ROYAL UNDERGARMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ROYAL UNDERGARMENT WORKERS UNION (PTGWO) AND ANTONIO CRUZ, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the
reversal of the decision rendered by the defunct Court of Industrial Relations
on January 21, 1974
adjudging the petitioner corporation guilty of unfair labor practice and
ordering the reinstatement of and payment of backwages
to respondent Antonio Cruz.

The antecedent facts as found by the industrial court are as
follows:

Respondent Antonio Cruz was employed by petitioner
corporation in 1957 as an electrician. 
Sometime in December, 1961, he was elected president of the Royal
Undergarment Workers Union (RUWU for brevity), a
legitimate labor organization which became affiliated with the Philippine
Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO for brevity).

On December 14, 1961, the RUWU-PTGWO, represented by the National
Secretary of PTGWO and respondent Cruz as RUWU President, sent proposals to
petitioner corporation for the purpose of collective bargaining.

On the following day, December
15, 1961, petitioner corporation, thru its personnel manager,
terminated the services of respondent Cruz allegedly on the basis of the
latter’s “record and after careful analysis and deliberation.” Respondent’s
wife, Felicidad Cruz, who was also an employee of petitioner,
was likewise terminated.  Thus, RUWU
called a strike sometime during the first week of January, 1962.

On January 10, 1962,
RUWU-PTGWO and petitioner corporation entered into a
Return-to-Work Agreement thru the conciliation efforts of the Department of
Labor.  The agreement contained the
following provision:

“x x x.

“Regarding the two (2) employees, Mr. Antonio Cruz and Mrs. Cruz,
the union entrusts the settlement of its complaint for decision to the
Management, which shall be reinstatement for both employees when the Royal
Undergarment Workers Union-PTGWO shall have been chosen as the collective
bargaining agent for the workers at the consent election to be held in the
company premises;

“x x x.” (pp. 39-40, Rollo)

The records do not disclose the results of the consent
election.  Subsequently however,
respondent Cruz and his wife were both re-employed and reinstated by petitioner corporation, thereby indicating the victory of
RUWU-PTGWO in the consent election.

On March 31, 1962,
RUWU-PTGWO and petitioner corporation entered into a
collective bargaining agreement which contained a grievance procedure for the
settlement of disputes.  Such grievance
procedure was applied on several occasions involving suspensions of union
members-employees through the help and active participation of respondent Cruz
as union president.

Sometime in November, 1962, the PTGWO urged its member-unions to
stage a nationwide strike.  Thus,
respondent Cruz campaigned among the members of RUWU to join the strike.

On November 28, 1962
at around 11:00 p.m., within the
company premises, respondent Cruz approached three co-employees who are
supervisors of the company, namely, Camaguin, Dayadante and Gaspar.  These persons contended that respondent Cruz,
who was under the influence of liquor, uttered the following remarks to
them:  “Ikaw, Ikaw, Ikaw – – – mga hayop kayo.  Bibigyan ko kayo ng isang
linggong taning sa buhay ninyo
ipapapatay ko kayo.” They
also claim that respondent Cruz had challenged another co-employee.  Respondent and his witnesses denied this
charge and claimed that what the respondent actually said to the three
employees was:  “Ikaw,
Ikaw, Ikaw pare, alam kong matitigas
kayo rito sa compania, kaya’t ako’y nakikiusap, kung maaari pag-natuloy ang nationwide strike bukas, makiisa kayo at gamitin ang tigas ninyo.”
Immediately thereafter, the three employees went to the personnel officer of petitioner corporation. 
On November 29, 1962,
they executed an affidavit regarding the incident.

The following day, on November
30, 1962, the general manager of petitioner
corporation placed respondent Cruz on preventive suspension effective December 3, 1962 for threatening “the
lives of four (4) employees” and for having “been reported under the influence
of liquor,” both acts being “contrary to rules and regulations.”

Upon the request of respondent Cruz and PTGWO, the petitioner
corporation conducted a conference which was in the nature of an investigation of the incident.

On December 13, 1962,
petitioner corporation dismissed respondent Cruz for
being under the influence of liquor on November
28, 1962 and for having threatened the lives of four of his
co-employees.

