HEIRS OF THE LATE DARIO DIAZ, REPRESENTED BY HIS WIFE, GLORIA M. DIAZ, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOLPHIN SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC., ALAMAT SHIPPING CORP.…
DICDICAN, J.:
The material and relevant facts, as culled from the record, are as follows:
Private respondent Dolphin Ship Management, Inc. (“Dolphin Ship Management”) is a Philippine manning agency, with its foreign principal, herein private respondent Alamat Shipping Corporation, (“Alamat Shipping”). Private respondent Mr. Marcelo R. Raneses (“Raneses”) is an officer of Dolphin Ship.
Petitioner Gloria M. Diaz (“Gloria”) is the surviving spouse and legal heir of the deceased Dario T. Diaz (“Dario”). Dario was hired by the private respondents as Chief Cook on board M/V Herefore Express on January 5, 2011 for a stipulated period of six (6) months[5].
Prior to his deployment, Dario underwent a series of medical examinations wherein he was found to be “fit to work” by the company designated physician.
Allegedly, Dario was already experiencing difficulty in breathing when he was on board the vessel but he did not report the same to the captain.
After six months from the time he boarded the vessel, Dario’s contract with the private respondent lapsed. He arrived in the Philippines on August 12, 2011.
While in the Philippines, Dario allegedly suffered from a heart attack as shown by an undated clinical abstract issued by Dr. Theserie B. Evangelista (“Dr. Evangelista”)[6].
On December 15, 2011, a cardiology report[7] prepared by Dr. Romeo Meriño declared that Dario was not fit to work.
Unfortunately, on August 8, 2012, Dario died with the following causes indicated in his death certificate[8]:
Immediate cause: Cardiac arrest
Antecedent cause: Status Asthmaticus
Underlying cause: Bronchial Asthma
For the refusal of the private respondents to pay for the death benefits to which Dario’s legal heirs were allegedly entitled to under the POEA contract, the petitioner, on December 14, 2012, filed a complaint against the private respondents for payment of death benefits, burial allowance, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees[9].
The petitioner claimed that her husband, Dario, incurred an illness on board the vessel during the term of his employment contract with the private respondents and that such illness was work-related, both medically and legally. For the petitioner, Dario’s death had converted the disability benefits that he was entitled to into death benefits. Moreover, aside from death benefits and burial allowance, the petitioner likewise sought for the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees.
In denying their liability, the private respondents claim that the petitioner had no cause of action against them since the deceased seafarer did not suffer any disability during the period of his employment with them. Neither did Dario die during his employment with the private respondents. According to the private respondents, Dario was repatriated due to the expiration of his employment contract on August 11, 2011.
Furthermore, the private respondents asserted that Dario had forfeited his right to claim benefits as provided under the POEA Contract on the ground that he failed to comply with the mandatory post-employment medical examination requirement with the company-accredited physician within three (3) working days after his return.
As all efforts to reach an amicable settlement proved futile during the conciliation conference conducted by the Labor Arbiter, the case underwent proceedings to determine the merit of petitioner’s complaint. The parties were made to submit their respective position papers and evidence in support thereof which they did dutifully submit.
After evaluating the evidence and contentions adduced and set forth by both parties, Labor Arbiter Lilia S. Savari rendered a Decision dated June 28, 2013[10] which dismissed the case for lack of merit. Pertinent portions of the said decision are cited herein as follows:
“The deceased seafarer, Dario T. Diaz, was contracted by the Respondents for a six-(6) month contract on board the vessel, MV Herefore Express. During the term of his contract, there is no showing that Complainant has suffered the symptoms of his illness as he was able to finish his contract and upon arrival in the Philippines, he reported to Respondent’s Office but failed to inform the Respondents that he was suffering from illness so that he could be referred to the company designated physician. The alleged ‘Salaysay ni Dario T. Diaz’ cannot be given due course as the same was not signed by him. Even the ‘Clinical Abstract’ issued by Dr. Theserie B. Evangelista did not state when Complainant was admitted at Mary Johnston Hospital, Inc. of Tondo, Manila.
“It was only on December 15, 2011 that a Cardiology Report was issued by Romeo U. Meriño stating that Complainant was unfit to work, and no other medical record was presented by the Complainant that her late husband has suffered from a work-related illness during the term of his employment.
“The seafarer Dario T. Diaz died on August 8, 2012, one year after his repatriation and there is no showing that he died from an illness which he incurred during the term of his contract.
