PEDRO ELCANO AND PATRICIA ELCANO, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS ASCENDANTS OF AGAPITO ELCANO, DECEASED, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. REGINALD HILL, MINOR, AND MARVIN HILL, AS FATHER AND NA…

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January
29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano
et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants,
the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald
Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the
defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the
killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito
Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the
said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because
of “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.”

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

“1.  The present action is
not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule 111,
of the Revised Rules of Court;

“2.  The action is barred by a prior judgment which
is now final and or in res-adjudicata;

“3.  The complaint had no cause of action against
defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the other
defendant through emancipation by marriage.”

(p.
23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

was first denied
by the trial court.  It was only upon
motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the
above grounds that the following order was issued:

“Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the
defendants on January 14, 1965
and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds
the same to be meritorious and well-founded.

“WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by
ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.

“SO ORDERED.

“Quezon City,
Philippines, January 29, 1965.” (p.
40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)

Hence, this appeal
where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are
presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:

“THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT –

I

“THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY
AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS
INAPPLICABLE;

II

“THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR
JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICATA;

III

“THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS,
ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE;
and

IV

“THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE
OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE.” (page
4, Record.)

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito,
of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant-appellee Reginald
Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City.  After due trial, he was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal because of “lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake.” Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably
because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the
court’s decision.  And so, when
appellants filed their complaint against appellees
Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their
son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss
above-referred to.

As We view the foregoing background of
this case, the two decisive
issues presented for Our resolution are:

1.     
Is the present
civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reserved?

2.     
May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding undisputed
fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of, Reginald, though a
minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally
married?

The first issue presents no more problem than the need a reiteration and further clarification
of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source
of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607.  In that case, this Court postulated,
on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo
on the nature of culpa aquiliana in
relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with
pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of
recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given
act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under
the Civil Code.  Thus, the opinion holds:

“The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same
act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code.  In that case, the action of the agent was
unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a
criminal action.  And yet, it was held to
be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code.  It is also to be noted that it was the
employer and not the employee who was being sued.” (pp.
615-616, 73 Phil.)^[1]

“It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could
have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death
of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. 
Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a
proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil
liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil
action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.  Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate
individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and
clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer
could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which,
after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability
arising from his crime.” (p. 617, 73 Phil.)^[2]

“It is most significant that in the case just cited, this
Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code.  It is thus that although J. V. House could
have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.” (p. 618, 73 Phil.)^[3]

“The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked
should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case.  But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines
that have been little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to
indicate their foundations.

“Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not
only reckless but also simple negligence. 
If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer
only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal
import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application
in actual life.  Death or injury to
persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence – even the
slightest – would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil
liability arising from a crime.  In such
a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito
or culpa aquiliana?  We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any
intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous.  Nor are we, in the interpretation of the
laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth
rather than the spirit that giveth life.  We will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin
and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana
or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading
of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia – that the concurrence of
the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of
negligence and not intentional voluntary acts – deeper reflection would reveal
that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in
fact it actually extends to fault or culpa.  This can be seen in the reference made
therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919,
supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not
a negligent act.  Indeed, Article 1093 of
the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided
textually that obligations “which are derived from acts or omissions in
which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the
subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)” And it is precisely the underlined
qualification, “not punishable by law”, that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an undesirable construction
or interpretation of the letter of the law that “killeth,
rather than the spirit that giveth life” hence,
the ruling that “(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring
in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.” And so, because
Justice Bocobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the
original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code,
which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, “not
punishable by law, ” thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character
or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent.  Thus, the corresponding provision to said
Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
“Obligations derived from quasi-delicts
shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws.” More precisely, a
new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:

“ART. 2177. 
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code.  But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.”

According to the Code Commission: 
“The foregoing provision (Article 2177) though at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature
of criminal and civil negligence.  The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a ‘culpa aquiliana‘ or quasi-delict, of
ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality,
separate from criminal negligence.  Such
distinction between criminal negligence and ‘culpa extra-contractual’ or ‘cuasi-delito‘ has been sustained by decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by
Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. 
Therefore, under the proposed article 2177, acquittal from an accusation
of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar
to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
‘culpa aquiliana‘. 
But said article forestalls a double recovery.” (Report
of the Code Commission, p. 162.)

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer
to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bocobo
about construction that upholds “the spirit that giveth
life” rather than that which is literal that killeth
the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same.  And considering that the preliminary chapter
on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil
action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil
responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule
111, contemplate also the same separability, it is
“more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in
harmony with modern progress”, to borrow the felicitous relevant language
in Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do
hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to “fault or negligence,”
covers not only acts “not punishable by law” but also acts criminal
in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.  Consequently, a separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award
of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.  In other words, the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused.  Briefly
stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law.^[4]

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action
against him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald’s
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his
father, it is also Our considered opinion that the
conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already
free from responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the minor (child)”, it
is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage
of the minor is not really full or absolute. 
Thus “(E)mancipation
by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over
the child’s person.  It shall enable the
minor to administer his property as though he were of
age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without
the consent of his father or mother, or guardian.  He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian.”

