SOCORRO DE LA CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. LICERIO SOSING AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

Plaintiff brought this action in the Court of First Instance of Samar
to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in
Pambujan, Samar, plus the sum of P10,000 as damages.

Plaintiff claims to be the owner of the land from time immemorial
having inherited it from her father, Tomas de la Cruz, who in turn
bought it from Felipe Adora. She alleges that on March 21, 1938,
defendant, by means of force and violence, occupied the land, thus
depriving her of its possession.

Defendant in turn claims to
be the owner of the land having acquired it by purchase from Felipe
Balanquit. Tomas de la Cruz, father of plaintiff, acted in bad faith
when he acquired it from Felipe Adora, who had no right to, nor was the
owner of, the land. And defendant had been in possession of the land
since time immemorial by himself and through his predecessor in
interest, Felipe Balanquit. By way of counterclaim, defendant also
claims the sum of P1,000 yearly as damages consisting of the fruits he
had been deprived since 1940, when plaintiff and her predecessor in
interest took possession illegally of the land. This counterclaim was
denied in due course by the plaintiff.

After the reception
of the evidence, the lower court rendered decision holding that
plaintiff is the true owner of the land and ordering defendant to
restore its possession to plaintiff and to pay damages in the amount of
P3,000, plus the costs of suit.

The Court of Appeals, to
which the case was taken, reversed the decision of the lower court
holding that defendant had already acquired the land in question by
prescription it appearing that since March 21, 1938, he had usurped it
and had been in possession thereof under claim of ownership up to the
time of the filing of the complaint,—February 17, 1949. The court said
that “even admitting that the appellant sold the property to Adora and
that the latter, in turn, sold it to De la Cruz and, upon his death,
the appellee remained in possession thereof until March 21, 1938, the
appellant had acquired full title to the same by prescription at the
time the present action was commenced.”

When appellee was
notified of the decision of the Court of Appeals, she filed in due time
a motion for reconsideration attaching thereto a certified copy of the
original complaint with which this case was initiated showing that the
action was commenced, not on February 17, 1949 as pointed out by the
Court of Appeals, but on November 13, 1940 as certified to by the clerk
of court of the court of origin. Said motion was denied, hence this
petition for review.

There is no question that the decision
of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of fact, not
only as pointed out by appellee in her motion for reconsideration, but
as may be seen from a perusal of the pertinent portion of the record on
appeal submitted in this case. It should be noted that the initial
pleading appearing in said record on appeal is an amended complaint.
This amended complaint appears to have been filed on February 17, 1949.
The original complaint with which this case was initiated has been
omitted undoubtedly because appellant did not consider it necessary to
include it because its allegations are already reproduced in the
amended complaint. That is the reason why the true date of the
commencement of the action does not appear therein which led the Court
of Appeals to believe that the action commenced on February 17, 1949.
But the truth is that the correct date of the commencement of the
action is November 13, 1940, the date of the filing of the original
complaint. This fact being important to make a correct adjudication,
fairness requires that proper rectification be made to give justice
where justice is due. This rectification the court can do in the
exercise of its discretion because it is a matter that can be gleaned
from the record. Thus rectified, the logical consequence is that
defendant has not acquired any title by prescription over the land in
litigation contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals.

It appearing that the decision appealed from is premised on a
misapprehension of fact, the next question that crops up hinges on who
is the real owner of the property in litigation. The decision of the
Court of Appeals contains merely a restatement of the evidence but does
not make any finding as to the issues of fact. This silence makes it
necessary for us to review the evidence. This we have done, and after
carefully examining the evidence, we are persuaded that the lower court
did not err in finding that plaintiff is the owner of the property in
question.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed.
The decision of the court of origin is affirmed, with costs against
appellant.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuazon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.