COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VI, MERCEDES TOBIANO CO, JOSE TOBIANO AND JUSTO T…

On motion of the Solicitor General to declare
respondent judge in contempt of court. 
Respondent judge filed his return thereto.  The motion was heard on oral arguments,
submitted for resolution.  The facts from
which the contempt proceedings stemmed are now to be related.

On September 27, 1962,
a decision was rendered by the Board of Commissioners of Immigration, excluding
respondent Mercedes Tobiano Co and her alleged
children, including respondents Jose Tobiano and Justo Tobiano, as aliens not properly documented for admission,
and directing their return to the port from whence they came or to the country
of which they are nationals.  A warrant
of exclusion was issued.  Jose Tobiano and Justo Tobiano were there­upon arrested.

Offshoots of the decision and warrant just mentioned are two
cases before the Court of First Instance of Manila, both entitled
“Mercedes Tobiano Co., et al. vs. Martiniano P. Vivo, et al.”, brought primarily against
the Acting Commissioner of Immigration. 
The first, Civil Case No. 58624, is for certiorari lodged by private
respondents and others^[1] to annul
said decision of the Board of Commissioners; the second is Civil Case No.
58782, for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Mercedes Tobiano
Co, on behalf of her sons, respondents Jose Tobiano
and Justo Tobiano.

In Case 58782, private respondents moved for the grant of bail to
Jose Tobiano and Justo Tobiano.  On February 5, 1965, respondent judge
granted their motion and directed their release upon approval of a P5,000.00-bond for each.  On the same day, pursuant to a surety bond in
the amount of P10,000.00 (P5,000.00 for
each), respondent judge directed the Commissioner of Immigration or the officer
in charge of the Immigration Detention Station to promptly release Jose Tobiano and Justo Tobiano.

The next day, February 6, 1965, the Commissioner of Immi­gration came to
this Court in the present proceedings on certiorari to annul respondent judge’s
orders of February 5, 1965 in Case 58782; and on injunction – preliminary and
perpetual – to prevent enforcement thereof, and to restrain the judge from
otherwise taking cognizance of, conducting further proceedings in, or in any
other manner assuming jurisdiction over, said case.

On February 10, 1965,
this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondent
judge, thus:

“NOW, THEREFORE, until further orders from this Court, You,
your agents, your representatives and/or any person or persons acting in your
behalf are hereby enjoined from enforcing or implementing the order dated
February 5, 1965 and the Order of Release dated February 5, 1965, and otherwise
taking cognizance of or in any manner assuming
jurisdiction or [conducting] further proceedings [in] the case No. 58782
(Mercedes Tobiano Co., etc. vs. Martiniano P. Vivo, etc., et al.) of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VI.”

Following a precedent,^[2]
this Court, on August 27, 1965,
amended the preceding injunctive order of February 10, 1965 –

“in the sense of permitting
respondent judge to grant bail to Jose Tobiano and Justo Tobiano (P25,000 each)
subject to conditions similar to those granted by the Court of Appeals in the
suit referred to in L-22696.  Such
release on bail shall be subject to the decision to be promulgated in this
litigation.”

The foregoing injunction notwithstanding, respondent judge, on January 6, 1967, promulgated a joint
decision in Cases 58624 and 58782 earlier mentioned, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

“IN CONSIDERATION OF ALL THE FORE­GOING, the Court finds the
decision of reversal of respondent Board of Commissioners, as well as the
warrant of exclusion issued by respondent
Commis­sioner of Immigration, both on the same date, Septem­ber 27, 1962, null and void, and the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry #1 dated October 3, 1961, as final.  This Court therefore holds that the
petitioners, MERCEDES TOBIANO CO, SUSANA TOBIANO, JOSE TOBIANO, JUAN TOBIANO,
JULIO TOBIANO, JUSTO TOBIANO, and PABLO TOBIANO, are entitled to remain in the Philippines
as citizens thereof, in accordance with the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry #1 of the Bureau of Immigration. 
No pronouncement as to costs.”

