EMPLOYEES’ LEAVE DIVISION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. JAVEELYN L. MATARO, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, BRANCH 15, REGIONAL…

Employees' Leave Division versus Mataro

The Case

This is an administrative disciplinary case. The Employees' Leave Division of the Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator, acting as complainant, charged Javeelyn L. Mataro, a Court Stenographer III assigned to a regional trial court branch, with habitual tardiness. The matter reached the Supreme Court as a regular administrative matter after the Judicial Integrity Board found her liable and recommended a fine. The case matters far beyond one employee's time records: the Court used it as the occasion to trace, decade by decade, how the offense of habitual tardiness has been classified and punished in the Judiciary, and to confront a gap in its own disciplinary framework, namely that the rules then in force allowed no penalty lower than a fine of more than 10,000 pesos even for a first offense.

Procedural History

The case began with a Report on Undertime Incurred prepared by the Employees' Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator, dated November 21, 2023, which was endorsed to the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Executive Director of the Judicial Integrity Board for appropriate action. The Judicial Integrity Board directed the respondent to file a Comment, which she did, verified, and which was received on January 10, 2024. The Officer-in-Charge then submitted a Report and Recommendation dated February 16, 2024, proposing a finding of guilt for habitual tardiness, a fine of 18,000 pesos, and a stern warning. In its own Report dated March 20, 2024, the Judicial Integrity Board recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter, that the respondent be found guilty of habitual tardiness, and that she be fined 17,501 pesos, payable within three months from promulgation. The case was then resolved by the Supreme Court in its own name, as an administrative matter within its disciplinary jurisdiction over Judiciary personnel.

Facts

The respondent was tardy from work ten times in September 2023 and twelve times in October 2023. These records prompted the Employees' Leave Division to prepare its report on undertime, which the Office of the Court Administrator endorsed to the Judicial Integrity Board.

In her verified Comment, the respondent offered her sincerest apology for her tardiness during those months. She explained that in the first week of September 2023 she learned that she was pregnant, and that because it was her first pregnancy she found it difficult to wake up early. She also had trouble sleeping at night and suffered persistent nausea and vomiting during the day. She acknowledged fully that her physical condition would not excuse her from administrative liability, but asked that the circumstance of first offense be considered in her favor.

The Judicial Integrity Board found that the records showed tardiness at least ten times for two consecutive months within the year, which fell squarely within the definition of habitual tardiness. Citing the 2004 case on the imposition of corresponding penalties for habitual tardiness, the Board held that health conditions do not absolve employees from administrative liability. It nonetheless reduced the proposed fine from 18,000 pesos to 17,501 pesos, considering the mitigating circumstance of first offense and the absence of any aggravating circumstance.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent is guilty of habitual tardiness.
• Whether or not the penalties prescribed under the rules in force at the time are still commensurate to the charge of habitual tardiness and its effects on service.
• Whether or not the Court should adopt guidelines governing the effects of administrative penalties on the allowances, incentives, and other benefits of members, officials, employees, and personnel of the Judiciary.

Applicable Provisions

The Civil Service Commission's Memorandum Circular No. 04, series of 1991, defines the offense and fixed its original sanctions:

Any employee shall be considered habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten (10) times a month for at least (2) months in a semester or at least two (2) consecutive months during the year.

This definition is the measure against which the respondent's ten and twelve tardinesses were counted, and it is the definition the Court carried through every later issuance.

Memorandum Circular No. 23, series of 1998, reclassified habitual tardiness as a light offense:

Violation of reasonable office rules and regulations which shall include Habitual Tardiness 1st offense – Reprimand 2nd offense – Suspension for one (1) day to thirty (30) days 3rd offense – Dismissal

This shows that habitual tardiness was once punishable by a mere reprimand on first offense, a leniency the Court later weighed against the heavier regime.

The 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service distinguished two grades of the offense:

Habitual tardiness in reporting for duty causing prejudice to the operations of the office;

and, among light offenses:

Habitual Tardiness.

These provisions show that before Rule 140 was expanded, the penalty for habitual tardiness depended on its gravity and its effects on government service.

Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, now governs all Judiciary personnel and classifies the offense as a less serious charge:

Less serious charge include: Frequent and unjustified absences without leave or habitual tardiness;

and fixes the sanctions:

If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed: Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months; or A fine of not more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

This is the provision under which the respondent was penalized, and its narrow range is precisely the gap the Court addressed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found the respondent guilty of habitual tardiness. Her ten tardinesses in September and twelve in October 2023 fell squarely within the settled definition. Consistent with prior doctrine, her pregnancy and its discomforts, while humanly understandable, did not absolve her of administrative liability.

On the second issue, the Court undertook an extensive review of the history of the offense. It noted that habitual tardiness was once a light offense punishable by reprimand on first offense under the Civil Service rules, and that when Rule 140 was expanded to cover all Judiciary personnel, the offense was effectively upgraded to a less serious charge, narrowing the range of penalties regardless of frequency or effects on the office. The Court observed that the circumstances warranted penalties lower than what the current rules allow, and that the case shed light on gaps in the disciplinary framework that need to be addressed.

On the third issue, the Court, in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel under Article VIII, Section 6, of the 1987 Constitution, as echoed in Section 20 of the Administrative Code of 1987, adopted and set guidelines, consistent with existing rules, to determine the effects of administrative penalties on the allowances, incentives, and other benefits of Judiciary personnel.

Doctrine

First, habitual tardiness is committed when an employee incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten times a month for at least two months in a semester or at least two consecutive months during the year. Second, health conditions and pregnancy do not absolve a Judiciary employee from administrative liability for habitual tardiness; they may, however, be considered in mitigation, as may a first offense. Third, under Rule 140 as amended, habitual tardiness is a less serious charge punishable by suspension of one to three months or a fine of more than 10,000 pesos but not exceeding 20,000 pesos. Fourth, the Court retains the power of administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel, and may adopt guidelines on the effects of penalties on benefits. A candidate should tie each rule to its quoted source: the definition to the Civil Service circulars, the classification and penalty to Rule 140, and the supervisory power to Article VIII, Section 6, of the Constitution.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent guilty of habitual tardiness and imposed a fine, and it adopted guidelines on the effects of administrative penalties on the benefits of Judiciary personnel.

Remember This

Memorize this line: habitual tardiness is ten times a month for at least two consecutive months or two months in a semester, and neither pregnancy nor poor health excuses it. Examiners use this case to test the classification of habitual tardiness as a less serious charge under Rule 140 and the Court's power of administrative supervision over Judiciary personnel.