G.R. No. L-21495. July 21, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PLAINTIFF (APPELLEE), VS. POLICARPIO HALASAN, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, POLICARPIO HALASAN, DEFENDANT (APPELLANT).
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
This is an automatic review, pursuant to Section 9, Rule 122 of
the revised Rules of Court, of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, in its
Criminal Case No. 1316, the dispositive portion of
which reads -?
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused POLIÂCARPIO HALASAN,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the special complex crime of
robÂbery in band with homicide and frustrated homicide, as defined and
penalized under Art. 294, par. 1, in relation to Art. 296 of the Revised Penal
Code, and there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, hereby
imposes upon the accused to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH; to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased Leoncio Balaobao
in the amount of P6,000.00; to pay to the offended party, Maximino
Maghuyop, the sum of P1,289.75, the value of the
articles and money robbed; and to pay the costs.”
The records disclose that:
In an information dated March 4, 1959, the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur charged in said
court one Policarpio Halasan
together with thirteen (13) others of the crime of robbery in band with
homicide and frustrated homicide, the pertinent part of which information reads
–
“That on or about January 16, 1959, at early dawn, in Barrio Calian, Municipality of Margosatubig,
Province of Zamboanga
del Sur, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with guns,
bladed weapons and clubs, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with intent to gain and with the use of force, threats, violence and
intimidaÂtion, went to the store
which is used as residence of Maximino Maghuyop, by then and there willfully, unÂlawfully and
feloniously detached and removed forcibly the wooden board of the kitchen
walling and at the same time fired their guns toward the kitchen door hitÂting
and killing instantaneously one Leoncio Balaobao and wounding the store owner, Maximino
Maghuyop, thereupon having successfully gained
entrance into the store by shouting at the inmates inside to open the front
door under threats and intimidation, hogtied all the occupants, and the said
accused demanded cash from the owner Maximino Maghuyop and wife Angela C. Maghuyop
handed to them in the amount of One Thousand Two Hundred (P1,200.00) Pesos,
also together with the cash amount mentioned herein various merchandise and
cigarettes all valued at Eighty Nine and 75/100 (P89.75) Pesos were taken and
carried away by the accused to the damage and prejudice of the owner in the
total amount of One Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Nine and 75/100 Pesos
(P1,289.75), Philippine Currency.”
Of the fourteen (14) accused charged in said information, only
four (4), namely, Policarpio Halasan,
Emilio Popera, Alfredo TalaÂsing,
and Teotimo Montalla were
apprehended, while the others remained at large and/or unidentified.
Upon being arraigned, the four (4) above-named accused, assisted
by the same lawyer, Ernesto O. Organo, who acted as
counsel de oficio for Halasan and as counsel de parte
for the others, pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, the court a quo, upon the Provincial Fiscal’s motion, ordered the discharge of accused Teotimo Montalla from the
information to be utilized as state witness.
The prosecution then proceeded with the presentation of its evidence. It finished with the direct examination of
state witness Montalla who narrated in detail how
appellant Policarpio HalaÂsan
(“Carping”) invited and later intimidated the witness into joining an
armed band of more than four men who attacked and broke into the house of Maximino Maghuyop, wounded the
latter and killed Leoncio Balaobao
and robbed the family, as described in the information. The defense began cross-examining Montalla, but before the cross-examination could be
terminated, defense counsel Organo manifested to the
court a quo that accused HalaÂsan had
signified his willingness to change his former plea and that he (counsel) would
discontinue and waive further cross-examÂination of said witness. He moved, therefore, that Halasan
be allowed to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and to substiÂtute therefor a plea of guilty.
The Provincial Fiscal did not interÂpose any objection to Attorney Organo’s motion.
Thereupon, the court a quo apprised accused Halasan of the consequences of his change of plea, the
seriousness or gravity of the offense charged against him and the possibility
of a heavy peÂnalty which might be imposed upon him. Despite this warning, said accused declared
in open court that he was willing to enter a plea of guilty because he really
committed the crime so that there was no use of setting up a defense; that he
considered himself a habitual delinquent because he had killed and wounded
persons in Tudela, Misamis
Occidental, killed three (3) persons in Zamboanga del
Sur and other persons in some other places which
crimes were still unsolved; that in the morning of the trial (August 24, 1960),
he stabbed a co-prisoner in the Provincial jail and his victim was hovering
between life and death; and that he wanted a death penalty to be meted against
himself in order that he may be able to prepare in the atonement of his sins.