“The deceased even re-applied for re-deployment which implies that he did not report his illness to the Respondents within three (3) days upon arrival which resulted to the forfeiture of his benefits under the Standard Contract particularly Section 20 B, No. 3 which states:
‘Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
‘For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.’
“WHEREFORE, a Decision is hereby rendered DISMISSING the case for lack of merit.
“SO ORDERED.”
Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed from the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC.
On November 15, 2013, the NLRC, Sixth Division, rendered the assailed Decision[11] which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated June 28, 2013 is AFFIRMED.
“SO ORDERED.”
The NLRC adopted the findings of the Labor Arbiter. According to the NLRC, except for the undated and unsigned statement of Dario, there is no record which would account of what really happened to him. Dario never reported his difficulty in breathing to the captain while he was still on board the vessel nor to the private respondents after his repatriation after the expiration of his employment contract. Neither did he comply with the mandatory post-employment medical examination supposed to be conducted by the company accredited physician upon his return to the Philippines. Per stance of the NLRC even if it be assumed that the cause of Dario’s death could be linked to his work, it will not be fair to hold the private respondents liable because the situation was kept from them. The private respondents were not given the opportunity to avoid the resulting death on account of Dario’s illness.
The NLRC likewise ruled that, under Section 20 B-3 of Memorandum Circular No. 55, a seafarer who is medically repatriated should submit himself to a post-employment medical examination within three days upon his return or to notify the agency within the same period of his physical incapacity to do so, and the failure to comply would result in the forfeiture of the right to disability benefits. Therefore, Dario’s physical examination which took place months after the date of his repatriation to the Philippines did not entitle him or his heirs to claim his right to any disability benefit, even if it be assumed arguendo that it existed.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the NLRC but the said motion was denied in a Resolution[12] dated December 27, 2013, viz:
“WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
“SO ORDERED.”
Unstirred by the foregoing disposition of the NLRC, the petitioner filed the instant petition with this Court assigning the following acts of grave abuse of discretion which were purportedly committed by the NLRC:
I.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR DEATH BENEFITS.
II.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT FAILED TO AWARD DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER.
In sum, the primordial issue brought before this Court for resolution is whether or not the petitioner was entitled to death benefits under the POEA Standard Employment Contract in connection with the death of her husband, Dario.
After a careful and judicious scrutiny of the whole matter, together with the applicable laws and jurisprudence in the premises, we find the instant petition to be devoid of merit.
The petitioner contends that it was inaccurate for the NLRC to state that Dario did not suffer from an illness during the term of his contract with the private respondents and that such illness was not work-related. The petitioner asseverates that, under Section 20 B, No. 4 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract, she has, in her favor, the presumption that Dario’s illness was work-related. As such, the burden of overturning such presumption was with the private respondents.
It is the oft-repeated rule that whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right to the benefits by substantial evidence[13]. Often described as more than a mere scintilla, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise[14]. Any decision based on unsubstantiated allegations cannot stand as it will offend due process[15]. Hence, the burden to prove entitlement to disability benefits lies on the petitioner, thus she must establish that Dario had contracted his illness which resulted to his disability during the term of the employment contract.
A review of the records would show that the petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that Dario’s illness which resulted to his death was acquired or arose during the term of his employment contract. There was no record of medical complaint lodged by Dario during his employment on board the vessel MV Herefore Express and even after his arrival in the Philippines on August 12, 2011. As both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC correctly observed, the medical certificates submitted were issued long after Dario had disembarked from the vessel. Except for her bare allegation and Dario’s unsigned and undated affidavit, the petitioner failed to present any evidence that would indeed establish that her husband contracted his illness during his employment. In fact, the private respondents were not even aware or apprised of Dario’s illness which was allegedly contracted during the term of his employment contract until the latter claimed for death benefits more than a year later. Thus, we give credence to private respondents’ claim that Dario was repatriated to the Philippines due to the completion of his employment contract and not on account of medical reason.
Assuming arguendo that Dario was repatriated for medical treatment as claimed by the petitioner, Section 20 B.3 of the POEA contract mandates that:
“3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
xxx
“For this purpose the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall resort in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.”
The above-quoted provision clearly provides that it is mandatory for a seaman to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination within three (3) working days from his arrival in the Philippines before his right to a claim for disability or death benefits can prosper.