The foregoing judgment triggered the present contempt
proceedings.

1. Respondent judge’s main defense, distilled into a few words, is this:  Since this Court, by resolution of August 27, 1965, granted bail to
petitioners Jose Tobiano and Justo
Tobiano, the injunctive order of February 10, 1965 has lost its prohibitory effect
and was reduced to functus officio.  The lack of validity of this pose is at once
apparent.

The import of the injunctive order of February 10, 1965 need not be essayed.  The terms employed therein are clear; the
mandate, brief and authoritative.  Two
separate and distinct acts are there forbidden: 
first, respondent judge was enjoined from enforcing his orders of
February 5, 1965 (granting the motion to release Jose Tobiano
and Justo Tobiano upon approval
of the bond fixed; and directing release upon bond filed); and second,
respondent judge was prohibited from “otherwise taking cognizance of or in
any manner assuming jurisdiction or [conducting] further proceedings [in] the
case No. 58782 (Mercedes Tobiano Co, etc. vs. Hon. Martiniano P. Vivo, etc., et al.).”

Unquestionably, all that respondent
judge was allowed to do by the amendatory
resolution of August 27, 1965
was to grant bail, in a considerably increased amount.  This is no license for the judge to decide
that Jose Tobiano and Justo
Tobiano may remain in the Philippines
as citizens thereof.  The import of his
decision is to render ineffective the bond requirement for stay.  For, a citizen needs no bond just to remain
in his own country.  The second portion
of the writ of February 10, 1965
remained as unaffected by said amendatory resolution of August 27, 1965. 
That specific portion is intact, undiminished in its peremptory
command.  It is too much of a wrench to
say that simply because our August 27, 1965 resolution allowing release on bail
is in line with respondent judge’s similar order of February 5, 1965 in Case
58782, said judge was at liberty to decide the case aforesaid.  Respondent judge cannot brush aside as
innocuous the fact that the resolution of August 27, 1965 made it abundantly clear that “[s]uch release on bail shall be
subject to the decision to be promulgated
in this litigation.”^[3]  Nor could an inference be justifiably drawn that
the resolution of August 27, 1965
was in the nature of a dismissal of the certiorari petition before this
Court.  It is not.  The petition herein still stands.  The case here remains pending.  And, the proscription against further
proceeding with Case No. 58782 subsists.

Clearly then, the joint decision rendered by respondent judge in
Cases 58624 and 58782 is an open defiance of the directive of this Court.  It violates the injunction.

2. As we pierce the shard of respondent judge’s plea of lack of
intention to defy or disobey, we perceive a subtle attempt on his part to
sidetrack the injunction.  We note that in his answer to the
motion for contempt, he deftly avoided any mention of the contents of
the injunction of February 10, 1965.  And then, as he decided Case 58782 for
habeas corpus jointly with Case 58624 for certiorari, he refrained from
reciting in the dispositive part any mention of Case
58782, apparently in an effort to justify a semblance of lack of disobedience
to the injunctive order.  And this, upon
his claim that, after all, “there is no injunctive order from this Honorable
Court” insofar as the other case – Case 58624 – is concerned.  But, no amount of judicial legerdemain will
bring about a conclusion other than that Case 58782, by the terms of the joint
judgment, is also decided therein.  For, the
judge declared that the two Tobianos are entitled to
remain in the Philippines as citizens
thereof.  And, perforce, the petition for
habeas corpus in Case 58782 was there granted; the Tobianos
were automatically released; they can no longer be arrested for
deportation.  It is well to remember that
“[v]iolation of a court order by subterfuge is as much
contempt of court as violation by more direct action.”^[4]

3. As early as 1903, Weigall vs.
Shuster, 11 Phil. 340, 354, has reminded us that “maintenance of
public order and the existence of the commonwealth itself, depend upon the
enforcement of the mandates of the courts and require prompt obedience to them,
not only by private citizens, but in a special manner by the Government
officers who are particularly charged with a knowledge of the law and with the
duty of obeying it.”  Respondent is
a judge of a superior court.  But his
official character will not insulate him from punishment for insubordination of
an order of the highest Tribunal of the land. 
When he took his oath of office as a judge, he swore that he would
“obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities.”  Canon 22
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics should have reminded him that “[t]he
judge should be studiously careful himself to avoid even the slightest
infraction of the law, lest it be a demoral­izing example to others.” As Mr. Justice Malcolm once said: 
“It would seem hardly necessary to add that judges should respect
the orders and decisions of an appellate court.”^[5]  A fundamental principle in our democratic
system of government is that no official, no matter how high, is above the law.^[6]  It is in this context that we say that
respondent judge is accountable for the contempt committed by him.^[7]

4. Courts are inherently empowered to punish for contempt to the
end that they may enforce their authority, preserve their integrity, maintain
their dignity, and insure the effectiveness of the administration of justice.^[8]

 Indirect contempt – as is
the case here – is provided in Section 3, Rule 71, Rules of Court, viz:

“SEC. 3.  Indirect contempts to be punished after
charge and hearing. 
– After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for contempt:

x        x          x

(b) Disobedience of
or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a
court, or injunction granted by a court or judge, x x
x.”

The disobedience which the law punishes as constructive contempt
implies wilfulness. 
For, at bottom, contempt is a willful disregard or disobedience.^[9]
 The act of respondent judge complained of
comes easily within the coverage of this rule.

In assessing the penalty, however, we are to be guided by the
salutary rule that the power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the
preservative, not vindictive, principle.^[10]

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge Gaudencio
Cloribel guilty of indirect contempt, we hereby
sentence him to pay a fine of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00).

Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, The
Secretary of Justice.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Included as petitioners
in that suit (Case 58624) were the other alleged
children of Mercedes Tobiano Co., namely:  Susana Tobiano,
Juan Tobiano, Julio Tobiano,
Pablo Tobiano.

^[2]
Commissioner of Immigration vs. Hernandez (Resolution), L-22696, August 10, 1965.

^[3]
Underscoring supplied.

^[4]
17 C.J.S., p. 30. See:  Glover vs. Malloska,
217 N.W. 896,
897, citing 6 R.C.L. 503; Craig vs.
Kelley, 18 N.W.
2d 413, 417; State vs. Koon, 201 S.W. 2d
446, 455, citing 12 Am. Jur., p. 406; Hobbs
vs. Poteet,
207 S.W. 2d
501, 503.

“The law abhors
subterfuges.  It lays aside the covering
and looks to the actual facts beneath.  x
x x ‘The law is not to
be hoodwinked by colorable pretenses; it looks at truth and reality through
whatever disguise it may assume.'”  Lohse Patent Door
Co. vs. Fuelle, 114 S.W. 997, 1005-1006.

^[5]
Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 209.

^[6]
Villavicencio
vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, 787.

^[7]
Valenzuela vs. Revilla and Carlos, 41 Phil. 4,
6-7; In re Quirino, 76 Phil. 630, 636-637.  See: 
17 C.J.S., p. 96.

^[8]
Sec. 5 (c), Rule 135, Rules of Court; In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944, 950; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322, 332; Perkins vs.
Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271, 274; Cabansag vs.
Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152, 159. See: 
17 C.J.S., pp. 109-110.

^[9]
Narcida vs.
Bowen, 22 Phil. 365, 369; People vs. Rivera, 91 Phil. 354, 357, citing
authorities; Ferrer vs. Rodriguez,
L-17507, August
6, 1962.

^[10]
Lualhati vs.
Albert, 57 Phil. 86, 90; Villavicencio vs. Lukban, supra,
at p. 798; In re Quirino, supra, at p.
636; People vs. Rivera, supra, at p. 358.