HEINZ R. HECK, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, RESPONDENT.
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Heinz Heck versus Judge Anthony Santos
The Case
This is an administrative complaint filed with the Supreme Court against a sitting regional trial judge. Heinz Heck, one of the defendants in a civil case pending before the judge, charged Judge Anthony Santos with grave misconduct and impropriety: the judge, after declaring the defendants to have waived their right to present evidence, ordered the plaintiffs' counsel to draft the decision, and then promulgated that draft verbatim as his own. The case matters because it fixes the rule that decision-making is a non-delegable judicial duty, and it shows how a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct is classified and penalized under the rules on administrative discipline of judges.
Procedural History
The case began as a verified complaint for disbarment and other disciplinary sanctions filed directly with the Supreme Court. The respondent judge filed his comment, and the matter was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation. The Office of the Court Administrator found that most of the charges — the denial of the motion to dismiss, the grant of shares to the plaintiffs, the directive to constitute a mortgage, and the alleged mingling with counsel — were either judicial matters correctable only through judicial remedies or bare, unsupported allegations. But it found one charge substantiated: the delegation of the drafting of the decision and its verbatim adoption. It recommended a fine of five thousand pesos with a warning. The Supreme Court, treating the recommendation as too light, resolved the administrative case itself in its decision of April 2003.
Facts
In a civil case for declaratory relief and damages pending before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, the defendants, including Heinz Heck, moved to dismiss on the ground that the dispute was an intra-corporate matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The respondent judge denied the motion. Later, the defendants' counsel, Atty. Samuel Jardin, filed a motion to withdraw, which the judge granted by an order of April 1, 1996, resetting the hearing to June 10 and 11, 1996. The defendants never received a copy of that order, and neither they nor their counsel appeared on June 10, 1996.
On that date, the judge issued an order stating that only the plaintiffs' counsel, Atty. Manuel Singson, appeared; that all the plaintiffs' exhibits were admitted; that the defendants were considered to have waived their right to present evidence; that the case was submitted for decision; and that Atty. Singson was authorized to draft the decision. The defendants did not receive a copy of this order either. Atty. Singson later submitted a draft decision, and on October 2, 1996, the judge rendered a decision copied verbatim from that draft.
Heck then filed the administrative complaint, alleging violation of the rule requiring judgments to be personally and directly prepared by the judge, violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics for allegedly stepping down from the rostrum to mingle with the plaintiffs' counsel, and gross ignorance of the law for the rulings in the decision. The judge explained that he had studied the evidence carefully, that the defendants' own negligence left him no choice, and that he adopted the draft in good faith after thorough study. He denied the mingling allegation.
Issues
- Whether or not the respondent judge violated Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Court, and Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, by ordering the plaintiffs' counsel to draft the decision and by adopting that draft verbatim as his own.
- Whether or not the respondent judge's other acts — denying the motion to dismiss, granting shares to the plaintiffs, directing the execution of a mortgage, and allegedly mingling with counsel — may be the subject of an administrative complaint.
- Whether or not the lack of malice or bad faith excuses the judge from administrative liability.
- Whether or not the recommended fine of five thousand pesos is the proper sanction.
Applicable Provisions
Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. — A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court.
This is the provision the respondent judge violated, because the decision was neither personally nor directly prepared by him.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
This canon is breached when a judge's conduct, even without bad faith, creates the appearance that he is not impartial.
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.
This canon is breached when a judge abdicates the adjudicative responsibility of deciding the case himself.
Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 10. Sanctions. — A. If the respondent is found culpable of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed: Dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits (except accrued leaves) and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including a government-owned or controlled corporation; Suspension for three (3) months without salary and benefits; or A fine not less than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00.
This fixes the range of the fine, which the Court applied because dismissal and suspension were no longer feasible after the judge's retirement.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court agreed with the Office of the Court Administrator that the respondent violated Section 1 of Rule 36 and Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. By ordering counsel for one party to draft the decision, the judge abdicated a function exclusively granted to him by the Constitution. Decision-making is the primordial and most important duty of a member of the bench; the judge must use his own perceptiveness in understanding and analyzing the evidence and his own discernment in determining the proper action. Delegating the preparation of a decision to counsel for one of the parties and parroting it verbatim reflect blatant judicial sloth.
On the second issue, the Court sustained the Office of the Court Administrator's view that the denial of the motion to dismiss, the grant of shares, and the directive to execute a mortgage are judicial issues for which judicial remedies exist, and that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every aberrant or irregular act of a judge where a judicial remedy is available. The allegation of mingling with counsel was a bare assertion unsupported by convincing evidence.
On the third issue, the Court held that lack of malice or bad faith is not an excuse. A judge must not only render a just, correct, and impartial decision; he must do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality, and integrity.
On the fourth issue, the Court held that the violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct is a serious charge under Section 3 of Rule 140, so the recommended fine of five thousand pesos was not commensurate. Since the respondent had retired on May 22, 2002, dismissal or suspension was no longer feasible, leaving only a fine within the range of not less than twenty thousand pesos but not more than forty thousand pesos.
Doctrine
A judgment or final order determining the merits of a case must be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court. This duty is non-delegable: a judge may not order counsel for any party to draft the decision, and may not adopt such a draft verbatim as his own. Doing so violates Section 1 of Rule 36 and Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and constitutes a serious charge under Rule 140. Good faith is not a defense, because a judge must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety. Where the judge has retired and dismissal or suspension is no longer feasible, the penalty is a fine of not less than twenty thousand pesos but not more than forty thousand pesos, deductible from retirement benefits.
Disposition
The Court found Judge Anthony Santos guilty of violating Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in relation to Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Court and ordered him to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos, to be deducted from his retirement benefits, while referring the prayer for disbarment to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation.
Remember This
The one line to memorize: decision-making is the primordial and most important duty of a judge, and it cannot be delegated to counsel for any party. Examiners use this case to test the personal and direct preparation requirement of Section 1 of Rule 36, the appearance-of-impropriety standard under Canon 2, and the classification of a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious charge under Rule 140.