Respondent Cruz filed a complaint for unfair labor practice
against petitioner corporation with the Court of
Industrial Relations.  On January 21, 1974, the respondent
industrial court, while affirming the findings of the hearing examiner,
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which, reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby declared guilty of unfair labor
practice and is ordered to cease and desist from further committing the
same.  Respondent is further directed to
reinstate complainant Antonio Cruz to his former or equivalent position without
loss of seniority and other privileges and to pay him backwages
including all benefits attached to his position, from the date he was dismissed
up to November 17, 1969.

“SO ORDERED.” (pp. 43-44, Rollo)

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari with the
petitioner assigning the following errors:

“I

RESPONDENT
CIR COMMITTED A GRAVE MISAPPREHENSION OF FACT IN HOLDING IN ITS DECISION
THAT IT WAS RESPONDENT CRUZ’ UNION ACTIVITIES WHICH CAUSED HIS DISMISSAL BY
PETITIONER.

“II

RESPONDENT CIR LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE MISAPPREHENSION OF FACT
IN NOT HOLDING IN ITS DECISION THAT THE DISMISSAL OF RESPONDENT CRUZ WAS FOR
CAUSE AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE TERMINATION PAY LAW AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH
MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE.

“III

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE, RESPONDENT CIR ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT CRUZ FULL BACKWAGES
WITHOUT DEDUCTING THEREFROM THE INCOME HE EARNED DURING SAID PERIOD.” (pp. 9?10,
Rollo)

Anent the first and second assigned errors, petitioner submits
that the records of the case, particularly the testimonies of respondent Cruz
himself and his witnesses, show that petitioner corporation did not interfere
with or prevent the union activities of its employees; that the former has even
allowed or abetted active unionism within the company; that the dismissal of
respondent Cruz was not impelled
by reason of union participation of respondent Cruz but solely by his
infraction of company rules and regulations, specifically, serious threats
against the lives of three co-employees, challenging another to a fight and
intoxication while on duty, all of which clearly amounted to a dismissal for
cause under the Termination Pay Law, Rep. Act No. 1052, as amended.

On the other hand, the Court of Industrial Relations found from
the surrounding circumstances of the case, a valid and sufficient basis for the
charge of unfair labor practice against petitioner company.  Said the respondent court:

“There is no question as to the union activities of the
complainant.  Starting from the time he
was elected president of the RUWU, he had engaged himself actively in union
affairs.  He had in behalf of others
pursued assiduously the employee relationships of the membership.  And on a higher plane, he urged the members
to join the nation-wide strike being planned by the PTGWO.

“On the part of respondent there appears to be an attitude of
antipathy towards the complainant.  Going
back to the time, when the RUWU sent collective bargaining proposals
represented then by the complainant, the latter and his wife were dismissed one
day after the same was received by respondent company.  The record does not show the specific reasons
or bases for this action except the general proposition that this
(complainant’s) record was supposedly carefully analyzed.  And yet, why include his wife in the
dismissal?  In the Return-to-Work
Agreement of January, 1962 which followed, a peculiar and strange arrangement
was made.  The reinstatement of
complainant and his wife was made to depend on a contingency – – the victory of
RUWU in the consent election.  The main
consideration therefore of complainant’s reinstatement, as well as that of his
wife, is, he gets back to work if his union wins; he
stays out, if his union loses.  Should
one’s employment be made to depend on his union affiliation or identity?  This aspect only projects the animosity
harbored by the respondent against the complainant.

