ERNESTO ANDRES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

In an information that was filed in the then Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Isabela, the
petitioner, Ernesto Andres, was charged with the crime of homicide with
frustrated homicide.  Trial on the merits
thereon ensued after the petitioner pleaded not guilty upon being arraigned.  The petitioner invoked the justifying
circumstance of self-defense under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code as his
main defense after it was indubitably proved that he stabbed the deceased and
the other offended party.

On June 25, 1975, the
trial court rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of homicide and frustrated homicide.  The trial court held that the petitioner
failed to establish self-defense by clear and convincing evidence for no
unlawful aggression on the part of the group of the deceased was
attendant.  Thus, in the dispositive portion of the said decision the petitioner was
convicted and sentenced:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds ERNESTO ANDRES guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE, as charged, for the unjustified
killing of FEDERICO BAYYA, the commission of which was attended by the
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation without any aggravating
circumstance to offset it, for which crime the said accused is hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeter­minate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, and TWELVE (12)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
indemnify the heirs of Federico Bayya in the sum of
TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The Court also hereby finds the same accused ERNESTO ANDRES guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, as charged, for the frustrated
killing of RODOLFO CUMARAT, the
commission of which was attended by the lone mitigating circumstance of passion
or obfuscation, without any aggravating circumstance to offset it.  Accordingly, the said accused is also
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4)
MONTHS of prision correccional,
as minimum, and SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the said RODOLFO CUMARAT in the sum
of ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY (P1,850.00) PESOS, as actual damages and in
the sum of THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as moral
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The knife (bread slicer) used in the
commission of said crimes is ordered confiscated in favor of the Government.

The accused shall also pay the costs.”^[1]

Not satisfied therewith, the petitioner elevated this case to the
herein respondent Court of Appeals.  The
respondent Court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial, court.  However, in the ratio decidendi of its decision, the respondent Court
brushed aside a discussion, in relation to the case at bar, of the most
important requisite of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, i.e., unlawful aggression, and merely
proceeded in adjudicating the case based on the absence of the second requisite
of self-defense, that of the “reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it.”^[2]
It held that:

“We are now called upon to rule on the appellant’s plea of
self-defense.  Assuming for the sake of
argument that the circumstances here as described by the witnesses for the
defense are true, We cannot see our way clear to crediting appellant with the
justification for taking the life of Federico Bayya
and for inflicting upon Rodolfo Cumarat with a stab
wound which nearly caused Cumarat’s life for it is
clear from the evidence that the four men were unarmed (the claim that one of
them was carrying a club is hardly to be believed) and the accused himself
stated that the attackers were only using their fists on him.  His claim that there were ‘many people’ may
be true in the sense that there were many passersby.  But as far as persons attacking him were
concerned there were only four, for which reason We
find it hardly justifiable for him to use his breadknife
against his attackers, a weapon which proved so lethal that only one thrust on
the victim was fatal enough.”^[3]

In assuming for the sake of argument that the defense’s version
of the facts is true and then ruling on the case only on the basis of the
second requisite of self-defense, the respondent Court paved the way for this
petition for review on certiorari. 
The petitioner then saw the ripe opportunity to call for an
interpretation and a correct application of the second requisite of
self-defense.

The facts of the case as found by the respondent Court are herein
reproduced, to wit:

“Facts
Not Contested:

“It was the town fiesta of Santiago,
Isabela and the streets were full of
pedestrians.  At 1:00 in the early
morning of July 26, 1972, the accused in the company of three ladies, Eufemia Calso, his fiancee, who later became his wife, her sister Sally and
one other were walking along the provincial road on their way home from a late
movie.  On the same road and going along
the Same direction were four men, the deceased Federico Bayya,
his cousin Fernando Bayya, Rodolfo Cumarat and one other, who too, were on their way home
after having drunk one bottle of beer each in a nearby restaurant when Federico
Bayya happened to bump Eufemia
(defense says he kissed Eufemia) which displeased the
accused causing the latter to box Federico. 
Federico tried to retaliate but due to the intervention of the lady
companion of the accused, Federico was appeased and both groups proceeded on
their way.

