RAYMUNDO ERFE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. WILLELMO C. FORTUN, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BRANCH VIII, THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, DAGUPAN CITY, ANGELES L. LEONO…

Erfe versus Fortun

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Raymundo Erfe against Judge Willelmo C. Fortun, presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Dagupan City, and against the private respondents Angeles L. Leonor and Florentina L. Biacad. Erfe was the defendant in a civil case for recovery of ownership and possession of three parcels of riceland. He claims to be not a trespasser but a share tenant of the former owner, and he asked the trial court to refer the case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties. The trial court refused. The case matters because it fixes a mandatory, jurisdictional step: under the agrarian decree then in force, no court may take cognizance of a case designed to remove a tenant of riceland unless the case is first referred to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, and that duty survives even after judgment, whenever execution would eject the actual tiller.

Procedural History

The private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of the ricelands before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch VIII, then presided by Judge Sixto Domondon. After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the plaintiffs the real owners and lawful possessors and ordering Erfe to vacate and surrender possession. Erfe moved for reconsideration, praying that the case be referred to the Department, now Ministry, of Agrarian Reform under the governing decree. He filed a second motion reiterating the plea. Judge Domondon denied the motion, declaring that Erfe was in estoppel and that the case was outside the purview of the decree. Judge Domondon was later promoted to the Court of Appeals, and Judge Willelmo C. Fortun was assigned to the vacated sala. The private respondents then moved for a writ of execution, which Judge Fortun granted over Erfe's objection, and the subsequent motion to set aside the decision and stay execution was denied. Erfe came to the Supreme Court on certiorari to annul those orders, and the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of the writ.

Facts

Angeles L. Leonor and Florentina L. Biacad, through their mother and attorney-in-fact Encarnacion A. Laygo, sued Raymundo Erfe to recover three parcels of riceland with a total area of about one hectare in Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan. They alleged that they had purchased the lands from their mother, who had possessed them continuously and openly for over ten years, and that Erfe, asserting ownership, entered the lands and refused to surrender possession despite repeated demands.

In his answer, Erfe averred that he claimed no right of dominion over the properties. He alleged instead that he had occupied and cultivated the lands continuously for over ten years as share tenant of Encarnacion A. Laygo, the former owner, and he asked that his security of tenure as an agricultural tenant be recognized and upheld.

The trial court nonetheless declared the plaintiffs the real owners and lawful possessors and ordered Erfe to vacate. Erfe twice moved to refer the case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. The motion was denied on the grounds of estoppel and of the case being outside the decree. When the new judge granted execution, Erfe sought relief from the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court may take cognizance of, and decide, an ejectment case against a tenant of agricultural land devoted to rice and corn without a prior referral to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for preliminary determination of the relationship of the parties.
• Whether or not the fact that judgment had already been rendered justified the denial of the referral sought, where execution of that judgment would result in the ejectment of the actual tiller or tenant farmer.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Presidential Decree Number 316 provides:

Unless certified by the Secretary of Agrarian Reforms as a proper case for trial or hearing by a court or judge or other officer of competent jurisdiction, no judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Court of First Instance, municipal or city court, or any other tribunal or fiscal shall take cognizance of any ejectment case or any other case designed to harass or remove a tenant of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn, and if any such cases are filed these cases shall first be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative in the locality for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties. If the Secretary of Agrarian Reform finds that the case is a proper case for the Court or judge or other hearing officer to hear, he shall so certify and such court, judge or other hearing officer may assume jurisdiction over the dispute or controversy.

This is the express mandate the trial court violated when it denied the referral, for it strips the court of competence until the certification is made.

Memorandum Circular Number 29 of the Minister of Agrarian Reform, implementing the decree, provides:

With respect to agrarian or civil cases submitted for decision or pending execution — before decision is rendered or before execution of decision where such decision or execution would result in the ejectment of the actual tiller or the tenant farmer in order to determine whether the defendant has become a beneficiary or a recipient of a Land Transfer Certificate pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27.

This answers the second issue: referral remains mandatory even after judgment, whenever execution would eject the tiller.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court, in denying the referral, violated the express mandate of Section 2 of the decree. The provision is categorical: absent certification by the Secretary of Agrarian Reforms, no judge of the Court of First Instance shall take cognizance of any ejectment case or any other case designed to harass or remove a tenant of agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn, and such cases shall first be referred for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties. Erfe having pleaded continuous cultivation as share tenant, the case fell squarely within the provision.

On the second issue, the Court held that the fact that a decision had already been rendered did not justify denial of the referral. Under the implementing circular, referral after judgment is still mandatory where execution of the decision would result in the ejectment of the actual tiller or the tenant farmer. The Court therefore set aside both the order denying the referral and the order granting the writ of execution.

Doctrine

Under Section 2 of Presidential Decree Number 316, referral to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties is mandatory and jurisdictional. No court may take cognizance of an ejectment case, or any case designed to harass or remove a tenant of agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn, unless the Secretary of Agrarian Reforms first certifies it as a proper case for trial. The duty to refer is not extinguished by judgment: where execution would result in the ejectment of the actual tiller or tenant farmer, referral remains mandatory even at the execution stage. A judgment rendered without the required referral cannot stand, and neither can the writ of execution issued under it.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the order denying the referral and the order granting the writ of execution were set aside, and the lower court was directed to refer the civil case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.

Remember This

Memorize the line that referral is mandatory even after judgment whenever execution would eject the actual tiller or tenant farmer. Examiners use this case to test the jurisdictional nature of the referral requirement under the agrarian decree and its survival into the execution stage.