THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RODOLFO CABATAC ALIAS “NEGRO” AND “JUNJUN” (AT LARGE), ACCUSED, LLOYD ESCOTON ALIAS “DODIE” AND ARIEL NABONG ALIAS “AYING”…
AZCARRAGA-JACOB, J.:
In an Information[2] dated 21 November 2002, appellants, together with a certain Rodolfo Cabatac alias Negro or Junjun, were accused of killing Roman Aungon, Sr., qualified by abuse of superior strength, viz:
That on or about the 27th day of July, 2002, in the Municipality of San Jose, Province of Antique, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed with knives, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with said knives one Roman Aungon, Sr. thereby inflicting fatal wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous death.
With the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659.
Testimonial evidence for the prosecution showed that on 27 July 2002, at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Delia Salvador was preparing a report in her house at Del Pilar Street, Barangay 8, San Jose, Antique when she heard a commotion outside. Upon hearing a man’s voice asking for help, she immediately peeped through the window, and there she saw Roman Aungon, Sr. being chased by appellants Escoton and Nabong, together with accused Cabatac. When Roman was cornered at the gate of a certain Mrs. Bergantino’s house, appellants Escoton and Nabong, each armed with sharp-pointed knife, took turns in stabbing Roman to death, while accused Cabatac was standing behind them, unarmed. After Roman had fallen to the ground–dead, appellants Escoton and Nabong and accused Cabatac hurriedly fled from the scene.
The post mortem examination[3] conducted by Dr. Maria Rosie G. Autajay, the Municipal Health Officer of San Jose, Antique, revealed that the victim sustained thirteen (13) stab wounds in the different parts of his body, particular in the neck, midline between the two clavicles, below the right clavicle, chest, abdomen, thigh, and below the armpit.
The Defense’s Version of the Facts
On his part, appellant Escoton invokes self-defense. He contends that at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 27 July 2002, he went out of his house to buy cigarettes when Roman Aungon, Sr. blocked his path, and suddenly stabbed him with a knife, hitting him in the nose. Fearing for his life, appellant ran away but Roman chased him to the gasoline station. When he fell down facing up, Roman stabbed him again, this time hitting him in his left arm. Having been able to push Roman, he successfully grabbed the knife from Roman’s hold, and stabbed the latter several times. After the incident, he hid at the concrete culvert behind the building of the Department of Education until 5:00 o’clock the next morning. He then proceeded to his sister’s house in Guimbal, Iloilo where he stayed for three days. Thereafter, he went to Manila and remained there for two years until his surrender to the police authorities in December 2004.
Appellant Nabong, on the other hand, denies any participation in the killing, and claims that when the incident happened he was in the house of his aunt in Angono, Rizal. He alleged that he had been there since December 2001 until his return to Antique on 12 October 2005 to wed his live-in partner Romilyn Hugo whom he met in Manila. It was upon his return that he came to know of the stabbing incident through his cousin Epigenio Dioso who informed him that he was one of the accused.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
After due proceedings, the court a quo rendered a verdict convicting appellants Escoton and Nabong as charged, sentencing both of them to suffer a prison term of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them to pay jointly and severally the heirs of their victim in the form of civil indemnity, and actual, moral and exemplary damages.[4]
Aggrieved, appellants interposed the instant appeal, ascribing the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court: (i) in giving credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Delia Salvador despite that it did not conform to the post-mortem examination of the victim’s body; (ii) in not appreciating incomplete self-defense as a privileged mitigating circumstance in favor of appellant Escoton; (iii) in finding them to have acted with abuse of superior strength; and (iv) in finding that the prosecution has proven their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[5]
First, appellants point out inconsistencies between (a) the testimony of Delia Salvador where she declared that Roman was stabbed six [6] times by appellant Escoton, and three [3] times by appellant Nabong, hitting the victim in the chest, abdomen, and thigh; and (b) the post-mortem examination findings of Dr. Autajay which showed that the victim’s body suffered thirteen [13] stab wounds in the neck, clavicle, chest, abdomen, thigh, and armpit.