Now, under Article 2180, “(T)he
obligation imposed by article, 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.  The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company.” In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living
with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence
in question.  Factually, therefore,
Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation
which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa,
the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of
parents with their offending child under Article 2180 is that it is the
obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent
them from causing damage to third persons.^[5]
On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a
minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it
freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation.  (See Manresa, id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely,
killing someone else invites judicial action. 
Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the
parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not
give cause to any litigation, in the same manner that the parents are
answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real
property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their
consent.  (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view,
Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage
of Reginald.  However, inasmuch as it is
evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of
Atty. Hill has become merely subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the
trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing
opinion.  Costs against
appellees.

Fernando, (Chairman), Antonio,
and Martin, JJ.,
concur.

Aquino, J., see concurring opinion.

Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.

^[1]
Referring to Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain
of February
14, 1919.

^[2]
Referring to Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil. 821.

^[3]
Referring to Bernal et al. vs. House et al., 54 Phil.
327.

^[4]
Parenthetically, Manresa
seemingly holds the contrary view thus:

“Sin embargo, para no incurrir en error hay que tener en cuenta
que los limites
del precepto contenido en el presente articulo son bastante mas reducidos,
pues no se hallan comprendidos en el todos los daños que
pueden tener por causa la culpa o la negligencia.

“En efecto,
examinando detenidamente la
teoria general de la culpa y de la negligencia, se observa que, tanto en una
como en otra de dichas causas, hay tres generos o tres especies distintas,
a saber:

1.  La que representa una accion u omision voluntaria por la que resulte incumplida
una obligacion anteriormente constituida.

2.  La que sin existencia de una obligacion anterior produce un daño
o perjuicio que, teniendo su origen
en un hecho ilicito, no reviste los caracteres
de delito o falta; y

3.  La que teniendo por origen un hecho que constituya delito o falta produce una responsabilidad civil como accesoria
de la responsabilidad criminal.

“La primera
de estas tres especies de culpa o negligencia es siempre accesoria
de una obligacion
principal, cuyo incumplimiento
da origen a la teoria especial de la culpa en materia
de contratos, y el estudio
de esta debe hacerse al examinar cada contrato, en especial, como lo hicimos asi, analizando entonces los peculiares
efectos de dicha culpa en cada uno de ellos.

“La tercera
de las especies citadas es accesoria
tambien, pues no puede concebirse su existencia sin la de un delito o falta
que la produzca.  Es decir, que solo al lado de la responsabilidad criminal puede subsistir esa responsabilidad
civil y la obligacion proveniente
de la culpa, indicada como una consecuencia de la responsabilidad criminal, y, por consiguiente, su examen y regulacion pertenecen al Derecho penal.

“Como consecuencia
de ello, resulta que la unica especie
de culpa y omision o negligencia
que puede ser y es materia del presente capitulo, es la segunda, o sea la que sin la existencia de una obligacion anterior, y sin ningun antecedente contractual,
produce un daño o perjuicio
que tiene su origen en una
accion u omision culpable
solo civilmente; es decir, que siendo
ilicita, no revista, sin
embargo, los caracteres de
un delito o falta por no estar penada
por la ley.  Y aun dentro de estos limites hay que restringir aun mas los terminos
o la materia propia de este articulo,
el cual se refiere unicamente a la culpa o negligencia
personales del
obligado, pero no a las que provienen
de actos o de omisiones de
personas distintas de este.”
(pp. 642-643, Vol. XII, Manresa, Codigo Civil Español.)

^[5]
“Nuestro Codigo no ha seguido la escuela italiana, sino que mas bien
se ha inspirado en el criterio
de la doctrina francesa, puesto que impone
la obligacion de reparar el
daño causado en virtud de una presuncion
juris tantum
de culpa por parte del que tiene bajo
su autoridad o dependencia al causante del daño, derivada del hecho de no haber puesto el cuidado y la vigilancia debida en los actos de sus
subordinados para evitar dicho resultado.  Asi
es que, segun
el parrafo ultimo del
art. 1,903, cesa dicha responsabilidad cuando se prueba que los
obligados por los actos ajenos
emplearon toda la diligencia de un buen padre de familia.  Luego no es la causa de la obligacion impuesta la representacion, ni el interes, ni la necesidad de que haya quien responda
del daño causado por el que no tiene
personalidad ni garantias de solvencia para responder por si, sino el incumplimiento
implicito o supuesto de los deberes de precaucion y de prudencia que imponen los
vinculos civiles que unen al obligado
con las personas por quienes debe reparar
el mal causado. 
Por
ese motivo coloca dicha obligacion
entre las que provienen de la culpa o negligencia.” (pp. 670-671, Manresa, Codigo Civil Español, Vol. XII.)

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