A.M. No. MTJ-88-160. March 30, 1994
NELIA GARCIANO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE JOSE R. SEBASTIAN, RESPONDENT.
PER CURIAM:
JUDGE JOSE R. SEBASTIAN, Metropolitan Trial Court, Br, 78,
ParaƱaque, is charged administratively as follows: (1) in A.M. No. MTJ-88-160, for gross ignorance of the law, abuse
of authority, serious misconduct and irregularity in the performance of
official duties relative to the issuance and enforcement of the writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 7342; (2) in A.M. No. MTJ-88-244, for partiality,
oppression and abuse of discretion relative to Civil Case No. 7611; (3) in A.M.
No. MTJ-89-322, for partiality and failure to decide Crim. Case No. 68688
within the 90-day reglementary period; (4) in A.M. No. MTJ-89-344, for serious
misconduct; (5) in A.M. No. MTJ-90-416, for dishonesty, misconduct and
ignorance of the law relative to Civil Case No. 3591; (6) in A.M. No.
MTJ-92-661, for falsification of public document and direct bribery; and, (7)
in A.M. No. MTJ-Ā89-4-371, for misappropriation of public funds, dismissal of a
criminal case for pecuniary benefit without approval of the Fiscal,
falsification of public document, acting both as judge and prosecutor in a
certain case, illegal exaction, immorality and misconduct.
On 19 July 1990, the Court resolved to consolidate A.M. No.
MTJ-90-416 (Gavia v. Sebastian) with A.M. No. MTJ-88-160 (Garciano v.
Sebastian), A.M. No. MTJ-88-244 (Lopez v. Sebastian, et al.), A.M. No.
MTJ-89-322 (Vilbar v. Sebastian), A.M. No. MTJ-89-344 (Lopez v. Sebastian), and
A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371 (Administrative Complaint of MeTC Personnel, Br. 78,
ParaƱaque v. Sebastian), and to refer the cases to Executive Judge Santiago J.
Ranada, Jr., RTC, Makati, for investigation, report and recommendation
considering that A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371 was previously referred to him in the
Resolution of 14 November 1989.[1]
On 28 July 1992, the Court consolidated A.M. No. MTJ-92-661
(Office of the Court Administrator v. Sebastian), a later case, with the rest
of the administrative cases against respondent judge.[2] The
Office of the Court Administrator
through Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad in a letter dated
15 September 1992 referred the case to Judge Job B. Madayag, the new Executive
Judge, for inclusion in the investigation, report and recommendation, as the
other six (6) administrative cases had already been previously referred to then
Executive Judge Ranada.[3]
However, it appears that upon the expiration of the term of Judge
Ranada, Jr., as Executive Judge, these cases were raffled to the judges in the
RTC at Makati: Judge Josefina
Guevarra-Salonga had the records of A.M. Nos. MTJ-88-160, MTJ-88-244,
MTJ-89-322, MTJ-89-344; Judge Julio R. Logarta, the records of A.M. No.
MTJ-89-4-371; and Judge Job B. Madayag, the records of MTJ-92-661. Upon being advised of the raffle of the
consolidated cases to different RTC judges in Makati, the Office of the Court
Administrator in a Memorandum dated 16 November 1992 informed this Court of
these developments and that only Judge Logarta was able to conduct the
investigation of the case assigned to him. It then recommended that considering that these administrative cases
were consolidated, they should be assigned to only one judge for investigation,
report and recommendation.[4]
On 3 December 1992, the Court referred all the seven (7)
administrative cases to Judge Julio R. Logarta, RTC, Br. 63, Makati, for
investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt
of the records and recalled the records of A.M. Nos. MTJ-88-160, MTJ-88-244,
MTJ-89-322 and MTJ-89-344 from Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga and A.M. No.
MTJ-92-661 from Judge Job Madayag to be forwarded to Judge Julio R. Logarta.[5]
Meanwhile, Judge Logarta had terminated the investigation in A.M.
No. MTJ-89-4-371 and submitted his report dated 22 February 1993 finding
respondent judge culpable of charges Nos. 1, 3, 6, and 7, thus –
FINDINGS
ON:
CHARGE NO. 1 – Misappropriation of Public Funds (sic) Alias Writ
of Execution dated November 11, 1987 for Forfeiture of bonds in more than ten
(10) criminal cases. Complainants
cite the affidavit executed by the clerk of court of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of ParaƱaque, Jose Ison (Annexes “I” and “I-1” of
Reply of complainants) to the effect that out of the P12,000.00 paid by Interworld
Assurance Corporation for the confiscation of bonds in ten (10) criminal cases,
Judge Sebastian, thru Remedios de Leon, paid only P6,000.00 to the Judiciary
Development Fund, and that after the payment, the balance of P6,000.00 was not
paid by Judge Sebastian or Remedios de Leon. This was also testified to by Jose Ison in open Court (t.s.n. pp. 11-18,
Oct. 21, 1992), affirming his affidavit of August 17, 1989, (Annex
“I”). Respondent judge in his
Rejoinder dated October 31, 1989, attempted to refute such charge by presenting
the affidavits (Exhs. “23” and “24”) of officers of the
payor of P12,000.00 check, Interworld Assurance Corporation, which affidavits
state that they actually paid only P6,000.00 out of the P12,000.00 liability
they had incurred while Interworld’s motion for reduction of bail bond was
still pending resolution before the sala of respondent judge. The Court notes that no verification can be
made as to the truth of said affidavits (Exhs. “23” and
“24”) that they (officers of Interworld) only paid P6,000.00, and not
their entire liability of P12,000.00 since the records, vouchers and motions
for bonds of Interworld ‘solicited before Courts’ were nowhere to be found per
certification (Exh. “22”) of Mercedita Jaca of Interworld. It cannot be shown beyond doubt that indeed
Interworld paid only P6,000.00, as the records of Interworld are no longer
available. Thus, the testimony of Jose
Ison vis-a-vis the said affidavits of the officers of Interworld is more
credible.
x x x
CHARGE NO. 3 – Falsification of Public Documents. Falsification of public document referred to
in this charge is the act of respondent judge in making it appear that the
trial fiscal participated in the dismissal of criminal cases numbers 65628-30
when the minutes for hearing of November 10, 1988 shows that no party appeared
in the hearing (Annex “G” of complainant). The trial fiscal Rodolfo Tuazon, on February 28, 1989, filed a
manifestation (Annex “I” of the complaint) saying that he was not
‘aware and have not participated nor have any knowledge that the case was
dismissed’ citing the minutes of November 10, 1988.
