BIENVENIDO E. DOLLENTE, RECURRENTE, CONTRA EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS, RECURRIDO.

El Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila condeno al acusado en cada
una de las siete causas a cuatro meses y un dia de arresto mayor y a
devolver a los denunciantes las cantidades que aparecen en la siguiente
tabla:

Causa Criminal No. 714 por P2,400 a Bonifacio Vistan
Causa Criminal No. 722 por P700 a Juan Camara
Causa Criminal No. 1189 por P1,450 a Nicanor Soriano
Causa Criminal No. 1516 por P1,000 a Domingo del Rosario
Causa Criminal No. 2464 por P1,000 a Maximino Pinpin
Causa Criminal No. 5050 por P1,400 a Maximo Picar
Causa Criminal No. 6078 por P2.750 a Arsenio Reyes

pero, despues de la condena y pendientes las causas en el Tribunal de
Apelacion, el acusado restituyo parte de estas cantidades. Dicho
Tribunal de Apelacion condeno al acusado en cada una de las siete causas
a un mes y un dia de arresto mayor a un ano y ocho meses de prision
correccional y a restituir a los denunciantes las siguientes cantidades:
P1,900 a Bonifacio Vistan, P650 a Nicanor Soriano, P500 a Domingo del
Rosario, P250 a Maximino Pinpin, P650 a Maximo Picar y P1,410 a Arsenio
Reyes. En la causa criminal No. 722 la cantidad entregada al acusado era
de P2,000 y no P700: se le condeno por el Tribunal de Apelacion a
restituir al denunciante P2,000.

En recurso de certiorari el recurrente pide la revision de la
decision del Tribunal de Apelacion, apuntando los siguientes errores:

“I. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the
transactions in question gave rise to civil but not criminal liability.

“II. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the remedy of
the aggrieved parties is against the corporation and not against the
petitioner whose personality is independent of that of the corporation.

“III. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the principal
stockholder of a duly registered corporation cannot be held responsible
for the act of misappropriation or conversion of said corporation in
the absence of a specific provision of law to that effect.

“IV. The Court of Appeals erred in not applying the 3-fold rule to
the penalties imposed on the accused.”

El recurrente sostiene que no ha cometido el delito de estafa porque
no recibio de los denunciantes las caritidades especificadas en la
tablo como Bienvenido E. Dollente, sino como Presidente y Administrador
General de B. E. Dollente & Co., Inc. La accion que tienen los
denunciantes, contiende el recurrente, es la rescision del contrato o el
complimiento del mismo—que es accion civil y no criminal—porque lo que
ha habido entre ellos y el acusado era la venta de jeeps con
pagos parciales a cuenta de sus precios.

Este Tribunal no revisa las pruebas; solamente decide si la ley ha
sido aplicada debidamente. Las conclusiones de hecho del Tribunal de
Apelacion son las siguientes:

“It appears that during the period from May, 1945, to June, 1946,
the appellant, a certified public accountant, was a major in the
Philippine Army on duty in the Finance Service as assistant auditor. On
January 31, 1946, he organized a private corporation for the purpose of
engaging in general merchandising, more particularly in the buying and
selling of surplus jeeps, under the name of B. E. Doliente
& Co., Inc., duly registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on March 6 of the same year and with offices at his own
residence at 116 Requesens St., Manila. The major portion of the P50,000
peso capital of the corporation, of which P10,000 was subscribed for,
and P2,500 paid up, was owned by the appellant and he was the President
and General Manager of the corporation.

“Soon after its incorporation, said company started advertising in
the local newspapers the sale of surplus jeeps assuring
special prices and priority to servicemen and war veterans. Numerous
customers flocked to its offices, among them appellant’s own
subordinates in the Finance Service of the Philippine Army. The evidence
discloses that cash deposits were required from and were made by
the prospective buyers. Upon the promise that the vehicle ordered
by them would be delivered in two or three weeks. Business was so brisk
that, in a short time, the cash deposits collected in this manner
reached the total amount of P272,848.21. Several purchasers,
among them the complainants in the cases before us, not only failed to
receive the promised vehicles but also to have all or part of
their deposits refunded, as promised. This gave rise to the cases under
consideration.

