FAUSTINO M. MERACAP, PETITIONER, VS. INTERNATIONAL CERAMICS MFG. CO., INC. (SECURITY INDUSTRIAL CO., INC.) AND HONORABLE RONALDO ZAMORA, RESPONDENTS.

In a number of decisions, Philippine Air Lines, Inc. v.
Philippine Airlines Employees Association,^[1]
Almira v. B.F. Goodrich Philippines,^[2]
Central Textile Mills v. National Labor Relations Commission,^[3]
and Genconsu Free Workers Union v. Inciong,^[4]
this Court has sought to vitalize the constitutional mandate of security of
tenure as an aspect of the protection accorded labor.^[5]
In this suit for certiorari to review the dismissal of an appeal from a
decision of the then Acting Secretary of Labor Amado
G. Inciong by respondent Ronaldo
Zamora, Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, ordering the dismissal of
petitioner Faustino Meracap, the relevance of such a
provision becomes apparent.  It was
alleged by petitioner that while the termination of his services was based on
his unauthorized absences, the real reason was due to his union
activities.  Respondent Zamora
ruled otherwise.  Such a finding of fact
must be accorded deference.  Nonetheless,
considering that petitioner Meracap has been in the
employ of the International Ceramics Manufacturing Company, Inc. for eighteen
years, it would appear that the punishment was much too severe.  Dismissal was not warranted.  Suspension would suffice.  To that extent, certiorari lies.

The order of respondent
Presidential Assistant Zamora insofar as pertinent, reads as follows:  “The issue raised in the instant case is
whether or not respondent company is guilty of unfair labor practice for
having demoted or transferred complainant-appellant from the Fire Tender Kiln
Section to the Pan Grinding Section and whether the dismissal is legal under
Article 294(f) of the New Labor Code, as amended.  After a study of the case, this Office finds
the decision of the Acting Secretary of Labor in order.  The evidence shows that because of
complainant-appellant’s consistent absences, respondent company was prompted to
write him a letter of August 23, 1974, requiring him to report for work within
2 days from receipt of said letter (Annexes D and D-1), which, however, was not
complied with by complainant; that in view thereof, respondent was constrained
to file an application for clearance to terminate complainant’s services for
abandonment of work; and that during the hearing, respondent again requested
complainant to report for work, but still to no avail.  Complainant’s allegation that his transfer
from the Fire Tender Kiln Section amounted to a demotion and that the main
reason for his transfer was due to his activities in starting to organize a
union, lacks factual basis.  The evidence
shows that complainant’s suspension and subsequent transfer were justified due
to his previous unauthorized absences; that his transfer did not entail any
reduction of wages; and the transfer was effected by respondent company to
promote the efficiency of the service and to avoid disruption of the operation
of respondent’s business occasioned by complainant’s frequent absences.  Evidence also indisputably shows that after
the lapse of complainant’s suspension, he did not report for work,
notwithstanding respondent’s verbal and written appeal for him to return to
work.”^[6]

As set forth at the outset, the allegation that the termination
of his services was the result of his union activities cannot be
justified.  The only question left,
therefore, again as mentioned earlier, was the conformity or lack of it with
the security of tenure provision when, on the above facts, he was
dismissed.  To repeat, the penalty of
dismissal should be modified to one of suspension.

1.  There is relevance to
this excerpt from Genconsu Free Workers Union v. Inciong,^[7] promulgated earlier this month:  “There is no occasion to pass upon the
allegation in the petition that certain discriminatory acts, anti-union in
character, could be attributed to private respondent.  Respondent Deputy Minister of Labor and the
National Labor Relations Commission absolved it from such a charge.  That is a finding of fact to which deference
must be paid.  That norm has invariably been
followed by this Court.”^[8]
As it was then, so it should be now.  The
determination by the then Acting Secretary of Labor as well as the Presidential
Assistant on Legal Affairs is entitled to respect – and not merely out of
courtesy due to a coordinate branch.