In his Answer, respondent judge contended that ‘it was a judgment
call on his part since he already called for the fiscal but the latter did not
come.’ This investigating judge believes that notwithstanding these allegations
of respondent judge, it cannot be denied that there was misrepresentation on
his part in stating in his Order of November 10, 1988, that there was no
objection on the part of the trial fiscal, when in truth and in fact, as
manifested by said fiscal, he was not aware nor did not participate in such
proceeding.
x x x
CHARGE NOS. 6 and
7: (These charges are discussed
simultaneously as they concern the same subject – common fund.)
No. 6 – He collected the amount of
P200.00 up to P1,500.00 for civil marriages he conducted and pocketed the said
money for himself.
No. 7. – He used
his office employees to collect from litigants certain amounts which he calls
Common Fund but after the litigant had paid and is (sic) gone, he solely appropriated for himself the said money.
Respondent judge in his answer denied charge No. 6 and presented the affidavit of
one Miss Ligaya P. Orogo, (Exh. “10”) attesting to the fact that
respondent judge did not exact or charge any fee for solemnizing
marriages. However, the testimony of
respondent’s witness, Paz Zialcita, belies this, to wit:
Q Is it not a fact Miss Witness that
whenever Judge Sebastian conducted marriages in Court, at times he collects
fees from the parties?
A No, sir. The money to be paid is
given voluntarily.
Q You said, he collects?
A Actually he does not collect, because for
instance, a couple is getting married in our branch, now when they asked us how
much is the pay, we tell them voluntarily, you just give whatever amount you
want to give.
Q To whom is the amount given, Miss
Witness?
A To one of the staff, sir.
Q Who?
A It’s either Charito or Imelda. (tsn, dated Feb. 12, 199[2], p. 5)
Anent Charge No. 7, for collecting monies from litigants to be
placed in a common fund, the testimony of respondent’s witness, Paz Zialcita,
is relevant, to wit:
Q And what happened to the money given
as fees?
A The
respondent judge put it in our common funds.
Q And what happened to your common
fund?
A The
common funds was [sic] divided into [sic] employees who are low salaried
employees. (tsn, dated Feb. 12, 199[2],
p. 5)
Another is the affidavit (Exh. “11”) executed by Paz
Zialcita, Josephine Junsay, Remedios de Leon, and Eulalia Meris attesting that there
indeed is a common fund which they collect, including respondent judge and
divided among the low salaried employees. Also, in the same Exh. “11” it was stated, ‘that the common
fund was thought of by Judge Sebastian; that it was at the instance and request
of Judge Sebastian.’ Moreover, in Exh. “3,” the affidavit executed by
spouses Apolinario and Milagros Sebastian, pars. 12 and 13 thereof, states as
follows:
12. That as a
gesture of appreciation for his assistance in going to the bank, we gave Mr. Jose
Co the amount of P200.00 and offered Judge Sebastian the amount of P500.00
which he firmly declined;
13. That we were
very insistent in giving this amount of P500.00. Judge Sebastian called in an
employee whose name we heard as Lalaine and instructed her to receive the
amount and allot P200.00 for the common fund and P300.00 for the replenishment
of kitchen supplies;
Considering that these affidavits (Exh,
“3” and Exh. “11”, Vol. I, pp. 95 and 105, respectively)
were marked as exhibits by respondent judge in his Answer (Vol. I – Record, p.
72, par. No. 13) in order to support his denial of the charge, his adoption of
said affidavits as part of his Answer is in effect an admission of the charges
Nos. 6 and 7, re: existence of a common
fund.[6]
However, the investigating judge withheld his recommendation on
the penalty “as more cases against the same respondent judge are assigned
to (him) for investigation,”
On 15 October 1992, we issued a resolution suspending respondent
judge from the service, thus –
x x x x It appearing that Judge Jose
Sebastian has been administratively charged in Administrative Matter No. MeTC
89-4-371 and criminally charged for falsification of public documents in
Criminal Case No. 17271 and direct, bribery in Criminal Case No. 17272 before
the First Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Court Resolved, in the interest of
justice and a fair and expeditious disposition of said cases, to SUSPEND Judge
Jose Sebastian from the service, effective immediately, until the final outcome
of the administrative and criminal cases pending against him.[7]
In the resolution of 4 May 1993, the Court directed Judge Logarta
to submit his report and recommendation on these administrative cases within
one (1) month in view of the length of time they have been pending resolution.[8]
On 16 June 1993, the investigating judge submitted his report –
This is in compliance with the Resolution of the Honorable Supreme
Court En Banc dated May 4, 1993 directing this investigating judge to
submit his report and recommendation within one (1) month from receipt of said
Resolution on the following cases:
1. A.M. No. MTJ-88-160
Nelia Garciano
vs. Judge Jose R.
Sebastian, MTC, Br.
78, ParaƱaque, M.M.;
2. A.M. No. MTJ-88-244
Alejo Lopez vs.
Judge Jose R. Sebastian, et al.;
3. A.M. No. MTJ-89-322
Efigenio Vilbar,
et al. vs. Judge Jose R. Sebastian;
4. A.M. No. MTJ-90-416
Numeriano Gavia vs.
Judge Jose R. Sebastian;
5. A.M. No. MTJ-92-661
Office of the Court
Administrator vs.
Judge Jose R.
Sebastian, MTC, Br. 78,
ParaƱaque, M.M.;
and,
6. A.M. No. MTJ-89-344
Alejo Lopez vs. Judge
Jose R. Sebastian.
Cases Nos. 1-6 above were dismissed on May 3, 1993 on motion of
respondent for failure of complainants and their counsels (sic) to appear on
two (2) scheduled hearings despite proper notices.
With respect to the remaining case A.M. No. MTJĀ-89-4-371, it will
be recalled that on March 21, 1993, this investigating judge submitted an
investigation report on the case thru the Office of the Court Administrator,
copy of which is hereto attached for ready reference.
In that case (No. 89-4-371), the charges against respondent judge
are the following: (1) Misappropriation
of Public Funds; (2) Dismissing Criminal Case without the participation of the
Trial Fiscal whether with or without his objection; (3) Falsification of Public
Document; (4) He was the Judge and Prosecutor in the issuance of Search
Warrants 014 to 019 and 21, commonly issued on February 7, 1989; (5) He used to
collect a kickback or percentage from Zeny, a supplier, for office supplies used by the office of the
Municipal Judge; (6) He collected the amount of P200.00 up to P1,500.00 for
civil marriages he conducted and pocketed the said money for himself; (7) He
used his office employees to collect from litigants certain amounts which he
calls Common Funds but after the litigant had paid and is (sic) gone, he solely
appropriated for himself the said money; (8) He deducted a certain amount
including the salaries from Saturday, Sunday and Holidays of his various drivers
whose salaries were being paid by the Municipal Government of ParaƱaque and
keeps the deducted amount for himself; (9) He has collected or taken with him
cash or goods from the following cases: a) Lorenzo Ona vs. Roberto Holt; b) Mario Tinitigan vs. Atty. Valdez; c)
BPI cases; d) Delgado vs. Corpuz; (10) He is courting one lady employee of the
ParaƱaque Municipal Court and out of fear, the lady got married; (11) x x x on
several occasions, Judge Jose R. Sebastian brought women defendants after
settling their cases to the Laguna Bay Lodge to have sex with him.
Of the above eleven charges, the
undersigned found the respondent judge to be culpable of charges numbers 1, 3,
6, and 7, namely: (1) Misappropriation
of Public Funds; (3) Falsification of Public Document; (6) He collected the
amount of P200.00 up to P1,500.00 for civil marriages he conducted and pocketed
the said money for himself; and, (7) He used his office employees to collect
from litigants certain amounts which he calls Common Funds but after the
litigant had paid and is (sic) gone, he solely appropriated for himself the
said money.[9]
After dismissing the six (6) administrative cases against
respondent judge for failure of complainants and their counsel to appear on two
(2) scheduled hearings despite due notice, and on the basis of his findings in
A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371, the investigating judge recommended that respondent
judge be suspended without pay for a period of six (6) months.[10]
We are not in complete agreement with the recommendations of the
investigating judge.
First. The
investigating judge has no authority to dismiss the six (6) administrative
cases filed against respondent judge for failure of the complainants and their
counsel to appear on two (2) scheduled hearings despite due notice. It is this Court alone that can dismiss the
administrative charges against respondent judge. The only authority of the investigating judge is to recommend
such appropriate action as may be proper on the basis of his findings.
Second. The
investigating judge also erred in dismissing A.M. No. MTJ-92-661, “Office
of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Jose R. Sebastian.” If the
investigating judge had taken a hard look at the records of this case, he would
have discovered that all the charges in A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371 were also the
subject of a complaint filed with the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-0-9-0974. On 8 February 1990, the Ombudsman issued a
resolution[11]
holding that a prima facie case for falsification of public document
existed in charge No. 3, and for direct bribery involving an act not included
in the complaint in A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371.
The direct bribery case stemmed from an accusation that
respondent Judge had asked P500.00 from parolee Leandro O. San Diego before the
former would sign the latter’s parole report. Later, the corresponding informations for falsification of public
document and for direct bribery were filed with the Sandiganbayan, docketed as
Crim. Cases Nos. 17271 and 17272, respectively.[12] In a
decision dated 16 December 1992,[13] the
Sandiganbayan acquitted respondent judge of the falsification charge in Crim.
Case No. 17271. Anent the direct
bribery charge in Crim. Case No. 17272, the same was provisionally dismissed on
14 October 1992 for failure of the prosecution to present its witnesses,[14]
Leandro O. San Diego and Jose L. Co. Under the circumstances, the investigating judge should have gone deeper
into the facts and compelled the attendance of witnesses considering the
observation of the Sandiganbayan that –
To the mind of this Court, accused’s liability here, if at all,
lies more within the threshold of a proper administrative proceeding where the
question of whether he should be subjected to any disciplinary action for such
a careless actuation or patent indiscretion as shown herein may be determined x
x x x[15]
Let it be emphasized that an investigating judge is not a mere
hearing officer. From the nature of his office, he is
tasked to look beyond the allegations of the parties and determine whether
respondent judge has in fact committed administrative infractions that would
adversely affect the administration of justice and the image of the judiciary
as a whole.
Furthermore, we observe that the investigation report of 22
February 1993, which contains the findings of the investigating judge in A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371, fails
to refute respondent judge’s
argument that the complaint is insufficient
in form and substance because the seven (7) original complainants
disowned any knowledge that the document they signed was a complaint against
respondent, as evidenced by their joint affidavit
of April 18, 1989.[16] It is noteworthy that at the hearing, Ronald
Javier, one of the complainants who signed the letter dated 19 April 1989
addressed to then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan,[17] repudiated the statements therein contained
thus –
Atty. Villamor:
This was previously
marked as Exhibit 1 during the preliminary conference.