Second, appellants claim that, although the means employed in repelling the attack was not reasonably necessary, the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense should have been applied in favor of appellant Escoton inasmuch as it was the victim who committed unlawful aggression when he stabbed the former despite the latter’s lack of sufficient provocation.
Third, appellants likewise argue that appellant Nabong should be acquitted because he had no participation in the crime, as he was working in Manila from December 2001 until his return to Antique on 12 October 2005. This was even confirmed by appellant Escoton who himself declared that it was he alone who perpetrated the killing of the victim.
Fourth, appellants allege that appellant Escoton should only be guilty of homicide because the killing was not attended by abuse of superior strength as he merely acted in incomplete self-defense, thus entitling him to the reduction of his penalty by one degree lower than that prescribed by law for the offense proven.
The Ruling of this Court
The arguments of appellants wield no merit.
Upon careful scrutiny of the entire record, this Court is all the more convinced that prosecution witnesses, specifically Delia Salvador, had concretely established the death of Roman Aungon, Sr. in the hands of appellants Escoton and Nabong on that murderous evening of 27 July 2002. The trial court was convincingly correct in so concluding and We find no reason to deviate from that finding. Too well-settled is the rule that factual findings and conclusions of the trial court are accorded not only great weight and utmost respect[6] but also finality, absent a showing that some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could have affected the outcome of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied.[7] Quite unfortunate for appellants, the murder case at bar is no exception.
The clear, straightforward, and positive testimony of Delia Salvador clearly proves in no uncertain terms that it was appellants Escoton and Nabong, along with accused Cabatac, who carried out the execution of the ghastly crime. Delia Salvador vividly narrated how she saw appellants Escoton and Nabong, with accused Cabatac, chase the victim Roman Aungon, Sr. to the gate of the house of Mrs. Bergantino. She also saw appellants Escoton and Nabong, each armed with sharp-pointed knife, take turns in stabbing the victim several times, while accused Cabatac stood watch behind them, unarmed, thus—
By contrast, appellants failed to cast any reasonable doubt upon their positive identification as the malefactors. They failed miserably to discredit or impair the positive testimony of prosecution witness Delia Salvador, which had been shown to have contained no inconsistencies and contradictions so as to affect her credibility. Equally noteworthy is the lack of ulterior motive on the part of this witness to testify falsely against appellants. Since there is no evidence that the witness was actuated by ill will or ill motive, her testimony should be given credit and credence.[9]
Ironclad is the rule that categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses has greater weight than the plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime by the accused.[10] In weighing contradictory declarations and statements, greater weight is given to the positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses to the denials and alibis of the accused-appellants. Elsewise stated, the accused’s defenses of denial and alibi cannot prevail when juxtaposed with the positive, straightforward, and clear identification and declaration of prosecution witnesses.[11] Denial and alibi, being evidence which are self-serving and negative in nature, cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who definitively testify on clear and positive evidence.[12]
Corollarily, appellant Nabong’s alibi that he was in Manila working when the killing incident took place on the fatal night of 27 July 2002 cannot prevail over Delia’s testimony positively placing him at the crime scene, as one of the assailants who stabbed the victim several times with co-appellant Escoton.
It bears stressing that for the defense of alibi to prosper, appellant Nabong must prove that not only he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.[13] Here, appellant Nabong miserably failed to establish the requisite physical impossibility of his having been at the locus and tempus of the crime’s commission. His claim is totally bereft of any evidence to show that he was at some other place during the commission of the crime and that it was physically impossible for him of being at or near the crime scene during the approximate time when the crime was committed.
The following distinct observation of the trial court deserves full weight and credence, viz.:
The other accused Ariel Nabong endeavored to exculpate himself by claiming that on July 27, 2002 he was in the house of his aunt, Lourdes Nabong, in Angono, Rizal, as he has been working there in a construction project since December 2001.