“Disputed
Facts:

“According to the prosecution witnesses, after the bumping
(kissing) incident Federico and his companions walked ahead of the group of the
ac­cused, but upon reaching the inter­section of the road where they were about
to turn to go to their respect­ive houses, the accused suddenly caught up with
them, and without any word of warning stabbed first Rodolfo Cumarat
on the left side of his ab­domen, followed by another stab at Federico.  Federico’s stab wound proved fatal, while
Rodolfo’s, although likewise fatal, was attended to on time and fortunately
treated effectively, thus averting his death.

“The defense on the other hand, thru
witnesses Eufemia and Sally Calso
offer a different version.  They
claim that after the ‘first incident’ they proceeded to walk ahead, with the
four men trailing behind them; and when they were about to reach the inter­section,
one of the four men who was later identified by the witnesses as Rodolfo Cumarat tried to catch up with Andres, and placing his hand
over Andres’ shoulder, boxed Andres twice. 
Andres tried to run away but all the four men chased him and started to
pummel him with fist blows.  Andres
testifies that one of his attackers was carrying a club with which he sought to
strike the accused.  (t.s.n. pp. 3-11, April 2, 1975)

Q.   Why were you not able to
reach the house of Eufemia Calso
on that particular night?

A.    When we were about to
reach the Kwikway, on the corner, a certain man put
his arms on my shoulder.

Q    After that man placed his
arms on your shoulder what happened next if any?

A.    That man when he placed
his arm on my shoulder boxed me on my throat and then the arms
which was placed on my shoulder boxed me at the back of my head.

Q.   Do you know that man who
placed his arms around your shoulder and boxed you?

A.    Before I did not know
the name of that man and I came to know him only during the investiga­tion.

Q.   And what is the name?

A.    Rodolfo Cumarat, sir.

Q.   After Rodolfo Cumarat boxed you in your throat and nape, what happened
next if any?

May we make the observation
that the trend of the question would lead the witness.

COURT:

Sustained.

Atty. Delizo:

Q.   When Rodolfo Cumarat boxed you what did you do, if any?

A.    After Rodolfo Cumarat boxed me I
ran from here to that place and then his companions got near me with clubs and
they started boxing me.

Q.   How many persons have you
seen with a club on that particular night?

A.    Only one sir.

Q.   And how many persons were
boxing you?

A.    I did not know, sir,
because when they were boxing me I covered my face (witness dem­onstrating the
way he placed both his hands in his face and crouch with his hands try­ing to protect his head and face).  And when I put up my face I saw plenty of
persons.

Q.   Where did you see those
persons?

A.    The place where they
overtook me, sir.

Q.   When you were boxed by
those persons whom you do not know the number what did you do, if any?

Fiscal Lopez:

Misleading.

Atty. Delizo:

I withdraw my question.

Q.   You said you saw a man
with a club what did that man do, if any?

A.    The man with a club
clubbed me.

Q.   What part of your body
was hit?

A.    Right shoulder, sir.

Q.   How many times were you
hit by the club?

A.    I don’t remember how
many times, sir.

Q.   How about Rodolfo Cumarat what
did he do, if any?

A.    Rodolfo Cumarat also boxed me
and when I crouched and covered my face, Rodolfo kept on boxing me and when I
raised my face I saw already many people.

Q.   Do you know how many
times were you boxed by those persons who boxed you?

A.    I don’t know how many times
sir.

Q.   What did you do if any,
when you were boxed and clubbed by those persons?

A.    When I lifted my face I
looked around and saw many people and they told me that they are going to kill
me and I remember my knife bread slicer in my waist.”^[4]

According to the respondent Court, the petitioner was not
justified in using his knife as against the bare fists of the unarmed group of
his alleged assailants.  In addition, the
respondent Court made the observation that “the accused was a little too fast
and imprudent in the use of his breadknife, for there
really was no imminent danger to his life and limb when he wielded it against
the deceased and Rodolfo Cumarat.”^[5]
Consequently, it held that the second requisite of self-defense was absent in
this case.

The petitioner claimed otherwise, hence, this petition.

