BLANDINA GARCIA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 45, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE, OCCIDENTAL MINDORO, PUBLIC RESPONDENT,
DICDICAN, J.:
The material and relevant facts of the case, as culled from the record, are as follows:
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint[4] for annulment of deed of reconveyance and titles which was filed by herein petitioner against Salvador Borromeo, Sr. (“Borromeo”) in the lower court on December 11, 1992. In the said complaint, the petitioner claimed that, from the years 1946 until 1970, she and Borromeo lived together as husband and wife and, out of their union, they begot eight (8) children. Thus, through their joint efforts, the couple acquired several real properties including a parcel of land with an area of Seventy Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Four (78,904) square meters located at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2515 (“subject property”).
However, the petitioner averred that, due to their intermittent quarrels that were brought about by Borromeo’s womanizing, the couple decided to separate in the year 1970. They then agreed to divide their real properties between the two (2) of them, including the subject property which was conveyed by Borromeo in favor of the petitioner. Subsequently, TCT No. T-2515 was canceled and a new land title covering the subject property, TCT No. T-4335, was issued in the name of the petitioner as the sole and absolute owner thereof.
Consequently, sometime in the year 1976, the petitioner decided to convert the subject property into a subdivision and she entered into a business partnership with Borromeo for the aforesaid purpose. A subdivision plan was thereafter prepared whereby a portion of the subject property was divided into one hundred sixty five (165) lots. However, sometime in August 1992, the petitioner purportedly discovered that Borromeo caused the cancellation of the land titles covering the said 165 lots using a fictitious deed containing forged signatures of the petitioner. As a result of the alleged falsification, new land titles covering the said 165 lots were issued in the name of Borromeo.
The foregoing antecedents thereby prompted herein petitioner to file a civil case for annulment of deed of reconveyance and titles against Borromeo in the lower court in the year 1992. In her complaint, the petitioner prayed that the deed of reconveyance, as well as the 165 land titles that were subsequently issued pursuant thereto, be declared as null and void by the lower court. Trial on the merits of the said civil case was thereafter conducted by the lower court and, after the presentation by the petitioner of her first witness, the original complaint was amended on March 2, 1993 and, subsequently, on October 5, 2005.
In the meantime, the case was archived by the lower court in view of the petitioner’s failure to proceed with the presentation of her evidence.
Thus, on October 2, 2008, herein private respondent Arleen B. Valera (“private respondent Valera”) filed a motion for intervention in the lower court which the latter granted. Several trial dates were then set by the lower court for the continuation of the presentation of evidence by the petitioner but the latter, nonetheless, failed to proceed with the aforesaid presentation of evidence. Thus, on April 10, 2013, private respondent Valera filed in the lower court a Motion to Issue Last Chance to Plaintiff to Present Evidence[5] praying that the lower court issue an order requiring the petitioner to proceed in the presentation of her evidence on May 17, 2013.
Subsequently, on April 15, 2013, the lower court issued an Order[6] directing the petitioner to present her witness on May 17, 2013 with a stern warning as follows:
“WHEREFORE, this Court hereby orders the plaintiff to present her witnesses if any on May 17, 2013 at 8:30 A.M. and at 2:00 P.M. with stern warning that should the plaintiff still fail to proceed with the prosecution of this case, with or without counsel, and with or without appearance, any manifestation/motion from the movant’s counsel shall be entertained accordingly.
“This is without prejudice however to any continuing dialogue between or among the parties for possible settlement, but in the interest of justice, the proceedings must proceed to obviate unreasonable delay.
“Issue notices or subpoena as the case may be to all the parties concerned.
“SO ORDERED.”
The aforequoted Order was followed by another Order[7] that was issued by the lower court on May 10, 2013 whereby the lower court directed the petitioner to submit the judicial affidavits of her witnesses at least three (3) days before the scheduled presentation of her evidence on May 17, 2013. However, on the latter date, the petitioner again failed to present her evidence. Thus, the lower court again scheduled two (2) trial dates in order to give the petitioner the opportunity to continue with the presentation of her evidence.
