PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. VALENTIN BAGSICAN, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This review pertains to a judgment of conviction handed down by the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte over the persons of the
accused Culito Bagsican and Valentin Bagsican. The above court found
them guilty as principal and accomplice, respectively, of the murder of
one Calixto Acorin. Culito Bagsican was, consequently, sentenced to reclusion perpetua
and its accessory penalties, and, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P4,000.00. He was also ordered to pay one half
of the costs. Valentin Bagsican, on the other hand, was meted an
indeterminate prison term of from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prison
correctional to 10 years, 2 months and 1 day of prison mayor.
In addition, Valentin Bagsican was ordered to indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the sum of P2,000.00 and to assume one half of the cost.
Both defendants appealed from the said judgment. Later, however,
Valentin Bagsican withhdrew his appeal. This review, therefore,
concerns solely the case of Culito Bagsican.

Valentin Bagsican and Culito Bagsican were father and son,
respectively. Calixto Acorin, the victim, was their neighbor. These two
families—the Bagsican and the Acorins—owned lands adjoining each other.
Prior to the incident at bar, there were already differences and
disagreements between them regarding the common boundaries of their
respective estates.

The case for the government was woven around the theory that the
above-mentioned boundary dispute precipitated the commission of the
murder here charged.

Accordingly, the prosecution presented two eyewitnesses. Angeles Esmade and Sergio Lorica, who testified to the following facts.

On June 15, 1956, at about 6:30 in the morning, several hired hands
were clearing Calixto Acorin’s coconut plantation situated at Barrio La
Union, Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte. Just about then, defendant Culito
Bagsican came over to where the hired hands were working and inquired
for the “capataz” or foreman of the group. Culito Bagsican was
referring to Calixto Acorin. On being informed that the man he was
looking for had not come yet, Culito Bagsican retired to the boundary
which separated Acorin’s land and that of his father, Valentin Bagsican.

Not long afterwards, Calixto Acorin arrived. He supervised the
workmen, prodding them to work a little faster. All that while, he was
within the premises of his plantation.

Meanwhile, someone had informed Culito Bagsican of Acorin’s arrival.
Thereupon, he called for Acorin, requesting the latter to come over so
that the two of them might settle the dispute regarding the boundary of
their adjoining estates. Acorin accommodated the request and started to
walk towards Culito Bagsican. Before Acorin could reach him, however,
Acorin saw that Valentin Bagsican, Culito’s father, was somewhere in
the same vicinity. That changed Acorin’s mind. For instead of
proceeding to Culito, Acorin proceeded to where Valentin Bagsican was
and there engaged the elder Bagsican in conversation.

While the two elders were thus conversing, Culito stealthily
approached Acorin from behind. As he came within striking distance, he
unsheathed his bolo and thrust it at the back of the unsuspecting
Acorin. As a result, Acorin, face first, fell to the ground.

But he was not dead yet. He stood up and ran, desperately trying to
flee from his armed attacker. Yet, even as he fled, Culito and Valentin
Bagsican followed in criminal pursuit, with Valentin yelling
encouragement to his son to go on and kill Acorin.” Go on, go ahead,
kill him!” he shouted. During the chase, and, with the purpose
consummating the murder, three more wounds were inflicted upon the
victim by the defendant Culito.

The victim was trying to run towards a nearby house owned by one
Eufrosina Alarquez. The laborers who were clearing the plantation of
Acorin, had, by then, dropped their tools and watched in natural
terror. As the victim and the pursuers got beyond the house of
Eufrosina Alarquez, however, the trio vanished and the laborers lost
sight of the chase.

Some moments passed. Then, though they could see neither the
pursuers nor the pursued, the laborers heard two shots fired
successively. Thereafter, the two Bagsicans emerged from where they
disappeared. The younger Bagsican, herein appellant, was holding a
blood-smeared bolo.

From the last scene, Culito went straight to the laborers who were
watching. These were the same laborers who, subsequently, testified
against the herein appellant and his father. Arrogant and defiant, he
warned them not to testify against him. “I warn you not to tell anybody
that I was the on who killed Calixto Acorin. If you are asked, you tell
that it was my father who killed’ him, because if you will tell that I
was the one who killed Calixto Acorin, I am going to kill you all.”
Then, together with his father, he proceeded to their house which was
not far from the scene of the crime. By the fence, they were met by
Culito’s mother, who thus rebuked her son, “why did you immediately
kill him?”