“Upon the main point at issue, the evidence of record clearly
shows that, because the corporation carried appellant’s name, because
its offices were located in his own residence, because he owned most of
the stock thereof and he was its President and General Manager, all
the prospective purchasers of jeeps, the herein complainants among
them dealt with the appellant direct and entrusted
their money directly to him.

“Upon the other hand, the record discloses that, at least in the
case of complainant Domingo R. Del Rosario (Crim. Case No. L-1518)1, the
appellant personally proposed in writing to refund his deposit. In
fact, appellant himself admitted in this connection that he had refunded
other deposits when he received his backpay and even went as far as to
ask his wife to sell all their personal properties “to clear my name
from this trouble.”

* * * * * * *

“* * * the informations filed allege and the prosecution evidence
clearly shows that he received the cash deposits made by the different
complainants in trust and under the express obligation on his part of
buying and delivering the vehicle or vehicles sought to be purchased by
the complainants or of returning the said money to the depositors if
unable to do so, within a period of time agreed upon In each case, it
having been proven likewise that notwithstanding repeated demands for
the refund of said deposits the appellant had failed to do so. * * *.
This appropriation and conversion has been conclusively established by
the eloquent fact that appellant was not able to refund the deposits
when demand therefore was made upon him. In this connection he was not
able to give any satisfactory explanation as to what had become of the
money of the complainants. If it was lost as a result of his business
transactions or if he used it to buy vehicles subsequently delivered to
others or to refund the deposits of other parties, then the employment
of complainants’ money for those purpose constitutes misappropriation
and conversion thereof in the absence of proof that appellant was duly
authorized to do so.”

De lo transcrito se ve que el acusado no recibio las cantidades
entregadas por los denunciantes como pago en una transaccion de venta de
jeep, sino como deposito, ni las recibio en su concepto de
Presidente y Administrador General de la B. E. Dollente & Co., Inc.,
sino personalmente. Si los denunciantes habian comprado ya los jeeps
con el dinero que habian entregado, entonces no hubiera dicho el
Trbunal de Apelacion que “the evidence discloses that cash deposits were
required from and were made by the prospective buyers.” Deposit
no es payment; el comprador no es “prospective buyer.” Si la
transaccion habida entre los denunciantes y el acusado era la venta de jeeps,
entonces el Tribunal de Apelacion no hubiera empleado las siguientes
palabras: “cash deposits” were required * * * from * * * the prospective
buyer.” Si el acusado actuaba en dichas transacciones como Presidente y
Administrador de la B. E. Dollente & Co., Inc., el Tribunal de
Apelacion hubiera expresado asi y no hubiera dicho que los denunciantes
“dealth with the appellant direct and entrusted their money directly to
him.” Si, como reclama el acusado, la transaccion habida entre el, como
Presidente de la B. E. Dollente & Co., Inc., y los denunciantes era
una venta de jeeps, entonces el no hubiera “personally proposed
in writing to refund their deposits.” Esta ultima actuacion del acusado
no es consecuente con su teoria de que habia vendido jeeps
como Presidente y Administrador General de la B. E. Dollente & Co.,
Inc. a los denunciantes.