Alibi, however, is a weak defense when unsubstantiated by credible and plausible testimonies, as it is a negative and self-serving evidence which cannot prevail over a categorical and positive identification of the accused, without any showing of any ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness who made the identification. In the present case, the accused Ariel Nabong was categorically and positively identified by the prosecution witness Delia Salvador as one of those who stabbed the victim Roman Aungon, Sr. that fateful evening of July 27, 2002. More specifically, Delia Salvador said that the accused Ariel Nabong stabbed and hit the victim three times on the right chest. As heretofore said, the record does not indicate any improper motive on the part of Delia Salvador and her testimony in positively pointing to the accused Ariel Nabong as one of those who stabbed the victim deserves full credence because of the settled rule that “where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full credence.”
Besides, the avowal of the accused that he was in the house of his aunt, Lourdes Nabong, in Angono, Rizal on July 27, 2002 has not been corroborated by his aunt, nor by anyone else who may have known the accused to have been in that place on that date. Moreover, the claim of the accused that he left for Manila on board a Negros Navigation vessel in December 2001 and that while in Manila he worked from January 2002 to August 2005 with KVN Construction Co. and LKS Construction Co. and was regularly paid weekly wages for which he signed a payroll or a voucher, is not corroborated by any boat ticket, or any payroll, voucher or pay slip.[14]
As to appellants’ invocation of incomplete self-defense, it is appropriate to remind them that in order to avail of the privileged mitigating circumstance, appellants must clearly prove the first element of self-defense, i.e., the attendance of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, followed by the other requisites: the reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or repel the attack, and lack of sufficient provocation on his part to defend himself.[15]
In People v. Agravante[16] and People v. Bautista,[17] the High Court was more than emphatic in holding that there can be no defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending.
Here, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim that placed the life of appellant Escoton in danger and forced him to inflict fatal wounds upon the person of the former. The extremely categorical and consistent testimony of Delia Salvador effectively negated the pretense of appellants that it was the victim who was the unlawful aggressor. The witness, who had no motive to fabricate her testimony, as hereinbefore stated, clearly declared that the victim was chased by appellants, and after being cornered at the gate of Mrs. Bergantino, was stabbed several times by appellants leaving him dead on the ground.
Assuming arguendo that there was prior unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, as appellants vigorously claim, such unlawful aggression had already ceased when appellant Escoton successfully wrested possession of the knife from the victim’s hand. From that moment, there was no longer any reason for appellant to topple the victim mercilessly and inflict fatal injuries which have caused the latter’s instantaneous death.
Deserving of Our imprimatur are the following categorical observations of the trial court:
The tentativeness and irresoluteness of the accused Lloyd Escoton are at once evident from the fact that he initially manifested before this Court that he will set up denial in the nature of alibi as a defense and his eventual turn-around when, in lieu thereof, during the trial he presented evidence tending to show the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The procedural ploy of the accused has only unmasked his lack of candidness.
But more significantly the accused Lloyd Escoton has unequivocably admitted having killed the victim Roman Aungon, Sr. and, thereby, the accused has shifted unto his shoulders the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the following elements of self-defense: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and (c) employment by the accused of reasonable means to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression of the victim, foremost of which is the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim as it is a sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
It is not hard for this Court to hold, as it hereby holds, that the accused has utterly failed to discharge his burden, of sufficiently establishing the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
There is nothing which may inspire belief in the story told by the accused Lloyd Escoton that he fatally stabbed the victim Roman Aungon, Sr. because the victim first attacked with a pointed weapon, initially hitting him in the nose and then in the upper left arm. If it were true that the accused Lloyd Escoton was wounded twice he could have presented a more credible evidence than his bare and self-serving assertion that he himself just treated his wounds. For a man, who has been wounded as a result of an unprovoked and unlawful aggression by another, not to submit himself to medical treatment is simply contrary to common knowledge, observation, and experience of mankind xxx Stated otherwise, this Court is of the considered view that the victim Roman Aungon, Sr. committed no unlawful aggression that evening when he was stabbed to death by the accused Lloyd Escoton. Accordingly, there is no factual basis for this Court to uphold the justifying circumstance professed by the accused Lloyd Escoton.
