R.C. LEDESMA, PETITIONER, VS. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, ANTONIO HERAS, MD TRANSIT, INC., AND DE DIOS TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner R. C. Ledesma would have us
review a decision of respondent Public Service Commission which authorized her
to operate a passenger and freight jitney service from the corner of Banawe and Laong-Laan, Quezon City up to the corner of Laong-Laan and Governor Forbes, Manila,
with the use of ten units instead of twenty as applied for.  While Commissioner Enrique Medina of
respondent Commission was of the opinion that she could operate her line as far
as the Manila City
Hall, as was sought by her, the then Associate
Commissioner Gregorio C. Panganiban was for limiting
her certificate only up to the corner of Laong-Laan
and Governor Forbes.  With the other
Commissioner Filomeno C. Kintanar
dissenting, the limitation of such service in accordance with the view of
Commissioner Panganiban prevailed.  Petitioner would have us, therefore, modify
the same so that the position taken by Commissioner Medina be sustained and her
application, as originally filed, be approved in its entirety.  With our jurisdiction to set aside any order,
ruling or decision of the respondent Commission being predicated on it clearly
appearing that there was no evidence
before it in support thereof or that the same is contrary to law or outside
its jurisdiction, we cannot accede to petitioner’s wishes.^[1] Her plea for the modification of the
decision now sought to be reviewed
finds no
support in the controlling legal provision as authoritatively construed
by us.

As noted in the opinion of Commissioner Medina: “From the
evidence adduced by the applicant at the hearing of this case, the Commission
believes that the proposed service is the first to be established over the
applied line due to the recent opening of the Laong Laan Street to traffic, thus precipitating the steady flow
of vehiculars from Quezon City to Manila.  While it is true that on the lower portion of
the applied line that is from Quezon Boulevard to P. Burgos,
this area is already considered saturated, nevertheless, it is important likewise to note that at present there
is no authorized operator along the upper portion of the applied line.  Consequently, it would rather be too expensive and
too inconvenient on the part of the riding public to be transferring from one
jitney to another if we are to limit
applicant’s operation up to the point where there are already numerous buses
and jitneys operating thereto.”^[2]

Then came this portion: “It is therefore the considered
opinion of the Commission that although the Quezon
Boulevard (Manila)-P. Burgos, is already saturated and covered by the
moratorium, we should not deprive the commuters of the Laong
Laan and Banawe of an
essential public service; a few more units to the Quezon
Boulevard-P. Burgos (City Hall),
can be tolerated as a part of the burden and sacrifices inherent in social and
City life.  The Commission, however,
aware of the memorandum order regarding saturation, should limit the number of
units authorized to the minimum and should be very careful not to allow any
unit not absolutely necessary to meet the present demand of the riding public
of the Laong Laan and Banawe, Quezon City.”^[3]
It then found that public convenience would be promoted in a proper and
suitable manner by approval of petitioner’s application, and that she is a
Filipino citizen legally and financially capable to maintain and operate the proposed service.  As set forth above, Commissioner
Medina was fully agreeable to her application, except that the number of units
was decreased from twenty to ten.

Why Commissioner Panganiban was not fully in agreement with the above views
was explained by him in his concurring and dissenting opinion thus:
“Since the portion of the line applied for from Dimasalang
to City Hall has already been declared by this Commission to be saturated and a
further grant of authority to operate thereon will aggravate the already
congested condition in the area, it is the considered opinion of the
undersigned that this application should be approved only from its northern
terminal. Corner Banawe and Laong-Laan
up to the southern end, Laong-Laan and Governor
Forbes.  Considering that there are
already numerous jeepneys and buses presently
rendering adequate service from the corner of Laong-Laan
and Governor Forbes to the City Hall which can be availed of by commuters along
the route proposed to be served whose destination is City Hall, the undersigned does not see any
compelling reason to totally depart from the policy of the Commission in
restricting the further entry of public utility vehicles to the saturated
streets of Manila.”^[4]
His concurrence was thus limited: “The undersigned, however, concurs in
the observation in the decision that at present, there is no authorized operation
from the Corner of Banawe and Laong-Laan
up to the corner of Laong-Laan and Governor Forbes
and it is for this compelling reason of
public interest that the undersigned votes to approve the application only up
to that said portion of the line.”^[5] As was mentioned earlier, it was the above
view that obtained the necessary two votes thus constituting the decision now
under review.

Four errors were assigned by petitioner but discussed jointly
inasmuch as they all could be summed up in the allegation insistently pressed
on us that in thus arriving at the aforesaid decision, the interest, comfort
and convenience of the traveling public were sacrificed to protect the big
operators who were the oppositors to such a petition.^[6]

As thus set forth, the contention of petitioner is bereft of the
necessary persuasive force to overturn the conclusion reached by the respondent
Commission.  The objection raised is at
bottom factual in character and our consistent course of decisions, from
Philippine Shipowners‘ Association v. Public Utility
Commission^[7]
to Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Gabatin,^[8]
decided barely a year and a half ago, has been to consider ourselves bound by such findings and conclusions of
fact unless, in accordance with the statute, there is no reasonable support in
the evidence of record.  As was stated in the Gabatin
decision: “Where the petition for review disputes merely the sufficiency
of the evidence, the finding cannot be disturbed.  It is not for this Court to determine
credibility and preponderance of proof nor to examine the proof de novo
and determine for itself whether or not the preponderance of evidence really
justifies the decision.  It is not to
substitute its discretion for that of the Public Service Commission on
questions of fact.  The lack of wisdom of
the conclusion reached by the Public Service Commission affects neither its
authority to decide nor the validity of its decision.”^[9]

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Commission of August 12, 1966, now under review, is
affirmed.  With costs against petitioner
R. C. Ledesma.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, and
Barredo, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., in the result.

Villamor, J., files a separate concurring and dissenting opinion.

^[1]
Sec. 35 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, approved on November 7, 1936, reads:
“The Supreme Court is hereby given jurisdiction to review any order, ruling
or decision of the Commission and to modify or set aside such order, ruling or
decision when it clearly appears that there was no evidence before the
Commission to support reasonably such order, ruling or decision, or that the
same is contrary to law, or that it was without the jurisdiction of the
Commission. The evidence presented to the Commission, together with the record
of the proceedings before the Commission, shall be certified by the Secretary
of the Commission to the Supreme Court. Any order, ruling, or decision of the
Commission may likewise be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon a writ of certiorari
in proper cases. The procedure for review, except as herein provided, shall be
prescribed by rules of the Supreme Court.”

^[2]
Brief for the Petitioner, Appendix A, pp. 14-15.

^[3]
Ibid, p. 16.

^[4]
Ibid., Appendix A-1, pp. 27-28.

^[5]
Ibid, p. 28.

^[6]
The oppositors
were Antonio Heras, MD Transit and Taxi Co., Inc.,
CAM Transit, Inc. and De Dios Transportation Co.,
likewise named respondents.

^[7]
43 Phil. 328 (1922).

^[8]
L-24472, 24 SCRA 411.

^[9]
Ibid, pp. 418-419.

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