G.R. No. L-6335. July 31, 1954
GLICERIA ROSETE, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF ZAMBALES, SIMPLICIO YAP AND CORAZON YAP, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
of Zambales, Epifanio Fularon was convicted and sentenced to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the amount of P2,000.
On February 10, 1949, to satisfy said indemnity, a writ of execution
was issued and the sheriff levied upon four parcels of land belonging
to the conjugal partnership of Epifanio Fularon and Gliceria Rosete.
These parcels of land were sold at public auction as required by the
rules for the sum of P1,385.00, leaving an unsatisfied balance of
P739.34.
On March 8, 1950, Gliceria Rosete redeemed two of the four parcels
of land which were sold at public auction for the sum of P879.20, the
sheriff having executed in her favor the corresponding deed of
repurchase.
On April 10, 1950, an alias execution was issued to satisfy the
balance of the indemnity and the sheriff levied upon the two parcels of
land which were redeemed by Gliceria Rosete and set a date for their
sale. Prior to the arrival of this date, however, Gliceria Rosete filed
a case for injunction to restrain the sheriff from carrying out the
sale praying at the same time for a writ of preliminary injunction.
This writ was issued upon the filing of the requisite bond but was
later dissolved upon a motion filed by defendants who put up
counter-bond.
The dissolution of the injunction enabled the sheriff to carry out
the sale as originally scheduled and the property was sold to one
Raymundo de Jesus for the sum of P970. This development prompted the
plaintiff to amend her complaint by praying therein, among other
things, that the sale carried out by the sheriff be declared null and
void. After due trial, wherein the parties practically agreed on the
material facts pertinent to the issue, the court rendered decision
declaring the sale null and void. The defendants appealed, and the case
was certified to this court on the plea that the appeal involves purely
questions of law.
The question to be decided is whether the sale made by the sheriff
on May 9, 1950 of the two parcels of land which were redeemed by
Gliceria Rosete in the exercise of her right of redemption is valid it
appearing that they formed part of the four parcels of land belonging
to the conjugal partnership which were originally sold to satisfy the
same judgment of indemnity awarded in the criminal case. The lower
court declared the sale null and void on the strength of the ruling
laid down in the case of Lichauco vs. Olegario, 43 Phil., 540, and this
finding is now disputed by the appellants.
In the case above adverted to, Lichauco obtained a judgment against
Olegario for the sum of P72,766.37. To satisfy this judgment, certain
real estate belonging to Olegario was levied in execution and at the
sale Lichauco bid for it for the sum of P10,000. Olegario, on the same
day, sold his right of redemption to his cousin Dalmacio. Later,
Lichauco asked for an alias writ of execution and the sheriff proceeded
with the sale of the right of redemption of Olegario whereat Lichauco
himself bid for the sum of P10,000. As Lichauco failed to register the
sale owing to the fact that the sale executed by Olegario in favor of
his cousin was already recorded, Lichauco brought the matter to court
to test the validity of the latter sale. One of the issues raised was,
“Whether or not Faustino Lichauco, as an execution creditor and
purchaser at the auction in question was entitled, after his judgment
had thus been executed but not wholly satisfied, to have it executed
again by levying upon the right of redemption over said properties.”
The court ruled that this cannot be done for it would render nugatory
the means secured by law to an execution debtor to avoid the sale of
his property made at an auction under execution. Said this Court:
“We, therefore, find that the plaintiff, as a
judgment creditor, was not, and is not, entitled, after an execution
has been levied upon the real properties in question by virtue of the
judgment in his favor, to have another execution levied upon the same
properties by virtue of the same judgment to reach the right of
redemption which the execution debtor and his privies retained over
them.”
Inasmuch as the Lichauco case refers to the levy and sale of the
right of redemption belonging to a judgment debtor and not to the levy
of the very property which has been the subject of execution for the
satisfaction of the same judgment, it is now contended that it cannot
be considered as a precedent in the present case for here the second
levy was effected on the same property subject of the original
execution. But this argument falls on its own weight when we consider
the following conclusion of the court, “* * * what we wish to declare
is that a judgment by virtue of which a property is sold at public
auction can have no further effect on such property.” (Italics supplied)
Nevertheless, when this case came up for discussion some members of
the Court expressed doubt as to the applicability of the Lichauco case
considering that it does not decide squarely whether the same property
may be levied on an alias execution if it is reacquired by the judgment
debtor in the exercise of his right of redemption and as on this matter
the requisite majority could not be obtained the injury turned to
another issue which for purposes of this case is sufficient to decide
the controversy.
The issue is: Since it appears that plaintiff redeemed the two
parcels of land in question with money obtained by her from her father,
has the property become paraphernal and as such is beyond the reach of
further execution?
We are of the opinion that the question should be answered in the
affirmative for the following reasons: (a) Gliceria Rosete, the wife,
redeemed the property, not in behalf of her husband, but as successor
in interest in the whole or part of the property, it being then
conjugal. The term “successor in interest” appearing in subdivision
(a), Section 25, Rule 39, includes, according to Chief Justice Moran,
“one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law” or
“the wife as regards her husband’s homestead by reason of the fact that
some portion of her husband’s title passes to her (Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 1, pp. 841-842); and (b) a property is
deemed to belong exclusively to the wife (1) when acquired by her
by-right of redemption, and (2) with money belonging exclusively to her
(Article 1396, old Civil Code).
The interest which a wife has in conjugal property in this
jurisdiction may be likened to that of a wife in a homestead in
American jurisdiction. That interest is known as “inchoate right of
dower”, or a “contingent interest.” By virtue of this inchoate right, a
wife has a right of redemption of a homestead as successor in interest of
her husband. Thus, in Hepfner vs. Urton, 12 Pac, 486, it was held that
by the declaration of homestead by the husband of the property sold a
portion of his title passed to his wife, and “she had the right of
residence thereon with him and the family during their joint lives, with some rights in case she should survive him.
She had a right of redemption as his successor in interest.” (Italics
supplied) In Taylor vs. Taylor, 92 So., 109, where a mortgage was
executed on a homestead and the husband refused to pay the
indebtedness, it was held that “the wife’s ‘inchoate right of dower’,
which is more than a possibility and may well be denominated a
contingent interest, was a sufficient interest in the lands to confer
the right of equitable redemption under the mortgage.” And in Malone
vs. Nelson, et al., 167 So., 714, it was declared that “the right of
the wife to redeem is rested upon her interest—inchoate right of
dower—a right subject to a monetary valuation.” These authorities have
persuasive effect considering the source of our rule on the matter.
The property in question has therefore become the exclusive property
of the plaintiff. She has acquired it by right of redemption as
successor in interest of her husband. It has ceased to be the property
of the judgment debtor. It can no longer therefore be the subject of
execution under a judgment exclusively affecting the personal liability
of the latter. The conclusion reached by the lower court on this matter
is therefore not warranted by law.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified as follows: the
sale of the two parcels of land executed by the sheriff on May 9, 1950
in favor of Raymundo de Jesus for P970 is hereby declared null and
void, and the deed of repurchase executed by the sheriff in favor of
the plaintiff on March 8, 1950 is hereby revived and maintained. The
rest of the decision is declared without effect.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur