EVA V. CANTELANG, PEDRO ARIETA, RUBEN COLIAT, MR. ABONOWOG, TONY VIRAY, RUDY RAMEN, CLESTINO CANALE, CHAYONG DINOY, WILSON TANA, FRANCISCO MAGAHAS, ELPIDIO FRANCISCO, GAUDENCIO …

This is a “Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Mandatory Injunction and Restraining
Order” filed on July 14, 1979 by petitioner Eva V. Cantelang
and seventy eight (78) others against Hon. Rustico C.
Medina, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Taytay,
Rizal, Hillcrest Realty Corporation and the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal and his Deputies,^[1] to
declare “null and void the Decision^[2] of
the Respondent Court dated May 4, 1978 and the Orders of Execution and
Demolition,^[3] dated
September 14, 1978 and May 14, 1978″ (should be June 29, 1978 and
September 14, 1978, respectively).  Upon
the filing of the petition, petitioners paid P3,792.00 docket fee, P395.00
legal research fund fee, and P0.60 Clerk’s commission, or a total of
P4,287.50.

The next day or on June
15, 1973, petitioners followed up with an “Urgent Motion Reiterating
Petitioners’ Prayer For Immediate Issuance of Restraining Order With Motion To
Make Some Corrections in The Petition.”^[4]

An examination of the petition and its voluminous annexes reveals
the following antecedent facts and proceedings. 
Petitioners are the defendants in separate complaints for forcible entry and illegal detainer
filed on September 22, 1977 by private respondent Hillcrest Realty Corporation
(henceforth HILLCREST) with the Municipal Court of Taytay,
Rizal presided by respondent Judge.^[5] Petitioners,
defendants below, filed their respective answers alleging, inter alia that the subject land forms part of the
Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban Estate and “has long been possessed by Don
Engracio San Pedro, Legal Administrator of the Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban Estate, through his previous authorized representatives
and then by defendants herein as authorized by Mrs. Eva V. Cantelang
Asst. Regional Manager of the aforesaid Estate . . .” their possession
thereof being more than ten (10) years already.^[6] At the hearing on June 13, 1978, Atty. Vicente Revelo,
counsel for defendants below, manifested that he is inhibiting himself from
further participation in these cases in view of the filing by defendant Eva V. Cantelang in her behalf of an ex-parte
motion to consolidate the cases.^[7] Because of this manifestation and it
appearing that defendants were duly notified of the hearing, and considering
the vigorous objection of plaintiff’s counsel to further postponement, the
Municipal Court allowed the plaintiff “to present further evidence ex-parte, at the resumption of the hearing on the same day in
the afternoon of June 13, 1978.^[8] On June 27, 1978 after plaintiff had presented its evidence
and rested its case, the Municipal Court issued an order resetting the hearing
on July 18, 1978 in the
interest of justice and fairness, to give defendants, their day in court.^[9]
When the case was called for hearing on July
18, 1978, they did not appear despite due notice to them.  Atty. Revelo,
counsel for defendants, appeared but manifested that he was not in a position
to proceed with the trial for the same reason stated in his manifestation at
the hearing of June 13, 1978.  In view of this development the Municipal Court
issued an order – (1) considering defendants to have waived their right to
adduce evidence and (2) declaring the case submitted for decision.^[10]

On May 16, 1978 and August 4, 1978, the Municipal Court of Taytay rendered two separate judgments finding “that
plaintiff’s cause of action has been fully established by the requisite
preponderance of evidence which stands uncontradicted
in the records” and ordering all the defendants, “and all persons
under them” (1) to vacate and restore to the plaintiff HILLCREST – private
respondent herein – the premises
in question and (2) to pay plaintiff (a) attorney’s fees in the amount of P1,000.00 each; (b) reasonable
compensation for the use of the subject property
at the rate of P300.00 a month, beginning September, 1977 up to the restitution
of the premises in question; (c) actual and compensatory damages in the sum of
P15,000.00; and (d) costs of suit.^[11]

