JOVENCIO LUANSING, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 00779-CR.

Jovencio Luansing was originally charged with rape in Criminal
Case No. 1240 before the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City
Branch).  After due trial the court
dismissed the case, stating that no crime of rape was com­mitted, but directed
the Provincial Fiscal to file an in­formation for seduction against the accused
within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the decision, otherwise the
said accused would be discharged from custody.

On
August 15, 1958 the offended party, Felisa Hernandez, filed a complaint for
seduction against the accused.  On the
basis thereof the corresponding information was filed by the Fiscal, as
follows:

“That on or about the 10th day of July, 1957, in the Barrio of
San Roque, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused by
means of deceit and false promise of marriage, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously seduce and have sexual intercourse several times with one Felisa
Hernandez, a virgin over 12 but under 18 years of age.”

This information was
later amended by the Fiscal to change the date of the alleged commission
of the crime from July 10, 1957 to July 15, 1957.  During the trial the private prosecutor made a reservation
to file a separate civil action and from then on the prosecution was handled
solely by the assistant Provincial Fiscal. 
The court a quo subsequently rendered judgment finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of seduction and sentencing
him to suffer four (4) months of arresto mayor; to
indemnify the offended party in the sum of P2,000.00, with the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, but not to exceed one-third of
the principal penalty; to acknowledge his offspring with her; to give the said
offspring a monthly support of P35.00; and to pay the costs and suffer all
accessory penalties prescribed by law.

Petitioner seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court.  The motion for reconsideration having been
denied, the accused filed the instant petition for review.

Petitioner avers here:  (1)
that the trial court acted without jurisdiction when it tried the case on the
basis of the amended information without the corresponding amended complaint of
the offended party; (2) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case,
it being under the jurisdiction of the municipal court; and (3) that assuming
that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case, the same was exceeded when
it awarded damages and other civil liabilities to the offended party, there
having been a reservation to file a separate civil action.

On the first averment it appears that the Fiscal filed the
information for seduction on August 15, 1958, after conducting a preliminary
investigation upon the complaint presented by the offended party.  On September 16 following, the Fiscal
conducted another preliminary investigation, after which he filed an amended
information changing the date of the commission of the offense from July 10,
1957 to July 15, 1957.  This amended
information, petitioner argues, was a nullity since there was no corresponding
amended complaint of the offended party which would authorize another
preliminary investigation.

The point raised is of no material consequence.  The original information for seduction
alleged that the offense was committed “on or about July 10, 1957.”
The phrase “on or about” is comprehensive enough to cover the change
to July 15, 1957, as the evidence in the hands of the prosecutor
indicated.  The substantial rights of the
accused were in no way prejudiced by the amendment.

On the issue of jurisdiction, Section 44(f), Republic Act No.
296, as amended, provides that Courts of First Instance have original
jurisdiction of “all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred
pesos,” and section 87(b) of the same Act provides that Justice of the Peace
and Municipal Courts have original jurisdiction over “all offenses in which the
penalty pro­vided by Law is imprisonment for not more than six months, or a fine of not
more than two hundred pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment.” The
penalty imposed by Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code for the crime of
simple seduction is arresto mayor the duration of which is from one month and one day to six
months.  Apparently, the crime of simple
seduction falls under the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace or
Municipal Courts.  However, it should not
be overlooked that persons guilty of seduction shall also be sentenced to
indemnify the offended woman, to acknowledge the offspring unless the law
should prevent him from so doing, and to give support to such offspring
(Article 345, Revised Penal Code).  These
are inherent accessory civil liabilities when a child is born as a result of the crime.  The acknowledgment of, and the giving of
support to, the offspring are matters beyond the jurisdiction of the Justice of
the Peace or Municipal
Courts.  They pertain to the
Courts of First Instance (Section 44(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 296).

