NICETAS C. RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (BUREAU OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION), RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner’s late
husband, Hector P. Rodriguez, was a public school teacher assigned at Salaan Elementary School in Mangaldan, Pangasinan.  On November
19, 1975 he went on
sick leave and was confined at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital after complaining of severe stomach pains
accompanied by nausea and
vomiting, later diagnosed as “Intestinal Lipomatosis
of the Large Colon with Obstruction of the Ascending Colon.” His ailment
called for a surgical operation which was performed on November
27, 1975 but this
proved unavailing.  A few days
thereafter, on December 2, 1975, he expired.

On January
28, 1976, petitioner
filed a claim for death
compensation under the Labor Code with respondent Government Service Insurance
System (hereinafter referred to as GSIS).  In a letter-decision dated February 23, 1976, the GSIS denied
the claim finding that the cause of the death of petitioner’s husband is not an occupational disease since the
nature of his duties as a teacher,
as well as the working conditions of his employment, could not have directly
caused his ailment which eventuated in his subsequent death.^[1]
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, dated August 11, 1976, was denied upon the finding that the
evidence failed to establish that the decedent’s employment had any causal
relationship with the contraction of the ailment and there was no showing that the same directly
arose therefrom or resulted from the nature thereof.^[2]
A second motion for reconsideration filed on October 18, 1976 having been denied by the GSIS, petitioner’s
claim was elevated for review to the respondent commission where it was
docketed as ECC Case No. 0266.

On March 16, 1977,
respondent commission affirmed the ruling of the GSIS and denied the claim of
petitioner.  The case is now before us on
a petition for review.

The applicable rule established in law and jurisprudence
concerning claims based on the provisions of the Labor Code on employees’
compensation, particularly on death benefits under Article 194, is that they
must result from an occupational disease. 
A compensable disease means any illness accepted and listed by the
Employees’ Compensation Commission or any illness caused by the employment
subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same was
increased by the working conditions.^[3]

If the disease is
listed in the Table of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex A of the Rules on Employees’ Compensation, no proof of
causation is required.  However, if it is
not so listed, it has been held that the employee, this time assisted by his
employer, is required to prove a positive proposition, that is, that the risk
of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.  The fact that the cause of the disease was
not positively identified does not dispense with this burden of proof.^[4]

The observations heretofore made do not mean that proof of direct
causal relation is indispensably required. 
It is enough that the claimant adduces proof of reasonable work
connection, whereby the development of the disease was brought about largely by
the conditions present in the nature of the job.  Strict rules of evidence are not demanded,
the degree of proof required being merely substantial evidence, which has been
held to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
sufficient to support a conclusion.^[5]

After the surgical operation performed by Dr. Arturo de Vera, he
gave the clinical impression that the deceased was suffering from
“Intestinal Obstruction Partial, due to Lipomatosis
of the Colon and Adhesion,”
explained by respondent commission as follows:

“x x x As established in medical science, intestinal obstruction
is a condition in which the passage of intestinal contents is arrested or seriously impaired.  This is
due to causes which are either mechanical, vascular or neurogenic.  Mechanical causes are intrinsic factors as
adhesions and tumors, such as what happened in the instant case, and hernia,
and such factors as impacted foreign body or feces, parasites and gallstones.  Vascular causes include embolism or trombosis of a large blood vessel.  The neurogenic
causes consist of those seen in pneumonia and peritonitis and following
abdominal surgery or injuries to the spinal cord.  (The Merck Manual-8th edition:  Principles of Internal Medicine by Harrison).  x x x “^[6]

Public respondent GSIS
in its letter-decision also gave this explanation to petitioner:

“Intestinal Obstruction is failure of progression of intestinal contents due to mechanical causes or to inadequacy of
intestinal muscular activity.  In your husband’s
case, it was due to Lipomatosis and Adhesions. Lipomata are benigned (sic) tumors characteristically found in middle adult life, although they may
have been growing slowly for many years before making clinical
mischief.  They arise from adipose or fatty
tissue anywhere in the body.  The
mesentery of the colon contains a large amount of such tissue and this may
produce obstruction by compression of the intestinal wall.  Worthy of note is the fact that the abdomen
of your late husband was markedly obese.”^[7]

Petitioner does not dispute the fact that the principal duties of
her husband as a classroom teacher alone would not have any connection with his
disease.  However, she posits that the
deceased’s auxiliary activities as a classroom teacher directly affected his
physical constitution and indubitably caused him to have sustained some trauma
in his abdominal cavity and other parts of the body.  According to petitioner, the deceased was a
member of the basketball team of the public school teachers in their school for
the last five years prior to his death and had served as a coach in basketball
for three years.  He was also said to
have been an active member of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines
serving as committee
chairman of Unit 671 of the Pangasinan council.^[8]

It is our considered view that the circumstances alleged by the
petitioner and the evidence she presented are not enough to discharge the
required quantum of proof, liberal as it is. 
There is no clear evidence as to when the disease commenced and supervened;
the tumors which developed in the deceased’s colon may have been growing for
many years even before he was employed as a teacher.  Neither was there any indication as to what
really caused the disease:  in fact, the nature of the disease as
described militate against a finding of a causal nexus.  The “trauma” that was supposed to
have caused or at least contributed to the disease was neither satisfactorily
clarified nor adequately proved.  Surely,
the activities relied upon by the petitioner being outside the regular or
primary functions of a teacher could not have been done every working day.  It is safe to assume that they were done only for certain limited periods of
time and on isolated occasions as for instance, during competitions.  Thus, it cannot be said that decedent’s work
as a teacher exposed him to hazards different or greater from those involved in
ordinary or normal life-styles.  There is
no showing that he did not engage in other extraneous activities, aside from
playing basketball or being a member of
the Boy Scouts.  Of further note
is the observation that the abdomen of the deceased was markedly obese, which
circumstance may also have been a causative or contributive factor considering
the etiological and pathological particulars of said ailment.

Additionally, even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that said co-curricular activities
can be considered as “hazards,” as theorized by petitioner, exposure to the same was on the
voluntary choice of the deceased.  As
pointed out by respondent commission, the decision to engage therein was at
decedent’s option since, not forming part of his work as teacher, there was no
compulsion on him to participate said activities.

UNDER THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the
instant petition is DENIED and
the decision of respondent Employees’ Compensation Commission is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman) and Padilla, J., concur.

Paras, J., I dissent conformably with my dissent in the RARO case.

Sarmiento, J., I dissent. (See
dissenting opinion.)

^[1]
Rollo, 20.

^[2]
Ibid., 12-13.

^[3]
Art. 167 (1), Labor Code; Dabatian vs. GSIS,
149 SCRA 123 (1987); Tanedo vs. Employees’
Compensation Commission, et al., 154 SCRA 289 (1987); Mora, Jr. vs.
Employees’ Compensation Commission, et al., 156 SCRA 16 (1987); Garol vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, et
al., G.R. No. 55233, November 29,
1988.

^[4]
Raro vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission,
et al., G.R. No. 58445, April 27, 1989.

^[5]
Bagsican vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 141
SCRA 226 (1986); Tolentino, et al. vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., 150 SCRA 26 (1987).

^[6]
Ibid., 22.

^[7]
Ibid., 11-12.

^[8]
Ibid., 15.

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