No es aplicable a los siete asuntos la causa invocada por el acusado
de People vs. Ma Su, G. R. No. L-3872, en que este Tribunal
dijo: “En la transaccion habida entre el acusado y Lino Casabar no hay
tal fideicomiso. La cantidad de P1,600 que Lino Casabar entrego al
acusado es, segun la querella, ‘part payment’ del precio de un molino de
arroz. Se trataba de una venta con un pago parcial. El dinero en esta
venta del molino de arroz entregado por Lino Casabar, ya habia dejado de
ser propiedad de este; ya era de la propiedad del vendedor. No era un
deposito; era pago parcial. En virtud de este contrato, Casabar tenia
derecho a exigir del acusado la entrega del molino dentro del plazo
estipulado, pagando el saldo del importe no pagado aun. Si el acusado
dejaba de cumplir su obligation de entregar el molino, Casabar podia
pedir (a) la rescision del contrato o (b) el
cumplimiento del mismo; esto es, que se le devolviese por el acusado los
P1,600, pago parcial, o que se le condenase a entregar el molino. Lo
que procede es una accion civil y no una accion criminal.” En la causa
citada la cantidad de P1,600 era pago parcial (part payment) del precio
del molino; en las siete causas presentes las cantidades entregadas por
los denunciantes eran depositos para poder obtener jeeps, y no
pagos de los jeeps; no era entrega del precio del jeep por los
compradores, sino deposito en poder del acusado efectuado por los
“prospective buyers.”

El artilulo 315, parrafo 3(b), del Codigo Penal Revisado es
la disposicidn penal infringida. El acusado dispuso de las cantidades
que los siete denunciantes depositaron en su poder para ser utilizadas
como pago de los jeeps, pero el acusado ni entrego los jeeps
prometidos, ni devolvio los dedositos. El Tribunal de Apelacion no
incurrio en los tres primeros errores que se le atribuye porque el
acusado, segun dicho tribunal, fue el que dispuso de las cantidades
depositadas y no la corporacion B. E. Dollente & Co., Inc. El unico
responsable, por tanto, es el y no la corporacion.

El acusado contiende que erro el Tribunal de Apelacion al imponerle
la pena, en cada una de las siete causas, de un mes y un dia de arresto
mayor a un ano y ocho dias de prision correctional, con infraction del
articulo 70 del Codigo Penal Revisado. Esta bien fundada la contention
del acusado. Dicho articulo, tal como fue enmendado por la Ley No. 217,
dice, en parte, asi:

“Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the
maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall not be more than
threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable
shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the said
maximum period.”

Aplicando esa disposition, este Tribunal dijo:

En Pueblo contra Penas, 68 Phil., 533, “* * * if an
accused has to serve more than three sentences, he cannot be sentenced
to more than three times, the most severe penalty that may be imposed
upon him for the various crimes he might have committed.”

En People vs. Concepcion, 69 Phil., 58, supra, “* * *
‘the maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall not be more than
threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties imposed upon him.’* * *.”

En People vs. Conception, 68 Phil., 530, “* * * the
accused should not serve a penalty of imprisonment for more than
three-fold the length of time corresponding to the severest of the
penalties imposed upon him in all of said cases * * *.”

En Bagtas y Alejandrino contra Director de Prisones, 47 Off. Gaz.,
1743, “Under article 70 of the Revised Penal Code the maximum duration
of the convict’s sentence cannot exceed three-fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him, and
the application of this rule does not preclude his enjoyment of the
deduction from his sentence of 5 days for each month of good behavior as
provided in paragraph 1 of Article 97 of said Code.”

En Aspra vs. Director of Prisons,^[*]
47 Off. Gaz., 4610, se concedio el recurso de habeas corpus porque el
preso al tiempo de la presentacion de su solicitud ya habia sufrido
prision de mas del triple de la pena mas grave impuesta a el en las
varias causas.

Segun el Tribunal de Apelacion, no concurre ninguna circunstancia
modificativa; debe imponerse, por tanto, la pena en su grado medio.
Segun el articulo 315, parrafo 3.° del Codigo Penal Revisado en relacion
con la ley de pena indeterminada, en cualquiera de las siete causas, la
pena imponible es la de un afio y un dia, como minima, a un ano, ocho
meses y un dia de prision correccional con las accesorias, como maxima.
Triple de esta pena: tres años y tres dias a cinco años y tres dias.
Esta es la pena total que debe imponerse al acusado en las siete causas y
debe confirmarse la decision apelada en cuanto a la restitucion de las
cantidades estanadas.

Dictese sentencia a tenor de lo resuelto con costas.

Paras, Pres., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista
Angelo y Labrador, MM., estan conformes.

---

^[*] 85 Phil., 737