The court a quo, after finding that accused Halasan understood the import of his change of plea,
granted the defense’s motion and ordered said accused to be arraigned anew.
Upon being re-arraigned, accused Halasan,
assisted by the same counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty.
Defense attorney Organo then prayed the
court a quo to
exerÂcise its sound discretion in considering the above plea of guilty as a
mitigating circumstance in favor of said accused, for the purÂpose of
determining the proper penalty to be imposed upon him. On the other hand, the Provincial Fiscal
asked that the aggravating cirÂcumstance of recidivism be counted against the
accused and moved that the information be amended to allege such circumstance,
which the defense opposed for being improper.
Said fiscal recommended that the maximum penalty of death be imposed on
the said accused.
On the basis of said plea of guilty, which the court a quo
did not credit as a mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused, it having
been entered after the prosecution had presented its evidence and other circumstances of this case, such as
the alleged “depravity” of the accused as confessed by him in open
court, and considering the nature of the crime (robbery in band with homicide)
charged in the information to which said accused pleaded guilty, the court a
quo rendered its decision, dated August 24, 1960, quoted at the
beginning of this opinion. Hence, the
record of this case was elevated to this Court for automatic review.
In this Court, counsel de oficio
for said accused was appointed to represent him. Said counsel alleged a lone assignment of
error in his brief, claiming that by such plea of guilty, accused is entitled
to the benefit of a mitigating circumstance and there being no aggravating
circumstance, the proper penalty which should have been imposed upon him should
be lowered by one degree (reclusion temÂporal) in accordance with
Article 61, paragraph 2, of the Revised PeÂnal Code; or, in the interest of
justice, that a new trial or reception of additional evidence be ordered to
enable this Court to arrive at a fair and impartial decision of this case.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General, in representation of
the People, maintains that the lower court correctly imposed the proper penalty
against the accused since any person found guilty of robbery in band with
homicide is punishable with a penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death which should be imposed in the maximum peÂriod; and he recommends,
therefore, that the decision under review should be affirmed.
We agree with the
lower court as well as the Solicitor General that the plea of guilty cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance to
benefit the accused in this case, the same (plea) having been enÂtered after
the prosecution had begun presenting its evidence. (People vs. Co Chang, 60 Phil. 293; People vs. De la Cruz, 63 Phil. 874; and People vs. Lambino,
103 Phil. 504).
We likewise agree with the Solicitor General that the lower court
correctly imposed the proper penalty upon the said accused, since by such plea
of guilty, he is deemed to have admitted the material alÂlegations of the
information[1]
including any aggravating circumstance
alleged therein (People vs. Llagas, G. R. Nos.
L-5015-17, May 31, 1957, 102 Phil. 1232 [unrep.]);
that “band” is considered as an aggravating circumstance (People vs. Ganal, 85 Phil. 743); and that this Court had already held
that –
“As the crime committed by the defendants is robbery in band
with homicide, the penalty provÂided for by article 294, of the Revised Penal
Code, is reclusion perpetua to death,
and in accordance with Republic Act 12, the penalty to be imposed upon them is
the maximum penalty, that is, death, even without the concurrence of any
aggravating circumstance.” (People vs. Valeriano,
90 Phil. 15)
With respect to the claim of counsel de oficio for a new trial or taking of additional
evidence, suffice it to cite that the award thereof rests upon the sound
discretion of the court (People vs. Acosta, supra.) and no valid
justification is shown to grant it.
However, for lack of the requisite number of votes to support the
infliction of the supreme penalty of death, the penalty next lower in degree,
that is, reclusion perpetua, should be
imposed upon the appellant.
WHEREFORE, as thus modified, the decision under review
is hereby affirmed in all other respects.
With costs against accused Policarpio Halasan.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, Bengzon,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., did not take part.
[1]
People vs. Buco, G. R. Nos. L-2633, February 28, 1950; People vs. Egido, 90 Phil. 762; People vs. Sabilul,
93 Phil. 567; People vs. Acosta, 98 Phil. 642; People vs. Rapirap, 102 Phil. 863; People vs. Lambino, 103 Phil. 504; and People vs. Santos, G. R.
No. L-12448, January 22, 1959.