Q Will you please go over this letter
and tell us if the contents of this letter are true?
A It
is not true, sir.
Q What
is it that it is not true in this letter?
A That
we never charged him and there is no reason for us to do so since he is a very
good judge.
Q What
is not true about this?
A I
only saw this letter now.
Q Why
is it that you still appear on page 2 of this letter?
A I
was not able to read the letter.
Q Even
if you did not read you still signed?
x x x x
A I
was just told to sign the letter.
x x x x
Q Who
told you to sign?
A Judge
Sebastian.
Q There
is here a joint affidavit which you were confronted a while ago marked as
Exhibit 2 of the respondent Judge, will you please go over this affidavit and
tell us if the contents are true?
A I
just saw this affidavit but I have not read the contents. I was just told to sign it.
Q Who told you to sign this affidavit?
A Judge
Sebastian.
Q When did Judge Sebastian ask you to
sign this affidavit and letter?
A Around
April 1989.
Q Was
this before or after the signing of the complaint?
A After.
Q Mr. Witness, do you recall having
executed a joint affidavit with a certain Godofredo de Villa which you have
attached in your reply to the answer of the respondent Judge? In that joint affidavit you complained that
you were forced by Judge Sebastian to do so?
A Yes,
sir.
Q
There is a signature appearing
above the typewritten name Ronald Javier whose signature is that?
A This
is my signature.
Q When did you execute this affidavit,
Mr. Witness?
Judge
Sebastian.
Already
answered.
Atty. Villamor:
Q Why did you execute this affidavit,
Mr. Witness?
A Because
we have a complaint against Judge Sebastian.
Q This affidavit says that: ‘Every now and then you were made to sign
documents by Judge Jose Sebastian the contents of which we were not allowed to
read because if we show hesitation or eagerness to read the contents of the
document he will raise his voice that if we will not sign the document ā¦.ā This
affidavit speaks of documents, the documents that you are referring to in this
affidavit are they the documents shown to you a while ago?
A Yes,
sir.
x x x x
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION
BY JUDGE SEBASTIAN:
Judge Sebastian:
Q Do
you know who prepared and typed the documents marked as Exhibits 1 and 2?
A No,
sir.
Q You
came to know that Mrs. Paz Zialcita and Mrs. Remedios de Leon were the ones who
prepared and showed it to all of you?
A You
were the one who showed it to me.[18]
As adverted to above, complainant Godofredo de Villa who
reiterated his complaint against respondent judge in the same joint affidavit
dated 3 May 1989 also deplored the harassment and pressure employed by
respondent.[19]
Another complainant, Ma. Rosario Manalo, Staff II, same court, testified to the
veracity of her complaint against respondent.[20]
The joint affidavit dated 18 April 1989 executed by the seven (7)
original complainants becomes even more dubious in the light of the Memorandum
for then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan dated 3 May 1989 submitted by the late
Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro reporting on the pressure exerted by
respondent judge upon complainants to desist from pursuing their complaint –
Included in the Agenda – Report dated April 19, 1989, is the
request of the complainants – employees for the preventive suspension of the
respondent Judge. The former are
allegedly subjected to pressure and harassment by the latter, creating an
intimidating atmosphere of tension and anxiety in the office. The desperate
complainants-employees have repeatedly reiterated their request to the
undersigned for the preventive suspension of respondent Judge Jose R.
Sebastian; as shown in the following instances.
1. April 21, 1989 – Complainant Jose Co,
Court Aide (local hire) personally came to inform the undersigned that he did
not sign any affidavit of desistance.
2. April 25, 1989 – Jose Co – Court Aide
(local hire), Clarence Ramirez – Staff II, Ronald Javier – Court Aide, Imelda
Lorenzo – Casual (local hire). The
aforementioned personnel of respondent Judge Sebastian, together with other
court personnel from ParaƱaque, personally came to inform the undersigned of
the harassment and pressure exerted on them by the respondent to execute their
affidavits of desistance regarding the case they filed in the Supreme Court.
3. April 27, 1989 – Paz Zialcita –
Branch Clerk of Court, Remedios A. de Leon – Interpreter. The aforementioned personnel of respondent
Judge Sebastian personally came to inform the undersigned that they are being
pressured by the respondent Judge not to join those employees who are filing a
complaint against him. They were not
able to meet with the undersigned as he left for Cotabato to attend a
conference.
4. April 28, 1989 – Telephone call from
Judge Roberto Makalintal, MeTC, Branch 77, ParaƱaque, informing that the
complainants-employees are seeking his assistance as they are being subjected
by the respondent Judge Sebastian to pressure and harassment.
5. May 3, 1989
– Rosalinda Arnuelo, Stenographer, MeTC, Branch 77, ParaƱaque, and President of
the Court Personnel Association, called to inform that respondent Judge
terminated the services of complainant Jose Co and blames complainant Court
Aide Ronald Javier for the alleged loss of certain records which, ironically,
are the records of the cases which are the subject matter of the complaint
against the respondent Judge.
6. May 3, 1989 – Jose Co – Court Aide (local
hire), Ronald Javier – Court Aide. The aforementioned personnel of the
respondent Judge personally came to confirm that, as earlier informed by Ms.
Arnuelo, the respondent Judge terminated the services of Mr. Co and blames Mr.
