SUSANA DE LA CERNA LAINGO, TEODORO DACUYAN, ELENA DACUYAN AND SAMSON DACUYAN, PETITIONERS, VS. DAMIAN CAMILO AND/OR JUAN MAGALLANES, RESPONDENTS.

Laingo versus Camilo

The Case

This is a petition for review on a pure question of law, brought directly to the Supreme Court from an order of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Davao. Susana de la Cerna Laingo and her children, Teodoro, Elena, and Samson Dacuyan, all surnamed Dacuyan, are the petitioners. Damian Camilo and Juan Magallanes are the respondents. The petitioners ask the Court to strike down the second paragraph of an order of execution which allowed the respondents to share possession of the entire twenty-two hectare homestead, including the fifteen hectares never litigated. The case matters because it fixes the rule that execution must conform to the dispositive part of the final judgment, and because it explains what co-possession means when a co-owner sells an undivided portion of a titled property before partition.

Procedural History

The petitioners, as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a seven hectare portion of a twenty-two hectare parcel of land in Malita, Davao, before the Court of First Instance of Davao. The trial court dismissed the complaint, divested the plaintiffs of ownership over the seven hectares on the southern side, vested the same in Juan Magallanes, directed the plaintiffs to allow the survey of the land, and sentenced them to pay attorney's fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the judgment. It held the sale to the respondents valid only as to an undivided seven hectares, not the specific portion litigated. It declared the petitioners entitled to co-possession with the respondents until the undivided seven hectares are definitely segregated through partition. It set aside the award of attorney's fees and made no pronouncement as to costs. That judgment became final and executory.

The petitioners then moved in the trial court for a writ of execution placing them in co-possession with the respondents over the seven hectares. The respondents countered with a motion asking that the petitioners be ordered to execute a project of partition among the heirs and, in the process, segregate the seven hectares they had long possessed. The trial court issued a writ of possession allowing the petitioners to enjoy with the respondents possession of the seven hectares, and, on oral motion, issued a second writ allowing the respondents to enjoy with the petitioners possession of the rest of the twenty-two hectares. After two motions for reconsideration were denied, the petitioners raised the matter directly to the Supreme Court on a pure legal issue.

Facts

The disputed land is part of a homestead applied for by Gaudencio Dacuyan, married to Susana de la Cerna. Gaudencio died before the application was resolved, and in 1934 the homestead was awarded to the heirs of Gaudencio Dacuyan. The title was registered in October 1934 under Original Certificate of Title Number 1175 of the Register of Deeds of Davao.

In 1942, the widow Susana, describing herself as half owner of the conjugal property, sold seven hectares of the land to Damian Camilo. Camilo possessed the seven hectares and planted coconuts on it. In 1966, Camilo sold the land to Juan Magallanes. The other children of Gaudencio and Susana, namely Teodoro, Elena, and Samson, were never shown to have taken part in the sale or to have consented to a physical segregation of the seven hectares.

The petitioners later sued to recover the seven hectares. The trial court ruled for the respondents, but the Court of Appeals held that Susana could validly sell only an undivided seven hectares, because a sale by one co-owner of a specific portion could not bind her co-heirs. The appellate court gave the respondents co-possession with the petitioners until partition. When the trial court tried to execute that judgment, it went further and gave the respondents co-possession of the entire twenty-two hectares, which brought the case to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the order of execution issued by the trial court conformed to the final judgment of the Court of Appeals.
• Whether or not the respondents may be allowed to enjoy co-possession with the petitioners over the remainder of the twenty-two hectares, beyond the seven hectares subject of the suit.
• Whether or not the respondents are entitled to continue possessing the specific seven hectares they have held since the sale, pending partition.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a statute; it rests on the settled rule of execution of judgments, which the Court states in these words:

Fundamental is the rule that execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision. Likewise, a court can not, except for clerical errors or omissions, amend a judgment that has become final.

This rule governs the first issue, because the trial court may not enlarge a final judgment in the course of executing it.

The Court also states how a judgment is to be read:

the meaning, operation and consequences of a judgment must be ascertained like any other written instrument and that a judgment rests on the intention of the Court as gathered from every part thereof including the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances.

This governs the second and third issues, because the co-possession decreed by the Court of Appeals must be understood in the light of the whole decision and the facts behind it.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled for the petitioners. The execution ordered by the trial court did not conform to the final judgment. The Court of Appeals had decreed co-possession only over the undivided seven hectares, and it had said nothing about the rest of the twenty-two hectares. By extending co-possession to the remainder, the trial court went beyond the confines of the judgment it was executing, and a court cannot amend a judgment that has become final.

On the second issue, the Court again ruled for the petitioners. The controversy litigated before the Court of Appeals was confined to the ownership of seven hectares. The respondents are entitled to seven hectares, but not necessarily the seven hectares they actually possess. To let them share in the other fifteen hectares would be inequitable and would not conform to the final judgment.

On the third issue, the Court ruled for the respondents in part. The co-possession mentioned in the appellate judgment refers to the right of the respondents, already certain and vested but not yet specific, over any seven hectares of the property, in effect ranging over the entire property but not fixed on any part of it. Until partition is effected and the boundaries of their seven hectares are spelled out, the respondents shall continue to possess the seven hectares they have held since the sale and enjoy all its fruits. They will have no share in the fruits or enjoyment of the other fifteen hectares, and the petitioners will have no share in the fruits or enjoyment of the seven hectares held by the respondents. The Court added that it would serve the interests of all concerned if the partition among the heirs were effected immediately.

Doctrine

First, execution must conform to the dispositive part of the decision, and a court cannot, except for clerical errors or omissions, amend a judgment that has become final. A writ that gives a party more land, or more possession, than the judgment awarded is void for going beyond the judgment.

Second, the meaning of a judgment is gathered from every part of it, including the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances, so an ambiguous dispositive portion is read together with the reasons of the court.

Third, when a co-owner sells a specific portion of a titled property before partition, the sale is valid only as to an undivided portion. The buyer acquires a right that is already certain and vested but not yet specific, and co-possession with the other co-owners continues until the share is segregated through partition. Exclusive possession by a co-owner does not give rise to prescription, and a Torrens title cannot be acquired by prescription.

Disposition

The petition was granted. The second paragraph of the questioned order was deleted, and the respondents were allowed to continue exclusively possessing and enjoying the seven hectares actually held by them until partition is effected and their share is definitely segregated.

Remember This

Memorize the line that execution must conform to what is ordained in the dispositive part of the decision, and that a final judgment cannot be amended except for clerical errors or omissions. Examiners use this case on execution of judgments that go beyond the judgment, and on the right of a buyer from a co-owner, which is certain and vested but not yet specific until partition.