ANTONIO V. BALANA, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. PERFECTO QUICHO, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ALBAY (BRANCH I), RESPONDENT.

As set forth in the report submitted by Honorable Jose M.
Mendoza, as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, to whom the complaint
herein, as well as respondent’s answer thereto, were referred for investigation
and report thereon, the pertinent facts are:

“In a verified complaint, Antonio V. Balana,
Jr. charged the respondent Judge with (a) Incom­petence; (b)
Gross Negligence and (c) Violation of law.

“The first charge of incompetence is based on the allegation
that respondent (a) made a query in the course of a hearing on the inventory
submitted in Special Proceeding No. 566 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, a guardianship proceeding, of whether or not the
said inventory is required to be under oath; (b) made a statement in the course
of the hearing of the accounting reports filed by the guardian that the
provision of Section 1(c), Rule 94, was purely directory and (c) that
respondent Judge gave due course to the motion for substitution of guardian
without notice to the parties concerned, invoking Section 4, Rule 15, Rules of
Court.

“The second charge of incompetence consists of the allegation
that the motion for removal of guardian dated June 10, 1967 in the said
guardianship proceeding was pending for seven (7) months and the respondent
Judge neglected to act on the failure of the guardian Tan Chu
Lim to submit the required inventory and accounting reports for a period of
five (5) years and not having set for hear­ing the two accounting reports
submitted by the said guardian until after the complainant filed a motion for
the removal of guardian.

“The last charge of violation of law consists of the
allegation that the respondent Judge was not holding court sessions on
Saturdays and of having made false statement in the monthly certifications (New
Judicial Form No. 86) submitted for the months of October, November and
December, 1967, to the Department of Justice, notwithstanding his failure to
resolve the complainant’s motion for removal of guardian in said Special
Proceeding No. 566 for a period of seven (7) months.

“In his answer, dated December
28, 1968, the respondent Judge denied the charges, giving reasons
for his denials.  He stated that:

“With respect to the first count, he cannot recall whether he
made the query in open court ‘Must it be under oath?’ referring to the form of
the inventory filed by the guardian in Special Pro­ceeding No. 566; neither can
he recall the statement attributed to him that ‘the provisions of the Rules
cited (Section 1 (c) Rule 94) are purely directory’; that if he made such
remarks, the same must have been recorded stenographically.

“As to the second charge of gross negligence, the respondent
Judge alleged that the delay in the resolution of the motion for removal of
guardian was due to the fact of the reopening of the incident by the filing of
new motions and pleadings after the hearing thereon.  In connection with the failure of the
guardian to file the required inventory and account­ing reports for a period of
five (5) years, the respond­ent Judge claimed that the guardian was repeatedly
reminded of the latter’s failure to comply with his duties as guardian.

“Finally, with regard to the last charge, the respondent Judge
stated that ‘he has adopted a practice of hearing motions any other day of the
week in order to have Saturdays for study and preparation of decisions and
orders not dictated in open court.’ He denied that he made false statement in
his monthly certificates (New Judi­cial Form No. 86) for the months of October,
November and December, 1967, claiming that the motion for the removal of
guardian in Sp. Pro­ceeding No. 566 was not yet submitted for decision owing to
the hearing of the inventory and accounting reports.”

The findings made by Justice Mendoza, upon consideration of the
evidence, oral and documentary, introduced at the hearings held therefor, were:

“First Charge:  INCOMPETENCE.  – This charge cannot be sustained.  While it is true that the respondent Judge
may have uttered the remark ‘Must it be under oath?’ referring to the
guardian’s inventory and account, nevertheless, such remark is not necessarily
an indication of incompetence, taken as an isolated instance of uncertainty as
to the exact rule on the matter.  Having
been made in the course of a hearing, without benefit of a review of the Rules
of Court, it cannot be considered a measure of the judicial mind.

“In the same manner, the statement attributed to the
respondent Judge that the provisions of Sec­tion 1 (c) Rule 94 are purely
directory deserves scant signification. 
The cited rule provides for the con­ditions of a guardian’s bond.  Verily, the conditions are mandatory, not
directory.  But as respondent Judge made
such statement just in passing, the error is innocuous.

“As to the fact that the respondent Judge gave due course to
the motion for substitution of guardian, without giving notice to the nearest
of kins of the ward, we are persuaded by the argument
that, as in the initial hearing, the nearest of kins
were duly notified, and none of them appeared, the lack of notice to them of
the motion for substitution of guardian, who had died meantime, may not be con­sidered
fatal violation of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15, Rules of Court.

“Indeed, the applicable provision on the substi­tution of
guardian is Rule 97, particularly Section 2 thereof.

“Second Charge:  GROSS NEGLIGENCE.  – This charge at first blush may appear to be
meritorious considering that the respondent Judge admittedly failed to resolve
the motion for removal of guardian for seven (7) months.  Considering, however, that in connection with
said motion for removal, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard must be
afforded to the guardian (Section 2, Rule 97, Rules of Court), and that other
pleadings were subsequently filed, the delay, while not justified, may not be
categorized as ‘gross negligence.’

“It is likewise obvious that the respondent Judge was
negligent in requiring the guardian to comply with his obligation to submit
sworn inventory and accounts, but this negligence is simple and not gross, in
the absence of any move by an inte­rested party to compel the rendition of such
inventory and accounting (Section 7, Rule 96, Rules of Court) until the motion
for removal of guardian was filed by complainant.

“Final Charge:  VIOLATION
OF LAW.  – The charge that the respondent
Judge does not hold session during Saturdays is admitted by him, but he claims
that he has made it a practice to dedicate Saturdays for study and preparation
of decisions.

“We do not wish to dwell on the wisdom of such a practice, as
that matter is better left to the sound judgment of the judge involved.  However, it does not appear that the public
has been informed of such prac­tice, thus creating confusion among practicing
lawyers in his sala.

“With respect to acts of falsification of the monthly
certificates of service (New Judicial Form No. 86), suffice it to state that
this count may be deemed in­cluded in Administrative Case No. 138-J, instituted
by the Secretary of Justice against the same respond­ent Judge, x x x.”

Based upon these findings, which are borne out by the record,
Justice Mendoza recommended “that the present charges against respondent
Judge Perfecto Quicho be dismissed, although in the
final determination of Adm. Case No. 138-J, it is suggested that the herein
charges be considered as circumstances affecting the fitness of the respondent
Judge in the judicial service.”

Finding the foregoing recommendation to be well-taken, the
complaint herein is, accordingly, dismissed, without prejudice to such action
as may be taken in Administrative Case No. 138-J, on the charge of violation of
law by the alleged falsification of respondent’s monthly certificate of
service.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Dizon, J., took no part.

Ruiz Castro, J., on leave.