The provision, however, admits of exception, i.e., when the seafarer is physically incapacitated to do so, but there must be a written notice to the agency within the same period for the seaman to be considered to have complied with the 3-day rule. The 3-day mandatory reporting requirement must be strictly observed since, within 3 days from repatriation, it would be fairly manageable for the physician to identify whether the disease of which the seaman died was contracted during the term of his employment or that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment[16].
In the case at bench, the petitioner’s evidence revealed that Dario had his physical examination only on December 15, 2011, which was months after his arrival in the Philippines on August 12, 2011. The other Clinical Abstract prepared by Dr. Theserie B. Evangelista was undated; hence, it could not be used as a basis for purposes of determining as to when a post-employment medical examination was undertaken by Dario. Clearly, Dario failed to comply with the required post-employment medical examination within 3 days from his arrival and there was no showing that he was physically incapacitated to do so to justify his non-compliance. Since the mandatory reporting is a requirement for a disability claim to prosper, Dario’s non-compliance thereto forfeits the petitioner’s right to claim the benefits as to grant the same would not be fair to the private respondents[17].
The petitioner further asseverates that, considering that Dario was declared fit to work prior to his embarkation on board the vessel, this circumstance would establish that he contracted the illness while still on board the vessel as it was quite impossible for him to have acquired the illness upon his arrival in the Philippines on August 12, 2011.
We are not persuaded by the said contentions of the petitioner.
The fact that Dario’s pre-employment medical examination showed that he was fit to work would not necessarily follow that his illness was acquired during his employment as a seaman. To reiterate, there was no showing of any medical complaint from him while still on board the vessel. He also did not comply with the mandatory post-employment medical examination within 3 days from arrival in the Philippines where the designated physician could have evaluated his medical condition. Dario’s failure to comply with the mandatory 3-day reporting requirement was not justified at all as there was no showing that he was physically incapacitated to do so.
The post-employment medical examination within 3 days from Dario’s arrival is required in order to ascertain his physical condition, since to ignore the rule would set a precedent with negative repercussions because it would open the floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits[18]. It would certainly be unfair to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant’s illness considering the passage of time[19]. In such a case, the employers would have no protection against unrelated disability claims[20].
Respecting the claim for moral and exemplary damages, the same cannot be granted, there being no concrete showing of bad faith or malice on the part of the private respondents.
Lastly, the petitioner assailed the deletion by the NLRC of the award of attorney’s fees in his favor. As a matter of sound policy, an award of attorney’s fee remains the exception rather than the rule. It must be stressed that it is necessary for the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in this case to make express findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the exception[21]. In the absence of a stipulation, attorney’s fees are ordinarily not recoverable, otherwise a premium shall be placed on the right to litigate[22]. Verily, there is no merit for the award of attorney’s fees in favor of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the petition filed in this case.
SO ORDERED.
Paredes[*] and Galapate-Laguilles,[**] JJ., concur.
[*] Acting Senior Member per Office Order No. 258-14-ABR dated June 2, 2014.
[**] Acting Junior Member per Office Order No. 258-14-ABR dated June 2, 2014.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-20.
[2] Ibid, pp. 22-28.
[3] Ibid, pp. 29-31.
[4] Ibid, pp. 56-57.
[5] Ibid, Seaman’s Employment Contract, p. 86.
[6] Ibid, p. 35.
[7] Ibid, p. 36.
[8] Ibid, p. 37.
[9] Ibid, pp. 38-39.
[10] Ibid, pp. 111-116.
[11] Ibid, pp. 22-27.
[12] Ibid, pp. 29-30.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc., et al. v. Salvador T. Serna, G.R. No. 172086, December 3, 2012, citing Abosta Shipmanagement Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission (First Division), G.R. No. 163252, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 505, 513-514.
[15] Crew and Ship Management International Inc. and Salena Inc. v. Jina T. Soria, G.R.No. 175491, December 10, 2012, citing Aya-ay, Sr. v. Arpaphil Shipping Corporation, 516 Phil. 628, 642, (2006), citing De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor v. National Labor Relations Commission, 364 Phil. 91, 102 (1999).
[16] Crew and Ship Management International Inc. and Salena Inc. v. Jina T. Soria, G.R.No. 175491, December 10, 2012.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Undag, G.R. No. 191491, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 670, 681.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] PAL vs. Miano, 242 SCRA 235 [1995]; Scott Consultants & Resource Development Corp. vs. CA 242 SCRA 393 [1995].
[22] DBP vs.CA, 262 SCRA 245 [1996], citing Mirasol vs. De la Cruz, 84 SCRA 337 and other cases.