THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ERNESTO PUNO Y FILOMENO, ACCUSED WHOSE DEATH SENTENCE IS UNDER REVIEW.

This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a defense
the exempting circumstance of insanity.

There is no doubt that at about two o’clock in the after­noon of
September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney driver, entered a bedroom in the
house of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72, a widow.  The house was located in the area known as
Little Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros, Malabon, Rizal.

On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by
saying:  “Mangkukulam ka,
mambabarang, mayroon kang bubuyog”. 
Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck her several times on the head
with a hammer until she was dead.

The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was in
the bedroom with the old woman, and by Lina Pajes, 27, a tenant of the
adjoining room.  They testified that
Puno’s eyes were reddish.  His look was
baleful and menacing.  Puno was a
neighbor of Aling Kikay.

After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria
had taken refuge, and, according to Hilaria, he made the following confession
and threat:  “Huag kayong
magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at
sabihin ninyo na umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay
sa matanda.” Or, according to Lina, Puno said:  “Pinatay ko na iyong matanda.  Huag kayong tumawag ng pulis.  Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang
paghihigantihan ko.”

After the killing, Puno fled to his parents’ house at Barrio
Tugatog, Malabon and then went to the house of his second cousin, Teotimo Puno,
located at Barrio San Jose, Calumpit, Bulacan,
reaching that place in the evening.  How
he was able to go to that place, which was then flooded, is not shown in the
record.

Disregarding Puno’s threat, Una, after noting that he had left,
notified the Malabon police of the killing. 
Corporal Daniel B. Cruz answered the call.  He found Aling Kikay sprawled on her bed
already dead.  Her head was bloody.  Her blanket and pillows were bloodstained.  He took down the statements of Lina and Hilaria at the police
station.  They pointed to Puno as the
killer (pp. 15-17, Record).

A medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investi­gation
conducted an autopsy.  He certified that
the victim had lacerated wounds
on her right eyebrow and contusions on the head caused by a hard
instrument.  On opening the skull, the
doctor found extensive and generalized hemorrhage.  The cause of death was intracranial,
traumatic hemorrhage (Exh. A).

Puno’s father surrendered him to the police.  Two Mala­bon policemen brought him to the
National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal on September 10, 1970 (p. 14,
Record).  He was charged with murder in
the municipal court.  He waived the
second stage of the preliminary investigation.

On October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the Circuit
Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal.  Alleged
in the inform­ation as aggravating circumstances were evident premeditation,
abuse of superiority and disregard of sex.

Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified about five
months after the killing, pretended that he did not remember having killed Aling
Kikay.  He believes that there are
persons who are “mangkukulam”, “mambabarang” and
“mambubuyog” and that when one is victimized by those persons, his
feet might shrink or his hands might swell. 
Puno believes that a person harmed by a “mambabarang” might
have a headache or a swelling nose and ears and can be cured only by a quack
doctor (herbolaryo). 
Consequently, it is necessary
to kill the “mang­kukulam” and “mambabarang”.

Puno is the third child in a family of twelve children.  He is married with two children.  He finished third year high school.  His father is a welder.  Among his friends are drivers.  (Exh. B).

Zenaida Gabriel, 30, Puno’s wife, testified that on the night
before the murder, Puno’s eyes were reddish. 
He complained of a headache.  The
following day while he was feeding the pigs, he told Zenaida that a bumble bee
was coming towards him and he warded it off with his hands.  Zenaida did
not see any bee.

Puno then went upstairs and took the cord of the religious habit
of his mother.  He wanted to use that
cord in tying his dog.  He asked for
another rope when Zenaida admonished him not to use that cord.  Puno tied the dog to a tree by looping the
rope through its mouth and over its head. 
He repeatedly boxed the dog.

Aida Gabriel, Zenaida’s
elder sister, saw Puno while he was boxing that dog.  Aida observed that Puno’s eyes were bloodshot
and his countenance had a ferocious expression.

Teotimo Puno testified that on the night of September 8, 1970,
Ernesto Puno came to their house in Barrio San Jose, Calumpit.  Ernesto was soaking wet as there was a flood
in that place.  He was cuddling a puppy
that he called “Diablo”.  He
called for Teotimo’s mother who invited him to eat.  Ernesto did not eat.  Instead, he fed the puppy.

Ernesto introduced
Teotimo to his puppy.  Then, he sang
an English song.  When Teotimo asked him
to change his wet clothes, Ernesto refused. 
Later, he tried on the clothes of Teotimo’s father.  When told that Teotimo’s father had been dead
for a couple of years already, Ernesto just looked at Teotimo.

While he was lying down, Ernesto began singing again.  Then he emitted a moaning sound until he fell
asleep.  Ernesto was awakened the next
morning by the noise caused by persons wading in the flood.  Ernesto thought they were his fellow cursillistas.