That same day, Valentin Bagsican surrendered himself to the police
authorities of Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte. He admitted killing Calixto
Acorin. When he gave himself up to the police, he also surrendered the
bolo used in the murder as well as a 38-Calibre pistol, bearing Serial
No. 133156.

Contradicting the above prosecution version of the incident,
appellant Culito Bagsican offered a different theory. At the trial, he
categorically denied having participated in the murder. He insisted
that on the occasion of the killing, he was some 40 kilometers away
from the scene as he was then in the town of Katipunan on an errand to
purchase a carabao for his father. In one word, “alibi.”

To support his claim, Culito Bagsican pointed to an entry in the
blotter of the Katipunan Police Force on the morning of the incident at
bar. The said entry read: “One Culito Bagsican of La Union, Rizal,
reported at about 7:00 a.m. in the morning that his pocketbook
containing P310.00 was stolen in the house of Emo Bagsican on the night
of June 14, 1956.” Then too, in the lower court, the Chief of Police of
Katipunan testified for the defendant. He acknowledged under oath that
it was he who received and entered the above report in the blotter.

The aforecited pieces of evidence relied upon by the appellant for
his alibi were most inconclusive. They were insufficient to prevail
over the positive evidence presented by the prosecution. Appellant’s
plea of alibi could not be accepted.

The regularity and authenticity of the entry itself were seriously
doubtful. The manner in which it was prepared, together with its
phraseology, leads one reasonably to suspect that it must have been
made at some “conveniently later date to corroborate the defense of
alibi.”

To start with, and, as was observed by the trial judge in his
decision, “the phrase ‘reported at about 7:00 a.m. in the morning’
conveys the idea that the entry was made not on June 15, but, on some
subsequent date, otherwise the entry shall be phrased’ at about 7:00
o’clock this morning.’

Then too, it is really noticeable that numerous pages in the blotter
concerned carry unfilled spaces. With such an entry book, one cannot
meet much difficulty if he should attempt to fabricate an entry by
taking advantage of one of those unfilled spaces.

One other factor prompted this Court to doubt the testimony of the
Chief of Police. He could not have been completely free from bias and
prejudice in favor of the herein accused. For as was aptly observed by
the trial court, and, which observation was borne out by the record,
“the chief of police was appointed by Mayor Lagora who belonged to the
political faction headed by Ex-Governor Felipe B. Azcuna, the lawyer
for both accused in this instant case. Such being the case, the chief
of police appears to be a bias if not perjured witness.” (p. 9,
decision).

Other convincing circumstances justify the rejection of appellant’s
alibi. The officer, Bautista Adrias, in charge of the blotter, on the
day in question swore on the witness stand that no such entry was
entered on June 15, 1956 and no motive whatsoever was attributed by the
appellant to the said officer for so testifying.

Moreover, in the monthly report submitted for the month of June 1956
by the same officer to the Provincial Governor, the Provincial Fiscal
and the P.C. Provincial Commander, there was no mention made of the
alleged robbery when logically the incident should have been so
mentioned. In explanation, the same officer charged with preparing the
monthly report said that the reason for its omission in the said report
was because at the time he prepared the report, there was indeed no
such entry in the blotter. Otherwise, he said, the alleged robbery
would have been carried in the report.

It is acknowledged that the Chief of Police testified in appellant’s
favor. He positively confirmed appellant’s claim that at the time of
the killing, Culito Bagsican was at his office in Katipunan reporting
the alleged robbery. This particular testimony, however, is difficult
to accept.

The Chief of Police was not the officer incharge of the blotter on the date in question.

Indeed, if Culito Bagsican, on June 15, 1956, presented himself to
the Katipunan Police Department to report a robbery, Bautista Adrias
would have received it; or, at the very least, Bautista Adrias would
have noticed the entry. On that day, he was at his post from 7 a.m. to
5 p.m. and it was he who closed all the entries for that day. That
being the circumstance, Culito Bagsican could not have reported the
alleged robbery without being known to Bautista Adrias.