x x x x
…[E]ven assuming arguendo that at the outset the victim Roman Aungon, Sr. stabbed the accused Lloyd Escoton twice, that initial aggression by the victim ceased and no longer existed when the accused succeeded in taking possession of the knife from the victim. It follows that at the point when the victim was already unarmed and not in a position to defend himself, the accused should have restrained himself from stabbing the victim. Verily, there was no longer grave peril or imminent danger to the life of the accused Lloyd Escoton after he wrested the knife from the victim Roman Aungon, Sr. and the accused went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict the excessive and fatal injuries of the victim who was at that time already unarmed and defenseless…[18]
As regards the inconsistent statements of prosecution witness Delia Salvador where she stated that appellant Escoton stabbed the victim six (6) times while appellant Nabong stabbed the victim three (3) times vis-à-vis those indicated in the post-mortem report which shows that the victim suffered a total of thirteen (13) stab wounds, suffice it to state that such disparity does not necessarily render her testimony incredible nor does it impair or discredit her credibility.
While the testimony of Delia Salvador did not accurately jibe with what was indicated in the post-mortem report, particularly as to the number of wounds sustained by the victim, this circumstance does not alter the essential fact that appellants indeed stabbed the victim several times with the use of a bladed weapon which caused the latter’s instantaneous death.
Moreover, such variance refers only to trivial and inconsequential details that are not material to the issues at hand. It has been said that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimonies; nor do they impair the credibility of the witnesses, especially where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the assailants.[19]
In dealing with this specific issue, the trial court did quite well in its disquisition, thus:
It does not matter that, by account of prosecution witness Delia Salvador, the victim was stabbed nine times by both accused—six times by the accused Lloyd Escoton and three times by Ariel Nabong. The variance between the number of times the victim was stabbed as witnessed by Delia Salvador and the number of stab wounds actually sustained by the victim as found by Dr. Ma. Rosie G. Autajay, does not detract from the fact of multiplicity of the stab blows and the stab wounds. The variance, therefore, does not constitute a serious inconsistency as to cast doubt on the credibility of prosecution witness Delia Salvador. In any event, the variance refers to a trivial point considering that in a horrifying event—such as the butchery of the victim by the knife-wielding assailants—eyewitnesses cannot be expected, nor be faulted, if they are unable to completely accurate in picturing to the court all that transpired and every detail of what they have seen. Moreover, it has been said that a truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony because of the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. It is, then, probable that both accused in the present case may have really stabbed the victim even more than thirteen times, but the victim actually sustained only thirteen stab wounds, while prosecution witness Delia Salvador perceived and saw only nine stab blows. Hence, what readily comes to mind is the dictum that the failure of a witness to recall each and every detail of an occurrence even serves to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of such witness because it erases any suspicion of a coached or rehearsed testimony. Indeed, a witness may give testimony that “reads brokenly and obscurely in print” and yet that same witness could “carry conviction of every truth to every soul who heard him testify.” Such a witness in the present case is Delia Salvador from whose testimony this Court heard nothing but plangent of truth.
It is worthwhile to state that in the present case the principal occurrence is the fatal stabbing of the victim Roman Aungon, Sr. and what is material in this regard is whether or not the accused Lloyd Escoton and Ariel Nabong assaulted the victim with bladed weapons, and not how many stab blows they delivered and how many of these hit the victim. As shown by the record, Delia Salvador consistently identified the accused Lloyd Escoton and Ariel Nabong as the knife-wielding assailants of the victim Roman Aungon, Sr., thereby establishing the prominent fact of the commission of the felonious act by the accused. Accordingly, the veracity and weight of the testimony of Delia Salvador are not impaired because she consistently related the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the accused Lloyd Escoton and Ariel Nabong as the ones who stabbed the victim.[20]
WHEREFORE, premised considered, the appealed Judgment dated 27 August 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, San Jose, Antique, in Criminal Case No. 2002-12-8726, finding appellants Lloyd Escoton and Ariel Nabong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Hernando, and Quijano-Padilla, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Judge Nery G. Duremdes; Records, pp. 108-124.