The defense presented three psychiatrists.  However, instead of proving that Puno was
insane when he killed Aling Kikay, the medical experts testified that Puno
acted with discernment.

Thus, Doctor Araceli
Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section of the Dr. Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital,
to whom Puno was referred for treatment ten times between September 8, 1966 and
July 24, 1970, testified that Puno was an out-patient who could very
well live with society, although he was afflicted with “schizophrenic reaction”; that Puno knew what he was doing
and that he had psychosis, a slight destruction of the ego.  Puno admitted to Doctor Maravilla that one
cause of his rest­lessness, sleeplessness and irritability was his financial
prob­lem (7 tsn November 4, 1970). 
Doctor Maravilla observed that Puno on July 24, 1970 was already cured.

Doctor Reynaldo Robles of the National Mental Hospital testified
that Puno was first brought to that hospital on July 28, 1962 because his
parents complained that he laughed alone and exhibited certain eccentricities
such as kneeling, praying and making
his body rigid.  Doctor Robles observed
that while Puno was suffering from “schizophrenic reaction”, his
symptoms were “not socially incapacitating” and that he could adjust
him­self to his environment (4 tsn January 20, 1971).  He agreed with Doctor Maravilla’s testimony.

Doctor Carlos Vicente, a medical specialist of the National
Mental Hospital, testified that from his examination of Puno, he gathered that
Puno acted with discernment when he committed the killing and that Puno could
distinguish between right and wrong (5 tsn January 11, 1971).

Doctor Vicente also concluded that Puno was not suffering from
any delusion and that he was not mentally deficient; otherwise, he would not
have reached third year high school (8-19 tsn January 11, 1971).

On December 14, 1970 or three months after the com­mission of the
offense, Doctors Vicente, Robles and Victorina V. Manikan of the National
Mental Hospital submitted the follow­ing report on Puno (Exh. B or 2):

“Records show that he had undergone psychiatric treat­ment at
the Out-Patient Service of the National Mental Hospital for schizophrenia in
1962 from which he recovered; in 1964 a relapse of the same mental illness when
he improved and in 1966 when his illness remained unimproved.

“His treatment was continued at the JRR Memorial Hospital at
the San Lazaro Compound up to July, 1970. 
He was relieved of symptoms and did not come back anymore for
medication.  On September 8, 1970,
according to inform­ation, he was able to kill an old woman.  Particulars of the offense are not given.

“MENTAL
CONDITION

“x x x.  Presently, he is quiet and as usual manage­able.  He is fairly clean in person and without
undue display of emotion.  He talks to
co-patients but becomes evasive when talking with the doctor and other
personnel of the ward.  He knows he is
accused of murder but refuses to elaborate on it.

x x x                          x x x                             x
x x

“REMARKS

“In view of the foregoing findings, Ernesto Puno, who
previously was suffering from a mental illness called schizo­phrenia, is
presently free from any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms.

“The seeming ignorance of very simple known facts and amnesia
of several isolated accounts in his life do not fit the active pattern of a
schizophrenic process.  It may be found
in an acutely disturbed and confused patient or a markedly re­tarded individual
of which he is not.

“However, persons who recover from an acute episode of mental
illness like schizophrenia may retain some residual symptoms impairing their
judgment but not necessarily their discernment of right from wrong of the
offense committed.”

The foregoing report was submitted pursuant to Rule 28 of the
Rules of Court and the order of the trial court dated Novem­ber 16, 1970 for
the mental examination of Puno in the National Mental Hospital to determine
whether he could stand trial and whether he was sane when he committed the
killing.

The trial court concluded that Puno was sane or knew that the
killing of Francisca Col was wrong and that he would be punished for it, as
shown by the threats which he made to Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina Pajes, the
old woman’s companions who witnessed his dastardly deed.

The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homi­cidal
maniac who had gone berserk, he would have killed also Hilaria and Lina.  The fact that he singled out Aling Kikay sig­nified
that he really disposed of her because he thought that she was a witch.

Judge Onofre A. Villaluz said that during the trial he
“meticulously observed the conduct and behavior of the accused inside the
court, most especially when he was presented on the witness stand” and he was
convinced “that the accused is sane and has full grasp of what was
happening” in his environment.

The trial court convicted Puno of murder, sentenced him to death
and ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim an indemnity of twenty-two
thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 509).

His counsel de oficio
in this review of the death sentence, contends that the trial court erred in
not sustaining the defense of insanity and in appreciating evident
premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex as aggravating circumstances.

When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from
responsibility, the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the
act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution (U.S. vs. Guevara,
27 Phil. 547).  Insanity should be proven
by clear and positive evidence (People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204).

The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed
Francisca Col because he had chronic schizophrenia since 1962; he was suffering
from schizophrenia on September 8, 1970, when he liquidated the victim, and
schizophrenia is a form of psychosis which deprives a person of discernment and
freedom of will.

Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that
the accused must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of
the will at the time of committing the
crime (People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660).

“Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation
of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is dep­rived of
reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete
absence of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of
freedom of the will.  Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.”
(People vs. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688, October 17, 1980; People vs. Renegado,
L-27031, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 275, 286; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288,
292.  As to “el trastorno mental
transitorio” as an exempting circumstance, see 1 Cuello Calon, Codigo
Penal, 15th Ed., 1974, pp. 498-504 and art. 8 of the Spanish Penal Code.)

After evaluating counsel de oficio’s contentions in
the light of the strict rule just stated and the circumstances sur­rounding the
killing, we are led to the conclusion that Puno was not legally insane when he
killed the hapless and helpless victim. 
The facts and the findings of the psychiatrists reveal that on that
tragic occasion he was not completely deprived of reason and freedom of will.

In People vs. Fausto y Tomas, 113 Phil. 841, the ac­cused was
confined in the National Mental Hospital for thirteen days because he was
suffering from schizophrenia of the para­noid type.  His confinement was recommended by Doctor
Antonio Casal of the San Miguel Brewery where the accused used to work as a
laborer.  About one year and two months
later, he killed Doctor Casal because the latter refused to certify him for re-­employment.  His plea of insanity was rejected.  He was con­victed of murder.

In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized the
killing as murder.  The qualifying
circumstance is abuse of superiority.  In
liquidating Francisca Col, Puno, who was armed with a hammer, took advantage of
his superior natural strength over that
of the unarmed septuagenarian female victim who was unable to offer any
resistance and who could do nothing but exclaim “Diyos ko”.

Thus, it was held that “an attack made by a man with a
deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman consti­tutes the
circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his
sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him and from which the woman was
unable to defend herself” (People vs. Guzman, 107 Phil. 1122, 1127 citing
U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; U.S. vs. Camiloy, 36 Phil. 757 and People vs.
Quesada, 62 Phil. 446).

Evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) cannot be
appreciated because the evidence does not show (a) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the
culprit had clung to his determi­nation and (c) a sufficient interval of time
between the deter­mination and the execution of the crime to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act (People vs. Abletes, L-33304, July 31,
1974, 58 SCRA 241, 247).

The essence of premeditation “es la mayor perversidad del
culpable juntamente con su serenidad o frialdad de animo”.  It is characterized (1) “por la
concepcion del delito y la reso­lucion de ejecutarlo firme„ fria, reflexiva,
meditada y detenida” and (2)
“por la persistencia en la resolucion de delin­quir demostrada por el
espacio de tiempo transcurrido entre dicha resolucion y la ejecucion del hecho”.  Premeditation should be evident, meaning that
it should be shown by “signos reiterados y externos, no de meras
sospechas” (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 1974 or 15th Ed., pp. 582-3).

Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on
account of her old age should be appreciated as generic aggravating
circumstances.  Disregard of sex is not
aggravating because there is no evidence that the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the
victim or showed mani­fest disrespect to her womanhood (People vs. Mangsant, 65
Phil. 548; People vs. Mori, L-23511-2, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 404;
People vs. Jaula, 90 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. De Jesus, 14 Phil. 190).

However, those two aggravating circumstances are off­set by the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender to the authorities and, as
contended by counsel de oficio, the offender’ s mental illness
(mild psychosis or schizophrenic reaction) which diminished his will-power
without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts.  (See People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694,
People vs. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 and People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658.)

Thus, it was held that “la equivocada creencia de los
acusados de que el matar a un brujo es un bien al publico puede considerarse
como una circunstancia atenuante pues los que tienen la obsesion de que los
brujos deben ser eliminados estan en la misma condicion que aquel que, atacado
de enfermedad morbosa, pero consciente aun de lo que hace, no tiene verdadero
imperio de su voluntad” (People vs. Balneg, 79 Phil. 805, 810).

It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder
should be imposed (Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised Penal Code).

WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside.  The accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua.  The indemnity imposed by the trial court is
affirmed.  Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De
Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., he unable to
arrive at that stage of moral certainty as to the guilt of the accused and
hence concur in the dissent of Justice Makasiar,
with the observation that the reference in the exhaustive opinion of Justice
Aquino to Ambat, where he was also the ponente, with its learned an
scholarly discourse on the law on insanity, gives me the opportunity to express
my preference for a liberal reading of Durham v. US,^[1] therein cited. 
For some eminent commentators, the M’Naghten doctrine no longer speaks
with authority.  In the light of the
advances in medical science there is, for me, a need for the reexamination of
what until now are authoritative pronouncements on this subject.

Teehankee, J., concurs
J. Makasiar in his dissent.

^[1]
214 F2d 862 (1954).

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