LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20, MANILA, RESPONDENT.

Atienza versus Brillantes

The Case

This is an administrative complaint for gross immorality and appearance of impropriety filed by Lupo Atienza against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., the presiding judge of a Metropolitan Trial Court branch in Manila. The complainant alleges that the respondent judge cohabited with the complainant's partner, Yolanda De Castro, and contracted a second marriage while his first marriage remained undissolved. The case matters because it fixes the rule that a judge's private life is not shielded from scrutiny, and because it settles that the requirement of a prior judicial declaration of nullity before remarriage applies even where the first marriage was celebrated under the old Civil Code.

Procedural History

The matter began as an administrative complaint filed directly with the Supreme Court against a sitting judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court. There were no intermediate proceedings in a lower court or in the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court treated the complaint as an original administrative action, received the respondent's comment and defenses, and resolved the case on the merits in a full en banc decision.

Facts

The complainant had two children with Yolanda De Castro and kept a house in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, which he had purchased in 1987 and used whenever he was in Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he found the respondent judge sleeping on his bed. The houseboy told him that the respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. The complainant did not wake the respondent; he left the house after instructing the houseboy to care for his children. Thereafter, the respondent allegedly prevented him from visiting his children and alienated their affection from him. The complainant further alleged that the respondent caused his arrest in January 1992 after a heated argument with De Castro in the latter's office.

The respondent denied causing the arrest and claimed that it was De Castro's sister who called the police. He admitted having five children with Zenaida Ongkiko but denied a valid marriage to her. He alleged that he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor in April 1965, and again in Manila in June 1965, but that neither ceremony was valid for lack of a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned him nineteen years earlier, leaving the children in his care. He claimed that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California, in December 1991, he believed in good faith that he was single because his first marriage had been solemnized without a license.

The respondent argued that Article 40 of the Family Code did not apply to him because his first marriage took place in 1965 under the Civil Code, while the second took place in 1991 under the Family Code. The Court noted that he passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to practice in 1963, so he was already a lawyer when he went through both ceremonies with Ongkiko, yet never secured a marriage license on either occasion.

Issues

• Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code applies to a remarriage entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code even if the first marriage was celebrated under the Civil Code.
• Whether or not the respondent may invoke good faith in contracting the second marriage without a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first.
• Whether or not the respondent's conduct constitutes gross immorality and appearance of impropriety warranting dismissal from the judiciary.

Applicable Provisions

Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

This is the core rule the respondent is charged with violating, since he remarried without any such final judgment.

Article 256 of the Family Code provides:

This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

This provision supplies the Court's answer to the retroactivity objection, because Article 40 is treated as a procedural rule that impairs no vested right.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Article 40 applies to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, regardless of the date of the first marriage. Through Article 256, Article 40 is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights under the Civil Code or other laws. The Court explained that Article 40 is a rule of procedure, and the respondent showed no vested right impaired by its application. It added that procedural statutes may be applied retroactively to pending actions without violating any right, because as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to cohabit with a woman who bore him five children. As a lawyer since 1963, he knew a marriage license was necessary, yet he never secured one on either occasion, and he let pass the opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he married Ongkiko the second time. His failure on both occasions betrayed his sinister motives and bad faith.

On the third issue, the Court held that the respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. While the deceit existed before his appointment, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued while he was already in the judiciary. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that a judge's conduct be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only in judicial duties but also as a private individual. There is no duality of morality; a public figure is judged by his private life as well. A judge must behave with propriety at all times, and no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness than a seat in the judiciary.

Doctrine

First, under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring that previous marriage void. Second, this requirement applies to remarriages entered into after the Family Code took effect, regardless of when the first marriage was celebrated, because Article 40 is a procedural rule given retroactive effect by Article 256 and impairs no vested right. Third, good faith is unavailable to a lawyer who contracts a marriage knowing the legal requirements were not met. Fourth, a judge's conduct must be free of any appearance of impropriety in both public duties and private life, since there is no duality of morality.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent guilty and dismissed him from the service, with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, the decision being immediately executory.

Remember This

Memorize the line that there is no duality of morality: a judge is judged by his private life as well as his public duties. Examiners use this case for Article 40 retroactivity and for the standard of moral fitness required of members of the judiciary and the bar.