PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GODOFREDO CALDOZA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Caldoza

The Case

This is the appeal of Godofredo Caldoza from his conviction for the crime of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code. The People of the Philippines prosecuted Caldoza, together with a minor named Gilbert Mangayan and three unnamed persons, for breaking into the house of Danilo Buna and carrying away personal property. The case matters for two reasons a reviewee must hold onto: it teaches how the constitutional rights of an accused belong to that accused alone and cannot be borrowed by a co-accused, and it teaches the liberal treatment our procedural law gives to the testimony of a child witness, including the allowance of leading questions.

Procedural History

Caldoza was charged by Information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Misamis Oriental. At arraignment he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution moved to discharge the co-accused Gilbert Mangayan, a minor, to be used as a state witness, but the trial court never acted on that motion before Mangayan was put on the witness stand. After Mangayan testified, the trial court ruled the motion to discharge moot and academic. Later, on motion of the Public Attorney's Office, the trial court dismissed the case as to Mangayan because he was eleven years old at the time of the offense and therefore exempt from criminal liability under Republic Act 9344. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22, rendered its Decision dated 25 November 2011, finding Caldoza guilty beyond reasonable doubt and imposing an indeterminate sentence of two years, four months and one day as minimum, to eight years as maximum, and ordering him to pay Danilo Buna nine thousand pesos. Caldoza appealed directly to the Supreme Court, assigning errors against the trial court's ruling.

Facts

On the evening of 4 May 2001, at Sitio Tigkawayan, Barangay Sinaloc, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, the house of Danilo Buna was robbed. Entrance was gained by destroying the upper part of the house near the kitchen, through the roof and ceiling. Money kept in a piggy bank, a cellphone, and some toys were taken, among other items.

The prosecution's account rested chiefly on Gilbert Mangayan, Buna's nephew. Mangayan testified that on that day Caldoza, who was driving a vehicle, called him and told him to rob the house of his uncle. Mangayan went with a certain Patrick and with Caldoza to the house. Mangayan and Patrick climbed to the roof, destroyed the wood, entered the house, and took the money, a cellphone, and toys. Outside, the loot was divided among five companions, including Caldoza. Mangayan received only the toys. When Buna learned of the robbery, he went to the house, verified his missing belongings, and reported the matter to the police, who recovered from Mangayan several toys and a dismantled cellphone. Mangayan admitted the act to Buna and named Caldoza and Patrick as his companions.

For his defense, Caldoza offered alibi and denial. He testified that at about seven o'clock in the evening of 4 May 2001 he was at a political rally at the plaza of Cogon, El Salvador, with his employer Jesus Palasan and others, and stayed until midnight. His witnesses placed him at that rally or at his work, and one neighbor testified she saw nothing unusual at Buna's house. The trial court rejected the defense and convicted him.

Issues

• Whether or not the testimony of the minor Gilbert Mangayan should be set aside because he was an accused who testified without counsel and without being informed of his constitutional rights.
• Whether or not the testimony of Mangayan is credible and admissible despite alleged inconsistencies, lack of corroboration, and the use of leading questions.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Caldoza when the prosecution allegedly failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not the defense of alibi and denial can overcome the positive testimony of the prosecution witness.

Applicable Provisions

Section 12, paragraph 1 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

This is the right Caldoza tried to invoke on Mangayan's behalf, and the Court held it is a personal right that only Mangayan may claim or waive.

Section 1, paragraph c of Rule 115 of the Rules of Court provides:

To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceeding, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment.

This guarantees the accused the right to counsel at trial, but again it belongs to the person whose rights are invaded.

Section 10 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

A question which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except: When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf mute.

This is the exception the Court applied to excuse the leading questions put to the child witness Mangayan.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the rights to counsel and to silence are personal rights that cannot be claimed by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded. Only Mangayan could claim or waive them, not Caldoza, who may not invoke the minor's constitutional rights to evade liability for his own crime. Mangayan testified of his own volition, without coercion, as an ordinary witness and co-conspirator, and his testimony is admissible even if he was never discharged as a state witness. The Court added that even if the requisites of a valid discharge were absent, an improper discharge would not render the testimony inadmissible nor detract from the witness's competency.

On the second issue, the Court found no error in the manner of examination or in the appreciation of the testimony. Leading questions are generally disallowed, but the Rules expressly permit them when there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a child of tender years. Mangayan was twelve years old when he testified, and the Court found the questions were phrased to elicit facts within his personal knowledge which he had difficulty expressing. On the alleged inconsistencies, the Court held that minor inconsistencies do not impair credibility where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and in positively identifying the wrongdoer. On corroboration, the Court held that even without it, Mangayan's declarations can stand alone, because he was an actual and direct participant in the criminal act and was giving direct evidence on the facts in issue.

On the third issue, the Court held that the elements of robbery in an inhabited house were established beyond reasonable doubt, with Caldoza as principal by inducement. The offender entered an inhabited house through an opening not intended for entrance or egress, by breaking the roof and ceiling, and once inside took personal property belonging to another with intent to gain.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that alibi is the weakest defense, inherently weak and easy to fabricate, and is generally rejected when the accused is positively identified. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove the accused was elsewhere; it must be shown he was so far away that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of the commission. The distance between the scene and Cogon, El Salvador, was only about eight kilometers, so it was not physically impossible for Caldoza to have gone to Tigkawayan and returned. Denial, being intrinsically weak, must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability.

Doctrine

First, the constitutional rights to counsel and to silence are personal rights. They may be claimed or waived only by the person whose rights are invaded, or by one authorized in his behalf, and a co-accused may not invoke them to escape his own liability.

Second, the testimony of an accused who testifies without having been validly discharged as a state witness is not inadmissible. He testifies as an ordinary witness and co-conspirator, and an improper discharge does not destroy his competency.

Third, leading questions are allowed in the examination of a child of tender years when there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers, consistent with the wide latitude courts exercise over the questioning of a child witness.

Fourth, minor inconsistencies in a witness's testimony do not impair credibility where the witness is consistent on the principal occurrence and on the positive identification of the wrongdoer, and the uncorroborated testimony of a direct participant may be given full credence.

Fifth, alibi must be supported by clear and convincing proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of the crime, and it cannot prevail over positive identification.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the conviction of Godofredo Caldoza for robbery in an inhabited house, with the sentence and the award of nine thousand pesos in favor of Danilo Buna sustained.

Remember This

Memorize this line: constitutional rights are personal and cannot be borrowed by a co-accused, and the testimony of a child witness may be elicited through leading questions. Examiners use this case to test the personal nature of the rights to counsel and silence, and the liberal rules on examining a child witness.