THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLE, VS. PEDRO BALDERA, MIGUEL BLAY, JOSE DE LA CRUZ, AND FOUR OTHERS, DEFENDANTS. PEDRO BALDERA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

We are called upon to review the sentence of death passed upon the
appellant Pedro Baldera, who was found guilty of robbery in band with
homicide and serious and less serioues physicial injuries by the Court
of First Instance of Batangas.

The evidence shows that at about 4a. m. on December 23, 1947, a Casa
Manila bus loaded with passengers left Batangas, Batangas, bound for
Manila. On the highway in barrio Calansayan, municipality of San Jose,
same province, it was held up by a group of five or six armed men. One
of these, later identified as the herein appellant Pedro Baldera, who was then armed with a .45 caliber pistol, fired a shot, and this was
followed by a hail of bullets coming from different directions. As a
result, several passengers, among them Jose Cabrera, Jose Pastor and
Francisco Mendoza, were wounded. After the firing had ceased, appellant
got on the bus and, threatening the passengers with his gun, took P90
from Jose Pastor and P34 from Ponciana Villena. Another passenger named
Francisco Mendoza was also relieved of his P3. Appellant then alighted
and ordered the bus to proceed, whereupon the driver headed for the
municipal building of San Jose and there reported the incident to the
authorities. The wounded were taken to the hospital, where Jose
Cabrera died from his wounds on the following day. Jose Pastor, who
was wounded in the left leg, was cured in two months, while Francisco
Mendoza’s gunshot wound in the right shoulder healed in 15 days.

For the above crime four persons were prosecuted and tried under an
information charging “robo en cuadrilla con homicidio y lesiones graves
y lesiones merios graves.” The case was dismissed as to two of the
accused due to insufficiency of evidence. But the other two, Pedro
Baldera and Miguel Blay, were, after trial, found guilty as charged and
sentenced, the first to capital punishment, and the second to life
imprisonment, both to pay the corresponding indemnity and proportionate
costs.

Only the case against Pedro Baldera is now before us.

There is no dispute as to the perpetration of the crime. The only
question is as to the identification of this appellant as one of the
authors thereof. On this point the evidence for the prosecution shows
that shortly after the commission of this crime, appellant was arrested
in the municipality of Batangas in connection with the theft of a
radio, and as his features tallied with the personal description of one
of the highway men given to the chief of police by some of the
passengers of the held-up bus, he was also investigated in connection
with the hold-up, and he then made a confession, which was reduced to
writing and later subscribed by him before the justice of the peace,
admitting his participation in the crime as the one who, armed with a
pistol, boarded the bus and through intimidation relieved Ponciana
Villena of her money.

At the trial, Ponciana also identified appellant as the one who
relieved her of her money at gunpoint, saying that she had a good look
at his face for she was watching him closely for fear that he might
fire at her. She also declared that when she was sent for by the chief
of police to identify appellant, the latter approached her as she came
into the office of said officer and asked her forgiveness. Two other
passengers of the bus declared at the trial that appellant resembles
the one who stopped the bus and robbed its passengers.

Testifying in his own defense, appellant denies participation in
the crime charged, declaring that he passed the night in question in a
house of prostitution in Batangas, where he was employed by the
prostitutes for drawing water. But this alibi is without corroboration
and can not stand up against the clear and positive testimony of
Ponciana Villena, who has not been shown to have any motive for falsely
testifying against him.

Counsel de oficio impugns the admissibility of appellant’s
confession on the ground that the same was made on a promise to render
him protection from his co-accused and also to utilize him as a
government witness. But appellant himself denied that such a promise
was ever made and the record shows that, when the confession was
offered in evidence, it was objected to on the sole ground that “it was
taken through force and intimidation,” which, however, was not proved.
Moreover, this Court has already held that “were one of several
co-defendants turns state’s evidence on a promise of immunity * * * but
later retracts and fails to keep his part of the agreement, his
confession made under such promise may then be used against him.”
(People vs. Panaligan et al., 43 Phil., 131). In any event, even
without the said confession, we find that appellant’s participation in
the crime herein charged has been clearly and satisfactorily proved.

Counsel also contends that the lower court erred in holding that
the crime committed is robbery in band, alleging that there was no
sufficient proof that the perpetrators thereof numbered more than three
armed men. The fact, however, that there were more than three armed men
in the group that held up the bus appears in appellant’s own confession
and is also established by the uncontradicted testimony of one of the
government witnesses. And the point is really not material because in
the crime of robbery with homicide it is not essential that the robbery
be in band, although that circumstance may be taken into account as an
aggravation in the imposition of the penalty. And even if it be not
taken into account as such in this case, there would still remain the
other aggravating circumstance that the robbery was perpetrated by
attacking a vehicle (Arto 295, R. P. C.), which is not offset by any
mitigating circumstance.

The lower court did, however, err in appreciating against the
accused the circumstance of recidivism by reason of his previous
conviction for theft, it appearing that that crime was committed on or
about December 30, 1947 (Exhibit E) while the offense now charged took
place seven days before that date.

In conclusion, we find appellant guilty of the crime of robbery
with homicide and serious and less serious physical injuries with two
aggravating circumstances. But there being no sufficient vote to impose
the extreme penalty, appellant can be sentenced to life imprisonment
only.

Wherefore, reducing appellant’s sentence to life imprisonment but
increasing the indemnity to be paid by him to the heirs of the deceased
Jose Cabrera to P6,000, the judgment below as so modified is affirmed,
with costs against the appellant.

Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.