It must be noted that the petitioner originally pleaded
self-defense.  In this kind of a defense,
the burden of proof rests upon the accused. 
His duty is to establish self-defense by evidence clear and con­vincing,
relying on the strength of his own evidence not on the weakness of the
prosecution’s.^[6]

The first requisite of self-defense is indis­pensable.  There can be no self-defense until it is
proved that there has been unlawful aggression on the part of the person
injured or killed by the accused.^[7]

If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent
or to repel.  The second requisite of
self-defense will have no basis.  In the
case of People vs. Yuman,^[8]
this rule was explained as follows:

“x x x it is
evident that our conclusion will have to be that her act of mortally wounding
her lover Marciano Martin had not been preceded by
aggression on the part of the latter. 
There is no occasion to speak here of the ‘reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it’, nor is it necessary to inquire whether
or not there was ‘sufficient provocation’ on the part of the one invoking
legitimate self-defense because both circumstances presuppose unlawful
aggression which, we repeat, was not present in the instant case.”

Therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that the issue raised by the petitioner as to
the second requisite of self-defense is rather premature for he must first
establish the existence of unlawful aggression being perpetrated against his
person.

Now, was there unlawful aggression on the part of the
petitioner’s alleged assailants?

We hold that there was none.

During the trial of the case, the prosecution and the defense
presented two conflicting versions of the facts.  Each one contended that the opposing party
was the aggressor.  Thus, the trial
court’s findings of fact and assignment of values as to the evidence ad­duced
become relevant and decisive.

After a thorough perusal of the evidence on record, We find the
trial court’s findings and conclusions to be well in accord.  We thus agree with the following:

“From the testimony of the pro­secution witnesses Fernando Bayya and Rodolfo Cumarat, and
that of the witnesses for the defense it is clear that the incident that
happened in the early morning of July
26, 1972 which resulted in the fatal stabbing of Federico Bayya and the almost fatal stabbing of Rodolfo Cumarat by the ac­cused consisted of two stages.  The first stage was the “accidental
bumping” or “kissing” of Eufemia Calso, the then sweetheart of the accused, by Federico Bayya
in front of the store of the Singer Sewing Machine along the provincial road of
Santiago.  The accused boxed Federico Bayya on the face but before the latter could retaliate,
Sally Calso intervened by pacifying Federico Bayya and holding his collar.  Eufemia Calso also held the accused and pulled him away; while the
companions of Federico Bayya apologized for their
companion’s conduct and also pulled away the latter.  Thus, the trouble was peacefully settled and
the two groups separated and continued walking along the road in the same
direction.  The second stage
happened at the inter­section near the Kwik-Kway
Engineering where the stabbing took place.

“As to who started the unlawful aggression in the second
stage, the two sets of witnesses do not agree. 
The prosecution witnesses claim that when their group was at the
intersection near the Kwik-Kway En­gineering
building, the accused suddenly attacked them with his knife and stabbed Rodolfo
Cumarat and then Federico Bayya.  The defense witnesses, however, testified
that it was the group of the four men that first attacked the accused.  They claim that Rodolfo Cumarat
walked to the side of the accused, placed his arm on the shoulder of the
accused and then boxed him on the back of his head and on his throat.  The accused then ran but he was chased by the
four men.  When they were able to
overtake the accused, they rained fist blows on all parts of his body and one
of them clubbed him on the shoulders.  The
accused crouched and tried to parry the blows with his hand.  Eufemia Calso told the accused to run but the latter could not run
because he was wounded.  The ac­cused
heard his attackers say that they were going to kill him,
he remembered that he had his knife (bread slicer)
tucked in his waist.  He pulled it,
closed his eyes and swung it in­discriminately against his attackers.  Then he heard the whistle of a police­man and
his assailants ran away.  The policeman
ran after his attackers and he also ran after the policeman to tell the latter
his attackers.  He did not, however,
continue to run after the policeman and instead went to the house of his
sweetheart, Eufemia Calso.  He did not know if he was able to stab any of
his attackers.

“The Court is not impressed by the testimony of the accused on
this point and that of his sweetheart Eufemia Calso because they are full of contradictions and
improbabili­ties.

“(1)    The testimony of the
ac­cused that he ran away after he
was boxed by Rodolfo Cumarat is contra­dictory to his
sworn statement, marked Exhibit “3”, in which he stated that after Cumarat boxed him, he
immediately stabbed the latter.

“(2)    The testimony at the
trial of Eufemia Calso that
the accused ran away after he was boxed by Cumarat is
also contradictory to her sworn statement given by her to the police (Exhibit
“1”) and also to her testimony at the preliminary investigation
(Exhibit “2”) in which she stated that the accused did not run away.