Even if the above observations were inadequate to reject appellant’s
plea of alibi, still another factor prompted this Court to dismiss
appellant’s plea of alibi. The transcript of the trial revealed that
the Chief of Police could not give the details of the alleged robbery
as reported to him. He could not account for the particulars of the
report—an undertaking he would have found easy and expedient to do had
such a report really been given to him.

A defendant may set up alibi as a defense, but, courts exercise
great caution in accepting it because it is easily concocted (People vs. Dalmari and Marudi. 63 Phil. 188; People vs.
Bienvenido Umali, 99 Phil, 36., 54 Off. Gaz. 347). That doctrine should
find more forcefule application in cases like this one here where the
evidence for the prosecution is strong. Between a strong prosecution
evidence, and, a doubtful alibi, courts naturally shall favor the
former. Furthermore, a long line of decisions by this Tribunal has
established the rule that positive identification of the accused either
by the victim or eyewitnesses or both, results in the rejection of the
plea of alibi. (People vs. Colman, 103 Phil., 6; People vs. Doroteo Bellena, et al., L-13415, December 30, 1961; People vs. Pedro Racca, et al., 113 Phil., 802; People vs. Longenos-Penafield, et al., 113 Phil., 893.)

In other words, when the identification and participation of the
accused in the assault has been established by positive and competent
evidence, the plea of alibi, even if corroborated, cannot be availed
of. (People vs. Portallo, 111 Phil., 315. Alibi has no weight
whatsoever if the perpetrators of the offense have been positively
identified by witnesses (People vs. Severino Corpus and Luis Ardaniel,110 Phil., 633; People vs. Fausto Linde and Manuel Prisno, 110 Phil., 637; People vs. Josefino G. Selfaison, 110 Phil., 839 People vs. Manuel Baniega, 110 Phil., 890).

As stated above, there are two witnesses who saw the incident and
testified positively that the defendant was the one who killed the
deceased.

Great stress was also laid by the defense upon the differences in
the narration of details by some of those who testified for the
government. And, for these contradictions, the rule in falsus in uno falsus in omnibus was vehemently invoked.

It would be unreasonable for this Court to sustain appellant’s
position with respect to those differences in details into which,
truly, on occasions, some of the prosecution witnesses lapsed. However,
going over the records, particularly the transcript of stenographic
notes, it is quite obvious that the said contradictions were
inconsequential. They did not touch upon any matter of significance.
They were such minor differences as naturally were bound to arise from
truthful descriptions of things past. Had their testimonies been so
perfect, so flawless, so completely accurate in details, would they not
only then have offered themselves to serious suspicion that the
testimonies they gave were fabricated and rehearsed?

Appellant likewise disputed the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses because they were either relatives, tenants or acquaintances
of the deceased. He has asked this Court to consider unreliable their
affirmations at the witness stand. But this Court is not disposed to
sustain appellant in his contention. Oral declarations of interested
witnesses are not necessarily biased and incredible. On the contrary,
it would be unnatural for such persons interested in vindicating the
crime to impute the same to any person other than those responsible.
(People vs. Lardizabal, G.R. L-8944, May 11, 1956).

Attention of this Court was called to the fact that some of the
witnesses presented at the trial were not among those originally listed
in the complaint. Appellant would have this as reversible error.
Apparently, appellant is unaware of this Court’s ruling in the cases of
People vs. Avanzado, 37 Phil. 658 and People vs. Manabat, 100 Phil., 603, where the rule was re-expressed that witnesses not so listed may be called upon to testify.

Lastly, appellant argued that he should be exonerated because at the preliminary investigation, it was ruled that no prima facie
case existed against him. This contention can find support neither in
law nor jurisprudence. On the contrary, this Court has already ruled
that such findings in the preliminary investigation do not bar
subsequent prosecution and conviction. Such findings are not final
acquittal as would preclude further proceedings (U.S. vs.
Banzuela, 31 Phil. 564, 574). As the Solicitor General correctly
stated, “the release may only have resulted from hesitation on the part
of eyewitnesses to testify on account of the threat made upon them by
the appellant. Indeed, fear may have temporarily suppressed the
emergence of the truth from their conscience.”

In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court sentencing Culito Bagsican to reclusion perpetua
and requiring him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P4,000.00 and to pay one-half of the cost is hereby affirmed.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.