Consequently, in a Motion[8] dated July 16, 2013, the petitioner requested that the lower court take her oral deposition in lieu of her judicial affidavit in view of the fact that she was a resident of California and that she was already unable to travel to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro because of her advanced age. The lower court granted the aforesaid motion to take oral deposition that was filed by the petitioner in an Order[9] dated November 6, 2013.
Thereafter, however, several trial dates were set by the lower court in order to take the oral deposition of the petitioner but the latter was still unable to comply during the aforesaid trial dates. Finally, on August 8, 2014, the lower court issued the herein first assailed order giving the petitioner only until September 25 and 26, 2014 within which to conduct a video-teleconference for her oral deposition, taking into consideration the time difference between California, U.S.A. and the Philippines. Moreover, the aforesaid first assailed resolution further states:
“Subject to the stern condition that should the video tele-conference hearing should not be held for whatever reasons on said date and time as approved by the Court the failure of the plaintiff to do so shall be considered as a permanent waiver to present her testimony. The proceedings of this case must be put to rest pursuant to the Rules, thus, further unreasonable delay is abhorred.”
Aggrieved by the foregoing disposition of the lower court, herein petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[10] of its herein first assailed August 8, 2014 Order. However, in the herein second assailed Order dated September 19, 2014, the lower court likewise denied the aforementioned motion for reconsideration that was filed by the petitioner for lack of merit thereof.
Hence, the petitioner filed this petition for certiorari wherein the petitioner raised the following acts of grave abuse of discretion that were purportedly committed by the lower court, to wit:
I.
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT PRECIPITATELY RULED THAT THE PETITIONER HAD PERMANENTLY WAIVED HER RIGHT OR OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HER OWN TESTIMONY MERELY BECAUSE ONE OR TWO HEARINGS WHICH WERE SCHEDULED FOR THE TAKING OF THE PETITIONER’S DEPOSITION VIA VIDEO CONFERENCE HAD BEEN POSTPONED AND RESET.II.
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT PRECIPITATELY RULED THAT THE PETITIONER HAD PERMANENTLY WAIVED HER RIGHT OR OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HER OWN TESTIMONY ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT THROUGH THE FAULT OF THE PETITIONER AND, INSTEAD, BECAUSE OF THE TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE TIME DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CALIFORNIA AND MINDORO.III.
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT PRECIPITATELY RULED THAT THE PETITIONER HAD PERMANENTLY WAIVED HER RIGHT OR OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HER OWN TESTIMONY, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HER COUNSEL WAS PREPARED TO HAVE HER SERVED WITH WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES.
In sum, the sole issue to be resolved by us in the instant petition is whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when it considered the petitioner to have waived her right to present her own testimony in court. After a careful and judicious scrutiny of the whole matter, together with the applicable laws and jurisprudence in the premises, we find the instant petition to be bereft of merit.
In the instant petition, the petitioner averred that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the petitioner had permanently waived her right or opportunity to present her own testimony after attempts at taking her deposition via video phone patch or video teleconference had failed through no fault of her own. Moreover, the petitioner contended that the aforesaid ruling of the lower court had ultimately deprived her of her right to be deposed via written interrogatories instead, which right was conferred to her by law.
Indeed, in our jurisdiction, it is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies during the trial of the case and in the presence of the judge.[11] This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions thereto, Rules 23 to 28 of the Revised Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules were adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery.[12]
The thrust of the Rules of Court is to even make the availment of the modes of discovery – depositions, interrogatories and requests for admissions – without much court intervention since leave of court is not necessary to put into motion such modes after an answer to the complaint had already been filed. The rationale behind the recognition which is accorded the modes of discovery is that they enable a party to discover the evidence of the adverse party and, thus, facilitate an amicable settlement or expedite the trial of the case.[13]
Depositions are, thus, allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial court judge. The procedure is not, on that account, rendered as illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken, inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of a deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of the deponent in open court and without being subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the trial court judge. Depositions are consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding. Depositions are allowed provided that the deposition is taken in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.[14]
Corollary thereto, it has been repeatedly held that deposition discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment.[15] They should not be unduly restricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law. Otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated.[16]
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that the lower court allowed the taking of the oral deposition of the petitioner. The lower court wisely ruled that it would be for the benefit of all the parties concerned if the petitioner would, instead, make her oral deposition in that she could no longer travel from the U.S.A. to the Philippines in view of her old age (late 90s). Thus, the lower court had set several dates for the taking of the said deposition as early as on November 6, 2013. Nonetheless, until in August and September 2014 or when the lower court issued the herein assailed orders, the aforesaid oral deposition had not yet been made by the petitioner.