“Then, in the space of eleven months, complainant once again was
dismissed from respondents’ employ, e.g. in December of the same year he was
reinstated.  Respondents based its
dismissal of complainant on the ground that he was obviously under the
influence of liquor and he threatened the lives of four co-employees.  The evidence of being ‘obviously under the
influence of liquor’ is based on the supposed observation of the three
witnesses whose lives were allegedly threatened, coming as it is from a biased
source.  None of these witnesses have
ever supplied, much less hinted on the motivation why complainant threatened
their lives.  On the contrary, they
claimed that they were on friendly terms with the complainant with no previous
background of misunderstanding between them. 
None of them ever filed criminal
charges against the complainant
for the supposed threat on their lives
indicating that whatever has transpired is not as serious as pictured by the respondent.  The incident was simply blown into such
proportion so as to provide a supposed
valid cause for complainant’s dismissal.  In the light of the initial attitude of respondent earlier discussed, the inducing cause directly contributing to
complainant’s dismissal is the respondent’s antipathy to complainant’s union
activity and not his misconduct.” (pp. 42-43, Rollo)

We accord respect to the findings of the industrial court.  Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, known as
the The Industrial Peace Act, as amended, provides
that employees shall have the right to self?organization and to form,
join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of
collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and
other mutual aid or protection.  Hence,
it shall be unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization (Section 4 (a)(4), R.A. No.
875).

We have perused the record and found that the totality of
evidence as found by respondent court supports the conclusion that respondent
Cruz has been unjustly dismissed by reason of his union activities.  The charge by petitioner against respondent
Cruz for being under the influence of liquor on a certain date and for having
threatened the lives of his co-employees is too flimsy to merit serious
consideration.  We have on record the
undisputed facts that private respondent, as president of RUWU, was known for
his aggressive and militant union activites; that he
and his wife had been previously dismissed on the ground of active participation
in union affairs; that they were re­employed only pursuant to the express terms
of the Return-to-Work Agreement executed by petitioner corporation and RUWU
when the latter won in the consent election; that respondent Cruz was dismissed
again for the second time in the course of his campaign among RUWU members to
join the nationwide strike of PTGWO in which RUWU is a member union.

It has previously been indicated that an employer may treat freely with an employee and is not obliged
to support his actions with a reason or purpose.  However, where the attendant circumstances,
the history of the employer’s past conduct and like considerations, coupled
with an intimate connection between the employer’s action and the union
affiliations or activities of the particular employee or employees taken as a
whole raise a suspicion as to the motivation for the employer’s action, the
failure of the employer to ascribe a valid reason therefor
may justify an inference that his unexplained conduct in respect of the
particular employee or employees was inspired by the latter’s union membership
or activities (Rothenbergon Labor Relations, pp.
401-402, cited in San Miguel Brewery, Inc., et al. v. Santos, et al., No. L-12682, August 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 1081).

Further, factual findings of the Court of Industrial Relations
are conclusive in the absence of a showing that the same have no support in the
evidence on record.  This Court will not
review said court’s factual findings as long as the same are supported by
evidence.  This is so because the
industrial court is governed by the rule of substantial evidence rather than by
the rule of preponderance of evidence as in ordinary civil cases (Sanchez v.
Court of Industrial Relations, L-19000, July 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 654; Industrial
Commercial Agricultural Workers Organization v. Bautista, L-15639, April 30,
1963, 7 SCRA 907).

Anent the third assigned error, it is the judicial trend to fix a
reasonable period for the payment of backwages to
avoid protracted delay in post judgment hearings to prove earnings of the
worker elsewhere during the period that he had not been reinstated to his
employment.  In consonance with the
rulings in many cases, and in view of the circumstances and equity of the instant
case, respondent Cruz should be reinstated and granted backwages
corresponding to a period of three (3) years from the time he was dismissed on
December 13, 1962, without deduction for his earnings elsewhere during his
lay-off and without qualification of his backwages as
thus fixed, that is, unqualified by any wage increases (Bachrach
Motor Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-26136, October 30, 1978, 86
SCRA 27; L.R. Aguinaldo & Co., Inc. v. Court of
Industrial Relations, No. L-31909, April 5, 1978, 82 SCRA 309; Davao Free
Workers Front v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-29356, October 27, 1975, 67 SCRA 418).

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated January 21, 1974 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that petitioner is directed to reinstate respondent Antonio Cruz without loss
of seniority rights and with backwages for three (3)
years from the time of dismissal, without deduction and qualification.  If reinstatement is no longer possible,
respondent Antonio Cruz should be awarded separation pay of one (1) month for
every year of service.  With costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa,
(Chairman), Cruz, and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

Griño-Aquino, J., on leave.