2.  From a reading, however,
of the dismissal of the appeal from the decision of the Acting Secretary of
Labor by respondent Zamora,
reference was made to “consistent absences” resulting in respondent
company requiring him to report for work within two days.  The failure to obey was followed by an
application for clearance for dismissal. 
It would thus appear that the penalty is much too severe.  There is an allegation which is not denied
that petitioner had been in the service of respondent company for a continuous
period of eighteen years without any adverse record.^[9]
The resolution of the Labor Arbiter showed that petitioner was transferred by
the company from the Fire Tender Kiln Section to the Pan Grinding Section on August 15, 1974; thereafter, on August 19, 1974, a complaint for
unreasonable transfer equivalent to demotion was filed with the respondent
company.^[10]  It does appear that management took umbrage
with this particular exercise of the constitutional right to petition, for
immediately it filed an application for the dismissal of petitioner for
abandonment with the Department of Labor on August 30, 1974. 
There is almost an indecent haste characterizing the effort of
respondent company to terminate the services of petitioner.  The mere fact, therefore, that there was no
showing of such a move being prompted by his union activities would not justify
such a penalty out of proportion to the offense committed.  Accordingly, disciplinary action should be
limited to suspension.

3.  In the aforesaid
Philippine Air Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Air Lines Employees Association, the
earliest case in point, the admission by the employee in the company that he
was apprehended by a company security guard with a piece of lead material he
intended to take home for his personal use, something he ought not to have
done, amounting as it did to a breach of trust as well as violation of the
rules and regulations of his company, the fact that he had been in the service
for seventeen years was deemed a mitigating circumstance that precluded his
dismissal.  The concern shown for the
termination of service even on the assumption that conduct far from exemplary
was indulged in was made even more evident in another case referred to in the
first paragraph of this opinion, Almira v. B.F.
Goodrich Philippines:  “It would
imply at the very least that where a penalty less punitive would suffice,
whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a
consequence so severe.  It is not only
because of the law’s concern for the workingman.  There is, in addition, his family to
consider.  Unemployment brings untold
hardships and sorrows on those dependent on the wage-earner.  The misery and pain attendant on the loss of
jobs then could be avoided if there be acceptance of the view that under all
the circumstances of this case, petitioners should not be deprived of their
means of livelihood.  Nor is this to
condone what had been done by them.  For
all this while, since private respondent considered them separated from the
service, they had not been paid.  For the
strictly juridical standpoint, it cannot be too strongly stressed, to follow Davis
in his masterly work, Discretionary Justice, that where a decision may be made
to rest on informed judgment rather than rigid rules, all the equities of the
case must be accorded their due weight. 
Finally, labor law determinations, to quote from Bultmann,
should be not only secundum rationem but also secundum
caritatem.”^[11]

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Presidential Assistant
on Legal Affairs, Ronaldo Zamora, dated June 20, 1977, dismissing the appeal
is modified in the sense that the penalty to be imposed on petitioner Faustino
M. Meracap should be limited to suspension for a
period of one year from August 30,
1974.  Thereafter, he is
entitled to backwages for three years.  This decision is immediately executory.  No costs.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, and Concepcion,
Jr., JJ., concur.

Santos and Abad Santos,
JJ., on official leave.

^[1]
L-24626, June 28, 1974, 57
SCRA 489.

^[2]
L-34974, July 25, 1974, 58
SCRA 120.

^[3]
L-50150, May 3, 1979.

^[4]
L-48687, July 2, 1979.

^[5]
According to Article II, Section 9 of the Constitution:  “The State shall afford protection to
labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regard­less of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between
workers and employers.  The State shall
assure the right of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.  The State may provide for compulsory
arbitration.”

^[6]
1st Indorsement dated June 20, 1977 of respondent Presidential Assistant for
Legal Affairs Ronaldo B. Zamora, 2-3.

^[7]
L-48687, July 2, 1979.

^[8]
The following cases were cited:  Antipolo Highway Lines v. Inciong,
L-38532, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 441; Jacqueline Industries v. National
Labor Relations Commission, L-37034, Aug. 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 397; Federacion Obrera v. Noriel, L-41937; July 6, 1976, 72 SCRA 24; Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa v. Noriel,
L-45475, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 414; Monark Inter­national,
Inc. v. Noriel, L-47570-71, May 11, 1978, 83
SCRA 114; National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. Court of
Industrial Relations, L-33496, June 19, 1979.

^[9]
Petition, Discussion, par. 7.

^[10]
Ibid, Annex B.

^[11]
58 SCRA 120, 131.  This excerpt was cited
in the aforesaid Genconsu Free Workers Union
decision.