota R. v. Whit­ney, ubi supra, an
affidavit for the purpose of entering land as a home­stead was filed on behalf
of one Tur­ner, in a local land office in Minne­sota, on May 8, 1865, Turner
claiming to act under section 1 of the Act of March 21, 1864 (13 Stat. 35), now
sec­tion 2293 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.  As a matter of fact, Turner was never on the
land and no member of his family was then residing, or ever did reside, on it,
and no improvements whatever had ever been made thereon by anyone.  Upon being paid their fees, the register and
receiver of the land office al­lowed the entry, and the same stood upon the
records of the local land office and upon the records of the General Land
Office, uncanceled, un­til September
30, 1872.  Between May, 1865,
and September, 1872, Congress made a grant to the State of Minnesota for the
purpose of aiding in the con­struction of a railroad from Hastings, through
certain countries, to a point on the western boundary of the State, which grant
was accepted by the Legis­lature of the State of Minnesota and transferred to
the Hastings and Dakota Railroad Company, which shortly there­after definitely
located its line of road by filing its map in the office of the commissioner of
the General Land Office.  All these
proceedings occurred prior to the 30th
of Septem­ber, 1872.  This
Court declared that the almost uniform practice of the Department has been to
regard land upon which an entry of record, valid upon its face, has been made,
as ap­propriated and withdrawn from subse­quent homestead entry, pre-emption,
settlement, sale or grant, until the original entry be cancelled or be declared
forfeited, in which case the land reverts to the government as part of the
public domain, and becomes again subject to entry under the Land Laws; and it
was held that whatever defects there might be in an entry, so long as it
remained a subsisting entry of record, whose legality has been passed upon by the
land authori­ties and their action remained unre­versed, it was such an
appropriation of the tract as segregated it from the public domain, and
therefore precluded it from subsequent grant; and that this entry on behalf of
Turner ‘at­tached to the land’ in question, with­in the meaning of the Act of
Congress making the grant (14 Stat. 87), and could not be included within
it.  And as to mere settlement with the
inten­tion of obtaining title under the Pre­emption Law, while it has been held
that no vested right in the land as against the United States is acquired until
all the prerequisites for the acquisition of title have been complied with, yet
rights in parties as against each other were fully recognized as existing,
based upon priority in the initiatory steps, when followed up to a patent.  ‘The patent which is after­wards issued
relates back to the date of the initiatory act, and cuts off all intervening
claimants.’ Shepley vs. Cowan, 91 U.
S. 330, 337 (23:  424, 426).

“There are compelling reasons of policy sup­porting the
recognition of a right in a bona
fide applicant who
has occupied the land applied for. 
Recognition of the right encourages actual set­tlement; it discourages
speculation and land-grabbing.  It is in accord
with well established practices in the United
States. 
It prevents conflicts and the
overlapping of claims.  It is an act of
simple justice to the enterprise and
dili­gence of the pioneer, without which land settle­ment can not be encouraged
or emigration from thickly populated areas hastened.

“Our answer to the second problem is also in the affirmative,
and we hold that even pending the investigation of, and resolution on, an appli­cation
by a bona fide occupant, such as plaintiff; appellee
herein, by the priority of his applica­tion and record of his entry, he
acquires a right to the possession of the public land he applied for against
any other public land applicant, which right may be protected by the possessory
action of forcible entry or by any other suitable remedy that our rules
provide.” (At pp. 10-17.)

It is on the basis of the foregoing that I predicate my
concurrence.

^[1]
Lucas v. Durian, L-7886, September
23, 1957.

^[2]
Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440, 443.

^[3]
Pitargue v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5.