Javier for the loss of certain records in his sala. Mr. Javier likewise filed an affidavit-complaint dated May 3,
1989 against respondent Judge Jose R. Sebastian which this Office will report
to the Court by way of Agenda.[21]
The moral ascendancy of respondent judge over his staff cannot be
gainsaid. The reply dated 19 August
1989[22]
filed by complainants Co and Javier to the answer of respondent judge proves
this point. According to them, the
employees of the MeTC drafted their complaint in secret. However, respondent
judge discovered their secret before the complaint could be notarized. To ensure the filing of the complaint which
could not be notarized, there being no lawyer who dared to do so, Co gave the
same to Ms. Rosalinda Arnuello, President of the Muntinlupa-Las PiƱas-ParaƱaque
Court Employees Association. The
initial testimony of complainant Paz Zialcita, Branch Clerk of Court, MeTC, Br.
78, who turned hostile witness for complainants, unwittingly gave credence to
their allegations –
Atty. Villamor:
Q Do
you know a certain Erlinda?
PAZ ZIALCITA:
A Yes,
sir.
Q Who
is she?
A Court
Stenographer, sir.
Q Is it not a fact that x x x prior
to the filing of this criminal complaint, there was an incident that involved
the responding Judge and this Erlinda?
A Yes,
sir.
Q What
was that?
A No
answer.
Q And
what was the root cause of that incident?
A It
was about a verbal order by Judge Sebastian.
Q What
was the verbal order?
A Regarding
a piece of paper which Judge Sebastian would like to get.
Q What
was that piece of paper . . . is it not a fact that that piece of paper is the
complaint Ms. Witness?
Your Honor, may I make
it of record that the Judge is restrain to (sic) the witness, Your Honor.
JUDGE SEBASTIAN:
Your Honor, that is not
true.
COURT:
Continue.
ATTY. VILLAMOR:
You said that it was
about to recover that piece of paper in the possession of Erlinda Armuello?
A Yes,
sir.
Q The very complaint?
A I
have no idea, sir.
Q And you were just instructed by
Judge Sebastian to get that piece of paper?
A Yes,
sir, no more knowledge.
Q And this incident happened before
the filing of the complaint . . . before you heard this on channel 7?
A Yes,
sir.
Q As a matter of fact it happened
after . . . by the way how many days before?
A I
can no longer recall.
Q So, but after the incident you
recall when?
A Yes,
sir but I don’t know the exact date.
Q
So independently what you heard
in channel 7 you already knew that a complaint was filed against Judge
Sebastian?
A It
was thru channel 7 when I came to know about that.
Q So,
you are withdrawing your answer that you knew that this complaint was filed
after you heard this on channel 7?
JUDGE SEBASTIAN:
Objection, Your Honor,
there was no such statement, it’s only a piece of paper.
COURT:
Let’s see.
ATTY. VILLAMOR:
Q You
testified that after . . . by the way when did you come to know this complaint?
A I
came to know this complaint when I heard it on channel 7.
JUDGE SEBASTIAN:
It’s about a piece of
paper, Your Honor please.
COURT:
Continue.
ATTY. VILLAMOR:
Q Did you know of this case before
it was televised, that is the question? . . . and she has stated that
(s)he has knowledge before it was heard
on the television?
A Yes, sir because of what transpired.
COURT:
She knows about it even
before.
ATTY. VILLAMOR:
So that incident that transpired
between Judge Sebastian and Erlinda Armuello has got something to do with the
filing of the complaint?
A I
don’t know, sir.
Q But
you came to know that a case was filed because of that incident?
JUDGE SEBASTIAN:
She came to know that a
complaint was filed thru channel 7 . . .
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A Come
again . . .
ATTY.
VILLAMOR:
Q
In other words Ms. Witness, that the
incident transpired between Judge Sebastian and Erlinda Armuello has got
something to do with this case, is it not?
A Okay sir, it goes like this . . . when
I was instructed by Judge Sebastian to get that piece of paper from Erlinda
Armuello and Erlinda Armuello hesitated
to give me that paper and that incident
resulted to a heated argument between Judge Sebastian and Erlinda Armuello.[23]
Likewise, the testimony of Clerk of Court Jose C. Ison
graphically illustrates the moral influence of respondent judge –
ATTY. VILLAMOR:
(To witness, JOSE C.
ISON)
Q Mr.
Witness, can you testify when you were asked whether or not you issued a
receipt to Judge Sebastian and you testified that you did not make any receipt
for it? My question now is: Why did you not make a receipt in the
delivery of those checks?
ATTY. MATIC:
That is improper for
redirect, Your Honor.
COURT:
Answer.
WITNESS:
A As
a judge, Your Honor, and as we are his subordinates, I think it would be
unethical for me to ask a receipt being his subordinate.[24]
These attendant circumstances prompt us to reject the plea of respondent
judge that the complaint in A.M. MTJ-89-4-371 be considered as insubstantial
because of the joint affidavit of some of the complainants dated 19 April
1993. We have always stressed that
administrative actions are not made to depend upon the will of every
complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act,
otherwise the supervisory power of this Court to discipline erring members of
the judiciary will be put to naught.[25]
Respondent judge lays too much emphasis on the inability of
complainant Jose L. Co to attest to the truthfulness of his complaint. Apparently, respondent judge forgets that at the hearings, Co’s
fellow complainants, Ronald Javier and Ma. Rosario Manalo, and Godofredo de
Villa, in a joint affidavit of 3 May 1993, have affirmed the veracity of their
complaint and their having voluntarily signed it.
Considering the need for a more thorough and in-depth examination
of these administrative cases, we initially contemplated remanding the records
to the investigating judge for further evaluation. Time constraints however prompted us to refer the reĀevaluation
of these cases to the Office of the Court Administrator instead.[26]
In a well-written and exhaustive memorandum of 8 December 1993,
the Office of the Court Administrator submitted its findings holding respondent
judge guilty of malversation, maintaining a common fund and falsification of
public document. Such findings being in
accord with law and the evidence need no further amplification, Thus –
E
V A L U A T I O N
What remains to be examined are the charges relating to
malversation (A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371), falsification of public document (A.M.