“(3)    The testimony of the
ac­cused at the trial that after he was overtaken by the four men, they boxed
him and clubbed him and that he crouched to evade the blows is contra­dicted by
his sworn statement, marked Exhibit “3”, in which he stated that
after Cumarat boxed him, he immediately stabbed the
latter and when he saw that the companions of Cumarat
were surround­ing him he immediately attacked them by stabbing them
indiscriminately, without stating that these companion boxed him and clubbed
him.

“(4)    The testimony at the
trial of Eufemia Calso that
it was Cumarat who first boxed the accused and then
the former’s companion also boxed and clubbed the
latter is contradicted by her sworn statements, Exhibit “1” and
Exhibit “2” in which she did not mention the boxing and clubbing of
the accused by the other companions of Cumarat.

“(5)    The testimony of the
ac­cused at the trial that the four men were armed is contradicted by his
aforementioned sworn statement, Exhibit “3”, in which he did not
mention any club at all.  That the men
had a club is also highly improbable and unbelievable because not one of them
was armed with a club when they first met the group of the accused in front of
the store of the Singer Sewing Machine and since the two groups walked together
up to the intersection, it can safely be presumed that the four men were also
unarmed when they reached the intersection since no evidence was presented to
show that somebody else handed a club to one of the four men.  Moreover, Eufemia Calso in her two sworn statements, Exhibit ‘I’ and Exhibit
“2”, stated that she did not notice any arm or weapon held by any of
the four men.  These statements also
contradict Eufemia Calso’s
testimony at the trial that one of the four men was armed with a club.

“(6)    The testimony of the
accused at the trial that he suffered contusions on his face and other parts of
his body is not only contradictory to his sworn statement, Exhibit
“3”, but also belied by the following facts:  (a) he did not submit himself for medical
treatment; (b) he was able to report for work as usual at 4:00 o’clock that
same morning of July 26, 1972, only a few hours after the occurrence of the
fatal incident; (c) he went to the municipal building at about 6:00 o’clock
that same morning where he was investigated by the police, and nothing was
mentioned about his physical condition or appearance during the investigation,
which shows that the contusions that he claimed at the trial to have suffered
is not true; otherwise, the police investigator would not have failed to notice
said contusions, if any, and to ask him about it; (d) Eufemia
Calso, in her aforementioned sworn statements did not
also mention the wounds suffered by the accused.

“(7)    If it is true as claimed by the accused that
the four men ganged up on him, boxed him and clubbed him, it would seem unbelievable
that the many people who were all around them on the road did not intervene to
stop it by holding the alleged combatants and calling a policeman.  An attack by
several men did not seem to be probable on the crowded road, but a sudden and
swift attack by a single person seemed possible.

“(8)    The claim of
innocence at the trial by the accused is negatived by
the fact that he ran away after having stabbed his victims and went to throw
his knife away to another street and also by the fact that he did not surrender
to the police right away.”^[9]

Even the respondent Court of Appeals added a piece of its opinion
in withholding credence from the defense’s version of the facts by stating
that:

“Besides We are not quite con­vinced
that the defense witnesses’ story on the witness stand is a true recital of the
incident as it really happened.  x x x.”^[10]

In view of the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the defense’s
version of the facts, was discredited by both Courts a
quo, proving without doubt that there was
no un­lawful aggression on the part of the petitioner’s victims.  On the contrary, it was petitioner who was
the unlawful aggressor.  His pretension
as to the presence of the second requisite of self-defense is obviously without
basis.

The indemnity to the heirs of Federico Bayya
is increased to P30,000.00

WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to the indemnity
the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.  No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Pp. 273-274, Original Record.

^[2]
Article 11, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code.

^[3]
Pp. 21-22, Rollo, pp. 6-7,
Decision.

^[4]
Pp. 17-21, Rollo,
CA Decision, pp. 2-6.

^[5]
Ibid., p. 23, Rollo.

^[6]
People vs. Talaboc, Jr., L-25004, October 31, 1969.

^[7]
People vs. Apolinario, No. 38562, October 18, 1933.

^[8]
61 Phil. 786 (1935).

^[9]
Pp. 263-267, Original Record, Decision of the CFI.

^[10]
P. 22, Rollo, Decision of
the Court of Appeals.