[2] Records, pp. 23-24.
[3] See Pertinent Gross Post-Mortem Findings dated 29 July 2002; Exhibit “A”, Records, pp. 2-3.
[4] The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused LLOYD ESCOTON alias “DODIE” and ARIEL NABONG alias “AYING” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9346, hereby:
(1) IMPOSING upon each of the accused LLOYD ESCOTON alias “DODIE” and ARIEL NABONG alias “AYING” the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessory penalties appertaining thereto.
(2) ORDERING the said accused LLOYD ESCOTON alias “DODIE” and ARIEL NABONG alias “AYING” to jointly and severally pay to the heirs of the victim ROMAN AUNGON, SR. the sums of P63,000.00 for and as actual damages, P25,000.00 for and as exemplary damages, P50,000.00 for and as moral damages, and P50,000.00 for and as civil indemnity; and
(3) PRONOUNCING no cost.
SO ORDERED.”
[5] See Assignment of Errors, Brief for the Accused-Appellants, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 19-20.
[6] See People v. Abella, G.R. No. 127803, 28 August 2000; People v. Garcia, 209 SCRA 164 (1992); People v. Torres, L-44429, 26 October 1983; People v. So, L-39504-06, 30 January 1984; People v. Clores, G.R. No. 130488, 8 June 2004; People v. Medina, G.R. No. 155256, 30 July 2004.
[7] See People v. Cabrera, G. R. No. 105992, 1 February 1995, 241 SCRA 28; People v. Yatco, 379 SCRA 432 (2002); People v. Boquirin, 383 SCRA 164 (2002); People v. Taboga, 376 SCRA 500 (2002).
[8] Transcript of Stenographic Notes, 17 August 2006, pp. 5-9.
[9] See People v. Leoterion, G.R. Nos. 111940-06, 21 November 1996, 264 SCRA 608.
[10] People v. Juan, 322 SCRA 598 (2000); People v. Armada, Jr., 225 SCRA 644 (1993); People v. Vergara, 221 SCRA 611 (1993); People v. Divina, 221 SCRA 543 (1993); People v. Sadiangbayan, 220 SCRA 551 (1993); People v. Dominguez, 217 SCRA 17 (1993).
[11] People v. Juan, 322 SCRA 598 (2000); People v. Armada, Jr., 225 SCRA 644 (1993); People v. Vergara, 221 SCRA 611 (1993); People v. Divina, 221 SCRA 543 (1993); People v. Sadiangbayan, 220 SCRA 551 (1993); People v. Dominguez, 217 SCRA 17 (1993).
[12] People v. Alib, 322 SCRA 93 (2000).
[13] People v. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251 (1998), citing People v. Barte, 230 SCRA 401 (1984), and People v. Aninon, 158 SCRA 701 (1988); People v. Pelopero, G.R. No. 126119, 15 October 2003; People v. Taboga, 376 SCRA 500 (2002); People v. Blanco, 324 SCRA 280 (2002).
[14] Citations omitted.
[15] The elements of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense. (See People v. Cawaling, 355 Phil. 1 [1998]; People v. Tan, 373 Phil. 990 [1999]; People v. Aglipa, 391 Phil. 879 [2000]; Salcedo v. People, 347 SCRA 499 [2000]; People v. Asuela, 426 Phil. 428 [2002]; People v. Magnabe, Jr., 435 Phil. 374 [2002]).
[16] 236 SCRA 300.
[17] 254 SCRA 621.
[18] Citations omitted.
[19] People v. Bato, G.R. No. 134939, February 16, 2000. Sumalpong v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764 (1997).
[20] Citations omitted.