It has been held that laws conferring jurisdiction on the
inferior courts over demands below certain amounts do not preclude a determination
of said demands in the superior court, where they are connected with larger
claims or
with a type of demand solely within the jurisdiction of the superior
court.  Thus for instance, where an
action is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance be­cause it
involves an issue of admiralty, the said court must be held likewise to have
jurisdiction over other causes of action joined thereto even if the amount
sought to, be col­lected is less
than the jurisdictional limit (Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. vs. Cia. General de
Tabacos de Filipinas, G. R. No. L-22625, April 27, 1967).  In like manner, since the crime of seduction
carries with it a liability, under Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, to
acknowledge and give support to the offspring resulting from the crime –
matters beyond the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace or Municipal Courts
– it follows that the instant case falls within the jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance (U.S. vs. Ber­nardo, 19 Phil. 265).  It would be absurd to have the prin­cipal
case of seduction tried and decided by the Municipal Court and the resulting
acknowledgment and support of the offspring by the Court of First
Instance.  The duplication would entail
unnecessary waste of time and effort for the parties and for the courts, to the
detriment of an orderly administration of justice.

It
is further contended that the amended information was
legally defective for failure to allege lewd design.  Reliance is placed on the case of People vs.
Gilo, G. R. No. L-18202, April 30, 1964, wherein it was held:

“Considering that in order that a crime constituting acts of
lasciviousness may be committed it is necessary that it be alleged that it was
committed with lewd design, the latter being an indispensable element of all
crimes against chastity, such as abduction, seduction and rape, including acts of lasciviousness x x x the words
‘feloniously and criminally” that are alleged in the complaint are mere
general terms which denote the criminal intent of the accused but which do not
necessarily con­note the idea of lust needed in the com­mission of the
act.  Lust or lewd design is an element
that characterizes all crimes against chastity, apart from the felonious or
criminal intent of the offender, and such element must be always present in order
that they may be so considered in contempla­tion of law.

In People vs. Obsania, G. R. No. L-24447, June 29, 1968, which
involved a case of rape, we had occasion to pass upon the above-quoted decision
in this wise:

“Nothing in the foregoing statement can be reasonably
interpreted as requiring an explicit allegation of “lewd design” in a
complaint for rape.  We hold in no
uncertain terms that in a complaint for rape it is not necessary to allege
“lewd design” or “unchaste motive,” for to re­quire such
averment is to demand a patent superfluity. 
Lascivious intent inheres in rape and the unchaste design is mani­fest
in the very act itself – the carnal knowledge of a woman through force or
intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise uncon­scious, or
when the woman is, under twelve of age.”

By the same token, “lewd design” is inherent in the
very act itself of having sexual intercourse with a chaste woman over 12 and
under 18 years of age under a false pro­mise of marriage, which act constitutes
the crime of seduction.  Besides, the
Gilo case involved acts of lasciviousness, and the element of “lewd
design” must necessarily be alleged in the information, because without it
the offense would be merely unjust vexation.

Lastly, petitioner contends that the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction when it awarded damages and other civil liabilities despite the
express reservation by the offended woman, through the private prosecutor, to file
a separate civil action.

On this point the Court of Appeals ruled that “if the
complainant had wanted to insist on filing a separate civil action for damages
against the appellant, she would have filed a motion to reconsider the decision a
quo of September 14, 1959.  The
fact that she did not take this step is clear proof that she had previously
abandoned her reservation to file a separate civil action.” We do not go
along with this pronouncement. 
Abandonment requires a more convincing quantum of evidence than mere
forbearance to actually file the civil action, especially considering that the
same could be filed even after the decision in a criminal case had been
rendered.  Besides, the claim for damages
requires proof, and contemplates a right on the part of the defendant to
present his own rebuttal.  As it was,
neither the offended party nor the accused was accorded the chance to present evidence on the point.  The sane is true with regard to the amount of
support for the offspring.

Wherefore, the
decision subject of review is hereby modified by eliminating the award of
damages and of support for the offspring, and affirmed in all other
respects.  No pronouncement as to costs
in this instance.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Fernando, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Sanchez, Castro, and
Capistrano, JJ., did not take part.

Barredo, J., concurring in a
separate opinion.