These decisions became
final and executory for failure of defendants below,
now petitioners, to appeal therefrom.  On June 29, 1978, an order of execution^[12] was issued followed by the issuance of the
corresponding writ of execution.  On September
14, 1978, the
municipal court issued an order of demolition.^[13] On May 14, 1979, Senior Deputy Sheriff Abelardo F. Magsajo served on petitioners
the “Notice of Demolition” directing them “to vacate, remove,
destroy and demolish the buildings and all appurtenances in the premises in
question and subject of the Order, within seven (7) days upon receipt hereof.^[14]

Instead of complying with
the aforesaid order of demolition, petitioners filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal which they amended on
January 7, 1979, against private respondent HILLCREST docketed as “Intestate Estate of the
late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, etc., et al.” seeking to:  (1) Declare null and void the certificates of
title of private respondent covering the subject properties; (2) Order the
Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal
to cancel certain Transfer of Certificates of Title of said respondent covering
the properties in question; (3) Declare plaintiff Estate legal
owners of the lands embraced in certain Original Certificates of Title in the
name of respondent corporation; (4) Declare plaintiff Estate and herein
petitioners – the alleged lot buyers – as legal owners of the lots in
controversy; (5) Order the Register of Deeds to issue Transfer
Certificates of Title in lieu of the ones sought to be cancelled and/or declared
null and void; and (6) Order private respondents to pay petitioners damages as
may be proved at the trial, plus attorney’s fees in
the amount of P20,000.00.^[15]

As the respondent Judge
refused to hold in abeyance the execution of its decisions aforementioned,
petitioners now come before Us and seek to – (a) restrain the respondent Judge
from taking cognizance of the cases for ejectment
(Civil Cases Nos. 519 to 597) and/or from taking any further action thereon; (b)
restrain respondents from harassing, molesting and disturbing petitioners in
their physical possession of subject premises; and (c) render judgment, after
due proceedings, declaring as null and void the decision of the Respondent
Judge dated August 4, 1978 and the Orders of Execution and Demolition dated
September 14, 1978 and May 14, 1979.^[16]

Petitioners – in
justifying the issuance of the writs prayed for – contend that the trial Court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in taking cognizance of the ejectment cases,
rendering judgment thereon, and issuing the writ of execution dated June 29,
1978, and the orders of demolition dated Sept. 14, 1978 and May 14, 1979,
respectively, allegedly because the correct remedy of respondent HILLCREST,
plaintiff below, was an action for recovery of possession and/or ownership in
the Court of First Instance (accion publiciana).

Petitioners’ contention
is without merit and is obviously resorted to solely as a dilatory
maneuver, to prevent or defeat the execution of the final and executory decision of the Municipal Court of Taytay, Rizal.

A.

1.  The separate complaints
for ejectment filed against petitioners (defendants
below) alleged that private respondent is the owner of the lots in question – its ownership being supported by the
corresponding Original Certificates of Title/Transfer Certificates of Title as against the mere claim of ownership of the controversial Estate of Don
Mariano San Pedro; that
petitioners forcibly entered the premises on different dates in 1977, through
holes in the fence which they made or over ladders which they constructed
against the fence; and that petitioners refused to vacate the premises despite
repeated demands, to demolish their improvements thereon and deliver the
premises to private respondent.  These allegations
conferred on the Municipal Court of Taytay
jurisdiction over the ejectment cases.  What is more, private respondent, HILLCREST,
submitted overwhelming evidence – documentary and the testimonies of its
administrator, security guards and other – to establish its ownership and actual physical possession of the lots in
question.