No. MTJ-92-661 and A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371), and of maintaining a common fund
(A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371). The records of
the case had to be meticulously examined to ascertain the culpability of
respondent judge.
The charge of malversation
(A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371)
This charge of malversation relates to four (4) Banco de Oro checks
of P3,000.00 each for a total of P12,000.00 delivered by Interworld Assurance
Corporation as satisfaction for the judgment against the bond liabilities in
eleven (11) criminal cases. The inquest
judge rejected the claim of respondent judge that initially, the insurance
company delivered four (4) checks in the amount of P3,000.00 each; these checks
were deposited in the personal savings account of respondent judge at
BPI-Family Bank because this was found to be a convenient way of encashment of
the checks, as allegedly, the Supreme Court office did not want to accept the
checks as they are payable to the MeTC of ParaƱaque; that all the checks were
dishonored and eventually, only the sum of P6,000.00 was paid by the insurance
company.
Respondent judge thus deny the charge of Clerk of Court Jose Ison
that he pocketed P6,000.00. The inquest
judge rejected this posture because ‘the records, vouchers and motions of
Interworld were nowhere to be found.’ The inquest judge found that there was no
sufficient evidence that Interworld only paid P6,000.00.
When this charge was first ventilated, the respondent judge
vehemently denied having received any checks from the Clerk of Court. Thus, in his Answer dated June 9, 1989, (p.
61 of Rollo, Adm. Case No, 89-Ā4-371 MeTC), respondent judge, under oath, swore
that he never had in his custody in any manner any money and fund that does not
belong to him.
In a Rejoinder to
Reply dated October 31, 1989 (p. 258, Rollo), respondent judge, under oath
again categorically and absolutely denied the statement that Ison handed to
respondent any postdated check. However, the Ombudsman discovered that these four (4) checks were
actually deposited with the personal account of the respondent judge. This deposit was concealed by the respondent
judge in his sworn answer to the charge.
Respondent judge has not explained even when he testified before
the inquest judge why he concealed the fact of the deposit of these checks with
his account. If two (2) of the checks
totalling P6,000.00 were dishonored and Interworld did not replenish the checks,
it has not been explained by respondent judge why no alias writ of execution
was issued against Interworld and why he allowed to pass the final return of the sheriff, and even alleged in his
answer that the matter of the four (4) checks “had been finally disposed.
The dishonor of the two checks issued by Interworld explains the
fact that respondent judge was able to turn over only the amount of P6,000.00
to the Judiciary Development Fund.
We are, however, gravely concerned over the fact that the respondent
judge lied to the investigator regarding his receipt of the Interworld checks
and the deposit of these checks in his bank accounts. His Rejoinder dated October 31, 1989 whereby he presented the
affidavits of Interworld officers stating that only P6,000.00 was actually paid
out of the P12,000.00 liability betrays a deliberate effort to mislead the
investigator and conceal the true circumstances surrounding the issuance of the
checks. The respondent judge not only
lied. He employed others to distort the
truth. There was a clear violation of the oath that he
took as a lawyer to ‘do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court.’
Moreover, while respondent judge may not be criminally liable, he
violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, that ‘[a] judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.’ If the checks
in question were not issued in the name of the Supreme Court, then they should
have been returned to Interworld with instructions that new checks be made
payable to the Supreme Court. Respondent judge should not have taken it upon himself to cause the
encashment of said checks. While he may
not have benefitted in this particular instance, his action casts doubts as to
the integrity of his judicial actions.
The charge of falsification
of public document (A.M. No. MTJ-92-661 and A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371)
As to the charge of falsification of public document, it appears
that respondent judge did not intentionally falsify the Order of November 10, 198(8),
particularly, the portion thereof that states that the trial fiscal had voiced
no objection in the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 65628-30. As found
by the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 17271,
respondent judge had ordered his branch clerk of court, Mrs. Paz Zialcita, to
prepare a dismissal order in said cases, using the prepared form of such an
order. That respondent judge signed the
Order of November 10, 1988, without checking the work done by his branch clerk
of court, does not make him liable for falsification in the absence of malice
or evil motive on his part.
At any rate, the Sandiganbayan noted that when the error was
brought to the attention of the respondent judge in a motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecution, he immediately reinstated the case.
This Court is in full accord with the conclusion of the
Sandiganbayan that the respondent judge did not maliciously intend to cause the
dismissal of Crim. Case Nos. 65628-30. We also quote with approval the Sandiganbayan’s observation regarding
respondent judge’s actuations in this case:
This lapse or indiscretion committed here by accused presiding
judge is, of course, uncalled for and unbecoming of, one whose position as a
magistrate of the law requires that he should always act with due care and
circumspection in the discharge of his duties. In his hands lies the fate of litigants and parties whose liberty and
properties are placed at stake before him. x x x
To the mind of the Court, accused’s liability here, if at all, lies
more within the threshold of a proper administrative proceeding(s) where the
question of whether he should be subjected to any disciplinary action for such
a careless actuation or patent indiscretion as shown herein may be determined. x x x (Decision in Crim. Case No. 17271, p.
13)
Respondent judge’s failure to exert due diligence in handling Crim.
Cases Nos. 65628-30 similarly constitutes a violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, particularly the judge’s duty to ‘diligently discharge his
administrative responsibilities’ (Rule 3.08, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct)
and ‘maintain professional competence in court management’ (Id.).
The charge of maintaining a
common fund (A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371)
We also find respondent judge administratively liable as regards the
charge that he has ordered his staff to collect money from litigants to be
placed in a so-called common fund.
