TOMAS SHAN, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. CANDIDO C. AGUINALDO, DISTRICT JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH IX, CEBU CITY, RESPONDENT.

Shan versus Aguinaldo

The Case

This is an administrative case. Tomas Shan, Junior, filed a letter-complaint against District Judge Candido Aguinaldo of the Court of First Instance of Cebu City, Branch Nine, charging him with gross negligence and incompetence. The complainant alleged that the judge refused or failed, without just cause, to lift a temporary restraining order and to resolve a pending petition for certiorari that had been submitted for decision seven months earlier. The case matters because it fixes the standard of judicial diligence: a judge who lets a case sit undecided beyond the ninety-day period violates the Constitution and the Judiciary Act, and neither heavy caseload nor missing personnel will fully excuse him.

Procedural History

The case began as an ejectment suit in the City Court of Cebu City, where Judge Julian Pugoy rendered judgment for the plaintiff. That judgment became final and executory, and a writ of execution and possession was issued. The defendant then filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and damages in the Court of First Instance of Cebu City, Branch Nine, presided over by the respondent judge. The respondent issued a temporary restraining order and later failed to act on the motion to lift it and on the petition itself, which had been submitted for decision. The complainant then filed this administrative charge directly with the Supreme Court, which treated it as an original administrative matter and resolved it in a resolution.

Facts

On June 21, 1976, Juanita Bereso Go Shan, mother of the complainant, filed an ejectment suit against Delfinito Montesclaros for non-payment of rentals in the City Court of Cebu City. Judge Julian Pugoy decided the case in favor of the plaintiff on March 29, 1977. The decision became final and executory by court order of October 25, 1978, and a writ of execution and possession was issued on November 3, 1978. When the City Sheriff served the writ, the defendant physically resisted it.

The defendant then filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and damages in the Court of First Instance, Branch Nine, presided over by Judge Candido Aguinaldo, praying for a restraining order. On August 13, 1979, the respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the execution of the City Court judgment and the taking of possession of the premises. The petition was submitted for decision sometime in October 1979. A motion for resolution followed on February 27, 1980, but the judge still did not act.

On May 26, 1980, the complainant filed this letter-complaint, claiming grave prejudice because the judgment in their favor could not be executed. The respondent judge explained that his sala lacked a branch clerk of court and a legal researcher, and that only one of his three stenographers was reporting daily. He also blamed his deputy clerk of court for failing to keep him informed of the status of submitted cases, saying he learned of the overdue case only when the Supreme Court required him to comment. He justified the restraining order as a means of preserving the status quo, and noted that a supersedeas bond had been attached to the record.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge may be administratively sanctioned for refusing to lift the temporary restraining order and to dismiss the petition for certiorari.
• Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for failing to decide the case within the ninety-day period fixed by law.

Applicable Provisions

Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Court, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall have the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction, and to punish contempts, and to determine all questions of fact and law brought before them. Every judge of a Court of First Instance shall be bound to dispose of all cases submitted for decision within ninety days from the date of submission.

This provision fixes the ninety-day limit that the respondent judge exceeded.

Section 11, paragraph 1, of Article Ten of the Constitution provides:

The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

This provision is the source of the Court's power to discipline judges and court personnel.

Section 1 of Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Justice shall be impartially administered without unnecessary delay.

This is the express mandate that the respondent judge failed to observe.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge cannot be administratively sanctioned for his refusal to lift the temporary restraining order and to dismiss the petition for certiorari. These matters fall within the legitimate exercise of his discretion as a dispenser of justice. The Court will not interfere with a judge's discretionary acts in the absence of bad faith or malice.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent judge is administratively liable for the undue delay. His explanation for not acting on the motion and the petition after seven months was not satisfactory. The Court acknowledged that the delay was not shown to be motivated by malice or ill motive, but it could not tolerate the delay. The Court stressed the express mandate of the Constitution and the Judiciary Act, and declared that the law always abhors delay in the dispensation of justice. The lack of key personnel and the omission of the deputy clerk of court were no excuse. The Court held that the respondent's justification could serve only to mitigate his administrative liability, not to exonerate him. It reminded judges to exhibit diligence and efficiency, to keep a watchful eye on the performance of their personnel, and warned that leniency in administrative supervision of employees is an undesirable trait.

Doctrine

A judge must dispose of every case submitted for decision within ninety days from submission. Failure to do so violates Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 and Section 11, paragraph 1, of Article Ten of the Constitution, and is an inexcusable infringement of the mandate that justice be impartially administered without unnecessary delay. Lack of personnel and the neglect of subordinate court employees do not excuse the judge; at most they mitigate the penalty. A judge is duty-bound to know the state of his docket and to supervise his personnel, and leniency in that supervision is an undesirable trait. Discretionary acts, such as issuing or lifting a restraining order, are not subject to administrative sanction absent bad faith or malice.

Disposition

The Court found Judge Candido Aguinaldo guilty of violating Section 11, paragraph 1, of Article Ten of the Constitution and Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, fined him the equivalent of fifteen days of his salary, and warned him that a repetition of the violation will be dealt with more severely.

Remember This

The single line to memorize: the law always abhors delay in the dispensation of justice, and a judge who exceeds the ninety-day period is administratively liable even without malice. Examiners use this case to test the constitutional duty of judges to decide cases promptly and the rule that understaffing mitigates but does not excuse delay.