2.  On the other hand, petitioners did not appear at the
trial of these cases to prove their claims of ownership and actual occupation
of the subject premises for more than one year from the filing of the
cases.  What is worse, they did not
appeal from the adverse decision of the Municipal Court.  Instead, they filed in the CFI of Rizal an action to annul and cancel private respondent’s
Original and Transfer Certificates of Title in a desperate, albeit
futile, attempt to make it appear that the question of title and possession
over the lots in controversy is a genuine issue in the ejectment
cases and, to bolster their transparent pretence that the Municipal Court of Taytay is bereft of jurisdiction to take cognizance of said
ejectment cases. 
The Municipal Court of Taytay, however, was
not impressed by the move of petitioners. 
It was determined, as it should be, to enforce its final and executory decision. 
We are also unimpressed by the dilatory tactics of petitioners.  They had a chance to prove ownership of the
lots; they did not avail of that chance. 
When they received a copy of the adverse decision, they had a right to
appeal therefrom; but, again, they did not take
advantage of that recourse.

3.  At this stage, We cannot
lend support to the efforts of petitioners, through Counsel, by means of this
special civil action for certiorari, to annul the proceedings had in the
Court below, which were regular and valid, in every respect.  We rule once again that the office of certiorari
is limited to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely; it
cannot be used for any other purpose, – much less to defeat the right of the
prevailing party to the execution of a valid and final judgment.^[17]
Stated otherwise, the remedy of certiorari is available only when a
court in the exercise of its judicial functions, has acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no
remedy by appeal.^[18]
Where a court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person, its
decision of any question pertaining to the cause, however erroneous, cannot be
corrected by certiorari.^[19]

In the present case,
petitioners failed to avail of the adequate remedies in the ordinary
course of law.  They did not timely file
a motion for reconsideration or new trial under Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of
Court.  They failed to file a petiton for relief from judgment under Rule 38.  Neither did they appeal, in either case, from
the judgment and from the order denying new trial or relief from the judgment. 
Furthermore, the questions raised by petitioners, thru counsel, such as
the issue of ownership and the issue of possession for “more than one (1)
year prior to the filing of the complaints for ejectment
and even the correctness of the judgment of the Municipal Court, relate to
errors of law which should be taken up in an appeal and do not involve
jurisdictional errors which may properly be raised and corrected
by certiorari.  It is settled
dogma that where appeal as an adequate remedy has been lost through
petitioner’s fault or negligence, he will not be permitted to avail
of certiorari as a substitute for an appeal.^[20]

As petitioners, thru
counsel, miserably failed to show that respondent Judge acted in the premises
without jurisdiction or in excess thereof, or with grave abuse of discretion
that would render the challenged judgment null and void ab
initio, the present petition must be dismissed.

B.

A word to counsel.  As an officer of the Court it was counsel’s
duty to advise his clients, petitioners herein, of the real merits of
their cause or the lack of it.  Had he
done so, petitioners could have realized the futility of filing this petition,
and spared them the need to spend their hard-earned money by way of court fees
in the total amount of P4,287.50,^[21]
for a hopeless recourse.  For as adverted
to above, the facts – (1) that respondent municipal court of Taytay had jurisdiction over the cases for forcible entry
and detainer; (2) that notice to counsel of record,
Atty. Vicente Revelo, was notice to petitioners, now
his clients, in the proceedings below; (3) that the proper remedies of his clients as defendants against
the adverse judgments below were either appeal and/or a motion for new trial
and/or petition for relief from judgment whichever was proper; (4) that certiorari is a
special remedy which cannot be a substitute for any of the foregoing recourses;
(5) that the judgment of the municipal court of Taytay
became final and executory in 1977, and, finally, (6)
that the filing of the action with the CFI, Rizal, to
annul the Certificates of Title of respondent HILLCREST did not justify the
holding in abeyance of the proceedings on execution in the municipal court – are
legal propositions too plain to be missed by any practitioner concerned with
the prompt administration of justice and mindful of his client’s welfare and
interest.  More importantly, it would
have spared this Court the trouble and efforts of resolving a manifestly
unmeritorious, if not sham, petition. 
Counsel by filing this petition did so in utter disregard of his duty to
his clients as well as his obligation to this Court.