There is no doubt that such a common fund exists. The staff of Branch 78, MTC, ParaƱaque,
attested to this fact in both their joint affidavit and their testimonies
before the investigating judge. They
claim that respondent judge had thought of the common fund to help the
low-salaried employees of the court. The money that goes into the common fund comes from the ‘extra fees’
received by the sheriff and process servers, as well as the fees received by
the court stenographers. The respondent
judge also contributes to the common fund. At times, litigants and those married before respondent judge donate to
the common fund.
The keeping of a fund, financed directly by litigants and other
persons dealing with the Court and by ‘extra fees’ collected by the sheriffs
and process servers, such fund being at the disposal of the judge for the
private and personal benefit of the employees of his court, is, to say the
least, condemnable. The respondent
judge did not only condone unlawful solicitation; he organized it as a part of
the day’s work and as a ready source of income. He thus defiled his noble office, indeed his entire Court, by
infecting it with desire for private gain and profit. More tragic than that, Judiciary as a whole, before the people in
respondent’s town, was placed in disrepute. As observed in Junio vs. Judge Rivera, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-91-565, August
30, 1993, a municipal judge is the most visible living representation of the
country’s legal and judicial system. He is the judicial officer who on a
day-to-day basis deals with the disputes arising among simple, rural people who
comprise the great bulk of our population. He is the judicial officer who comes into closest and most frequent
contact with our people. The judiciary
as a whole and its ability to dispense justice are inevitably measured in terms
of the public and private acts of judges in the ‘grass roots’ level.
We have previously dealt with acceptance by judges of benefits from
litigants. In ‘In Re: Solicitation of Donations By Judge Benjamin
H. Virrey, MTC, Polillo, Quezon,’ Adm. Matter No. 90-7-1159-MTCC, October 15,
1991, we ordered the dismissal from the service of the respondent judge for
having received a P3,000.00 ‘donation’ for a ‘Judiciary Welfare Fund’ from an
accused in an illegal fishing case. We
found the respondent judge guilty of unlawful solicitation under provisions of
Section 7(d) of R.A. 6714, which provides:
(d). Solicitation or
acceptance of gifts. – Public Officials
and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift,
gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person
in the cause of their official duties or in connection with any operation being
regulated by or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their
office.
We found the act violative of Canons 1 and
2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct inspite of the justification, similar to that
made in Lecaroz vs. Garcia (107 SCRA 557), that the amount will be used to
refurnish respondent’s office. In
Lecaroz, we ruled that solicitation of donations for office equipment and
furniture from private persons is violative of the proper norm of judicial
behavior. And, in the consolidated
decision in five administrative cases against Judge Luis D. Dictado, A.M. No.
RTJ-86-50, A.M. No. RTJ-88-222, A.M. No. RTJ-88-224, A.M. No. RTJ-89-320, A.M. No.
RTJ-89-389, June 28, 1993, we considered as grave misconduct the acceptance by
the Judge of the benefits of free bus rides from a litigant. We have repeatedly stated the reasons why
the Judge must be above suspicion and beyond reproach. As we said in Ubarra vs. Judge Mapalad, A.M.
No. MTJ-Ā91-622, March 22, 1993:
The Judiciary performs a very delicate function and a very sacred
duty – that of administering justice. The Judicial Office demands that the incumbent should conduct himself in
such a manner as to merit the respect, reverence and confidence of the people
because a Judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly,
of justice. For him, the people draw
their will and awareness to obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests. In a larger sense, the Judge must be at the
forefront of all efforts to preserve and enhance the public trust character of
a public office. Anyone who cannot do
so should not be allowed to stay a minute longer in any judicial seat.
The herein respondent judge did not just
engage in a solitary instance of solicitation. He instituted a system of contribution by what he considered as his
public, the very people who seek justice in his court, of money for the use, as
unabashedly admitted, of the employees of the court. His act constituted an utter disregard of the public trust
character of a public office.
We find respondent GUILTY:
1. In A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371 (on malversation)
of gross violation of his lawyer’s oath and violation of Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct that [a] Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities;
2. In A.M. No. MTJ-92-661 and A.M. No.
MTJ-89-4-371 of violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct regarding
the duty of a judge to ‘diligently discharge his administrative
responsibilities’ and to ‘maintain professional competence in court
management;’
3. In A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371 (maintaining a
common fund) of gross misconduct and of violation of Section 7(d) of R.A. 6714
and of Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[27]
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that appropriate
disciplinary sanctions be imposed upon respondent judge as warranted by his
misconduct. Significantly, it observes
that violations of Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct are serious
offenses punishable by dismissal from the service; and that the infractions of
respondent taken together render him unfit to discharge the duties and
functions of a judge. The Office of the
Court Administrator also recommends that the charges in all the other
administrative cases be dismissed for want of evidence.
We agree in toto
with the findings and recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator.
Additionally, there is one equally disturbing incident of
misconduct committed by respondent judge in A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-31. In charge No. 2, he was accused of deriving
pecuniary benefit from his dismissal of Crim. Case No. 71396 without approval
of the Fiscal.[28]
In that case, complainant received a check in the amount of
P35,000.00 as settlement of the civil liability of accused. Upon request of complainant’s daughter,
respondent judge readily deposited this check in his personal account. After having received the cash, the spouses
contributed P500.00, P200.00 for the common fund and P300.00 for the
replenishment of kitchen supplies in respondent’s court. While there is no evidence to support the
charge against him, we however note that respondent judge finds nothing
unethical in his action.[29] He
justified his behavior by claiming that complainants were barrio folks who
urgently needed cash but could not deposit or encash the check because they did
not have any bank account.