The petitioner would like to impress upon us that the postponements of the trial of the case were without her fault, pointing out that the difficulties lie on the time difference between California and Occidental Mindoro. She further argued that, in considering her to have waived her right to present her evidence should she fail to present the same in September 2014, the lower court had, in effect precluded her from availing of the other modes of discovery that were available to her under the law.
It seems, however, that the petitioner missed the point of the lower court when the latter issued the herein assailed orders. Indeed, there is no question that she was entitled to avail of the modes of discovery under the Rules of Court and that the use of one would not preclude the use of the other modes of discovery provided therein. However, this Court is of the opinion that it is now too late in the day to raise the aforesaid issue. The said issue is now of no moment. It is noteworthy that the case a quo had been filed by the petitioner in the lower court in the year 1992 or more than twenty (20) years ago. In fact, the case was already in the archive of the lower court until in the year 2008 when private respondent Valera filed her motion for intervention. Until such time, the petitioner did nothing which would prove that she was still interested in pursuing the case. It is thus ironic that the petitioner is now claiming that she would be deprived of her opportunity to present her evidence when she slept on her right to do so for many years.
On the contrary, this Court finds that the lower court had already been very lenient and liberal when it gave numerous opportunities to the petitioner to present her testimony. The petitioner would like this Court to believe that the lower court had only given two (2) opportunities for her to present her testimony but she failed to state that there were at least ten (10) hearings which were postponed at the instance of the petitioner or her counsel from September 2012 until March 2013. Surely, this is more than enough opportunity that was given to her by the lower court.
At this point, grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.[17]
Viewed against the foregoing standards, the assailed orders of the public respondent judge dated August 8, 2014 and September 19, 2014 do not appear to have been made with grave abuse of discretion. As clearly discussed above, the lower court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it set the hearing for the last time in September 2014 for the presentation of the testimony by the petitioner. Aside from the fact that the petitioner had already been accorded ample opportunity to present her evidence, this Court is also mindful of the fact that herein private respondents and the other parties to the action in the lower court are also entitled to their right to a speedy disposition of their case which is now at the risk of being violated.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the petition filed in this case for lack of merit. The Orders that were issued by Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth (4th) Judicial Region situated in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro dated August 8, 2014 and September 19, 2014 in Civil Case No. R-831 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Ybañez, and Paredes, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pages 3-28.
[2] Ibid, Annex “Z”, page 154.
[3] Ibid, Annex “BB”, page 171.
[4] Ibid, Annex “B”, pages 33-39.
[5] Ibid, Annex “C”, pages 41-45.
[6] Ibid, Annex “F”, page 54.
[7] Ibid, Annex “G”, page 56.
[8] Ibid, Annex “I”, pages 61-65.
[9] Ibid, Annex “L”, pages 75-76.
[10] Ibid, Annex “AA”, pages 156-169.
[11] Manuel R. Pamaran, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 Edition, page 510.
[12] Cuenco v. Risos, et al., G.R. No. 152643,
[13] Ong v. Mazo, G.R. No. 145542, June 4, 2004.
[14] San Luis v. Rojas, G.R. No. 159127, March 3, 2008.
[15] Ayala Land Inc. v. Tagle, G.R. No. 153667, August 11, 2005.
[16] Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v. Ley Construction and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 147143, March 10, 2006.
[17] Angelina Pahila-Garrido v. Eliza M. Tortogo, G.R. No. 156358, 17 August 2011.