But on par with the duties of counsel to the courts and to his
clients is his responsibility to society as a whole – the social dimension of
the law profession.  For it is the duty
of counsel to promote and enhance instead of defeat and frustrate the
objectives and policies of the society in which he lives.  An aspect of the social responsibility is
very clearly the lawyers’ duty to promote the public policy with respect to
squatting, which are, firstly, to prevent the same and punish those guilty
thereof as legislation and Presidential Directives provide,^[22]
and where actually done, to relocate, even at substantial outlay of public
funds, squatter families to settlements,
e.g., Bahay Pare, Dasmariñas,
etc.  This Court, in recognition of the
public policy, thru Justice Conrado Sanchez, in 1967
spoke in no uncertain terms against the evils of squatting.^[23]

“Since the last global war, squatting on another’s property in
this country has become a widespread vice. 
It was and is a blight. 
Squatters’ areas pose problems of health, sanitation.  They are breeding places for crime.  They constitute proof that respect for the
law and the rights of others, even those of government, are being flouted.  Knowingly, squatters have embarked on the
pernicious act of occupying property whenever and wherever convenient to their
interest – without as much as leave, and even against the will, of the
owner.  They are emboldened seemingly
because of their belief that they could violate the law with impunity.  The pugnaciousness
of some of them has tied up the hands of legitimate owners.  The latter are thus prevented from recovering
possession by peaceful means.  Government
lands have not been spared by them.  They know of course, that intrusion into
property, government or private, is wrong. 
But, then, the mills of justice grind slow, mainly
because lawyers who, by means, fair or foul, are quite often successful in procuring delay of the day of reckoning…”

This
action, therefore, on the part of counsel which will tend to encourage or give
comfort to, instead of frustrate or discourage squatting, is clearly against
public policy and is a great disservice to the legal profession.

This is an opportune
occasion as any, there­fore, to remind
counsel that this Court will
ever be vigilant to nip in the bud any dilatory manueuver
calculated to defeat and frustrate the ends of justice, fair play and the
prompt implementation of final and executory
judgments.

WHEREFORE, petition is DISMISSED.  Costs charged to Counsel Atty. FERNANDO V.
DOMINGO who should reimburse the same to his clients, petitioners herein.  Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished
each petitioner.

Barredo, (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino, and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., would charge double costs to counsel and make him
report to US that he has paid the same to the petitioners.

^[1]
Roll, pp. 2-21, and Annexes A to G, Roll, pp. 22-355.

^[2]
ANNEX “C”, Roll, pp. 33-54.

^[3]
ANNEX “D”, Roll, pp. 55-56.

^[4]
Roll, p. 356.

^[5]
Id., pp. 8-9.

^[6]
Roll, pp. 28-32.

^[7]
Id., pp. 42-43.

^[8]
Id., p. 43.

^[9]
Id., p. 53.

^[10]
Id., p. 54.

^[11]
Roll, pp. 33, 54.

^[12]
Id., p. 10.

^[13]
Id., pp. 55-56.

^[14]
Roll, p. 57.

^[15]
Roll, pp. 59, 65-66.

^[16]
Id., pp. 2, 20-21.

^[17]
Cf. Herrera vs. Barretto and Joaquin, 25 Phil.
24.

^[18]
Regala vs. Court of First Instance of Bataan, 77 Phil. 684.

^[19]
Herrera v. Barretto, supra.

^[20]
Guevarra vs. Hermoso,
et al., L-28241, Aug. 6, 1971,
40 SCRA 335, 339.

^[21]
Broken down as follows:  P3,792.00 docket
fee, P395.00 legal research fund fees, P100.00 sheriff’s fee, and P0.50 clerk’s commission.

^[22]
See:  P.D. No. 296 (which directs all
persons, natural or juridical, to renounce possession and, move out of portions
of rivers, creeks, esteros, drainage channels and
other similar waterways encroached upon by them and pres­cribes penalty for
violation thereof) and P.D. No. 772 (which penalizes squatting and other
similar acts).

^[23]
City of Manila v. Garcia, et al., Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 413, quoted in Pascual v. Hon. De los
Angeles, G.R. No. L-27914, July 31,
1978, 84 SCRA 310.