We are not persuaded. In
a joint affidavit dated 13 April 1989, complainant Apolinario Sebastian and his
wife, Milagros Sebastian, corroborated the statement of respondent judge that
they were in immediate need of cash. But, they did not confirm his allegation that they did not have any bank
account.[30]
Be that as it may, compassion is undisputably a commendable trait. Yet, this sentiment should not be made to
prevail at the expense of the integrity of the court. The Ombudsman correctly states that by reason of his duties and
functions, respondent judge is supposed to possess utmost prudence and/or
delicadeza in dealing with parties-litigants. He should have declined or refused the request of Mrs. Milagros
Sebastian to avoid suspicion that he had some pecuniary interest in the case.[31]
Granting that complainant did not have a bank account, respondent judge could
have required the insurer of the vehicle who issued the check to pay
complainant in cash or he could have advised them to open an account using the
check as initial deposit. The affidavit
of complainants reveals that they did not get the money immediately but had to
go back to respondent judge after several days to get the cash.
While every office in the government service is a public trust,
no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of
an individual than a seat in the judiciary.[32]
Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide with the law, the Code of Judicial
Conduct and with existing administrative policies in order to maintain the
faith of our people in the administration of justice.
Respondent judge miserably failed to measure up to stringent
judicial standards. His lack of candor,
gross misconduct and careless discharge of his administrative duties, and
worse, leading his subordinates to graft and corruption through unauthorized
solicitations from litigants and private parties, constitute a serious
liability to the administration of justice. As rightly perceived by the Office of the Court Administrator, his
transgressions when considered together are grave and cannot be countenanced.
In Sulu Islamic Association of Masjid Lambayong v. Malik[33]
and in In re Solicitation of Donations
by Judge Benjamin H. Virrey,[34] we
held that violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct are serious offenses which
call for dismissal from the service. Hence, we find no reason to depart from this ruling. Respondent judge’s breach of the provisions
of the Code clearly manifests his unfitness to remain any minute longer in
office.
WHEREFORE, for (1) his gross violation of the lawyer’s
oath and of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371;
(2) his violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in A.M. Nos.
MTJ-92-661 and MTJ-89-4-371; and, (3) his gross misconduct and violation of
Sec. 7, par. (d), of R.A. 6714 and of Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct in A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371, respondent JUDGE JOSE R. SEBASTIAN,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Br. 78, ParaƱaque, is DISMISSED from the service with
prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public office including
government-owned or controlled corporations, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and privileges.
Conformably with our ruling in Office of the Court Administrator v. Gines, A.M. No. RTJ-92-802, 5 July 1993,
respondent JUDGE SEBASTIAN is ordered to VACATE IMMEDIATELY his position as
such Presiding Judge of Branch 78 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of ParaƱaque
as well as any other position in the judiciary to which he may be presently
assigned, and to CEASE and DESIST from performing any further official
function.
Except for the administrative cases where we find respondent
judge guilty, all the rest of the charges are DISMISSED for want or
insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, A.M. No. MTJ-90-416, p. 7.
[2]
Rollo, A.M. No. MTJ-97-661, p. 47.
[3]
Id., p. 60.
[4]
Rollo, A.M. No. MTJ-88-160, p. 92.
[5]
Id., p. 101.
[6]
Rollo, A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371, Vol. II, p. 712.
[7]
Rollo, A.M. No. MTJ-92-661, p. 61.
[8]
Rollo, A.M. No. MTJ-88-160, p. 127.
[9]
Rollo, A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371, Vol. II, p. 720.
[10]
Id., p. 723.
[11]
Exh. “28,” Id., p. 589.
[12]
Rollo, A.M. No. MTJ-92-661, pp. 8-12.
[13]
Rollo, A.M. No. MTJ-88-160, p. 104.
[14]
Id., p. 71.
[15]
Rollo, A.M. No. MTJ-88-160, p. 115.
[16]
Exh. “2,” p. 94.
[17]
Exh. “1,” p. 92.
[18]
TSN, 9 May 1990, A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371, Vol. II, pp. 507Ā-510.
[19]
Rollo, A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371, Vol. I, p. 29; Affiant is now abroad, Id., Vol. II, p. 443.
[20]
TSN, 9 May 1980, Id., Vol. II, pp. 489-492.
[21]
Id., Vol. I, pp. 16-17.
[22]
Id., p. 163.
[23]
TSN, 12 February 1992, Rollo,
A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371, Vol. II, pp. 553-554. Erlinda Armuello referred to here
is none other than Rosalinda Arnuello. In the answer of respondent judge and reply of complainants Co and
Javier, the surname “Arnuello” is spelled with single letter
“L” and double “LL”, respectively.
[24]
TSN, 21 October 1992, Id., p. 658.
[25]
See Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog, Adm. Matter No. R-351-RTJ; Samson v.
Corpuz-Macandog, Adm. Matter R-359-RTJ; Torres v. Macandog, Adm. Matter
No. R-621-RTJ; Lazaro v. Corpuz-Macandog, Adm. Matter No. R-684-RTJ;
Alba v. Corpuz-Macandog, Adm. Matter No. R-687-RTJ; Designation of an
Acting Judge in Branch CXXI, RTC, Caloocan City, Adm. Matter No. 86-4-9987-RTJ,
all promulgated on 26 September 1986, 144 SCRA 462, 476.
[26]
En Banc Resolution of 31
August 1993, Rollo, A.M. No. MTJ-Ā92-661, p. 92.
[27]
Rollo, A.M. No. MTJ-92-661, p. 92.
[28]
Rollo, A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371, Vol. I, p. 2.
[29]
Answer of respondent judge, Id., p.
71.
[30]
Id., pp. 95-96.
[31]
Rollo, A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371, Vol. II, p. 595.
[32]
Montemayor v. Collado, A.M. No. 2516-MJ, 10 September 1981, 107 SCRA
258, 264.
[33]
A.M. No. MTJ-92-691, 10 September 1993,
[34]
Supra, p. 29.